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Abstract 
Petroleum Transportation Systems (PTSs) have a significant impact on the flow of 
crude oil within a Petroleum Supply Chain (PSC), due to the great demand on this 
natural product. Such systems are used for safe movement of crude and/or refined 
products from starting points (i.e. production sites or storage tanks), to their final 
destinations, via land or sea transportation. PTSs are vulnerable to several risks because 
they often operate in a dynamic environment. Due to this environment, many potential 
risks and uncertainties are involved. Not only having a direct effect on the product flow 
within PSC, PTSs accidents could also have severe consequences for the humans, 
businesses, and the environment. Therefore, safe operations of the key systems such as 
port, ship and pipeline, are vital for the success of PTSs.  
This research introduces an advanced approach to ensure safety of PTSs. This research 
proposes multiple network analysis, risk assessment, uncertainties treatment and 
decision making techniques for dealing with potential hazards and operational issues 
that are happening within the marine ports, ships, or pipeline transportation segments 
within one complete system. The main phases of the developed framework are 
formulated in six steps. In the first phase of the research, the hazards in PTSs operations 
that can lead to a crude oil spill are identified through conducting  an extensive review 
of literature and experts’ knowledge. In the second phase, a Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian 
Reasoning (FRBBR) and Hugin software are applied in the new context of PTSs to 
assess and prioritise the local PTSs failures as one complete system. The third phase 
uses Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) in order to determine the weight of PTSs local 
factors. In the fourth phase, network analysis approach is used to measure the 
importance of petroleum ports, ships and pipelines systems globally within Petroleum 
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Transportation Networks (PTNs). This approach can help decision makers to measure 
and detect the critical nodes (ports and transportation routes) within PTNs. The fifth 
phase uses an Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach and Intelligence Decision System 
(IDS) software, to assess hazards influencing on PTSs as one complete system. This 
research developed an advance risk-based framework applied ER approach due to its 
ability to combine the local/internal and global/external risk analysis results of the 
PTSs. To complete the cycle of this study, the best mitigating strategies are introduced 
and evaluated by incorporating VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno 
Resenje (VIKOR) and AHP to rank the risk control options. The novelty of this 
framework provides decision makers with realistic and flexible results to ensure 
efficient and safe operations for PTSs. 
  
 
iv 
Abbreviations 
AAR  Association of American Railroads 
ABS  American Bureau Shipping 
AHP  Analytic Hierarchy Process  
API  American Petroleum Institute 
BBNs  Bayesian Belief Networks 
BCA  Benefit-Cost Analysis 
BDE  Banxia Decision Explorer 
BN  Bayesian Network 
BP  British Petroleum 
BR  Bayesian Reasoning 
C  Consequence 
CBA  Cost-Benefit Analysis 
CP  Compromise Programming 
CPD  Conditional Probability Distribution 
DAG  Directed Acyclic Graph 
DoBs  Degrees of Belief 
Dp  Probability risk event cannot be detected before it occur 
EC  Expert Choice 
EIA  U.S. Energy Information Administration 
EMSA  European Maritime Safety Agency 
ER  Evidential Reasoning  
ETA  Event Tree Analysis 
FMEA  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FMECA  Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis 
 
v 
FRB  Fuzzy Rule-Based 
FRBBR Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning 
FRBN  Fuzzy Rule Based Bayesian Network 
FRBR  Fuzzy Rule Based Bayesian Reasoning 
FSA  Formal Safety Assessment 
FST  Fuzzy Sets Theory 
FTA  Fault Tree Analysis 
FuRBaR Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning 
H  Hazards 
HASAW Health and Safety at Work Act 
HAZID Hazard Identification 
HSE  Health, Safety and Environment 
IDS  Intelligent Decision System 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
IMO  International Maritime Organisation 
ISGOTT International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals 
ISPS  International Ship and Port Facility Security 
ITOPF  International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited 
L  Likelihood 
LD  Logical Decisions 
MADA Multi Attribute Decision Analysis 
MADM Multi Attribute Decision Making 
MCDM Multi Criteria Decision Making 
MHIDAS Major Hazard Incident Data Service 
MPA  Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore 
 
vi 
MPTNs Maritime Petroleum Transportation Network 
NIS   Negative Ideal Solution  
SAW  Simple Additive Weighting 
Sc  Consequence Severity 
SNA  Social Network Analysis 
SMS  Safety Management System 
OCIMF Marine terminal baseline criteria and assessment questionnaire 
OPA  Oil and Pipelines Agency 
OPEC  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
QRA  Quantitative Risk Assessment 
P  Probability 
Paris MOU Paris Memorandum of Understanding 
PERSGA Program for the Environment of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 
PIS  Positive Ideal Solution 
PHA  Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
Pl  Occurrence Probability  
PSC  Petroleum Supply Chan 
PTNs  Petroleum Transportation Networks 
PTSs  Petroleum Transportation Systems 
R  Risk 
RPN  Risk Priority Number 
RSSB  Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited 
SOLAS Safety of Life at sea 
TOPSIS Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution 
 
vii 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
VIKOR VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje Method 
 
 
viii 
Table of Contents  
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... i 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... ii 
Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. iv 
1 Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Summary ............................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Research Background ........................................................................................ 1 
1.3 Aim of the Investigation .................................................................................... 4 
1.4 Thesis Outline .................................................................................................... 6 
1.5 Research Justification ........................................................................................ 8 
1.6 Research Contributions ...................................................................................... 9 
1.7 Research Scope .................................................................................................. 9 
2 Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................... 11 
2.1 Summary .......................................................................................................... 11 
2.2 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 11 
2.3 Overview of Petroleum Transport ................................................................... 13 
2.4 Petroleum Transportation Systems Operations ................................................ 18 
2.5 Petroleum Transportation Systems Operations Accidents ............................... 26 
2.6 Risk Assessment of PTSs................................................................................. 29 
2.7 Existing Risk Assessment Methodology for Petroleum Transportation Systems 
 .......................................................................................................................... 33 
2.7.1 Hazard Identification (HAZID) Phase ......................................................... 34 
2.7.2 Risk Evaluation Phase.................................................................................. 36 
2.7.3 Risk Mitigation Phase .................................................................................. 44 
2.8 Existing Hazards in Petroleum Transportation System ................................... 47 
2.8.1 Petroleum Port ............................................................................................. 48 
2.8.2 Tanker Transportation .................................................................................. 53 
2.8.3 Pipeline Transportation ................................................................................ 60 
2.9 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 63 
3 Chapter 3: Analysing Safety Critical Points within MPTNs using Centrality 
Measures ..................................................................................................................... 65 
3.1 Summary .......................................................................................................... 65 
3.2 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 65 
3.3 Centrality Measures ......................................................................................... 67 
3.3.1 Degree Centrality ......................................................................................... 70 
3.3.2 Betweenness Centrality ................................................................................ 71 
3.4 Network Analysis Software ............................................................................. 72 
3.4.1 NetDraw ....................................................................................................... 72 
3.4.2 R-Software ................................................................................................... 73 
3.5 Methodology .................................................................................................... 74 
3.5.1 MPTNs Development .................................................................................. 75 
 
ix 
3.5.2 Data Collection ............................................................................................ 76 
3.5.3 Evaluation Process ....................................................................................... 76 
3.5.4 Degree Centrality ......................................................................................... 77 
3.5.5 Betweenness Centrality ................................................................................ 80 
3.6 Case Study and Results Analysis ..................................................................... 83 
3.6.1 MPTN Development and Data Collection ................................................... 84 
3.6.2 Evaluation Process ....................................................................................... 87 
3.7 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 97 
4 Chapter 4: A New Quantitative Hybrid Fuzzy Rule Based Bayesian 
Reasoning for PTSs Operations .............................................................................. 100 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 100 
4.2 Background of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis ..................................... 102 
4.2.1 Drawbacks of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis ................................... 104 
4.2.2 Fuzzy Failure Modes and Effects Analysis ............................................... 105 
4.3 Background of the Bayesian Network Method .............................................. 109 
4.3.1 Definition and Characteristics of Bayesian Network................................. 111 
4.3.2 HUGIN Expert Software............................................................................ 113 
4.4 Methodology .................................................................................................. 114 
4.4.1 Step I: Identify the PTSs Hazards .............................................................. 115 
4.4.2 Step II: Establish an FRB with Belief Structure in FMEA ........................ 119 
4.4.3 Step III: Develop a BN Model ................................................................... 122 
4.4.4 Step IV: Aggregate the Rules by using a BN ............................................ 123 
4.4.5 Step V: Prioritise the PTSs Hazards .......................................................... 125 
4.4.6 Step VI: Sensitivity Analysis ..................................................................... 126 
4.5 Case Study and Results Analysis ................................................................... 126 
4.5.1 Identification of the PTSs Hazards ............................................................ 126 
4.5.2 Application of FRB Approach with Belief Structure in FMEA ................ 129 
4.5.3 BN Model Development ............................................................................ 135 
4.5.4 Application of the BN to Aggregate the Rules .......................................... 135 
4.5.5 Prioritisation of the Failure Factors ........................................................... 139 
4.5.6 Sensitivity Analysis ................................................................................... 142 
4.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 145 
5 Chapter 5: An Advanced Risk Assessment Framework for PTNs using 
Evidential Reasoning Approach ............................................................................. 147 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 147 
5.2 Evidential Reasoning (ER) Background and Approach ................................ 148 
5.2.1 Intelligent Decision System Software ........................................................ 151 
5.3 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) Background and Approach ................. 152 
5.4 Methodology .................................................................................................. 155 
5.4.1 Step I: Identifying the Hazards within the Petroleum Transportation 
Network and Presenting them in a Hierarchical Structure ..................................... 157 
5.4.2 Step II: Applying the Analytical Hierarchy Process Method to Determine 
the Weight of the Hierarchical Criteria .................................................................. 158 
 
x 
5.4.3 Step III: Applying Established Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning to 
Measure the Internal Operational Risks ................................................................. 161 
5.4.4 Step IV: Applying the Evidential Reasoning Approach to Aggregate the 
Assessment Risks ................................................................................................... 162 
5.4.5 Step V: Applying Network Analysis Technique to Determine the Weight of 
the Ports and Transportation Modes within the Petroleum Transportation Network .. 
 .................................................................................................................... 165 
5.4.6 Step VI: Aggregation of Internal and External Analysis through Evidential 
Reasoning Approach .............................................................................................. 165 
5.4.7 Step VII: Obtaining a Crisp Number for the Petroleum Transportation 
Network by using a Utility Approach .................................................................... 166 
5.4.8 Step VIII: Sensitivity Analysis .................................................................. 166 
5.5 Case Study and Results Analysis ................................................................... 167 
5.5.1 Hazard Hierarchy Development ................................................................ 167 
5.5.2 Application of Analytical Hierarchy Process ............................................ 168 
5.5.3 Application of Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning ............................ 173 
5.5.4 Aggregation of Risks through Evidential Reasoning Approach ................ 176 
5.5.5 Application of Network Analysis .............................................................. 181 
5.5.6 Aggregation of Internal and External Analysis through Evidential 
Reasoning Approach .............................................................................................. 182 
5.5.7 Application of Utility Approach ................................................................ 183 
5.5.8 Sensitivity Analysis ................................................................................... 184 
5.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 186 
6 Chapter 6: Developing a Risk Based Decision Making Modelling to Enhance 
Safety in PTSs Operations ...................................................................................... 189 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 189 
6.2 VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje Background and 
Review ....................................................................................................................... 191 
6.3 Risk Mitigation .............................................................................................. 194 
6.4 Methodology .................................................................................................. 196 
6.4.1 Step 1: Identify the Goal ............................................................................ 197 
6.4.2 Step 2: Identification of the Possible Criteria and Alternatives for Mitigating 
the Risk .................................................................................................................. 198 
6.4.3 Step 3: Model Development ...................................................................... 198 
6.4.4 Step 4: Identification of the Best Alternative by using VIKOR ................ 198 
6.4.5 Step 5: Sensitivity Analysis ....................................................................... 202 
6.5 Case Study and Results Analysis ................................................................... 202 
6.5.1 Identification of the Goal ........................................................................... 202 
6.5.2 Identification of Possible Criteria and Alternatives for Mitigating the Risk ... 
 .................................................................................................................... 203 
6.5.3 Model Development................................................................................... 206 
6.5.4 Identification of the Best Alternative by using VIKOR ............................ 207 
6.5.5 Sensitivity Analysis ................................................................................... 214 
 
xi 
6.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 216 
7 Chapter 7: Discussion ...................................................................................... 218 
7.1 Research Implication ..................................................................................... 218 
7.1.1 Discussion of Applying Network Analysis Techniques for Analysing 
Nodes’ Vulnerability within Petroleum Transportation Systems (PTSs) .............. 218 
7.1.2 Discussion of an Advanced Risk Assessment Approach for Petroleum 
Transportation using Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning .............................. 221 
7.1.3 Discussion of An Advanced Risk Assessment Framework for PTNs using 
Evidential Reasoning Approach ............................................................................ 224 
7.1.4 Discussion of Developing a Risk Based Decision Making Modelling Tool to 
Enhance Safety in PTSs Operation ........................................................................ 227 
7.2 Research Contribution ................................................................................... 229 
7.3 Research Limitations ..................................................................................... 231 
7.4 Recommendations for Future Work............................................................... 231 
References ................................................................................................................. 234 
List of Appendix ....................................................................................................... 272 
Appendix Chapter 3 ................................................................................................... 273 
Questionnaire used for the purpose of Chapter 4....................................................... 287 
Appendix Chapter 4 ................................................................................................... 294 
Questionnaire used for the purpose of Chapter 5....................................................... 306 
Appendix Chapter 5 ................................................................................................... 312 
Questionnaire used for the purpose of Chapter 6....................................................... 346 
 
  
 
xii 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1: Historical petroleum port accidents ............................................................ 27 
Table 2.2: Historical pipeline transportation system accidents ................................... 28 
Table 2.3: Historical ship transportation system accidents .......................................... 28 
Table 2.4: Summary of human-related hazards that affect terminal operation within 
PTSs ............................................................................................................................. 50 
Table 2.5: Summary of machinery-related hazards that affect terminal operation 
within PTSs .................................................................................................................. 52 
Table 2.6: Summary of nature-related hazards that affect terminal operation within 
PTSs ............................................................................................................................. 53 
Table 2.7: Summary of collision hazards that affect ship operations within PTSs ..... 55 
Table 2.8: Summary of grounding hazards that affect ship operations within PTSs ... 56 
Table 2.9: Summary of hull failure hazards that affect ship operation within PTSs ... 58 
Table 2.10: Summary of equipment failure hazards that affect ship operations within 
PTSs ............................................................................................................................. 59 
Table 2.11: Summary of fires/explosions hazards that affect ship operations within 
PTSs ............................................................................................................................. 60 
Table 2.12: Summary of internal failure hazards that affect pipeline operations within 
PTSs ............................................................................................................................. 62 
Table 2.13: Summary of external failure hazards that affect pipeline operations within 
PTSs ............................................................................................................................. 63 
Table 3.1: Degree centrality when different values are used for α. ............................. 79 
Table 3.2: Lengths of paths when defined by binary and weight as well as when 
different values of α are used ....................................................................................... 83 
Table 3.3: Conversion factors for crude oil adopted from OPEC’s annual statistical in 
2014 (OPEC, 2014a) .................................................................................................... 86 
Table 3.4: Out-degree centrality scores sample with different values of tuning 
parameter...................................................................................................................... 89 
Table 3.5: In-degree centrality scores sample with different values of tuning 
parameter...................................................................................................................... 89 
Table 3.6: Betweenness centrality scores sample with different values of tuning 
parameter...................................................................................................................... 92 
Table 3.7: Out-degree centrality scores sample with different values of tuning 
parameter...................................................................................................................... 94 
Table 3.8: In-degree centrality scores sample with different values of tuning 
parameter...................................................................................................................... 94 
Table 3.9: Betweenness centrality scores sample with different values of tuning 
parameter...................................................................................................................... 96 
Table 4.1: Linguistic grades for the likelihood parameter for each hazard in the IF part
.................................................................................................................................... 120 
Table 4.2: Linguistic grades for the consequence parameter for each hazard in the IF 
part ............................................................................................................................. 120 
 
xiii 
Table 4.3: Linguistic grades for the probability parameter for each hazard in the IF 
part ............................................................................................................................. 121 
Table 4.4: The established IF-THEN rules with belief structure for PTSs risk 
evaluation ................................................................................................................... 123 
Table 4.5: Hazards associated with the operation of each system within PTSs ........ 127 
Table 4.6: PTSs experts’ experience .......................................................................... 131 
Table 4.7: Prior Probability of Pl, Sc and Dp when evaluating the MRHAA ............. 132 
Table 4.8: Prior Probability of Pl, Sc and Dp for the petroleum port hazards ............ 133 
Table 4.9: The steps for calculating the utility value of MRHAA............................. 139 
Table 4.10: Analysis values of the 42 hazards by HUGIN software ......................... 140 
Table 4.11: Utility Value of the most significant hazards in each operational system 
within the PTSs .......................................................................................................... 142 
Table 5.1: The ratio scale for the pairwise comparison ............................................. 159 
Table 5.2: Random Index (RI) values (Saaty, 2013) ................................................. 161 
Table 5.3: Pairwise comparison matrix for the main criteria ..................................... 169 
Table 5.4: The performance ratio of each criterion ................................................... 170 
Table 5.5: The weight value of each criterion ........................................................... 170 
Table 5.6: The calculation results .............................................................................. 171 
Table 5.7: Weight of port operation criteria in each level ......................................... 171 
Table 5.8: Prior probability of Pl, Sc and Dp for petroleum port B hazards ............... 174 
Table 5.9: Analysis of petroleum port B hazards by HUGIN software ..................... 175 
Table 5.10: The individual degree values of MRHDA and MRHDB ....................... 177 
Table 5.11: Internal evaluation of the petroleum ports hazards by IDS software ..... 180 
Table 5.12: Normalised values of the external evaluation of the local PTN ............. 182 
Table 5.13: The degree of belief of the PTN ............................................................. 182 
Table 5.14: The steps for calculating the utility value of PTS................................... 184 
Table 5.15: Sensitivity analysis of all lowest-level criteria while decreasing highest 
preference linguistic variable by 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 ..................................................... 185 
Table 6.1: List of criteria with an explanation of each one ....................................... 204 
Table 6.2: List of alternatives with an explanation of each one ................................ 204 
Table 6.3: Rating scale for benefit criteria ................................................................. 208 
Table 6.4: VIKOR decision matrix ............................................................................ 208 
Table 6.5: Normalisation of the VIKOR decision matrix .......................................... 209 
Table 6.6: AHP Weight of cost criteria ..................................................................... 210 
Table 6.7: Maximum criterion function and minimum criterion function values ..... 211 
Table 6.8: The criterion function with respect to each alternative ............................ 211 
Table 6.9: The utility measure values ........................................................................ 212 
Table 6.10: The regret measure values ...................................................................... 212 
Table 6.11: VIKOR index values ............................................................................... 213 
Table 6.12: Sensitivity analysis of all alternatives after increasing the weight of each 
criterion by 0.2 ........................................................................................................... 215 
 
  
 
xiv 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Risk management framework for PTSs operation ...................................... 5 
Figure 1.2: Thesis outline .............................................................................................. 6 
Figure 1.3: Research scope .......................................................................................... 10 
Figure 2.1: Main hierarchical structure if the risk in Petroleum Transportation 
Systems (PTSs) ............................................................................................................ 48 
Figure 3.1: The MPTNs assessment model flow chart ................................................ 75 
Figure 3.2: A network sample ...................................................................................... 76 
Figure 3.3: A network with seven ports and seven weighted throughputs .................. 78 
Figure 3.4: A network with three weighted paths between ports A and B .................. 82 
Figure 3.5: Sample network ports and their throughputs in 2013 (million barrels) .... 85 
Figure 3.6: Visualisation of ports through using NetDraw software ........................... 87 
Figure 3.7: Correlations between throughputs and degree centrality when β=1 ......... 90 
Figure 3.8: Correlations between throughputs and degree centrality when β=0 ......... 91 
Figure 3.9: Correlations between throughputs and betweenness centrality ................. 92 
Figure 3.10: Visualisation of ports through using NetDraw software ......................... 93 
Figure 3.11: Correlations between throughputs and degree centrality when β=1 ....... 95 
Figure 3.12: Correlations between throughputs and degree centrality when β=0 ....... 96 
Figure 3.13: Correlations between throughputs and betweenness centrality ............... 97 
Figure 4.1: A BN sample ........................................................................................... 112 
Figure 4.2: Conditional and unconditional probabilities of Figure 4.1...................... 113 
Figure 4.3: The PTSs operational hazards assessment model flow chart .................. 114 
Figure 4.4: Hierarchical structure of hazards associated with the operation of 
petroleum terminals ................................................................................................... 117 
Figure 4.5: Hierarchical structure of hazards associated with the ship transportation 
operation .................................................................................................................... 118 
Figure 4.6: Hierarchical structure of hazards associated with the pipeline operation119 
Figure 4.7: BN model of the MRHAA hazard ........................................................... 136 
Figure 4.8: The analysis of MRHAA by HUGIN software ....................................... 138 
Figure 4.9: Utility Value of the 42 petroleum port hazards ....................................... 142 
Figure 4.10: The analysis of MRHAA by HUGIN software given the evidence for 
node “𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ = 100%" .................................................................. 143 
Figure 4.11: The analysis of MRHAA by HUGIN software given the evidence for 
node “𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ = 100%” and “𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ = 100%”
.................................................................................................................................... 144 
Figure 4.12: The sensitivity analysis of the 42 hazards ............................................. 145 
Figure 5.1: The hierarchical structure of AHP (Source: Tzeng and Huang, 2011) ... 154 
Figure 5.2: The PTSs assessment methodology structure ......................................... 156 
Figure 5.3: Main hieratical structure of the risk in Petroleum Transportation Networks 
(PTNs) ........................................................................................................................ 157 
Figure 5.4: The degree of belief of the PTN by IDS software ................................... 183 
Figure 5.5: Sensitivity analysis output ....................................................................... 186 
 
xv 
Figure 6.1: The hierarchical structure of the AHP-VIKOR for safety improvement of 
the hazards ................................................................................................................. 195 
Figure 6.2: The risk-control assessment model flow chart ........................................ 196 
Figure 6.3: The hierarchical structure for mitigating the hazard of procedural failure 
during ship/port interference ...................................................................................... 207 
Figure 6.4: Sensitivity analysis output ....................................................................... 215 
 
  
1 
1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Summary 
This chapter contains the background of the research and an explanation of the 
principal research objective and sub-objectives which have been developed through a 
broad and comprehensive literature survey. The justification of the research study is 
also addressed in order to identify the importance of this study according to the 
industrial needs. A number of techniques and methods are highlighted in brief for 
consideration. Finally, the structure and scope of this research is outlined.  
1.2 Research Background 
Over the years, crude oil became one of the most important natural resources in almost 
every nation. This importance came from its impact on global, national, and local 
economies. Accordingly, the petroleum industry is one of the most popular and critical 
businesses. Year after year, the demand on this natural resource is continually 
increasing. Therefore, a safe transportation system for petroleum is essential in order to 
ensure the safe flow of this strategic resource. 
The main purpose of any transportation system is to ensure the movement of people or 
cargo from point A to point B, within a business supply chain. In the petroleum 
industry, the transportation system connects the producers of the product to the final 
customers. The high demand for crude oil ensures the continuous need for Petroleum 
Transportation Systems (PTSs) (e.g. ports, ships, and pipelines). PTSs arrangements 
are characterised by huge infrastructures, which comprise sensitive and complex 
operations and time schedules, and expensive machinery. Due to the dynamic 
environment of PTSs, many potential risks and uncertainties are involved. 
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An operational accident within a transportation system leads not only to product loss 
but also to severe environmental, equipment, and human damage. Recovering from 
these losses may cost a business millions of dollars. For instance, in 2007, a major oil 
spill occurred near the Daesan port in South Korea due to a ship collision, in which a 
ship’s hull was punctured. The consequences of the Hebei Spirit accident included 
damage to the ship and massive environmental damage due to the 11,000 tonnes of oil 
spilled (Kim et al., 2010). In another incident, a cost of 750 million US dollars was 
estimated for the losses that followed a ship colliding in the North Sea in Norway 
(MARSH, 2014). In 2013, a major explosion occurred in an offshore terminal close to 
Brazil. This incident had negative consequences on both human and properties (250 
million US dollars was estimated for property damages) (MARSH, 2016). In 
Vishakhapatnam, India, 37 people died and 100 were injured when 15 storage tanks of 
liquefied petroleum gas ignited during a ship’s offloading operations (Chang and Lin, 
2006; Clark et al., 2001). Other disastrous accidents can be found in the 23rd and 24th 
edition of MARSH (1974 - 2013) and (1974 - 2015), ITOPF (2016) and (2017), and 
CONCAWE statistical reports. 
These accidents have generated concern about the safety of existing PTSs. Notable 
organisations in the petroleum transportation industry strive to address historical 
accidents by establishing and continuously improving safety regulations. Those 
organisations include the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the Program for 
the Environment of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (PERSGA), the Paris Memorandum 
of Understanding (Paris MOU), the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS), the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Oil and Pipelines Agency (OPA), 
and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). These 
regulations aim to enhance the safety of the petroleum transportation operation within 
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Petroleum Transportation Networks (PTNs) by controlling and minimising risks within 
each system. Nevertheless, even with all these rules and regulations, accidents continue 
to occur. When an accident occurs, a system cannot implement its desired functions, 
hence causing a failure in PTSs (Baublys, 2007). Therefore, the safety of PTSs should 
be assessed and managed by the International Maritime Organization’s Formal Safety 
Assessment (FSA) as one complete system. Risk assessment of petroleum port, ship 
and pipeline operations is a central route in maintaining the petroleum transportation 
industry’s safe operations at operational platforms. 
This research investigates the uncertainties of petroleum transportation operations. The 
research attempts to develop a novel approach that directly influences operational risks, 
as it enables petroleum supply chain operators to monitor, mitigate, and control the 
impact and consequences of those risks. Important questions considered in this research 
include the following: Will the implemented research framework and models affect the 
operations in petroleum port, ship and pipeline systems? What are the hazards and risks 
involved in petroleum transportation operations? How might the proposed novel risk 
models benefit PTSs operations? How do we implement the proposed research 
framework and models in case studies?  
In summary, within this research, first the existing problems in the petroleum port, ship 
and pipeline systems operations are investigated and critically reviewed, and the major 
hazards are identified. Second, the research’s framework aimed at developing a 
preferred approach for PTSs operations is presented. Third, the research applies the 
following mathematical tools: centrality measures, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), Fuzzy Rule Based Bayesian Network (FRBBN), Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP), Evidential Reasoning (ER) and VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I 
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Kompromisno Resenje Method (VIKOR) method. Finally, the proposed research 
framework and models are applied to case studies. 
1.3 Aim of the Investigation 
The research aims to develop a novel risk assessment methodology for estimating, 
controlling, and monitoring the operational risks in PTSs. This research will benefit the 
petroleum industry by allowing operators to better control PTSs hazards and thereby 
ensure safe operation for petroleum transportation as a complete system. In order to 
accomplish the research’s aim, the following objectives are addressed:  
1. To review comprehensively previous research in order to identify the problems 
that are associated with petroleum port, ship and pipeline systems operations 
and consider all traditional risk assessment methods. 
2. To identify and analyse the Petroleum Transportation Networks (PTNs) 
vulnerabilities that need to be considered while carrying out safety assessments 
of petroleum supply chains. 
3. To develop a new quantitative hybrid Fuzzy Rule Based Bayesian Reasoning 
(FRBBN) for evaluating the risk level of each component involved in Petroleum 
Transportation Systems (PTSs) operations. 
4. To develop an advanced risk assessment framework for Petroleum 
Transportation Networks (PTNs) using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and 
Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach. 
5. To design a risk-based decision-making support system that offers a systemic 
approach capable of improving the decision-making process of PTSs operations 
and implementation of those operations in the petroleum industry. 
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6. To perform test cases and numerical analysis to validate the proposed 
framework and models. 
These objectives are accomplished across chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The first objective 
is accomplished with the literature review in chapter 2. The centrality measures, 
FRBBN, AHP, and ER techniques are applied in chapters 3, 4, and 5, respectively to 
accomplish the second, third and fourth objectives. The VIKOR method is applied in 
chapter 6 for improving the safety within this system (objectives 5). Finally, the case 
study objective is accomplished within chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 (see Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1: Risk management framework for PTSs operation 
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
This research comprises seven chapters, as shown in Figure 1.2.  
Chapter 1 
Introduction
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Chapter 3
Analysing Safety Critical Points within 
MPTNs using Centrality Measures 
Chapter 4
A New Quantitative Hybrid Fuzzy 
Rule Based Bayesian Reasoning for 
PTSs Operations
Chapter 5
An Advanced Risk Assessment 
Framework for PTNs using Evidential 
Reasoning Approach 
Chapter 6
Developing a Risk Based Decision Making 
Modelling to Enhance Safety in PTNs 
Operations 
Chapter 7
Discussion
Hazard Identification
Degree Centrality + betweenness Centrality
 Global Evaluation Hazard Identification
Fuzzy Rule-Based (FRB) + Bayesian 
Network (BN) 
Prioritise the PTSs Hazards Locally 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)
FRBBN + Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) + Evidential Reasoning (ER)
 Internal Evaluation  + Degree Centrality 
 Global Evaluation  + ER
 Aggregate Local and Global Evaluation 
AHP + VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I 
Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR)
 
Figure 1.2: Thesis outline 
These seven chapters are defined in more detail as follows: 
Chapter 1 starts with a background of the research. An explanation of the aim and 
objectives of the study follows. To identify the importance of this study, the research 
justification is then presented. A list of the techniques employed to accomplish the aim 
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of this research is presented. The chapter concludes with this outline of the study. 
Finally, this chapter ends with a statement on the scope of the research. 
Chapter 2 presents the significant literature review undertaken to appropriately 
organise this research. This literature review provides the basic foundation that guides 
the research. Several relevant conference papers, journal articles, books and websites 
reviewed to accomplish the aim of this chapter were presented. The review explains in 
detail the typical hazards and risk reliability of PTSs operations. Moreover, the major 
causes and/or risk factors in the petroleum port, ship and pipeline systems operations 
are defined and analysed to provide an understanding of risk identification and analysis.  
Chapter 3 analyses the maritime petroleum transportation network. Furthermore, this 
chapter introduces the centrality measures technique used to evaluate the global 
network of PTSs. This technique is then applied to a real maritime transportation 
system. This chapter accomplishes the 2nd objective and part of the 4th objective 
described in Section 1.2. 
Chapter 4 analyses the hazards associated with PTSs in order to prioritise and identify 
the most significant hazards within such systems. Within this chapter, a hybrid Fuzzy 
Rule Based Bayesian Reasoning (FRBBR) model is introduced due to the high level of 
uncertainty in petroleum port, ship, and pipeline operations.  
Chapter 5 analyses petroleum transportation as a complete system in order to evaluate 
the safety level of this system. The novelty of this chapter is through combining the 
external and internal evaluations presented in chapters 3 and 4, respectively.  To 
aggregate the internal with the external evaluations, the AHP and ER techniques are 
introduced.  
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Chapter 6 identifies the best solution from a list of identified risk-control options in 
order to mitigate the PTSs’ most significant hazards, as identified in chapter 4. To 
accomplish this chapter, VIKOR is used to analyse different alternatives (i.e. risk-
control options) with respect to several criteria. Furthermore, the AHP technique is used 
to evaluate the weight associated with each criterion.  
Chapter 7 discusses the research model and its capability in assessing petroleum 
terminals and transportation modes. The chapter also addresses and discusses how the 
system risk-control options can be achieved. Furthermore, the research contribution of 
the knowledge presented in this research is discussed. Finally, the chapter offers 
recommendations for possible future study that could improve the developed model. 
The references and the appendices, which include some of the data that could not be 
presented in the main chapters, are delivered at the end of the research. 
1.5 Research Justification 
Crude oil is an important product for various businesses. The transportation systems 
that move this natural product from the production site to the final customer are 
therefore of great concern to stakeholders, organisations, and the public. This concern 
has been amplified due to the rapid increase in crude/refined petroleum transportation 
and in the number of associated accidents. The operation of PTSs, like the operation of 
any other systems, is associated with hazards. These unwanted hazard events are a 
threat to the environment and public due to the harms that follow failures. Identifying 
the hazards that are associated with PTSs helps decision makers to mitigate or even 
eliminate them, which in turn makes the transportation system safer and more efficient 
in certain and uncertain situations.  
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This study could be instrumental in enhancing the safety level of petroleum 
transportation operations, which must take into consideration the past accidents in the 
industry. Namely, this research responds to the lack of a risk management framework 
that addresses the safe operation of petroleum transportation as one complete system. 
The study thus helps to fill the research gap on safety processes for complex systems 
like PTSs operations. To accomplish its objectives, this research uses the International 
Maritime Organization’s Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) technique to identify, 
analyse, and manage the hazards associated with PTSs operations, which entails a great 
deal of uncertainty. There is a need for this research because this study addresses 
petroleum transportation as a system (i.e. ports and maritime transportation). This study 
evaluates PTSs both internally and externally to ensure the safety of the transportation 
system. 
1.6 Research Contributions 
Unlike other petroleum industry related research, this research proposes a framework 
for analysing and managing PTSs as one complete system under uncertainty. Overall, 
the main aim of this research was to identify, evaluate, and propose a way of controlling 
PTSs’ operational risks. 
1.7 Research Scope 
The scope of study is briefly explained in Figure 1.3. The literature review on PTSs 
highlights that several researchers have focused intensively on the petroleum supply 
chain. The petroleum supply chain has three parts: the exploration phase, the production 
phase, and finally the distribution and delivery of the crude oil or refined products to 
the final customer (An et al., 2011). Within this research, PTSs, which are employed in 
the third phase, are highlighted. 
  
10 
The transportation system that moves crude oil around the world involves many ports 
and transportation modes. Pipelines, trains, ships, and trucks are the transportation 
modes that ensure the flow of the product through the petroleum supply chain. Most 
petroleum is still transported around the world via tankers and/or pipelines to reach the 
end user. Therefore, this research focuses on analysing the ports, ships, and pipelines 
within the global PTS in order to achieve all the objectives described in Section 1.2. 
Within this study, a local PTS is explored and evaluated internally and externally. 
Several ports and transportation routes are associated with this transportation system.  
 
Figure 1.3: Research scope 
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2 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Summary 
This chapter reflects the importance of the literature to this study. The petroleum supply 
chain stages are reviewed, followed by individual discussion of the petroleum 
transportation means, which include inland and water transportation systems. The 
chapter also briefly reviews the transportation systems of crude oil. The operations for 
each of the involved systems are discussed in depth in this chapter. In each case, the 
numerous historical accidents that have taken place within each system are noted. This 
chapter next provides a review on the risk assessment of petroleum transportation 
systems (PTSs). Different risk assessment and decision-making approaches such as 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA), Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution 
(TOPSIS), and Fuzzy Sets Theory (FST) are described. Furthermore, this chapter 
demonstrates in depth the risks that are involved within these transportation systems. 
2.2 Introduction 
The petroleum industry boom has fuelled the growth of major transportation systems 
for crude petroleum and derivatives such as petrol, kerosene, and oil. Since the first 
boom in the oil industry in the 19th century (Balcilar et al., 2015) several transportation 
systems have been established based on the nature of the areas through which this 
natural resource must pass. This system of major transportation includes rail 
transportation, shipping, pipelines, track transportation, and petroleum ports (Coyle et 
al., 2010).  
The petroleum industry supply chain has five major stages (Varma et al., 2008). The 
first stage is exploration, followed by production, transportation, refining, and finally 
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storage and delivery to the end customer (An et al., 2011). Many operational actions 
take place at each stage. For example, in the exploration and production stages, 
activities may include seismic geological operations, drilling processes, and reservoir 
extractions (AL-Othman et al., 2008; Sinha et al., 2011). The refining stage entails 
complex chemical processes; these processes transform the extracted crude oil into 
several final products (e.g., liquefied petroleum gas, diesel, and kerosene) that are 
useful to numerous industries (Papageorgiou, 2009; Yue et al., 2014).  
Petroleum Transportation Systems (PTSs) involve many methods to ensure that 
petroleum and its refined products reach the final customers through connections 
between different industry supply chains. PTS means are comprised of land 
transportation systems (i.e. rail, pipelines, and truck transportation systems), sea 
transportation (i.e. shipping), and petroleum ports (Coyle et al., 2010). Through the 
years, PTSs have rapidly improved. The safety of land and sea transportation systems 
and petroleum ports has been taken into consideration. In enhancing the operational 
practices of these systems, several technologies have been incorporated in order to 
enhance safety and reliability (McCoy, 2008). As a result, modern PTSs are becoming 
more and more oriented towards the safety of the environment, humanity, and 
equipment, while ensuring the safe delivery of crude products to various destinations 
within the supply chain.  
PTSs safety is a vital subject due to the growth of the petroleum industry. PTSs connect 
the petroleum industry chains that are used for the transportation of crude oil and other 
hazardous refined petroleum products. These transportation systems are responsible for 
carrying flammable products with high risk potential for humans, businesses, and the 
environment (John et al., 2014a). Therefore, PTS safety demands high attention in order 
to avoid any unwanted consequences. This research entails an in-depth risk assessment 
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of the transportation systems of petroleum. As noted above, petroleum is transported 
by several means, including pipelines, ports, shipping, rail carriers, and truck tanks. In 
addition to port transportation system, this study focuses on risk assessment for sea 
transport, namely ship transportation system, and for the pipeline transportation system. 
Therefore, this chapter aims to present a brief literature review about PTSs’ operations 
in these two areas. To accomplish this aim, the chapter is divided into three sections. 
The chapter starts with an overview of the petroleum transportation chain, with a 
particular focus on PTSs operation and the associated historical accidents. Within the 
first section, the research gap that this thesis aims to address is identified. The second 
section describes the methodology traditionally used for management of PTSs. Well-
known and popularly used assessment techniques are discussed in this section. Finally, 
the third section identifies the existing hazards in each operational system. The chapter 
ends with a brief conclusion. 
2.3 Overview of Petroleum Transport 
Petroleum transport is the movement of crude oil from its origin to its final destination. 
This movement is considered one of the foundations of the petroleum industry. PTSs 
play a critical role in the flow of crude oil within a Petroleum Supply Chain (PSC). 
PTSs enable the movement of crude and/or refined products from starting point (i.e. 
production sites or storage tanks) to their final destinations, via land and/or sea. During 
the crude oil journey through the PSC, multiple systems are involved. Ports and 
transportation modes are the basic elements in PTSs. Petroleum ports, ships, trucks, 
rail, and pipelines represent the transportation elements structures of PTSs.  
Petroleum ports comprise a major element within PTSs. Ports are mostly designed for 
the reception of crude oil that comes by water or land transportation. Ports are typically 
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used to transport petroleum locally or internationally to serve the port market (John et 
al., 2014a; Wang and Cullinane, 2008). Ports are considered to be the last point that 
separates land and ocean; they connect land transportation systems to sea transportation 
systems. In other words, ports act as a middleman between the landmass and waterway 
(Fleming and Hayuth, 1994).  
Ships, specifically oil tankers, are well-known sea transportation means. Marine oil 
tankers are used for local and global transportation of crude oil from one port to another. 
Product tanker, Panamax, Aframax, Suezmax, Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), and 
Ultra Large Crude Carrier (ULCC) are terms used to classify petroleum ships based on 
the tanker size. Tankers have the ability to carry a huge amount of crude oil, thus 
facilitating movement of the product across the oceans (Song and Panayides, 2012). 
Petroleum ships are considered to be the most convenient way of transporting large 
volumes of crude oil across oceans (Coyle et al., 2010; Ismail and Karim, 2013). 
Trucks and rail are two transportation means used to move crude oil by land. While 
trucks employ a single tank, trains travelling along rails can employ several tank cars 
(Yan and Crookes, 2010; Shunping et al., 2009). Trucks are usually used to transport 
refined oil from storage areas to the final destination. Unlike other modes of 
transportation, trucks are usually used to transport smaller volumes of flammable 
products as gas and diesel (Pootakham and Kumar, 2010). Trucks are used to deliver 
the product to areas that other transportation modes cannot reach or to deliver small 
volumes of the hazardous product (Yan and Crookes, 2010). On the other hand, the rail 
transportation system uses special tanks to move crude oil by train, taking the product 
to its final destination, often the refinery (Shunping et al., 2009). Unlike trucks, trains 
can pull multiple tanks. As a result, the rail system is capable of transporting much 
larger volumes of petroleum by land (Association of American Railroads, 2017). Rail 
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carriers are a cost effective mode of transporting oil and can be used to transport crude 
oil to the refinery as well as refined oil from the refinery to different distribution 
channels (Shunping et al., 2009; Coyle et al., 2010). 
Pipelines are the most common and cost effective mode of transporting petroleum by 
land (Herrán et al., 2010; Coyle et al., 2010). Pipelines are mainly used to transport 
crude oil extracted in the production stage to the refineries and the storage facilities 
(Pootakham and Kumar, 2010). Pipelines are also used to deliver finished refined 
petroleum products from the refinery to the customer. A number of factors such as 
pumping stations are involved in pipeline systems, which aim to ensure continuous flow 
over long distances (MirHassani and Ghorbanalizadeh, 2008). Checkpoints are placed 
along pipelines to observe the crude or refined products and make sure that it is not 
affected during transportation. Constructing the pipeline system is expensive. However, 
once pipelines are in place, operation costs are low compared to operation costs of other 
land transportation means (Coyle et al., 2010). Therefore, pipeline systems have 
become the most used and safest oil transportation mode for land transportation (Herrán 
et al., 2010). 
To ensure the smooth flow of the product within the system, tankers and pipelines are 
the two most commonly used transportation modes (Pootakham and Kumar, 2010; 
Herrán et al., 2010). While ports act as a connecting point between the transportation 
modes, pipelines and tankers are used for inland and sea transportation respectively. 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014) highlight that, in 2013, 56.5 
million barrels of oil per day (bbl/d) were transported by sea. In other words, about 63% 
of total world crude oil production (i.e. 90.1 million bbl/d) is moved using PTSs. In 
addition, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2017) stated that, 96.7 million 
bbl/d was the total world production of crude oil, where 58.9 million bbl/d (i.e. about 
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61% of the total production) was carried via sea transportation systems in 2015. It 
highlights the rapid growth in crude oil production and its high demand market. The 
great demand on this critical product led to an increase in the quantity of crude oil that 
was transported within the PTSs (i.e. 2.4 million bbl/d increase in crude oil movement). 
The nature of petroleum supply chains necessitates prioritizing safety and performing 
risk management. PTSs risk management plays a critical role in ensuring the 
transportation system resilience in the context of PSC. Previous PTSs scholars have 
researched various aspects of the transportation modes involved in petroleum 
transportation. For example, MirHassani (2008) investigated sea and land 
transportation modes, including marine vessels, pipelines, rails, and road tankers, from 
a management perspective. According to MirHassani (2008), pipelines are considered 
as the most reliable and economic petroleum transportation mode via land, while 
tankers are the most economic mode for transporting huge volumes of crude oil by sea. 
Underwood and Waterson (2013) highlight that the number one priority in any 
transportation system and most especially within transporting crude oil or other 
hazardous products is safety.   
No transport mode is considered 100% safe when it comes to transporting petroleum 
(Bersani et al., 2010). However, some modes are considered to be safer than others. 
According to Green and Jackson (2015), when transporting petroleum products over a 
very long distance on land, pipelines are the safest option. However, pipelines still 
entail numerous hazards, including the risk of leaks (Aroh et al., 2010).  Restrepo et al. 
(2009) observed that pipeline leakages might not actually happen along the pipeline; 
instead other involved factors, such as human error at pumping stations, tend to be the 
cause. Accordingly, Restrepo et al. (2009) suggest that if human error is minimised at 
the sub-stations, leakage could go down to a negligible level or even to zero. Spillage 
  
17 
of these flammable products during transportation also poses a danger to the 
environment and to human lives (Sovacool, 2008). Therefore, any mode of transport to 
be used should incorporate a means of protecting the environment as incarnate the 
product movement (Rausand, 2013). 
Researchers have done research on the impact of petroleum transportation on the 
environment. According to Petrova (2011), so long as the petroleum and its compounds 
are not exposed or leaked into the surface, the transportation remains harmless. 
However, if exposed or leaked to the surface, the products become a threat to nature. 
For instance, they could pose health risks to animals and cause deadly fires and 
explosions (Restrepo et al., 2009). On the other hand, when considering transportation 
across continents and large water bodies, marine ships are the most effective and safest 
mode of transporting petroleum products (Song and Panayides, 2012). Researchers 
such as Psaraftis and Kontovas (2013) focused on transportation speed, due to its 
importance for the industry supply and its effect on the environment.  Relvas et al. 
(2013) focused on finding fast solutions to the petroleum transportation scheduling 
problem. 
Numerous studies have addressed the component level of the crude oil transportation 
supply chain. Ronen (1995) addressed the scheduling problem associated with 
transportation of crude oil and that problem’s effect on refining and distributing heavy 
products (such as base stock for lube and residual oil) and light products (such as 
gasoline, kerosene, and diesel oil). Ronen (1995) proposed partitioning in scheduling 
formulations to minimise cost and set packing to maximise profit. Catchpole (1962) 
focused on the tactical planning of the product flow. The researcher proposed a liner 
programme that planned the crude oil flow from the production stage to the refinery 
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and the refined products flow from the refinery to the customer. The programme 
considers the cost and demand of the products as stochastic factors. 
Sear (1993) developed a model for refined products transportation in an oil company’s 
downstream supply chain. Sear (1993) also delivered a calculation matrix for estimating 
the transport cost. Through using an approximation algorithm based on problem 
decomposition and function approximation, Cheng and Duran (2004) developed a 
simulation model for planning world-wide crude oil transportation and a Markov 
decision module. Cheng and Duran’s (2004) model is for stochastic optimal control of 
inventory and transportation systems. Li et al. (2012b) developed a dynamic fuzzy logic 
model to meet the unbalanced demand and production of crude oil which affects the 
market activity in maritime transportation. 
Overall, petroleum production and consumption is highly associated with nations’ 
development. Also, the produced petroleum and its refined products pass through 
various stages within the industry supply chain. Transporting this natural product 
ensures its movement till reaching its final destination. PTSs are considered to be one 
of the critical stages within the petroleum supply chain. A failure within this system 
might lead to a disaster in the petroleum industry. Such systems are complex because 
they often operate in a dynamic environment. Consequently, the systems’ key 
components (i.e. ports and transportation modes) must operate in a safe condition to 
ensure the success of PTSs. Therefore, it is crucial to identify and assess the hazards 
affecting PTSs to ensure the overall safety and reliability of the systems. 
2.4 Petroleum Transportation Systems Operations 
PTSs compose a critical part of the petroleum supply chain. The connections within 
PTSs form a complex system. This is demonstrated by the fact that there are multiple 
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systems (i.e. ports, tankers and pipelines) engaged within its operations. As a result, 
PTSs operations are highly associated with unwanted hazards that might strike any 
point within the system which might lead to system failure.  
As mentioned previously, PTSs consist of two attributes: ports and transportation 
modes. Effective operation of these two attributes ensures that petroleum is successfully 
transported through PTSs. Still, accidents might occur within ports, ships, or pipelines. 
Such an accident would negatively affect the product flow throughout the Petroleum 
Transportation Networks (PTNs). Therefore, crude oil flow between two points may be 
affected by an accident which might occur at any stage within the PTSs. To avoid 
possible risks in PTSs operations, the dynamic environment of PTSs needs to be 
investigated. Such investigation can deliver control options for unwanted hazards that 
threaten proper operation of PTSs. Ports, ships, and pipelines systems compose the 
three main systems that operate within PTSs.  
Ports comprise the first operation system within PTSs. Within the ports area, several 
operational activities take place in order to ensure that the crude product is successfully 
transported through the system (Mokhtari et al., 2012). Offloading and loading the 
crude oil are among the major activities at petroleum ports (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000). 
Loading or offloading operations could be either the first or last operational activity at 
the ports system. Offloading involves transferring crude oil from a newly arrived tanker 
into a petroleum terminal; loading, which occurs upon the crude oil’s departure to 
another destination port, is the opposite process (Ronza et al., 2006; Trbojevic and Carr, 
2000). Between offloading and loading operation, several other operational activities, 
such as pumping the product, also occur at petroleum ports. These forms of operation 
require equipment such as pipes and pumps to guarantee the operational process and 
product movement within the ports system (ISGOTT, 2006). In addition, as ports act 
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as a middleman between land and water transportation, in some scenarios ports also act 
as a temporary storage space for cargo (Wang et al., 2013a). Ports usually have 
warehouses in which the products to be transported are temporarily stored awaiting 
their turn to be loaded into the tankers (Chang and Lin, 2006). Dolman and Van Ettinger 
(2013) define ports system as intermodal connectors that connect the land and sea 
systems. An effective port operation ensures that the products are safely transported 
(Dolman and Van Ettinger, 2013). Generally, all the operations in the ports aim at 
ensuring efficient and effective loading and offloading of petroleum to and from the 
vessels and storage tanks. 
Ships constitute the second system in PTSs operations. While the ports system connects 
trade between local and oversea markets, ship transportation enables transporting of 
petroleum for short and long distances across waters (Coyle et al., 2010). The sea 
transportation system is designed to transport the crude or refined products in bulk 
across the sea. In general, compared with other transportation modes (i.e. land 
transportation systems), sea transportation is cheaper over long distances (Coyle et al., 
2010). Since the first tanker set sail in 1886, vessels have grown in size (Papanikolaou, 
2016). This growth has led to an increase in the size of cargo that can be transported by 
sea in every ship. However, growth in vessel size has not eliminated the disasters that 
follow accidents in this system.  
After 9/11, measures were put in place due to the security issues for sea transportation 
(Harrald, 2005). The International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) code (2003), for 
example, became part of SOLAS (i.e. the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea). These measures have had a drastically positive impact on ships, ports, and 
governments. ISPS is mandatory for SOLAS parties, who must construct, equip, and 
operate their ships as per SOLAS minimum safety standards. These measures are 
  
21 
regulated to improve the safety and security of the maritime industry (Mazaheri and 
Ekwall, 2009).  
On tankers, several operations activities take place. Examples include ensuring the 
vessel is operating in safe conditions in open waters and when the ship enters port areas; 
loading and discharging the crude product at the port; ensuring that the pressure within 
the ship hull is at a safe level; and keeping the equipment in good condition for a safe 
operation (Mahfouz, 2009; Uğurlu, 2016; ISGOTT, 2006). Qualified staff members 
(i.e. engineers and captains) are required on board to provide the required services in 
everyday activities and emergency situations (Riahi et al., 2012; Uğurlu, 2016). 
Pipelines system is one of the most common means of crude oil transportation. 
According to Herrán et al. (2010), low-carbon steel or low-alloy steel are the materials 
usually used to construct transportation system pipes. Pipelines are usually located at a 
depth of about 1 to 1.5 meters underground (HSE, 2008). Within PTSs, the crude 
product is commonly pumped through pipelines, and pump stations located alongside 
the pipelines ensure the product flow within the pipes (Coyle et al., 2010). At present, 
over 60 countries have pipeline systems were USA and Russia have the longest 
networks (El-abbasy et al., 2015). Pipelines need to be protected against damage such 
as abrasion, corrosion, and even impacts in order to ensure the product flow within the 
system (Rajasekar et al., 2010).  
In addition, maintenance of pipelines should not be neglected. Maintenance schedules 
need to be put in place to ensure an effective, efficient and safe transfer of petroleum 
and petroleum products through the system pipelines (Yuhua and Datao, 2005). Such 
activities necessitate regular inspection via a process known as pigging. Pigging is an 
operational process that uses an inspection device (pigs) to maintain the system pipes. 
This technological operation is used to identify and detect any abnormal happenings 
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along the pipe such as the presence of dents, corrosion, cracks, and any other 
mechanical damage (Esmaeilzadeh et al., 2009). After detecting damage in the pipes, 
the operators must then carry out measures to fix those problems and improve the 
condition of the pipeline. The ‘smart pigs’ used for inspecting the status of the pipes 
are at times also used to clean any paraffin wax that may be deposited on the pipe or 
any other deposited materials; these machines are then received at the other end of the 
pipe (Anifowose et al., 2012).  
Research on the ports and transportation modes industry mainly relates to the legislation 
and safety acts. Such policies include the Application of the Employers’ Liability 
(Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969, the Health and Safety at Work Act (HASAW) 1974, 
and the Oil Pipeline Act (1956) (amended by the Oil Pipeline Act 1965) (ABS, 2003; 
OCIMF, 2008; HSE, 2017; Aroh et al., 2010). The research has demonstrated the 
applicability of quantitative and qualitative risk analysis approaches. Many sources 
have discussed comprehensively the issues of safety cases and safety reports; Safety 
Management System (SMS); Formal Safety Assessment (FSA); Health, Safety and 
Environment (HSE); ISPS Code; Safety Case Regulations; and Quantitative Risk 
Assessment (QRA).  
The safety of system operations is a prime concern for operating companies due to the 
high economic and financial impact of safety apart of failures (Elsayed et al., 2009). 
Recent studies have highlighted the importance of PTSs’ safety in the movement of 
crude oil. A careful literature review has revealed that several studies have been 
conducted on operational risk and reliability relating to PTSs. Siddiqui and Verma’s 
(2013) research outlined a risk assessment methodology for estimating the risk of 
transporting crude oil internationally via ship tankers. Eliopoulou et al. (2012) 
performed a risk assessment study of historic medium and large oil tanker accidents. 
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Markowski and Mannan’s (2009) research presented a risk assessment framework for 
the hazards of long-distance transportation of flammable cargo through pipelines. 
Uğurlu et al. (2015) investigated the Global Integrated Shipping Information System 
(GISIS) data for collision and grounding oil tanker accidents from 1998 to 2010. The 
researchers carried out a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) in order to perform risk assessment 
on the collision and grounding accidents. In their work, the consequences of the present 
hazards were categorised into three categories: economic loss, pollution, and death or 
injures. Based on the investigated system, the economic loss consequence gains the 
bigger chair between the two accidents.  
A risk assessment framework presented by Mokhtari et al. (2011) helps to evaluate the 
overall risk level of petroleum seaports and terminals in their complex environment. 
Within this research, the researchers carried out Fuzzy Set Theory and Evidential 
Reasoning (ER) techniques. Due to the uncertainties associated with this complex 
system, the researchers started by applying FST to evaluate the hazards associated with 
the operations and management of the ports and terminals. The researchers then used 
the ER approach in order to synthesise the system risk factors necessary for assessing 
the petroleum seaports and terminals. The work of Rao and Raghavan (1996) discussed 
the hazards identification techniques for ships and for port installations. Through 
applying cause–consequence analysis, the researchers identified the hazard events 
associated with port installations and discussed the effect of spills of this flammable 
product. Pak et al. (2015) carried out a safety analysis technique to identify which 
factors influence ports’ safety. The researchers collected and analysed the factors by 
applying the fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to ship captains’ perspectives of 
five ports, as data were generally unavailable or lacking. 
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Yuhua and Datao (2005) analysed the failures associated with oil and gas transmission 
pipelines by using fuzzy fault tree analysis. The authors in this research introduced 
fuzzy set theory for its effectiveness in treating the fuzzy events involved in fault tree 
analysis in order to decrease the errors of conventional fault tree analysis. Dziubiński 
et al. (2006) took into account individual and societal risk in order to perform a risk 
assessment methodology for analysing the basic events of pipeline failures and their 
probable consequences. In order to perform risk assessment for long distance pipelines, 
the researchers presented a combination of qualitative and quantitative pipeline 
assessment techniques. Combination of both types of techniques offered the possibility 
of a complete risk assessment. In the work of El-abbasy et al. (2015), the condition of 
oil and gas pipelines was assessed through considering several factors; unlike most 
studies with this focus, corrosion was not the only focal factor. The researchers 
performed a simulation test on an offshore gas pipeline in Qatar in order to test the 
module performance. 
Emovon et al. (2015) developed two novel methodologies due to the limitations 
associated with traditional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) in order to 
prioritise the risk associated with marine machinery systems. The novelty of these two 
methodologies was the integration of the averaging technique firstly with 
Vlsekriterijumska Optimizacija Ikompromisno Resenje (VIKOR), and secondly with 
the Compromise Programming (CP) technique in order of ranking of risk of failure 
modes. In the work of Martins and Maturana (2013), human reliability in the operation 
of an oil tanker was analysed by using Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs). The 
researchers aimed to determine the most likely sequence of hazardous events and 
thereby identified which of the presented activities should receive more attention in 
order to eliminate/reduce the operation risk as significantly as possible. Ismail and 
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Karim (2013) analysed the accident cycle in sea transportation over a period of 47 years 
from 1964 to 2011, covering spills equal to and over 1,000 tonnes. According to the 
research, the total spill volume of the analysed period was 4.27 million tonnes. The 
causes of these spills were classified into several factors such as navigation error, 
national conditions, mechanical and maintenance factors, and engine failure. Moreover, 
the analysis revealed that spill volume has been decreasing in recent years, as confirmed 
by the annual reports presented by International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation 
Limited (2016). 
A careful literature review has revealed that most PTSs studies have been conducted on 
operational risk and reliability at a segment/local level, i.e. from the perspective of 
ports, ships, or pipelines (e.g. Elsayed et al., 2009; El-abbasy et al., 2015; Mokhtari et 
al., 2011; Yuhua and Datao, 2005; Siddiqui and Verma’s, 2013; Eliopoulou et al., 2012) 
instead of from a system-wide perspective. Regarding the petroleum supply chain, most 
existing literature on PTSs has focused on security, health, safety, and environmental 
protection at the local level instead at the system level. The literature indicates that the 
safe operation of petroleum ports and transportation modes for PTSs safety as complete 
systems has been specifically discussed only on very rare occasions. In other words, 
none of the mentioned research and other research in the PTSs domain has conducted 
a specific or even generic risk/safety assessment methodology or framework for 
evaluating a PTSs as one complete system. Within the context of supply chains and 
specifically within PTSs, optimal risk controls at segment/local levels may not 
necessarily ensure the highest safety at the system/global level. The literature review 
has therefore revealed a research gap that urgently needs to be filled.  
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2.5 Petroleum Transportation Systems Operations Accidents 
Transporting petroleum product within PTSs is usually associated with various hazards. 
PTSs hazards can lead to fatal accidents within the system due to failures in the 
transportation process (Jo and Ahn, 2005). Anifowose et al. (2012) mentioned several 
factors involved in PTSs that might affect the safety of the system. The human factors 
are one of the most significant factors that can cause accidents. One example of a failure 
due to the human factor is poor operational processes in the flow of the petroleum, 
which might lead to the product spilling and in turn to explosions or fires (Yuhua and 
Datao, 2005).  
Historically, transporting the crude product by pipeline has been proven to be the safest 
and most effective means of transporting petroleum. Spills in pipelines are very rare, 
and a high percentage of the spills that do occur usually happen due to operation failure, 
(Hasan et al., 2010). For example, since 1897, with length more than 2000 km, over 60 
countries with pipeline systems have been using pipelines for transporting petroleum 
and refined products for domestic and international purposes for more than a century 
(Zhang and Bai, 2008; El-abbasy et al., 2015). This proves that pipeline transport is the 
safest and most economical inland transportation mode for transporting petroleum 
products compared to other systems. However, if an accident does occur within the 
pipeline system, the consequences are severe for the economy and environment 
(Petrova, 2011). Due to the long-lasting effects, the area’s economy can also be 
negatively affected. Research done with safety bodies such as the US Department of 
Transport has shown that most of the pipeline infrastructure in use today was installed 
about 40 years ago, back in the 1970s (Petrova, 2011). Thus, despite pipelines being 
the safest system, a petroleum spill could occur at any time simply due to the old age 
of the system itself. 
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Spillages of this crude product pose a threat to both flora and fauna (Restrepo et al., 
2009). Spilling on land can lead to the death of plants as well as abnormalities in the 
animals that depend on the environment for food (Anifowose et al., 2012). Other than 
a direct effect on life, these spillages can have an unfavourable effect on the economic 
status of the area. If spillage occurs, people may choose to move from that area into 
other areas (Sosa and Alvarez-Ramirez, 2009). This movement was observed in the 
case of an Enbridge pipeline; when the spillage occurred, people who owned homes in 
the area sold them.  
Historically PTSs accidents/incidents have been happening since transportation 
systems were first used to move this flammable liquid within the system. This section 
could not possibly outline the full history of all the operation accidents that have ever 
occurred within PTSs. Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 therefore outlines some of the most 
catastrophic PTSs accidents. These historical PTSs accidents dictate the importance of 
this research. This study aims to estimate, control, and monitor the PTSs operational 
risks as further presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
Table 2.1: Historical petroleum port accidents 
No Date Location Accident description 
1 21/12/1985 Naples, Italy 
An explosion occurred at a marine petroleum products 
terminal due to tank overfill. This explosion destroyed 
several of the terminal facilities and nearby business 
and residential constructions (Chang and Lin, 2006). 
2 16/07/2010 Dalian, China 
Over 1500 tonnes of crude oil spilled into the Yellow 
Sea due to a pipeline rupture and an explosion at 
Dalian Xingang oil port. This explosion caused a 
severe fire which destroyed approximately 200 m of 
oil pipeline. As a result, the operation was disrupted 
for almost two weeks (Zhang  et al., 2013a) 
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Table 2.2: Historical pipeline transportation system accidents 
Table 2.3: Historical ship transportation system accidents 
No Date Location Accident description 
1 05/11/1977 
Abqaiq, Saudi 
Arabia 
Motor vehicles destroyed a 30-inch-diameter crude oil 
pipeline transportation system (MARSH, 2014). 
2 07/08/1997 
Fairbanks, 
Alaska, USA 
A fire occurred at a pipeline transportation system due 
to operator mistake. The operator started operation 
while the strainer cover plate was open that released 
and ignited oil (MARSH, 2016). 
3 25/07/2010 
Calhoun County, 
Michigan, USA 
In 2010, at the south of Michigan state near Marshall, 
Michigan, a pipeline ruptured due to an operator 
failure, spilling an estimated 843,444 gallons of crude 
oil wile transporting the product from Canada to the 
US (Killian, 2010). 
4 05/12/2016 
Belfield, North 
Dakota, USA 
A rupture in the Belle Fourche Pipeline leaked about 
530,000 gallons of oil. The cause of the rupture has 
not been revealed (Nicholson, 2017). 
No Date Location Accident description 
5 06/12/1985 
Kharg Island, 
Gulf of Iran 
A NOVA oil tanker, which is a very large crude 
carrier (VLCC), collided with another huge oil tanker 
(an ultra large crude carrier (ULCC)) due to a lack of 
special operating process (lights on both vessels) 
during the Iran–Iraq war. The spilled oil from this 
accident was approximately 70,000 tonnes. 
Furthermore the flag state of NOVA ship states that 
the collision damaged five of the ship tanks (ITOPF, 
2016). 
6 30/03/1994 
Fujairah, United 
Arab Emirates 
Two tankers (BAYNUNAH and SEKI) collided near 
the Fujairah coast. This accident led to 16000 tonnes 
of crude oil being spilled into the Gulf of Oman due to 
a rupture on the ship body (ITOPF, 2016). 
7 27/07/2003 Karachi, Pakistan 
30,000 tonnes of oil was spilled while the tanker 
entered Karachi Port, Pakistan due to ship grounding. 
The grounded ship was transporting 67,800 tonnes of 
crude oil for a refinery in Karachi (ITOPF, 2016). 
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This research focuses mainly on petroleum transportation operation by seaports, 
shipping, and pipeline transportation. Other means of crude oil transportation modes 
such as railroads and road transport are uncommonly used for the movement of this 
product. Still, like other transportation modes, these two modes are also prone to 
accidents. Some of the major causes of accidents on railroads include poor 
infrastructure, the designs of the car tanks, intersections where railway lines and roads 
usually cross, poor assembling of the train, and human factors and errors (Nicolet-
Monnier and Gheorghe, 2013). However, due to the scope of the research and the 
uncommon usage of these systems, railroads and road transport are not involved in this 
study. 
2.6 Risk Assessment of PTSs  
The above mentioned accidents, which compose an incomplete list of all the many 
accidents throughout history, highlight that the transportation of petroleum is 
accompanied by the occurrence of unforeseen risks which may have severe and even 
fatal consequences (Soszynska, 2010). A safe PTS requires safety/risk assessment in 
managing the system.  
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is the most systematic methodology for assessing 
risks and evaluating the costs and benefits of different options (Wang, 2002; Rosqvist 
and Tuominen, 2004; Quangen et al., 2007; Kontovas et al., 2009). According to the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), FSA is a structured and systematic 
methodology designed for improving marine safety, for life, health, marine 
environments, and property protection, through utilising risk and cost benefit 
assessments which lead to decisions (IMO, 2002). FSA is designed as a tool for decision 
makers that aims to mitigate risk and enhance maritime safety through utilising risk 
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analysis and cost benefit assessment. In other words, the FSA mechanism is built on 
risk assessment and the cost benefit analysis for enhancing maritime safety (Wang and 
Trbojevic, 2007). FSA consists of the following five steps: 
Step 1: Identification of hazards.  
Step 2: Assessment of risks that arise from the identified hazards. 
Step 3: Risk-control options for controlling the risks that are defined in step 2. 
Step 4: Cost benefit assessment of the risk-control options. 
Step 5: Recommendations for decision making based on the information derived in the 
previous steps. 
Risk assessment is a key element for maintaining the overall safety of PTSs and 
ensuring the safe transportation of crude oil. Risk assessment has been applied in many 
industries for its ability to analyse and manage the risk factors that influence systems’ 
safety. Risk assessment is defined as a comprehensive estimation of the probability and 
the degree of the possible consequences in a hazardous situation in order to select 
appropriate safety measures (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). In short, risk assessment is a 
vital tool for system safety. According to Bersani et al. (2010), risk assessment process 
is carried out in three major phases. The first phase is Hazard identification (HAZID). 
In this phase, any risk that is likely to arise during the project in question is identified. 
Once the hazards are identified, the second phase is analysing the risk. In this phase, 
the structure and form of risk are examined in detail. Furthermore the causes and effects 
behind the risks are evaluated. The fatality of the risks and the measure of damage, 
together with whom or what it could affect, are identified. The final step of analysing 
is the risk mitigation stage. During this stage, ways of preventing the risks from 
occurring are identified. Once identified, the safety measures are put in place. 
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Risk assessment provides an effective method for the safety of a system. Through an 
effective safety analysis and risk management programme, it is possible that all major 
accidents and losses of life and resources can be avoided (Mokhtari et al., 2012). A 
hazard within a system is identified based on the knowledge that people (e.g. 
researchers and operators) have gained from past events. For instance, risks that may 
occur due to flammable products activities tend to be viewed as more deadly than those 
that occur due to the risks associated with transport of other products (Bersani et al., 
2010). Different methodologies are used in risk assessment in PTSs. Such approaches 
include the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Bow-Tie method and the Fuzzy Sets Theory (FST) 
(Nicolet-Monnier and Gheorghe, 2013). These tools are used to identify risks and to 
assess those risks’ probabilities and losses. Within the subject of petroleum 
transportation, many high environmental risks are associated with the occurrence of 
accidents within PTSs. Specifically, leakage is considered to be one of the major risks 
that might occur due to a failure in PTSs operation. Whether the transport is by 
pipelines, sea, railways, or road transport, PTSs can face a great risk of leakage. During 
pipeline transportation, leakage could be a result of corrosion on the pipe or a crack 
(Restrepo et al., 2009). A default material at manufacturing stage can also lead to 
leakage. In transportation by waterways, leakage can occur as a result of several 
possible accidents, such as collision of the tanker with another ship or with a different 
object. Human error in loading and transporting the petroleum and extreme weather 
conditions such as strong winds are also risk factors that threaten the safety of tankers 
in both overseas and port areas (Zaman et al., 2015; Uğurlu, 2016). Leakage in 
petroleum terminals might occur due to equipment conditions or a human error by the 
operators (Mokhtari et al., 2012).  
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Leakages have severe consequences for the economy and environment. Regarding the 
environment, petroleum contains hydrocarbons, which are dangerous to living creatures 
and harmful to plants, and hence leakages can lead to complications and abnormalities 
in the environment (Bandowe et al., 2014; Mzoughi and Chouba, 2011). If the product 
leaks in oceans, it might leads to the death of the creatures that live in the water, and its 
wider effects may be fatal and long lasting (Bandowe et al., 2014; Mzoughi and 
Chouba, 2011).  
Accidents can be controlled by following some regulatory measures and safety codes.  
In the United States and Nigeria, for example, the regulations are contained in the 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation respectively (Park and Park, 2011). Prevention 
measures for these accidents include lagging the pipelines externally and internally by 
coating material; constantly monitoring the state of the transportation items such as the 
terminals, tankers, and pipelines; and minimising human error by ensuring that the 
persons in charge are highly qualified for their role and are keen and careful with details 
(HSE, 2008; Wang, 2002; ISGOTT, 2006; Hoppe, 2005). The transportation mode 
equipment and ports should also be constantly monitored to ensure that they are 
operating in good condition. The risk assessment tools listed above should always be 
used to foresee faults and take preventative measures against system failure (Eckle and 
Burgherr, 2013). Petroleum industry scholars and other industries’ risk-based 
researchers have proposed quantitative, qualitative, or hybrid data (i.e. a combination 
of quantitative and qualitative data) in order to identify, assess, and mitigate industry 
risks (Khan et al., 2015). 
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2.7 Existing Risk Assessment Methodology for Petroleum 
Transportation Systems 
As summarised previously, the operation of PTSs is a high-risk process. Risk 
assessment provides an effective method for identifying, assessing, and mitigating 
hazards to ensure the safety of a system. An effective safety analysis and risk 
management programme can allow decision makers to avoid most or even all major 
accidents that are associated with the system. As explained previously, the risk 
assessment process consists of three major phases for system safety which are as 
follows: 
 Hazard Identification Phase 
 Risk Evaluation Phase 
 Risk Mitigation Phase 
In risk assessment, a number of key words are regularly used to describe a related 
action. Therefore, a clear understanding of risk assessment related phrases such as risk 
and hazards is important for flow of this study. The following are a sample of words 
relevant to risk assessment: 
 Event, an action that occurs in a specific place and may or may not involve 
people. 
 Incident, an event that has the potential to harm lives or businesses (HSE, 2004).  
 Accident, an event that results in harm to lives or businesses (HSE, 2004). 
 Hazard, a situation that is likely to cause harm to humans, property, the 
environment, and businesses (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000). 
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 Risk, the measure for unwanted hazards in term of the likelihood and 
consequences severity of the unwanted hazard (Mokhtari et al., 2012).   
 Consequences, the results that fallows the occurrence of a particular event (John 
et al., 2014a). 
2.7.1 Hazard Identification (HAZID) Phase 
Hazard Identification (HAZID) is the first phase in any risk/safety assessment. HAZID 
is a well-documented and widely used method in risk assessment (Kianmehr et al., 
2013; Andersen and Mostue, 2012). The Institute of Risk Management (2002) states 
with reference to HAZID “Hazard identification should be approached in a methodical 
way to ensure that all significant activities within the organisation have been identified 
and all the risk factors flowing from these activities are defined.” In other words, the 
method systematically assesses the possible hazards of a system and the associated 
factors that have the potential to cause a significant consequence to humans, properties, 
and the environment.  
In this study, HAZID is used to assess systematically the potential hazards and 
problems associated with the transportation system of the petroleum industry. Any 
hazards or problems that could harm PTS operations are considered. This phase can be 
used in the assessment of individual activities, for example, in assessing a system that 
needs to be upgraded, modified, replaced, or improved (Yin et al., 2012). According to 
Gould et al. (2012), the HAZID process is the beginning of three major assessment 
phases. The phases start with identifying the hazards threatening the system. Once the 
hazards associated with the system have been identified, they can be further evaluated 
by the appropriate risk assessment techniques. Once identified, the measure of the risk 
is determined, and finally safety measures are added. Hazard identification techniques 
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include literature search, Hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies, Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA), what-if analysis, Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), 
Progressive Loss of containment Analysis Optimising Prevention (PLANOP), physical 
inspection, organisational charts, flow charts, and check-lists. These techniques have 
been recommended and used by various authors due to their potential to identify the 
hazards and associated events that might occur within a system (ABS, 2003; Dickson, 
2003; Wang, 2002; Pasman et al., 2009; Marhavilas et al., 2011; Groso et al., 2012; 
Khan and Abbasi, 1998). Groso et al. (2012) recommended combining two or more 
HAZID techniques to obtain better results in identifying a system’s hazards. Literature 
search is one of the techniques that have been adopted in this study. This technique 
saves time and costs, as the required risk-based data has already been gathered 
(Saunders et al., 2007). To obtain better results in identifying PTSs hazards, what-if 
analysis, which is a brainstorming approach, is used. What-if analysis is a popular 
technique and possibly one of the oldest HAZID methods; it involves simply asking a 
series of questions that begin with ‘what if’ (Khan and Abbasi, 1998; Kavianian et al., 
1992; Golfarelli and Rizzi, 2010).  
The HAZID phase has a number of advantages when applied to an operating system. 
The phase provides an early identification of hazards and potential problems before 
they actually occur in the system (Kianmehr et al., 2013). In other words, this phase 
enables the prevention of the occurrence of hazards through identifying the possible 
hazards associated within an operating system. In the case of PTSs, HAZID is applied 
in different petroleum companies and plants for identifying the petroleum 
transportation operational hazards in order to ensure the safe flow of the petroleum 
product as well as the safety and health of the system’s operational staff and the 
environment as a whole. For instance, in the pipeline transportation system, HAZID is 
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used to identify the possibility of leaks occurring and the causes of these leaks such as 
cracks and corrosion along the pipelines (Esmaeilzadeh et al., 2009). HAZID also 
provides a platform for evaluating hazards that could cause system failure.  
HAZID is applied to every system involved in the movement of petroleum products in 
order to reduce system risks. In the transportation of petroleum by ship, HAZID 
assessment has helped to identify fires and explosions as one of the major system risks 
that should be taken into consideration (Eckle and Burgherr, 2013). According to 
studies by Yin et al. (2012), undetected leaks from tankers that may occur during 
loading might be the cause of these fires. For example, a leak accidentally exposed to 
high temperatures might cause a fire along the line of the leak, and if the line gets to 
the tank containing the petroleum, an explosion could occur. A crude oil spill might 
also occur during a ship collision or even ship grounding, which can lead to fatal 
consequences.  
2.7.2 Risk Evaluation Phase  
Risk analysis is a procedure carried out by analysts to identify, outline, and examine in 
detail the potential dangers facing persons, organisations, or corporate bodies (Chun-
rong, 2012). Systems such as PTSs are complex because they involve unpredictable 
and vague events. The nature of the petroleum supply chain requires that PTSs transport 
flammable products which might harm animals and humans, the environment and 
construction. Therefore, the assessment phase plays a critical role in minimising risks 
that might occur to businesses and the environment (Dawotola et al., 2011). This 
process involves assessment of the overall risk by gathering information about the 
occurrence probability and consequence severity of the hazards (Dziubiński et al., 
2006; John et al., 2014a; Goerlandt and Montewka, 2015). This information is gathered 
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via qualitative and quantitative techniques (Khan et al., 2015). Risk analysis enables 
the concerned parties to find out what dangers organisations, individuals, and even 
corporations would face in natural, equipment or human-caused unwanted events. 
Identifying those dangers allows additional protection measures to be taken. When 
evaluating the risk model, the model is scrutinised so that decision makers can have a 
clear picture to make a practical decision. This process is important during the first 
stage of risk assessment, as the model selected must be able to concretise what it is 
supposed to measure. After assessing the risks, safety measures are taken to prevent the 
risks from occurring. This is known as risk mitigation (Phase 3). Risk analysis can be 
carried out through a number of methodologies such as Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), and 
Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach. 
2.7.2.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
Failure Modes Effects and Analysis (FMEA) is a step-by-step procedure which is 
capable of describing something that could go wrong during an operation (Jiang et al., 
2017). It describes how a system that is put in place can fail to do what it is expected to 
do. According to Chun-rong (2012), FMEA is a widely used method that plays a part 
in eliminating problems before they occur in operations and systems. FMEA is a well-
known safety/risk analysis technique used in the maritime and petroleum industries. In 
the 1960s in the United States, the FMEA technique was developed and adapted in the 
aerospace industry for enhancing the industry’s safety and reliability levels. The FMEA 
technique is well known for its ability to handle both qualitative and quantitative 
assessment (Henley and Kumamoto, 1996; Wang and Ruxton, 1997). This technique 
has been applied in many studies on addressing safety and risk assessment problems 
(Jiang et al., 2017; Emovon et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2015; Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). 
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The technique has also been integrated into the early stage of designing systems. 
According to Ravi Sankar and Prabju (2001), the advantages of this method are that it 
allows for processes to be improved while considering the Likelihood (L), Consequence 
(C), and Probability (P) of system failures. The technique thereby builds project 
confidence by eliminating the concerns that the system would otherwise face in the 
future. The technique is carried out in four steps (Chun-rong, 2012). The first step 
involves the identification of the ways in which the project, system, or product can 
actually fail. After identifying the areas where the business could fail, the measure of 
risk that could be brought about by this failure is identified together with the causes of 
the risk. A course of action is then identified to prevent the failure, and that plan is used 
to validate design. 
2.7.2.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a systematic analysis technique used in safety/risk 
analysis studies to evaluate system failures (Dawotola et al., 2009). During an Air Force 
study contract for the Minuteman Launch Control System in the early 1960s, Watson 
developed FTA. Since the early 1970s, FTA has become perhaps the most widely used 
technique in risk assessment research (Henley and Kumamoto, 1996; Andrews and 
Beeson, 2003). The well-known method examines a system from top to bottom to detect 
if the system is in an undesirable state at any level. The system is analysed using the 
probability of the unwanted events at the lower levels (base events) to identify which 
series of events led to the failure (Dawotola et al., 2009). FTA starts with an unwanted 
event, for example, petroleum failing to reach its destination during pipeline 
transportation. This unwanted event in FTA would be the modal top output. The lower 
events are the tree inputs. The technique has been widely used for its ability in 
estimating the probability of a failure. To identify the probability of an unwanted or 
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‘top’ event, the lower events have to be analysed backwards, tracing back the system 
failure (Lavasani et al., 2015a). In the example given, consider that FTA reveals that in 
the pipeline transportation, a problem exists in one of the pump stations. Specifically, 
a pump engine is not properly working, and as a result, petroleum is not being pumped. 
The engine failure may be due to technical problems or human error. In this case, 
according to FTA analysis, the top failure in the system resulted from a number of lower 
occurrences, which could include technical problems or human error and the resulting 
failure of a pump engine. The FTA is, however, mainly analysed by the possibility of 
the base trigger occurring (Senol et al., 2015).  
FTA is a safety/risk analysis technique that can be used to handle both quantitative and 
qualitative risk assessment problems. It can be used in HAZID and risk evaluation. The 
technique is a deductive reasoning approach, and it is probably the most widely used 
technique for hazard identification and risk estimation for its ability to analyse systems 
with diverse sizes for risk assessment purposes (Peng et al., 2016; Mokhtari et al., 2011; 
Lindhe et al., 2009; Yuhua and Datao, 2005; Lavasani et al., 2015b). The hierarchy of 
a fault tree is based on multiple gates constructed to clarify the causes of a failure or an 
event. “AND” and “OR” are the two logic gates used in this process. Both help define 
the route to the top event. In other words, these two gates clarify the event’s connection 
with the occurrence of the unwanted event (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). Within the 
fault tree graphical modal, the AND gate is employed if the all the inputs result in the 
output. On the other hand, if less than all of the inputs result in the output, the OR gate 
is used. The modal logic gates define the calculation formula in order to obtain the 
unwanted event assessment (Lavasani et al., 2012).  
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2.7.2.3 Event Tree Analysis (ETA)  
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is a forward logic technique that is used to analysis the 
consequences that would accompany the occurrence of an unwanted event (Ferdous et 
al., 2009). Since the successful introduction of the technique in the WASH 1400 nuclear 
study in the 1960s, ETA started to be applied in risk assessments research in different 
areas such as chemical processing, offshore oil and gas production, and transportation 
(Andrews and Dunnett, 2000). The technique allows for assessment of the frequency of 
an event, which involves identifying the trigger or initiator of the event and how fatal 
the event can be (Cigolini and Rossi, 2010). ETA is a largely logical bottom-up diagram 
that can be applied in the production and process of transporting oil and gas and in order 
to investigate unknown effects from known causes (Mokhtari et al., 2011; Khakzad et 
al., 2013a; Ferdous et al., 2011). The logical diagram variables mostly connect by 
following a series of paths. Therefore, the occurrence of an event gives an assurance of 
the events that follow within the diagram through its success or failure (Ferdous et al., 
2009). ETA is a safety/risk analysis technique used in the risk evaluation phase; in ETA, 
the probability of each of the unwanted event’s possible paths is identified using 
historical data or expert judgement (Ronza et al., 2003; Mokhtari et al., 2011; Khan et 
al., 2015). The ETA technique tree can be applied to many different scenarios and gives 
a true expression of an event’s final fatal consequences. The technique analyses the 
probability of an event’s consequences through taking into consideration the accident’s 
probability of existence and the likelihood of failure or success in each path (Khakzad 
et al., 2013a). 
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2.7.2.4 Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) 
Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) was introduced by Prof. L. Zadeh in the 1960s for uncertainty 
treatment within the possibility theory bases (Riahi et al., 2012). As the name suggests, 
fuzzy sets cater not only to ideas that are completely true or completely false but also 
to those that lie in between. FST is a powerful technique to analyse systems with 
uncertainty situations due to human or machine actions (Ballı and Korukoğlu, 2009). 
Unlike the probability theory, in which values are indicated by numbers, the values in 
the possibility theory are indicated by words, whether in natural or artificial language, 
such as high, medium, and low for dealing with uncertainty (Riahi et al., 2012). This 
method consists of a set of objects with a range of grades of membership. The set is 
represented by a membership (characteristic) function, with each object having a 
membership degree ranging between 0 and 1 (Rahman, 2012; Ren et al., 2005). The 
theory also allows mathematical operators and programming to apply to the fuzzy 
domain. Furthermore, a fuzzy set is an extension of a crisp set. 
FST is a powerful tool which has been successfully applied in various risk assessment 
and risk management studies in several fields due to the technique’s ability to deal with 
vagueness of human judgment. Fuzzy environments that benefit from this technique 
include engineering, medicine, computer science, and several operational research 
areas such as the oil and petroleum industries. In the petroleum production and 
transportation industry, FST uses quantitative information to determine the possibilities 
of accidents occurring (Elsayed et al., 2009; Mokhtari et al., 2012; Yuhua and Datao, 
2005; Shahriar et al., 2012).  
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2.7.2.5 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a well-known multi-criteria decision making tool 
that was introduced in the 1970s by Thomas L Saaty (Alexander, 2012). According to 
Varma et al. (2008), this powerful technique for analysing complex systems is usually 
used when choosing from among several alternatives. AHP technique is known for its 
ability to provide a comparison of a list of considered options according to each option’s 
weight through performing a pairwise comparison of a group of criteria. Moreover, the 
technique has the ability to deal with large numbers of decision-making criteria of both 
a quantitative and a qualitative nature, and it also simplifies the decision making process 
with its hierarchy structure formation (Cheng and Li, 2001). Instead of plainly deciding 
which decision is the best one, the process helps in making a decision that is best in line 
with the goals of the organisation, as it allows deep consideration of how the decision 
makers understand the problem (Liu et al., 2011a). The technique starts by breaking 
down the problem into a hierarchical structure with different levels. Each level is 
analysed independently up to the top level (Varma et al., 2008). This method is also 
useful in analysing the other alternative solutions. Various elements are evaluated by 
comparing them to other elements one at a time (Cheng et al., 2002). The AHP approach 
has been widely and successfully used in several fields (Katarne and Negi, 2013; 
Pecchia et al., 2011; Wickramasinghe and Takano, 2009; Kubler et al., 2016; Dawotola 
et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2016) 
2.7.2.6 Evidential Reasoning (ER) 
Evidential reasoning (ER) theory has been used to deal with multi attribute decision 
making analysis since the 1990s (Yang and Xu, 2004; Xu, 2012). ER approach 
addresses problems that involve both quantitative and qualitative measures under 
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uncertainty based on the Dempster–Shafer theory. The Dempster–Shafer theory of 
evidence or D-S theory allows the aggregation of different pieces of evidence using 
their Degrees of Belief (DoBs) (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993; Kong et al., 2012; Riahi et 
al., 2012). This approach has been used to develop models that are used in assessing 
risk, the impact of those risks on the environment, the risk of fraud, the level of 
information security, and the risk of information quality (Wang et al., 2013b). Unlike 
all other multi-attribute decision-making approaches, ER is capable of handling 
incomplete, uncertain, and vague data through allowing the decision maker to illustrate 
a belief degree less than 1 (Li and Liao, 2007; Riahi, 2010). The ER mechanism allows 
aggregation of the attributes at the same levels of the approach hierarchy up to the 
system’s highest level. The ER approach has been widely and successfully used in 
several fields for dealing with multi-attribute decision-making problems under 
uncertainty in a reliable, transparent, and reasonable way (Alyami et al., 2016; Yang et 
al., 2014; Yeo et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2016; John et al., 2014a).     
2.7.2.7 Bayesian Network (BN)  
At Stanford University in the 1970s, the basic Bayesian theory and a networking 
technique were successfully married into a single technique in order to develop a strong 
framework for dealing with uncertainty problems. The marriage of these techniques 
created the technique known as Bayesian Network (BN) (McCabe et al., 1998; 
Bernardo and Smith, 2009). The first application of BNs, as addressed by Andreassen 
et al. (1989), occurred when Munin first researched using the technique. Since Munin’s 
research, the method has become popular and is now widely applied due to its ability 
to model many real world problems (Oliver and Smith, 1990; Ottonello et al., 1992; 
Burnell and Horvitz, 1995; Szolovits and Pauker, 1993; Russell and Norvig, 1995). BN, 
which is also known as Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs), is an artificial intelligence 
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technique that aims to provide a decision-support framework for problems involving 
uncertainty, complexity, and probabilistic reasoning (Ben-Gal, 2007). A set of random 
variables is represented in the BN probability graphical model. The technique graphical 
models a set of nodes and links are presented. The nodes represent random variables, 
and each node is connected to another node. The nodes’ relationships (i.e. parent node 
to child node) are represented by a connection (link) representing the dependencies 
between these variables (Vinnem et al., 2012). According to Trucco et al. (2008), this 
link starts from the parent node and ends with an arrowhead pointing to the child node. 
The BN approach has been widely and successfully used in several fields (Riahi et al., 
2013; Montewka et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2015; Khakzad et al., 2013a; Khakzad et al., 
2013b).     
2.7.3 Risk Mitigation Phase 
Risk may be described as the chance of occurrence of undesired activities. In the case 
of petroleum transportation, the consequences of these activities are oil spillage. Oil 
spillage has the potential to have adverse effects on the surrounding environment, 
culture, and economic resources. The outcome of spillage might threaten not only the 
petroleum flow within the system but also human and natural life. In risk analysis, a 
higher risk reflects a higher probability and more severe consequences of the hazard 
event. Risk-control/mitigation is a major element in addressing a risk and is required in 
order to reduce the risks associated with high-risk hazards (Wang, 2001; Wang and 
Foinikis, 2001; Wang, 2002). Risk mitigation usually involves taking steps to reduce 
the effects of a risk. Mitigation can be accomplished through two major steps: reducing 
the probability of occurrence of the likely undesirable result and mitigating the 
consequences should the unwanted event occur anyway (Lassen, 2008). In other words, 
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these two steps are introduced in order to reduce the frequency of an event or to prevent 
it from happening altogether. When reducing the consequences, preparation must be 
made to reduce the impact of the spill on humans and valuable resources. For example, 
fires should be avoided as well as human contact with the spilled substance (Menoni 
and Margottini, 2011). All statutory regulations, classification of societies’ rules, and 
the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) conventions and codes are typical 
examples of strategies used for the purpose of risk mitigation. In this phase, various 
analysis techniques are usually performed for measuring and selecting the best solution 
among various strategies for mitigating the risk. The multi-criteria decision-making 
techniques such as AHP, Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal 
Solution (TOPSIS), ER, and VIKOR are the most popular techniques for risk mitigation 
purposes. 
2.7.3.1 Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution 
(TOPSIS) 
The Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), was 
generated by Hwang and Yoon in 1981 (Suder et al., 2015; Chang et al., 2014; Zandi 
and Tavana, 2011; Peng et al., 2011). The developed approach is utilised to deal with 
multi-attribute decision-making problems. The technique is built around the concept of 
ranking alternatives based on their distance from the Positive Ideal Solution (PIS) and 
the Negative Ideal Solution (NIS), where the preferred alternative has the shortest 
distance to the PIS and the farthest distance to the NIS (Rahman, 2012; John et al., 
2014b; Ertuğrul and Karakaşoğlu, 2009; Behzadian et al., 2012). In other words, 
TOPSIS is a decision-making tool that takes into account the distance between the PIS 
and NIS in ranking and deciding between the system alternatives. The PIS maximises 
the benefit criteria and minimises the cost criteria, but the NIS does the opposite 
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statement (i.e. increases the cost criteria and reduces the benefit criteria). TOPSIS is a 
powerful technique which has been extensively used in different fields such as in 
engineering (John et al., 2014b; Krohling and Campanharo, 2011), healthcare 
(Büyüközkan and Çifçi, 2012), finance (Mardani et al., 2015; Ertuğrul and 
Karakaşoğlu, 2009) and management (Liao and Kao, 2011). It offers simplicity in 
calculation and the capability to deal with complex systems, which includes selecting 
the best and the worst solution from several alternatives in a system and presenting 
them in a ranking order (Behzadian et al., 2012; Rahman, 2012; Suder et al., 2015). For 
example, in the petroleum industry, Wood (2016) used the method to determine which 
option could be selected by suppliers for development projects across the petroleum 
industry (Wood, 2016). TOPSIS can be used to identify the best option for a system. 
For instance, the major petroleum transportation mode for long distances on land is a 
pipeline system. However, if pipelines cannot be used due to uncertainties such as 
cracking of the pipes, TOPSIS can be used to calculate the next best mode that can be 
used in place of pipelines (Ertuğrul and Karakaşoğlu, 2008). 
2.7.3.2 VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR) 
VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR), is a multi-attribute 
decision-making tool that was established by Opricovic in 1998 and developed by 
Opricovic and Tzeng in 2004 for multi-criteria optimisation problems and compromise 
solutions (Tzeng and Huang, 2011; Tzeng et al., 2005; Kaya and Kahraman, 2011). The 
technique was built around the concept of distance from the Ideal Solution for ranking 
the alternatives (Opricovic and Tzeng, 2004; Rezaie et al., 2014; Ebrahimnejad et al., 
2012). Unlike TOPSIS, VIKOR used a formula that fused the ranking index (i.e. the 
VIKOR index). This index uses all criteria, the relative importance of the criteria, and 
a balance between total and individual satisfaction in order to determine a compromise 
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solution based on each solution’s distance from the ideal solution (Chu et al., 2007; 
Tzeng and Huang, 2011). In other words, VIKOR is a decision-making tool that 
produces a ranked list of solutions after taking into account the distance from the ideal 
solution. Many researchers have successfully applied the technique in economics, 
finance, anthropology, communication systems, transport infrastructure, and even in 
humanities studies (Yazdani-Chamzini et al., 2013; Bazzazi et al., 2011; Sanayei et al., 
2010; Jahan et al., 2011; Rezaie et al., 2014; Yalcin et al., 2012).   
2.8 Existing Hazards in Petroleum Transportation System 
In the past decades, studies have examined the safety of the petroleum industry in 
different areas within its supply chain such as petroleum production, storage, marine 
transportation, inland transportation, offshore and onshore terminals refining, system 
infrastructure etc. Studies on the PTSs chain have commonly been investigating 
operational risk in a specific segment/local level instead of from a system perspective. 
Generic PTSs can be categorised into 1) petroleum terminal operation, 2) ship 
transportation operation, and 3) pipeline transportation operation. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
the systems within PTSs in a generic picture. In this thesis, the literature review has 
been used to detect the hazards and the hazard events of petroleum ports, ships, and 
pipeline systems. According to Hassler (2011), operational risk is one of the driven risk 
sources in transportation systems, where crude oil spill is one of the driven sources of 
this hazard. Within this study, a careful identification process (i.e. literature review) has 
been carried out to identify the driven sources of oil spills in PTSs.  
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Figure 2.1: Main hierarchical structure if the risk in Petroleum Transportation 
Systems (PTSs) 
 
2.8.1 Petroleum Port 
Operational risk was defined by Chavez-Demoulin (2006) as risk associated with 
carrying out an operation. With respect to the operational activities that occur in the 
ports area, oil spill is a widespread hazard associated with marine transportation. 
According to O’Rourke and Connolly (2003), “The current separation between the 
location of oil reserves and the location of oil consumption necessitates that crude oil 
be transported great distances to refineries and consumer markets”. Consequently, 
almost 60% of petroleum is transported by sea to reach the final customer (Burgherr, 
2007). Therefore, about 60% of all transported petroleum passes through the 
petroleum port system.  
Diverse activities take place at ports area, such as activities related to oil terminals and 
port-vessel related activities (e.g., loading/unloading activities) (Ronza et al., 2006). 
Leaks and spillages may occur during the handling operation of transferring crude oil 
from the terminal to tankers or vice versa, as this process requires equipment such as 
pipelines. A crude oil spill not only leads to loss of the product, its impact extends to 
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reach economic and environmental levels (Ventikos and Psaraftis, 2004). Furthermore, 
continued operational failure may lead to an organisation’s loss of reputation among 
the public at large and its shareholders. For example, two of the largest marine spills 
in US history occurred because of well blowouts during ocean drilling (Ronza et al., 
2003). According to the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited 
(ITOPF) statistics (2015), from 2004 to 2014 there were 132 spills where 
approximately 102,000 tons of oil were lost as a result of maritime activities. 
Therefore, with the increase in marine activities, there is the potential for oil spills to 
occur more regularly with the lack of protective processes.  
A single failure or mistake is not the most common reason for an accident to occur. 
Rather, accidents tend to occur due to the confluence of a whole series of errors. For a 
spill of petroleum caused during the operational process, accidents are often initiated 
by errors induced by machinery failures, human failures, or a combination of both. 
This internal operational failure leads to a crude oil spill and affects the petroleum flow 
within the Maritime Petroleum Transportation Networks (MPTNs). Therefore, the 
most important elements that affect the safety of the petroleum terminal are listed as 
follows (see Figure 2.1):  
 Human-Related Hazards 
 Machinery-Related Hazards 
 Natueral-Related Hazards 
These three hazard sources are investigated in the following sections. 
2.8.1.1 Human-Related Hazards 
Human activities are a prime source of hazards and can contribute to a cause of 
accidents within PTSs. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) defines the 
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human-related factor in the maritime industry, as follows (IMO, 2008): “A departure 
from acceptable or desirable practice on the part of an individual or group of 
individuals that can result in unacceptable or undesirable results”. There is a growing 
awareness of the neglect of the human elements in risk education strategies due to the 
severe consequences that can result from human error that threatens humans and 
businesses (Rothblum, 2000). Most studies agree that the majority of accidents that 
occur in crude oil transportation operations are primarily attributable to human 
activities (Martins and Maturana, 2013; Eleye-Datubo et al., 2006; Ventikos and 
Psaraftis, 2004; Ren, 2008; Wang et al., 2011; Horck, 2008).  
Human Failure can be evaluated by the aggregation of the following four elements 
(see Table 2.4): 
• Organisation/Management Failure 
• Terminal/Vessel Personal Error 
• Operators’ Error 
• Ship/Port Interference 
Table 2.4: Summary of human-related hazards that affect terminal operation 
within PTSs 
Main criteria Description Hazards Reference 
Organisation/
Management 
Failure 
A failure caused by an 
organisation or 
management decision 
that affects the safety 
of the operation 
Company Policies, 
Company 
Standards, and 
Management 
Procedure. 
Mokhtari et al. (2012); John 
et al. (2014a); Skogdalen 
and Vinnem (2011); 
Grabowski et al. (2010); 
Brattbakk et al. (2005); 
Wang et al. (2011) 
Personal Error 
An individual-related 
error that affects the 
safety operations of ports 
system 
Inattention, Skills, 
Fatigue, and Neglect. 
Cai et al. (2013); International 
Safety Guide for Oil Tankers 
and Terminals (2006); Eleye-
Datubo et al. (2006); Ren et 
al. (2008); Ventikos and 
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Psaraftis (2004); Riahi et al. 
(2012); Vinnem et al. (2012); 
Ceyhun (2014); Uğurlu et al. 
(2015); Wang et al. (2011) 
Operators’ Error 
A failure related to the 
operator that affects the 
safety of the operation 
Breakdown of 
Communication, 
Communication 
Misunderstanding, 
Wrong Signals, 
Overfill, SOPs Not 
Followed, 
Overpressure, 
Release From 
Loading Arm, and 
Understaffing. 
Trbojevic and Carr (2000); 
Cai et al. (2013); Horck 
(2008); International Safety 
Guide for Oil Tankers and 
Terminals (2006); Wang et al. 
(2011); Rao and Raghavan  
(1996); Chang and Lin (2006); 
Eleye-Datubo et al. (2006); 
Ventikos and Psaraftis (2004); 
Ronza et al. (2006); Ronza et 
al. (2003); Riahi et al. (2012); 
Vinnem et al. (2012); 
Grabowski et al. (2010) 
Ship/Port 
Interference 
Poor or failed interaction 
at ports area between 
ports and tankers, e.g., 
poor operation between 
ship and port operators, 
or between moving or 
immobile objects (ship 
and berth or a ship with 
other ships) 
Procedural Failure, 
and Collision 
between Ship and 
Other Ship/Berth 
Trbojevic and Carr (2000); 
Christie (2014); Rømer et al. 
(1993); Martins and Maturana 
(2013); Horck (2008); Ren et 
al. (2008); Ventikos and 
Psaraftis (2004); Ronza et al. 
(2003); Ronza et al. (2006); 
Rømer et al. (1995); Ceyhun 
(2014); Ismail and Karim 
(2013); Uğurlu et al. (2015). 
2.8.1.2 Machinery-Related Hazards 
In this context, a machine is a tool used for the operational process that occurs in the 
ports area. A small failure in a machine’s activity or parts may lead to loss of a large 
volume of a hazardous cargo, in this case, petroleum. Therefore, operators should not 
overlook the danger of equipment failure (Shang and Tseng, 2010). According to 
Chang and Lin (2006), machinery-related hazards have their own share in the failures 
that occur at oil terminals and lead to oil spills. The ITOPF and Major Hazard Incident 
Data Service (MHIDAS) databases highlight that oil spillage might occur due to 
machinery failure. Consequently, engineering skills are required to maintain the 
equipment in good working order (Darbra and Casal, 2004). Certain researchers 
(Vinnem et al., 2012; Cai et al., 2013; Rao and Raghavan, 1996; Ronza et al., 2003; 
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Ronza et al., 2006) have identified that machinery failure should be taken into 
consideration during the operational process. 
Machinery failure can be evaluated by the aggregation of the following two elements 
(see Table 2.5): 
 Maintenance Failure 
 Equipment Failure 
Table 2.5: Summary of machinery-related hazards that affect terminal operation 
within PTSs 
Main criteria Description Hazards Reference 
Maintenance 
Failure 
A failure that occurs 
after maintenance 
activities caused by 
an error or an 
omission during the 
maintenance 
Maintenance Omission, Lack of 
Tools/Spare Parts, Inappropriate 
maintenance, and Use of 
Inappropriate Tools/Spare Parts 
Chang and Lin (2006); 
Ronza et al. (2003); 
Thorsen and Dalva (1995); 
Vinnem et al. (2012); Liu 
and Frangopol (2006); 
International Safety Guide 
for Oil Tankers and 
Terminals (2006); Nwaoha 
et al. (2013) 
Equipment 
Failure 
Any event in which 
the equipment 
cannot accomplish 
its intended purpose 
or task 
Lack of Communication 
System, Lack of Lighting 
System, Lack of Movable 
Facilities, A/C System Failure, 
Control System Failure, 
Instrument Failure, Cathodic 
Protection Failure, Gasket 
Failure, Pipeline Failure, Valve 
Failure, Loading Arm/SBM 
Failure, Hose/Pump Failure, and 
Power Failure 
Cai et al. (2013); Rao and 
Raghavan  (1996); Chang 
and Lin (2006); Darbra 
and Casal (2004); Ronza et 
al. (2006); Thorsen and 
Dalva (1995); Vinnem et 
al. (2012); International 
Safety Guide for Oil 
Tankers and Terminals 
(2006); Nwaoha et al. 
(2013); Soszynska (2010) 
2.8.1.3 Natural-Related Hazards 
Unpredicted natural events can influence operations at oil terminals. Such events are 
capable of disrupting maritime business and therefore make this business vulnerable 
to hazards. A limited amount of research has highlighted the importance and 
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effectiveness of nature in causing accidents. According to Kröger (2008), 
hydrological, atmospheric, and seismic hazards are the categories for the main natural-
related hazards, which are responsible for about 4% of accidents. The effects of these 
hazards have consistently increased the costs of the oil terminals in the form of annual 
maintenance, reconstruction, and preparedness. For example, Hurricane Sandy, which 
struck New York Harbor’s oil terminal in 2012, damaged the infrastructure and the 
environment.  
Natural-related hazards can be evaluated by the aggregation of the following three 
elements (see Table 2.6): 
• Hydrologic hazards 
• Atmospheric hazards 
• Seismic hazards 
Table 2.6: Summary of nature-related hazards that affect terminal operation 
within PTSs 
2.8.2 Tanker Transportation 
Oil tankers are floating objects classified by different sizes in order to transfer the 
crude product from point A to point B across the sea. According to Burgherr (2007), 
almost 60% of petroleum is transported by sea. International maritime authorities have 
recently been working to improve the safety of shipping transportation (Celik et al., 
Main criteria Hazards Reference 
Natural-Related 
Hazards 
Heavy Rainfall, Flood, Snow, 
Hurricane, Tornadoes, 
Lightning, Earthquake, and 
Tsunami 
Skogdalen and Vinnem (2011); Ronza et 
al. (2003); Mokhtari et al. (2012); John et 
al. (2014a); Kröger (2008); Chang and Lin 
(2006); Trbojevic and Carr, (2000); Guha-
Sapir et al. (2012); Ceyhun (2014); Ismail 
and Karim (2013). 
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2010; Hetherington et al., 2006; Chauvin et al., 2013). However, despite significant 
efforts, shipping accidents are still occurring. The European Maritime Safety Agency 
(EMSA) (2016) stated that 5,942 marine accidents occurred from 2011 to 2015. This 
report highlights that accidents involving oil tankers significantly increased in 2015 
and that the majority of these accidents took place at ports (EMSA, 2016). Historically, 
shipping accidents have been the result of human errors, technical and mechanical 
failures, and environmental factors. In this study, ship accidents are classified based 
on the type of accident as follows:  
 Collision 
 Grounding 
 Hull Failure 
 Equipment Failure 
 Fire/Explosion 
The mentioned hazard sources are investigated in the following sections. 
2.8.2.1 Collision 
A collision is an interaction that occurs between two ships, between a ship and a port 
jetty, or between a ship and another floating or immovable body. In recent years, ship 
collision was the cause behind two of the largest spills in 2015 and 2017. Both of these 
spills occurred in January, but in different years and different areas (i.e. near Singapore 
and Kamarajar Ports) (MPA, 2015; Simhan, 2017). Certain researchers (Soares and 
Teixeira, 2001; Uğurlu et al., 2016; Montewka et al., 2011; Zaman et al., 2015; Li et 
al., 2012a; Vanem and Skjong, 2004) have identified that collision accidents should 
not be neglected because of the high risk that follows such accidents. Collision 
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accidents destabilize the individuals, publics, and industries involved. The EMSA 
(2016) found that collision was also the cause of the most oil tanker accidents between 
the years of 2011 and 2015. ITOPF (2017) highlighted that ship collision was the major 
accident category behind crude oil spills, accounting for 26% of the biggest spills 
between 1970 and 2016. 
Collisions can be evaluated by the aggregation of the following two elements (see 
Table 2.7): 
• Internal Factors  
• External Factors 
Table 2.7: Summary of collision hazards that affect ship operations within PTSs 
Main Factors Description Hazards Reference 
Internal 
Factors 
Failures related to 
either machinery or 
navigational errors 
that occur due to 
operational failure 
on board 
Main Engine Failure,  Bridge 
Navigation Equipment Failure,  
Communication System Failure,  
Wrong use of Navigation 
Equipment,  Lack of 
Communication,  Failure to Follow 
Operational Procedure,  Action To 
Avoid Collision,  Human 
Inattention,  Human Neglect,  
Human Fatigue,  and Human 
Skills, 
Uğurlu et al. (2015); 
Uğurlu et al. (2016); 
Montewka et al. 
(2011); Zaman et al. 
(2015); Li et al. 
(2012a); Hänninen and 
Kujala (2009); Gucma 
and Przywarty (2008); 
Qu et al. (2012). 
External 
Factors 
Off-board actions 
that affect the 
overall ship 
operation 
Weather Condition, and Third 
Party Activity 
Uğurlu et al. (2015); 
Uğurlu et al. (2016); 
Montewka et al. 
(2011); Zaman et al. 
(2015); Li et al. 
(2012a); Hänninen and 
Kujala (2009). 
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2.8.2.2 Grounding  
The Exxon Valdes oil spill in 1989, which remains one of the largest crude oil spills 
in history, was the result of ship grounding. 37,000 tonnes of crude oil spilled due to 
this accident (ITOPF, 2017). One of the main reasons behind this type of operation 
failure is failure to account for sea depth. Grounding diminishes the strength of the 
ship hull and makes the ship in an unfavourable situation for loading conditions (Gill 
et al., 2012; Piatt et al., 1990; Williams et al., 1994). This operation failure affects the 
environment and poses a threat to human life and the culpable business (Martins and 
Maturana, 2010; Uğurlu et al., 2015; Mazaheri et al., 2015; Samuelides et al., 2009; 
Li et al., 2012a). From 1970 to 2016, a total of 150 accidents took place; ship 
grounding was considered to be the main accident category among all operational 
accidents, with the consequences totalling over 700 tonnes of oil spilled (ITOPF, 
2017). Within the last few years (from 2011 to 2015), approximately 50 tanker 
accidents have occurred due to ship grounding (EMSA, 2016).  
Grounding can be evaluated by the aggregation of the following two elements (see 
Table 2.8): 
• Internal Factors  
• External Factors 
Table 2.8: Summary of grounding hazards that affect ship operations within 
PTSs 
Main Factors Description Hazards Reference 
Internal 
Factors 
Failures that occur 
due to operational 
failure on tanker. 
This failure is 
either related to 
Main Engine Failure,  Bridge 
Navigation Equipment Failure,  
Communication System Failure,  
Wrong use of Navigation 
Equipment,  Lack of 
Uğurlu et al. (2015); 
Uğurlu et al. (2016); 
Martins and Maturana 
(2010); Mazaheri et al. 
(2015); Akhtar and Utne 
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machinery or 
navigational errors 
Communication,  Rout Selection, 
Failure to Follow Operational 
Procedure,  Action To Avoid 
Collision,  Human Inattention,  
Human Neglect,  Human Fatigue,  
and Human Skills. 
(2014); Kite-Powell et al. 
(1999); Mohović et al. 
(2013); Cross and Ballesio 
(2003) 
External 
Factors 
Outside actions 
that affect the safe 
operation of the 
ship 
Weather Condition, Water Depth, 
and Third Party Activity. 
Uğurlu et al. (2015); 
Uğurlu et al. (2016); 
Montewka et al. (2011); 
Kite-Powell et al. (1999); 
Quy et al. (2006); Briggs 
et al. (2003). 
2.8.2.3 Hull Failure 
The hull of a tanker is, roughly speaking, the body of the ship. In ship design, hulls 
have passed through several generations, from the single hull of the first generation to 
the double side, double bottom, and double hulls of subsequent generations. The 
accident of the Exxon Valdes oil spill played an indirect role in the redesign of hulls 
from single hulls to the current generations that aim to enhance vessel safety (Gill et 
al., 2012; Piatt et al., 1990; Williams et al., 1994). These hull generations are a vital 
safety measure for tankers. Still, despite all this improvement, hull failures are 
considered as one of the major operation failures for ship operations in recent years. In 
recent years, no reported ship transportation accidents have been attributed to ship hull 
failure. Still, looking at the history, hull failure has been the cause of oil spills at anchor 
areas, in open water, and during loading and unloading operations (ITOPF, 2017; 
EMSA, 2016).    
Hull failure can be evaluated by the aggregation of the following two elements (see 
Table 2.9): 
• Structural Failures  
• Procedural Failures 
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Table 2.9: Summary of hull failure hazards that affect ship operation within 
PTSs 
Main Factors Hazards Reference 
Structural 
Failures 
Construction Damage, Hull 
Corrosion, and Maintenance 
Failure 
Wang et al. (2002); Hussein and Soares (2009); 
Kim et al. (2014); DeCola (2009); Terhune 
(2011); Tzannatos and Xirouchakis (2013); 
Akpan et al. (2002); 
Procedural 
Failures 
Stowage Planning Failure, 
Collision, and Grounding 
Vanem and Skjong (2004); Kim et al. (2013); 
Akyuz, (2015); Wang et al. (2002); Kim et al. 
(2014); DeCola (2009); Terhune (2011); 
Tzannatos and Xirouchakis (2013) 
2.8.2.4 Equipment Failure 
Equipment failure is one of the major types of accident that might lead to crude oil spill. 
Due to the complexity and amount of equipment involved in the operation process of 
oil tankers, dangerous that tracks the operating equipment failure should not overlook 
(Shang and Tseng, 2010). Damage to the equipment might harm the operation and 
environment. Part of operating tankers is maintaining the equipment; failing to maintain 
equipment might contribute to operational risks (Xie et al., 2010; Lindgren and 
Sosnowski, 2009). Unlike collision and grounding, equipment failure is a main cause 
of major, moderate, and minor petroleum spills. The ITOPF and MHIDAS databases 
state that loading and discharging operations comprise one of the major areas for a 
crude oil spill due to equipment failure. There are various causes behind this failure 
(see Table 2.10). The operational process on any ship is a step-by-step process that 
plays a direct and an indirect role in enhancing the vessel safety. That process includes 
ensuring that equipment is operating in a safe condition.  
Equipment failure can be evaluated by the aggregation of the following two elements 
(see Table 2.10): 
• Machinery-Related Failures  
• Man-Related Failures 
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Table 2.10: Summary of equipment failure hazards that affect ship operations 
within PTSs 
Main Factors Description Hazards Reference 
Machinery-
Related 
Failures 
Failures that occur 
due to the ship 
operational 
equipment 
Pipe Failure, Valve Failure, Pump 
Failure, Tank Gauging System, 
Manifold Failure, Power Failure, 
Heating System Failure, Loading 
Computer, Maintenance Error, and 
Maintenance Omission. 
Uğurlu et al. (2015); 
Uğurlu et al. (2016); 
Martins and Maturana 
(2010); Mazaheri et 
al. (2015); Akhtar and 
Utne (2014); Kite-
Powell et al. (1999); 
Mohović et al. (2013); 
Cross and Ballesio 
(2003) 
Man-Related 
Failures 
Human activities 
that cause failures to 
occur in the 
operational 
equipment 
Lack of Communication, Procedural 
Failure, Human Inattention, Human 
Neglect, Human Fatigue, and Human 
Skills. 
Uğurlu et al. (2015); 
Uğurlu et al. (2016); 
Montewka et al. 
(2011); Kite-Powell et 
al. (1999); Quy et al. 
(2006); Briggs et al. 
(2003). 
2.8.2.5 Fire/Explosion 
Fires and/or explosions form another of the accident classifications for crude oil spills. 
This type of accident might cause tragic results for human life and the environment 
(Zhang et al., 2013b; Gasparotti and Rusu, 2012; Samuelides et al., 2009). Compared 
with the other four types of tanker accidents (i.e. collision, grounding, hull failure, and 
equipment failure), fires/explosions historically from 1975 to 2015 have caused fewer 
oil spills. Nonetheless this type of accident should be involved when considering the 
hazards associated with ship transportation. The database of EMSA (2016) recorded 
that from 2011 to 2015, fewer than 50 ship tanker accidents were due to fire/explosion. 
One died and four suffered burns after a massive explosion of a petroleum tanker at Al 
Hamriyah port in 2017 (Aghaddir, 2017).  
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Fires/explosions can be evaluated by the aggregation of the following two elements 
(see Table 2.11): 
• Internal Factors  
• External Factors 
Table 2.11: Summary of fires/explosions hazards that affect ship operations 
within PTSs 
Main Factors Hazards Reference 
Internal Factors 
Inert Gas/Ventilation System 
Failure, Electric Failure, 
Pumping Room Failure, Main 
Engine Failure, Heating 
system Failure, Human 
Inattention, Human Neglect, 
and Human Skills. 
Cross and Ballesio (2003); Lindgren and 
Sosnowski (2009); Uğurlu et al. (2015); 
International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers 
and Terminals (2006); Li et al. (2012a); 
IMO (2008); Trucco et al. (2008); Riahi et 
al. (2012); Vinnem et al. (2012); Trbojevic 
and Carr (2000) 
External Factors 
Spread of Fire From Other 
Object, Sabotage, and 
Weather Condition. 
 
Uğurlu et al. (2015); International Safety 
Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (2006); 
Li et al. (2012a); IMO (2008); Lehr (2009); 
Nwaoha et al. (2013) 
2.8.3 Pipeline Transportation  
Pipelines within the petroleum industry are used to transport crude or refined products 
by pumping the product through the pipes to reach the final destinations. The final 
destinations might be a port, a refinery, or a storage area (Aroh et al., 2010; Papadakis, 
1999; Yuhua and Datao, 2005). Pipelines are the most used modes in order to transfer 
the product by land; pipelines are constructed above or under the ground (Dziubiński 
et al., 2006; Brito and Almeida, 2009). In recent years, the pipeline safety level has 
significantly improved via changes to pipeline building materials and dimensions 
(Restrepo et al., 2009). Nonetheless, rupture and puncture pipeline accidents, such as 
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with the Shell and Sunoco pipeline leak in 2016, still occur. In addition, the 
CONCAWE (2017) annual spillage database recorded that 196 spillage incidents were 
reported from 2011 to 2015. Based on historical data, pipeline failures can be due to 
internal and external failures (see Figure 2.1). 
2.8.3.1 Internal Failures 
Internal failures are hazards in the pipeline system that are either related to the system 
design or to the operator who executes the operation process. According to the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE), internal hazards were the main reason for 32% of the 
system failures (HSE, 1999). For example, in 2014 and 2015, seven accidents were 
recorded as causing crude oil spills (CONCAWE, 2017). Internal failures have received 
attention in numerous studies due to the consequences that follow (Mohamed et al., 
2011; Simonoff et al., 2010; Rios et al., 2015; Dawotola et al., 2011; Dawotola et al., 
2012). Studies show that 14.9% of the total crude oil spills in 2002–2005 in the United 
States occurred due to the corrosion caused by pipes corrosive (Restrepo et al., 2009). 
Internal failures can be evaluated by the aggregation of the following three elements 
(see Table 2.12): 
• Operator Failures  
• Structural Failures 
• Corrosion 
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Table 2.12: Summary of internal failure hazards that affect pipeline operations 
within PTSs 
Main Factors Hazards Reference 
Operator Failures 
Failure to Follow Procedure, 
and Maintenance Failure 
Yuhua and Datao (2005); Jo and Ahn 
(2005); El-Abbasy et al. (2015); 
CONCAWE (2017); HSE (1999) 
Structural 
Failures 
Material Failure, and 
Construction Failure 
Yuhua and Datao (2005); Onuoha et al. 
(2008); Jo and Ahn (2005); CONCAWE 
(2017); HSE (1999); Soszynska (2010) 
Corrosion 
Internal Corrosion, and External 
Corrosion 
CONCAWE (2017); Yuhua and Datao 
(2005); El-Abbasy et al. (2017); HSE (1999) 
2.8.3.2 External Failures 
External failures are hazards that are man-made or nature-based hazards. They affect 
either the operation process or the facility structure of the pipeline. If any external 
failures accrue, they could lead to crude oil spillage. These failures are dangerous not 
only to the business but also to the environment. The Health and Safety Executive 
(1999) highlights that the majority, at 64%, of spills in recent years are due to external 
hazards. Accidents related to human interaction with pipelines cause the majority of 
pipeline crude oil spills. For instance, only in 2015 third party activities caused 87 spills 
(CONCAWE, 2017). This statistic highlights the significant importance of addressing 
external failures. The causes of external failures have been investigated by several 
researchers (Girgin and Krausmann et al., 2014; Onuoha et al., 2008; Anifowose et al., 
2012; Yuhua and Datao, 2005). 
External failures can be evaluated by the aggregation of the following two elements 
(see Table 2.13): 
• Natural Hazards  
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• Third Party Activity 
Table 2.13: Summary of external failure hazards that affect pipeline operations 
within PTSs 
Main Factors Hazards Reference 
Natural Hazards 
Weather Condition, and 
Geological Hazards 
Yuhua and Datao (2005); Girgin and 
Krausmann (2014); Girgin and Krausmann 
(2016); El-Abbasy et al. (2015); 
CONCAWE (2017); HSE (1999) 
Third Party 
Activity 
Workers’ Actions, and Sabotage 
Yuhua and Datao (2005); Onuoha et al. 
(2008); Anifowose et al. (2012); 
CONCAWE (2017); HSE (1999) 
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed PTSs to exhibit their impact on the petroleum industry. PTSs 
contain multiple systems, and their operational processes include petroleum tankers, 
terminal facilities, and pipeline infrastructure. These aspects were described, and a 
detailed review followed that focused on previous accidents for the systems involved 
within PTSs. This chapter carefully discussed the theory, practice, and research 
developed in the risk assessment of petroleum ports, tankers, and pipelines. The chapter 
also overviewed existing safety/risk analysis techniques such as Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), Evidential Reasoning (ER), Bayesian Network 
(BN), and VIKOR. The links of those techniques to risk assessment were discussed and 
supported with significant works that can be employed to assess the operational practice 
of PTSs. The basis of this research is this chapter’s comprehensive literature review 
related to petroleum ports, tankers, and pipeline safety. This review has opened the 
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doors to discover several practices and problems related to PTSs’ operational processes 
and risk factors. 
PTSs studies over the last decade, have highlighted the significance of operational 
practices research in enhancing PTSs. However, most scholars have dealt with 
operational issues that occur either within the marine ports, ship, or pipeline sectors 
instead of in petroleum transportation as a complete system. In other words, previous 
studies have focused on operational aspects of the PTSs and have comprehensively 
examined system safety in terms of a specific segment/local level, though these studies 
have failed to address system safety on a global/system level. The absence of safety 
studies on PTSs as a complete system marks a research gap that must be filled in order 
to ensure worker and resources protect, as well as increasing efficiency on operational 
and managerial levels, which will reflect either negatively or positively on revenue. 
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3 Chapter 3: Analysing Safety Critical Points within 
MPTNs using Centrality Measures 
3.1 Summary 
Centrality theory is a useful measurement tool in identifying the node situation within 
a system. The aim of this chapter is to apply centrality theory in a petroleum supply 
chain risk assessment study and thereby highlight the nodes’ vulnerability within 
petroleum transportation systems (PTSs). The chapter adopts two of Freeman’s well-
known centrality measures: degree centrality and betweenness centrality. The two 
measures are used to evaluate the centrality of ports and routes within maritime PTSs 
regarding direct connections between pairs of nodes and strategic positions in the 
network. An additional tuning parameter is also introduced to the formulas to identify 
the importance of each node, namely consideration of shipping capacity and connection 
to other ports or routes. Furthermore, a beta parameter is presented to recognise each 
node’s role within Petroleum Transportation Networks (PTNs). The results of this 
chapter present powerful decision-making tools to identify nodes’ vulnerability within 
PTSs 
3.2 Introduction 
Crude oil is one of the world’s strategic resources. The petroleum industry has a 
strategic impact on global, national, and local economies. The logistics network of the 
petroleum industry faces major challenges in terms of the links in its nodes (Jenkins 
and Wright, 1998). Those links include production of crude oil and the modes of 
transportation that are used in the movement of the product (Hussain, 2006). 
Transportation systems connect the petroleum industry supply chain nodes. The 
strategic role of transportation within Petroleum Transportation Systems (PTSs) is 
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based on connecting three major components: upstream, midstream, and downstream 
components. Upstream refers to exploration and production phases. Midstream refers 
to refining phases (wherein the petroleum is refined into different products such as fuel, 
diesel, petrochemicals, etc.). The downstream is distribution and delivery of the refined 
products to storage terminals for the end users (Ross, 2000; Fernandes et al., 2010, 
Briggs, 2010). Once a disruption event strikes, it is too late to take emergency action 
without any preparation or facilities. Disruption will affect the supply chain’s desired 
functions, leading to failure (Baublys, 2007). 
Still, PTSs are complex systems that cannot be easily dealt with by classical risk 
assessment methods. Therefore, social network analysis techniques have been adopted 
in this transportation system. Social network analysis is a technique that was originally 
introduced in social systems to analyse the connections between groups of people. 
Social network analysis has also been used by researchers in order to understand the 
influence of a person’s connections in a social system (Valente and Foreman, 1998). 
When dealing with a huge and complex network, the critical points must be identified. 
For determining these points, various network analysis techniques have been 
established for identifying the importance of nodes within systems. 
Centrality is one of the most studied concepts in analysing networks. This old concept 
was introduced as a tool to analyse the importance of a node through connecting each 
node to other nodes within the overall network (Benzi and Klymko, 2013). Based on 
this concept, several studies have adapted centrality measures in fields that involve 
large and complex networks, including communication systems, transport 
infrastructure, and social science (Borgatti and Li, 2009; Hagen et al., 1997; Cohn and 
Marriott, 1958; Granovetter, 1995; Holme, 2003; Guimera et al., 2005; Valente and 
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Foreman, 1998; Kaltashov et al., 2010). Conversely, there is still a major shortage in 
centrality studies on PTSs. 
When considering the safety of a system, one should take into account the important 
points in the examined network. To reach the aim of this chapter, centrality theory has 
been adopted to evaluate maritime PTSs. Following the introduction, a brief review of 
the concept of centrality measures is given. Degree centrality and betweenness 
centrality measures, which are two of the most well-known centrality measures, are 
then adopted for analysing the centrality of ports and routes within maritime PTSs. 
Finally, a study of a real-life system is displayed. 
3.3 Centrality Measures 
Centrality is one of the most commonly studied concepts in social network analysis. 
Developed in the 1950s, centrality aims to deepen understanding of the structure and 
relationship of a network (Freeman, 1978). Unlike other network analysis techniques 
(e.g. cohesive sub-groups, cohesion and density), centrality method measure node 
importance to other nodes within the network (Haythornthwaite, 1996; Benzi and 
Klymko, 2013). Thus, centrality theory is suitable for describing and analysing 
networks. 
Centrality measures provide powerful tools for analysing networks. The structure of a 
network consists of collections of nodes, which may or may not be connected to other 
nodes by links (also known as edges). After the success of the first use of social network 
analysis, which described the connections between the individuals within a group of 
people, many researchers have successfully adopted the technique in different fields 
such as economics, finance, anthropology, communication systems, transportation, and 
even medicine (Benzi and Klymko, 2013; Barrat et al., 2008; Boccaletti et al., 2006; 
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Brandes and Erlebach, 2005; Caldarelli, 2007; Burgess, 1969; Pitts, 1978; Cook et al., 
2015; Berger and Iyengar, 2009; Park et al., 2002; Paul, 2011; Zio and Piccinelli, 2010; 
Zio and Golea, 2012). 
In the transportation sector, Wang et al. (2011) adopted centrality measures to examine 
the complex air transportation network of China. Within this study, various centrality 
measures were adopted in order to analyse the locational advantage of an airport based 
on its connection, accessibility and strategic proximity to other airports within the 
network by employing degree, closeness, and betweenness measures respectively. The 
results of their model indicated that all centrality outputs were closely aligned with 
socioeconomic indicators of nodes such as air passenger volume, population, and gross 
regional domestic product. Derrible (2012) also adopted centrality measures in the 
transportation sector, specifically to help improve the design of the transit systems of a 
metro network system. The scholar applied betweenness centrality to 28 of the world’s 
metro systems. The author studied the emergence of metro trends in terms of network 
centrality by examining the measurements of several systems. 
In maritime transportation, specifically in the container port sector, the centrality 
concept has already been addressed in various research works (Hall and Jacobs, 2010; 
Wang and Cullinane, 2008; Wang, 2013). Centrality measures were introduced for 
identifying the locational advantages of a port and its strategic role within the 
transportation system (Fleming and Hayuth, 1994). Identifying port centrality helps 
scholars in analysing the locational advantage of a specific port in the market area 
which the port serves. For example, when a seaport is positioned in the centre of a large 
inland market, the port has an advantage in attracting traffic. Hong Kong port versus 
Singapore port and Hamburg port versus Rotterdam port are good examples in respect 
to Southeast Asia and European business areas respectively. 
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Centrality measures have greatly facilitated practical research in port development and 
the area of inter-port relationship issues. For example, McCalla (2008) applied the 
betweenness centrality measure in order to determine the possibility of constructing 
Kingston port as a central port in the Caribbean Basin area. Wang and Cullinane (2008) 
studied the relationship between the competitiveness and accessibility of a port to 
overseas markets. In this research the centrality measure within the network was the 
opportunity or potential for transporting containerised cargo via a port. Furthermore, 
Laxe et al. (2012) provided further evidence for the efficiency of a container port in the 
containerised sea transportation network through using degree centrality. These studies 
highlight that researchers studying maritime transportation systems have proved the 
ability of centrality measures to symbolise the capabilities of a port in attracting cargos 
from its inland market and shipping services from markets further afield. In other 
words, centrality measures can be used in order to highlight the advantage of a port 
within the market area that the port serves. Therefore, the concept is a capable tool to 
identify a port’s importance within a maritime transportation system. 
Centrality measures have also been adopted in risk assessment studies to highlight the 
critical nodes within a network. Cadini et al. (2008) applied centrality measures to a 
complex electrical power transmission system. This type of network is not easily 
analysed by classical risk assessment approaches. Its complexity thus raises critical 
concerns regarding safety, reliability, and security. The researchers found that adopting 
centrality measures to study the electrical power transmission system highlighted the 
safety strengths and the weaknesses in the network (Cadini et al., 2008). Büttner et al. 
(2013) used network analysis for analysing the risks of disease spread when 
transporting live animals (pigs) between farmhouses. To identify the centrality of a 
holding in a directed network in Northern Germany, several methods were applied (i.e. 
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in-degree, out-degree, ingoing and outgoing infection chain, betweenness centrality, 
and closeness centrality). Zio and Golea (2012) developed an analysis measurement for 
analysing the vulnerability of an electrical network. To test the approach of a 
vulnerability analysis of the most critical links (edges) in a network, an Italian high-
voltage electrical transmission network was examined. Moreover, for identifying the 
importance of a link within the electrical network, betweenness centrality was 
considered. Furthermore, a multi-objective genetic algorithm was carried out to 
maximise the importance of these edges in the network. 
Based on the flow movement through the network, measuring node centrality 
developed from binary formation to directed weighted networks in order to identify 
which node is more central than others in the network (Opsahl et al., 2010). Many 
methods are available for measuring centrality, which involves ranking and describing 
the important nodes in the network. Degree centrality and betweenness centrality, are 
the two most commonly used centrality measures. Unlike other centrality measures, 
degree centrality and betweenness centrality were built around the concept of assessing 
nodes importance, regarding its connectivity between pairs of nodes and being in a 
strategic position in the network (Ergün and Usluel, 2016; Derrible, 2012; Laxe et al., 
2012). Degree centrality and betweenness centrality are described in the following 
sections. 
3.3.1 Degree Centrality 
Degree centrality, which was introduced by Shaw (1954) and has been generalised by 
researchers including Garrison (1960) and Nieminen (1973), is the simplest and the 
most intuitive measure. The measure can be defined by the number of links each node 
has, which reflects the node’s importance within a network. However, this 
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interpretation does not take into account any indirect links in the same network. Opsahl 
et al. (2010) performed further study in order to improve the capability of measuring 
nodes within a network. As a result, two measures were developed for measuring the 
degree centrality in terms of the direction of the link: the first is in-degree, which is 
defined by the number of links to a node; and the second is out-degree, which is defined 
by the number of links that go from a node to connect with other nodes (Opsahl et al., 
2010; Wang, 2013). 
3.3.2 Betweenness Centrality 
Unlike other measures, betweenness centrality offers a pragmatic way of highlighting 
the importance of a node in the network; degree centrality, in contrast, counts only the 
number of connections. Therefore, in betweenness centrality, the node has a paramount 
importance to the whole network. The betweenness centrality measure is based on the 
concept that the node is central when it is strategically located in communication routes 
for linking between other nodes (Bavelas, 1950; Shaw, 1954). The betweenness 
centrality measure evaluates the centrality of a particular node that is located between 
other nodes in a network (Freeman, 1977). If a node is located in a strategic position, 
namely if a node offers the shortest paths to connect to many other nodes in the network, 
the node tends to be in a powerful position for connecting or breaking the connections 
between other nodes. 
Freeman (1978) generated both of the above centrality measures (i.e. degree and 
betweenness). Through transferring from a binary network to a graph, these two 
centrality measures are expressed as flow: Degree centrality is expressed by the sum of 
links connected to a node, and betweenness centrality is expressed by the number of 
times that a node acts as a bridge that allows completion of the connection between 
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other nodes by the shortest path.  
Freeman’s (1978) original formula was designed to analyse undirected, unweighted 
networks. Through adapting the original two centrality measures to deal with directed 
or weighted network types in particular networks, a number of researchers (e.g. Opsahl 
et al., 2010) have attempted to overcome the disadvantages of undirected, unweighted 
network nodes. 
3.4 Network Analysis Software 
In the last 20 years, a great number of software programs have been developed for 
network analysis. Some of the most popular software packages that have been used in 
network analysis are UCINET, NetDraw, R-Software, Pajek, and NetMiner. To meet 
the objectives of this research, two software packages are used, namely NetDraw and 
R-Software. NetDraw was used to present the maritime petroleum transportation nodes 
and their connections, and R-Software was applied to conduct the maritime petroleum 
transportation network evaluation (R-Software allows for the measuring of the 
centrality of a node in a weighted network (Batagelj and Mrvar, 2007; Borgatti et al., 
2002)). 
3.4.1 NetDraw 
NetDraw is software developed by Steven Borgatti in 2002 for the purpose of 
visualising social network data. The software reads UCINET files, operates in 
Windows, and is used for analysing network data. The objective of the software is to 
transfer UCINET data in a way that allows researchers to visualise graph formation. 
NetDraw allows users to organise the output network (e.g. to change the colours of the 
nodes and the links) and to save these changes (Apostolato, 2013). For the purpose of 
this study, NetDraw has been adopted to allow easier visualisation of the maritime 
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petroleum transportation network. To utilise NetDraw for the visual representation of 
nodes within the network, the following steps should be taken: 
 The network nodes must be identified. 
 The nodes’ connection must be defined. 
 The nodes’ data must be presented in UCINET files for visual representation in 
NetDraw. 
3.4.2 R-Software 
R-Software is a free statistic computing programming language. This programming 
language was developed at the University of Auckland, New Zealand by Ross Ihaka 
and Robert Gentleman for statistical analysis and data visualisation (Ihaka and 
Gentleman, 1997). R-Software was developed to work on various computer operation 
systems (e.g. Windows and Mac). 
Most network analysis software adopts Freeman’s (1978) two centrality measures. 
However, R-Software has an advantage for the purpose of this research. Software such 
as UCINET and Pajek are capable only of analysing node centrality in binary networks; 
thus they do not allow for measuring the centrality of a node in a weighted network 
(Batagelj and Mrvar, 2007; Borgatti et al., 2002). Therefore, the present research has 
adopted R-Software, which is an open source software. Through the introduction of 
writing packages, the software has been made capable of measuring node degree and 
betweenness centralities in a weighted network. To apply R-Software in the analysis of 
the centrality approach, the following steps should be taken (Opsahl, 2009): 
 The network nodes must be identified. 
 The nodes’ connection data must be defined. 
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 The nodes’ data must be installed in R-Software tnet form. 
3.5 Methodology 
Centrality measures have been applied in risk assessment studies of various fields such 
as engineering, health, and transportation systems to highlight the critical nodes within 
a network. Still, there is a shortage of studies on adopting centrality measures in PTSs. 
Therefore, the novelty of this chapter is to adopt centrality measures for the evaluation 
of PTSs as one complete system.  
The Petroleum Transportation Network (PTNs) constitutes a complex transport 
network within the Petroleum Supply Chain (PSC). This network is influenced by 
internal and external disruptions. These disruptions could affect a single throughput 
between two transportation systems or impact the whole network. Therefore, 
determining the critical points within a complex network, which is a difficult task when 
working with only classical risk assessment approaches, is an important issue with 
respect to the protection of PTSs. For the purposes of this study, petroleum ports and 
the transportation modes within PTSs are analysed. Maritime petroleum transportation 
networks (MPTNs) comprise one of the systems within petroleum transportation 
networks (PTNs). To identify the critical ports in the MPTNs, degree and betweenness 
centrality measures have been applied to analyse ports’ ability to connect two ports via 
direct connections and ports’ location in terms of strategic advantages.  
The steps in analysing the petroleum terminals and shipping routes within the MPTNs 
are defined as follows (see Figure 3.1): 
 MPTNs development: Identify the petroleum ports within the MPTNs and 
present them in a network structure. 
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 Data collection: Identify and collect the petroleum throughput between two 
ports within the MPTNs. 
 Degree centrality: Apply degree centrality to identify critical nodes based on 
network direction. 
 Betweenness centrality: Apply betweenness centrality to identify critical 
nodes based on location. 
Develop the MPTNs
Data Collection
Betweenness CentralityDegree Centrality
Evaluation Process
 
Figure 3.1: The MPTNs assessment model flow chart 
 
3.5.1 MPTNs Development 
MPTNs are complex systems that contain ports that are connected with each other by 
ship transportation routes. The simple structure of this network is a node connected to 
other nodes by links. In MPTNs, the nodes represent the petroleum terminals, and the 
links represent the maritime transportation routes (see Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2: A network sample 
To evaluate the ports within the crude oil transportation system, firstly, it was important 
to identify the ports involved within the network. The links between pairs of ports were 
identified based on whether any trade occurs between the two ports. Therefore, a list of 
ports and their connections had to be produced by investigating real-life data. 
3.5.2 Data Collection 
As mentioned previously, pairs of nodes within a network might be connected by links. 
Presence of links between two nodes was determined based on whether trade exists 
between the ports. To identify the connection or lack thereof, a set of quantitative data 
were collected for the evaluated network. These data were collected through contacting 
individuals, organisations, and trusted maritime sources.  
3.5.3 Evaluation Process 
Within the context of this research, the process of measuring port centrality in a 
weighted network was adopted from Opsahl et al. (2010), who re-formalised the 
measures on the basis of Freeman’s degree and betweenness centrality measures (1978) 
to identify the safety critical ports in MPTNs. A tuning parameter (𝛼) was introduced 
to the centrality formulas to identify the criticality of the node based on both shipping 
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capacity and connection to other ports (Opsahl et al., 2010). A beta parameter (𝛽) was 
introduced to determine the port importance to inland and sea transportation. 
Consider an MPTN composed of a group of nodes (N) which represent the petroleum 
ports and links (L) which represent the maritime transportation abstracted as graph G 
(N, L), in which L is connecting a set of 𝑁 = {𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗 , … , 𝑥𝑛} if (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) ∈ 𝐿. Centrality 
measures for the safety criticality of the petroleum transportation network are defined 
as follows. 
3.5.4 Degree Centrality 
The concept of degree centrality is based on identifying the port importations within 
the MPTNs through the port links. In network analysis, the first step of measuring 
Degree centrality [𝐶𝐷(𝑖)] is to analyse the binary network of the MPTNs. The measure 
of binary network was detected by Freeman (1978) as follows: 
𝑁𝑖 = 𝐶𝐷(𝑖) = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑃
𝑗          3.1 
where i is the focal port, j represents all other ports inside the network, P is the total 
number of ports, and 𝑥𝑖𝑗  is the connection between port i and port j, in which it is 
defined by 1 if there is a connection between port i and port j, or by 0 if this connection 
does not exist.  
In terms of the safety of MPTNs, the formalism of a weighted network is calculated 
undertaken by [𝐶𝐷
𝑊(𝑖)]. Consequently, the measure of a weighted network has been 
extended to the sum of weights, in which Equation (3.1) has been formularised (Barrat 
et al., 2004; Newman, 2004) as follows: 
𝑁𝑖 = 𝐶𝐷
𝑊(𝑖) = ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝑃
𝑗         3.2 
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where 𝑊𝑖𝑗 is similar to 𝑥𝑖𝑗, which represents the interaction between port i and port j. 
However, 𝑊𝑖𝑗 is weighted by the throughput strength in terms of its value (i.e. barrel) 
instead of its link. To simplify, assume that an MPTN consists of a group of ports and 
seven weighted shipping routes (see Figure 3.3). Ports A and C obtain the same weight 
in terms of their relative throughputs. However, Port C has more connections compared 
to Port A.  
 
Figure 3.3: A network with seven ports and seven weighted throughputs 
 
Degree centrality has been defined in terms of the number of connected shipping routes 
or by the total weights (based on throughput) allocated to ports, which can be evaluated 
by Equations (3.1) and (3.2). However, neither of these definitions is capable of 
reflecting the safety criticality of a port in weighted MPTNs. To overcome this 
deficiency, a tuning parameter (𝛼), which was originally introduced by Opsahl et al. 
(2010), is incorporated in order to aggregate Equations (3.1) and (3.2). The degree 
centrality measuring the safety of a port in weighted MPTNs has thus been formularised 
as follows (Opsahl et al., 2010): 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛼(𝑖) =  𝑘𝑖 × (
𝑠𝑖
𝑘𝑖
)
𝛼
= 𝑘𝑖
(1−𝛼) × 𝑠𝑖
𝛼       3.3 
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where α is a positive number or is equal to zero, which can be described based on the 
research setting and data. When α = 0, the port safety degree centrality value is identical 
to the degree centrality value interpreted in Equation (3.1). Similarly, when α = 1, the 
port safety degree centrality value is identical to the degree centrality value interpreted 
in Equation (3.2). Conversely, when 0 < α < 1 and the total port strength is fixed, the 
safety degree centrality value of the port increases, and the total strength is distributed 
from the port to further connections. On the other hand, when 1 < α and the total port 
strength is fixed, a higher number of connections through which the strength is 
distributed will lead to a lower value of the measure; greater concentration of port 
strength among only a limited number of ports will be favoured (Opsahl et al., 2010). 
Table 3.1 exemplifies the effectiveness of the changing 𝛼 values (i.e. α = 0, 0.5, 1, and 
1.5) of the network in Figure 3.3. 
Table 3.1: Degree centrality when different values are used for α. 
Port 𝐶𝐷 𝐶𝐷
𝑊 𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛼 when 𝛼 = 
   0 0.5 1 1.5 
A 2 8 2 4 8 16 
B 2 7 2 3.74 7 13.1 
C 4 8 4 5.66 8 11.31 
D 2 5 2 3.16 5 7.91 
E 2 9 2 4.24 9 19.09 
F 1 7 1 2.65 7 18.52 
G 1 4 1 2 4 8 
The direction of the network can be identified as out-degree or in-degree. Values of 
these measures reflect the criticality of the port, which could be quantified by the 
amount of throughput from the port (𝐾𝑜𝑢𝑡)  and the amount of throughput that is 
directed to the port (𝐾𝑖𝑛). The equations are shown below (Opsahl et al., 2010): 
𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑖) =  𝑘𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡 × (
𝑠𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡)
𝛼
= 𝑘𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡(1−𝛼) × 𝑠𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝛼               3.4a 
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𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑖) =  𝑘𝑖
𝑖𝑛 × (
𝑠𝑖
𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑖
𝑖𝑛)
𝛼
= 𝑘𝑖
𝑖𝑛(1−𝛼) × 𝑠𝑖
𝑖𝑛 𝛼               3.4b 
Within MPTNs, the out-degree indicates the safety criticality of the port in terms of its 
influence on other ports, while the in-degree indicates the safety criticality of the port 
in terms of its link to downstream inland transportation. Therefore, the out- and in-
degree are combined in this study as follows: 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛽(𝑖) =  [𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑖)]𝛽 × [𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑖)](1−𝛽)       3.5 
where 𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛽
 means the safety criticality, and β is the parameter describing the role of in 
and out in the MPTNs. For example, if β = 1, the MPTN is a network focusing on sea 
transportation. If β = 0, the network is focused more on inland transportation. When β 
= 0, the port safety criticality value is identical to the value interpreted in Equation 
(3.4b). Similarly, when β = 1, the port safety degree centrality value is identical to the 
degree centrality value interpreted in Equation (3.4a). 
3.5.5 Betweenness Centrality 
The concept of betweenness centralities is based on identifying the shortest routes 
between pairs of ports in MPTNs. Betweenness centrality is defined as the number of 
steps that a port needs to pass through in order to complete the connection between 
pairs of ports within a network via the shortest route (Freeman, 1978). In the binary 
network of MPTNs, the shortest route [𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗)] of this measure is simplified by the 
following equation (Freeman, 1978): 
𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗) =  𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑥𝑖ℎ + ⋯+ 𝑥ℎ𝑗)        3.6 
where h are intermediary ports on pathways between ports i and j when indirect 
connections are considered. The shortest pathway in a binary network is identified by 
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minimising the number of in-between ports, and the length of that pathway is identified 
through minimising the number of routes that link between two ports. 
Therefore, port betweenness centrality within a binary network of MPTNs has been 
simplified with reference to Freeman (1978) as follows: 
𝐶𝐵(𝑖) =  
𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖)
𝑔𝑗𝑘
           3.7 
where 𝑔𝑗𝑘 is the number of binary shortest routes between ports j and k, and 𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖) is 
the number of those pathways that pass through port i.  
Unfortunately, this type of equation does not work with weighted networks for 
measuring the safety criticality of a port in weighted MPTNs, where the throughputs 
are weighted with different values (i.e. barrel). As a result, for defining a network’s 
shortest route, Newman (2001) and Brandes (2001) implemented Dijkstra’s (1959) 
algorithm for network analysis definition of the shortest path in a weighted network 
[𝑑𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗)]. Their approach has been formularised as follows (Opsahl et al., 2010):  
𝑑𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) =  𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
1
𝑤𝑖ℎ
+ ⋯+
1
𝑤ℎ𝑗
)        3.8 
where 𝑊𝑖ℎ is similar to 𝑥𝑖ℎ. However, 𝑊𝑖𝑗 is weighted by the throughput strength in 
terms of its value. 
Still, none of these equations can reflect the relative importance of paths in weighted 
MPTNs. Therefore, based on the tuning parameter (𝛼) introduced by Opsahl et al. 
(2010), the safety shortest path has been formularised by the following equation: 
𝑑𝑤𝛼(𝑖, 𝑗) =  𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
1
(𝑤𝑖ℎ)
𝛼 + ⋯+
1
(𝑤ℎ𝑗)
𝛼)       3.9 
α can be described based on the research setting and data where α ≥ 0. For example, 
when α = 0, the port safety shortest path value is identical to the shortest route value 
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interpreted in Equation (3.6), which was on the basis of a binary network. Similarly, 
when α = 1, the port safety shortest pathway value is identical to the shortest route value 
interpreted in Equation (3.8). However, when 0 < α < 1 and the total route strength is 
fixed, the safety shortest pathway value of the ports increases as more intermediary 
ports become involved. On the other hand, when 1 < α and the total pathway strength 
is fixed, the impact of an additional intermediary port is relatively unimportant, as the 
strength of the links and routes with more intermediaries are favoured (Opsahl et al., 
2010). To simplify, the network in Figure 3.4 shows four routes between ports A and 
B, each of which contains a different number of in-between ports with different 
weighted routes. Table 3.2 further illustrates the binary and weighted distance between 
ports A and B as shown in Figure 3.4, as well as different values of tuning parameters 
(i.e. the last four columns in Table 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.4: A network with three weighted paths between ports A and B                                                                                                                                         
As a result, both the number of intermediary ports and weighted links took into account 
the betweenness centrality measures through applying the proposed shortest route 
algorithm. Therefore, to identify the safety critical ports in weighted MPTNs, Equations 
(3.7) and (3.9) are combined as follows (Opsahl et al., 2010): 
𝐶𝐵
𝑤𝛼(𝑖) =  
𝑔𝑗𝑘
𝑤𝛼(𝑖)
𝑔𝑗𝑘
𝑤𝛼                    3.10 
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where 𝑔𝑗𝑘
𝑤𝛼 is the sum of all shortest routes between ports j and k, and 𝑔𝑗𝑘
𝑤𝛼(𝑖) is the 
number of these shortest pathways that go through port i. 
Table 3.2: Lengths of paths when defined by binary and weight as well as when 
different values of 𝜶 are used 
Path 𝑑(𝐴, 𝐵) 𝑑𝑤(𝐴, 𝐵) 𝑑𝑤𝛼(𝐴, 𝐵) when 𝛼 = 
   0 0.5 1 1.5 
(A,B) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
(A,C,B) 2 0.67 2 1.15 0.67 0.38 
(A,D,E,B) 3 0.75 3 1.5 0.75 0.37 
(A,F,G,H,B) 4 2 4 2.83 2 1.41 
Min 1 0.67 1 1 0.67 0.37 
As the results from the degree and betweenness centralities are in absolute values, the 
outcomes are not easy to compare. Therefore, the values are normalised with min-max 
normalisation by the following equation: 
Min − Max 𝑎𝑖 =
𝑎𝑖−𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑛
                  3.11 
where i is the focal port, 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the minimum centrality results, and 𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥  captures the 
maximum centrality results. 
The sum of the normalised values is going to be greater than 1 (∑𝑎𝑖 < 1). This result 
needed to be equal to 1 (∑𝑎𝑖 = 1). Therefore, the values are normalised as follows: 
Normalised 𝑎𝑖 =
 𝑎𝑖
∑𝑎𝑖
                  3.12 
where i is the focal port, and 𝑁 is the number of ports within the network. 
3.6 Case Study and Results Analysis 
To identify the safety critical points within the crude oil transportation system, a case 
study is conducted in this chapter in order to demonstrate how the methodology can be 
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employed to evaluate a real-life MPTN within a PTN. The steps of this evaluation 
process are listed as follows:  
3.6.1 MPTN Development and Data Collection 
Maritime crude oil transportation is undertaken by a combination of various shipping 
companies and worldwide petroleum terminals. This highly interconnected system runs 
with a typical network feature, which could be abstracted to a graph where petroleum 
terminals constitute the nodes and shipping services provide the links. Thus the 
maritime crude oil transportation network provides an excellent fundamental basis for 
accomplishing network analysis of the petroleum transportation structure. 
Crude oil is among the most strategic natural resources for all industries. In the annual 
2013 report, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced 
that worldwide growth in crude oil demand was 1.05 million barrels per day. The 
importance of crude oil is rooted in the refined products of this resource, which are 
applied in many businesses for generating heat, fuelling vehicles and airplanes, and 
manufacturing nearly all chemical products (e.g. plastics, detergents, paints, and even 
medicines). Therefore, transporting this resource plays a strategic role in the world 
economic growth cycle. 
Maritime crude oil transportation networks contain a group of nodes (ports) that are 
connected to each other through links (shipping companies). The nature of this network 
contains two types of ports:  
1) Exporting ports: Used for transporting the crude oil out of an origin country 
after the production phase. 
2) Importing ports: Used for importing the crude oil that is shipped from the origin 
country to the refineries. 
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For the purpose of this research, the maritime crude oil transportation network is going 
to be built based on a major petroleum exporter and on the world’s major crude oil 
importers (see Figure 3.5).  
 
Figure 3.5: Sample network ports and their throughputs in 2013 (million 
barrels) 
Due to the lack of actual crude oil traffic statistics, links within the network are 
weighted with the crude oil transportation capacity (in barrels) deployed between the 
ports of major OPEC members and the ports of major crude oil importers for the year 
in 2013. The reason for accounting only for capacity from OPEC members is that about 
81% of the world’s crude oil reserve is handled by these members (OPEC, 2014a). 
Moreover, they contributed more than 60% of the world’s total crude oil exports in the 
year 2013 (OPEC, 2014a).  The OPEC members that are adopted in this network are 
counted in the world’s top 10 crude oil exporters according to U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA, 2014): Angola, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Directions of capacity flow 
movement are considered as well in this network. Therefore, this research covers all 
major crude oil trading markets on the East-West route, which includes the North 
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American, Latin American, European, Asia and Pacific, Middle-East, and African 
areas. 
The data in this research have been collected from annual reports, countries’ customs, 
and companies’ statistics. As aforementioned, the MPTN in this case study covers 
major crude oil trading markets, and the connections between ports have been weighted 
based on these statistics. Therefore, this evaluated maritime network will consist of 45 
of the world’s major ports in the PTN, where the links between these ports are weighted 
with barrels through 2013 (see Figure 3.5).  
In the collected data, each port was using different units for measuring the throughput 
(e.g. Houston port measures by barrel, while Chiba port uses kilolitres). According to 
British Petroleum (BP) (2010), there are several different units for measuring the crude 
oil throughput: tonnes (metric), kilolitres, barrels, and US gallons. For the purpose of 
this study, and before starting to analyse the port centrality in a weighted network, 
firstly it was important to convert different units to one unit (i.e. barrel). The OPEC 
annual report (2014a) delivers simple mathematical matrixes to convert the units, which 
are shown in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Conversion factors for crude oil adopted from OPEC’s annual 
statistical in 2014 (OPEC, 2014a) 
From 
 
To 
Tonnes 
(metric) 
Kilolitres Barrels 
US 
gallons 
Tonnes per 
year 
Multiply by 
Tonnes (metric) 1 1.165 7.33 307.86 - 
Kilolitres 0.8581 1 62898 264.17 - 
Barrels 0.1364 0.159 1 42 - 
US gallons 0.00325 0.0038 0.0238 1 - 
Tonnes per year - - - - 49.8 
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3.6.2 Evaluation Process 
In this section, the safety critical ports within the MPTN are identified by applying 
degree and betweenness centrality measures. This section identifies the safety critical 
ports and choke points within the MPTN. Therefore, in case 1, the safety critical ports 
within the maritime PTS are identified. In case 2, through adding crude oil choke points 
(i.e. Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline, Bab el-
Mandab, and Cape of Good Hope), the central points within the MPTN are identified. 
3.6.2.1 Case 1 
First, port safety criticality was analysed with Freeman’s degree and betweenness 
centrality measures without adding world choke points (see Figure 3.6). The analysed 
results were further normalised with min-max normalisation (see Appendixes 1.5, 1.6, 
and 1.7) to ensure the identification. The results were finally examined through 
comparing correlations between port centrality and throughputs via Microsoft Excel. 
 
Figure 3.6: Visualisation of ports through using NetDraw software 
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Port degree centrality 
To identify the safety critical ports within the MPTN, port centrality has been examined 
from the perspective of its direct connectivity (i.e. degree, in-degree, and out-degree 
centrality). Through assigning different values to the tuning parameter (α) (i.e. 0, 0.5, 
1, and 1.5), Equation (3.5) illustrated the safety criticality of the ports within the crude 
oil transportation network. To calculate that equation, the collected data of the 
petroleum transported between ports were calculated through R-software (see Tables 
3.4 and 3.5 and Appendixes 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4). The following section first exemplifies 
the steps for measuring the safety criticality of a port in the weighted MPTN. The 
section then demonstrates the normalisation of the values with min-max normalisation. 
For measuring the safety criticality of a node in the weighted MPTN, the Suez 
Canal/SUMED Pipeline (S) is used as an example (see Appendix 1.1).  
Through applying Equation 3.1, the degree centrality of 𝐶𝐷(𝑆) is equal to 7.Based on 
Equation 3.1, the Suez Canal/SUMED Pipeline links to seven ports (i.e. Ras-Tanura 
port, Mina al-Ahmadi, Basrah Oil Terminal, Umm Said and Ras-Laffan Terminal, Jebel 
Dhanna port, Wilhelmshaven port, and Rotterdam port). 
In terms of safety network, Equation 3.2 measures the degree centrality of 𝐶𝐷
𝑊(𝑆) (i.e. 
weighted by throughput in terms of barrels instead of the number of links) as 355.92. 
Through introducing a tuning parameter (𝛼) to aggregate the values of Equations (3.1) 
and (3.2), Equation (3.3) analyses the centrality of (S) in the weighted MPTN 𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛼(𝑆). 
With respect to the direction of the network, Equations (3.4a) and (3.4b) analyse the in, 
and out-degree safety centrality of (S) in the weighted MPTN (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5 
and Appendixes 1.3, and 1.4).  
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Table 3.4: Out-degree centrality scores sample with different values of tuning 
parameter 
 Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port  34 213.9311 1346.074 8469.6204 
Jebel Dhanna port  20 95.9467 460.288 2208.1546 
Puerta la Cruz  21 99.0519 467.204 2203.6884 
Table 3.5: In-degree centrality scores sample with different values of tuning 
parameter 
 Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Corpus Chris port 5 17.9101 64.154 229.8003 
Singapore port 6 40.3368 271.176 1823.0612 
Zhanjiang port 8 32.6745 133.453 545.064 
 
Based on the result of Equations (3.4a) and (3.4b), Equation (3.5) introduced a 
parameter (𝛽) to aggregate the in and out values (see Appendixes 1.3, and 1.4).  
In terms of normalisation, Equation (3.11) normalised the safety criticality values when 
𝛽 = 0 as follows: 
Normalised CD
w(S)  =
CD
wβ(S) −CD−
wβ
min
CD−
wβ
max
−CD−
wβ
min
 =  
5 −0
9−0
 = 0.5556 
Normalised CD−in
wα (S)  =
CD−in
wα (S) −CD−in
wα
min
CD−in
wα
max
−CD−in
wα
min
 =  
29.83 −0
45.972−0
 = 0.6489 
Normalised CD−in
wα (S)  =
CD−in
wα (S) −CD−in
wα
min
CD−in
wα
max
−CD−in
wα
min
 =  
177.96 −0
271.176−0
 = 0.6563 
Normalised CD−in
wα (S)  =
CD−in
wα (S) −CD−in
wα
min
CD−in
wα
max
−CD−in
wα
min
 =  
1061.692 −0
1823.061−0
 = 0.5824 
Appendix 1.5 shows the resulting normalised scores of the petroleum ports with respect 
to ports’ safety criticality when 𝛽 = 1 with different assumptions of tuning parameters. 
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With respect to the change of the tuning parameters’ values, Ras-Tanura port is the 
most critical port (1). This importance is mainly attributed to the port’s dominant role 
in petroleum transportation; in other words, Ras-Tanura port attracts significant 
shipping capacity. Therefore, any major incident/accident in Ras-Tanura port leading 
to a disruption would affect the petroleum throughput within the MPTN. On the 
opposite side, ports such as Wilhelmshaven port and other ports from different regions 
have low centrality scores (0) within the evaluated MPTN (see Figure 3.7). Umm Said 
and Ras-Laffan terminal maintains a relatively stable position, ranking as eighth across 
the changes of parameter. 
 
Figure 3.7: Correlations between throughputs and degree centrality when β=1 
Mina al-Ahmadi (0.484) and Basrah Oil Terminal (0.526) score high safety levels when 
the parameter is set as 0 and 0 < α < 1. However, when the network is weighted with 
shipping capacity (i.e. 1 < α), Jebel Dhanna port (0.261) and Puerta la Cruz port (0.26) 
become ports with higher safety criticality within the MPTN in comparison with Mina 
al-Ahmadi (0.21) and Basrah Oil Terminal (0.2). 
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Turning to the ports’ effect on inland transportation, which is represented in Appendix 
1.6, in terms of incoming service, Mundra seaport (1) is the most central port. However, 
when the network is weighted for the safety of the MPTN, the port loses this importance 
to other ports (i.e. α ≤ 1). Conversely, the port of Singapore has a low level of 
importance (0.667 and 0.877). However, when α ≤ 1, the port of Singapore has a high 
level of criticality in the crude oil transportation network. Therefore, based on safety 
criticality, any risk factor that should strike Singapore port would have a significant 
impact on the petroleum throughput within the MPTN in terms of port connection to 
the downstream supply chain (see Figure 3.8).   
 
Figure 3.8: Correlations between throughputs and degree centrality when β=0  
Therefore, the safety criticality degree centrality of a specific port within the network 
is affected by the change of the parameters’ values as well as by the shipping capacity 
of the port. The number of connections in and out of a port within the MPTN also affects 
the degree centrality.  
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Port Betweenness Centrality 
Through assigning different values to the tuning parameter (α), Equation (3.10) 
illustrates the safety critical ports within the crude oil transportation network. To 
generate this equation, the collected data of petroleum transported between ports were 
calculated by R-software (see Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6: Betweenness centrality scores sample with different values of tuning 
parameter 
 Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port  0 0 0 0 
Yokkaichi port 0 0 0 0 
Suez Canal/SUMED Pipeline 10 10 10 10 
Appendix 1.7 shows that, with the changes of the parameter, the Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline counts as the most critical point within the network (1) (i.e. it is the location 
for exporting and/or importing petroleum to ensure the ability of ships to pass through 
the Suez Canal) (see Figure 3.9). This critical point gains its importance based on the 
nature of this network. The world choke points were then added to identify the safety 
critical ports and routes in the MPTN.    
 
Figure 3.9: Correlations between throughputs and betweenness centrality 
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3.6.2.2 Case 2 
Port safety criticality was identified by using Freeman’s degree and betweenness 
centrality measures and adding world choke points to the network (see Figure 3.10). 
The results were normalised with min-max normalisation to ensure the identification. 
The results were then examined through comparing correlations between port criticality 
and throughputs via Microsoft Excel (see Appendixes 1.10, 1.11, and 1.12).  
 
Figure 3.10: Visualisation of ports through using NetDraw software 
Port Degree Centrality 
To identify the safety critical petroleum ports and routes within the MPTN, different 
values (namely 0, 0.5, 1, and 1.5) were assigned to the tuning parameter (α) in Equations 
(3.4a) and (3.4b). The results illustrate the relative importance of the ports and routes 
within the crude oil transportation network (see Tables 3.7 and 3.8 and Appendixes 1.8, 
and 1.9). 
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Table 3.7: Out-degree centrality scores sample with different values of tuning 
parameter 
  Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port  1 1 1346.074 49385.949 
Niger Delta area 8 8 153.077 669.6069 
Strait of Malacca 20 20 2531.985 28488.9665 
Table 3.8: In-degree centrality scores sample with different values of tuning 
parameter 
  Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Strait of Hormuz 6 137.5612 3153.847 72307.8263 
Port Arthur port 4 28.3487 200.912 1423.8978 
Singapore port 1 16.4674 271.176 4465.5697 
The degree centrality is measuring the safety criticality of a node in the weighted 
MPTN, which contains ports and choke points, assumed by different parameters (see 
Appendix 1.10). The Strait of Malacca (1) and Cape of Good Hope route (0.7) are 
important routes in respect of outflow; also, the Malongo port (0.55) and Puerta la Cruz 
port (0.55) are important ports within the MPTN. When the network is weighted for the 
safety of the ports and routes within the MPTN, these ports and routes still have high 
safety criticality levels. However, their levels are not the most critical points. In terms 
of binary networks, the Strait of Hormuz (0.4) and Ras-Tanura port (0.05) have less 
advantage in terms of direct connections to other routes and ports. Conversely, when 
considering the connection and the strength of these connections with respect to the 
change of the tuning parameters’ values, the Strait of Hormuz (1) and Ras-Tanura port 
(0.789) become the most critical choke point and port, respectively, in the MPTN. This 
result is mainly attributed to their role in the petroleum transportation routes (see Figure 
3.11). Therefore, any major incident/accident in Ras-Tanura port and the Strait of 
Hormuz will significantly impact the petroleum throughput within the MPTN.  
  
95 
 
Figure 3.11: Correlations between throughputs and degree centrality when β=1 
Appendix 1.11 shows the normalised values with respect to safety criticality when 𝛽 =
0 with different assumptions of tuning parameters. The Strait of Hormuz (1) and Cape 
of Good Hope route (0.667) are the two most critical routes. Despite overtaking the 
Strait of Malacca in terms of the safety of the routes within the MPTN, these two routes 
still rank as the second and third when α = 1.5. In the ports sector, the Rotterdam (0.667) 
and Arthur (0.667) ports have a high centrality level across the network. When the 
network is weighted for the safety of the MPTN, they still hold this importance in their 
regions. Conversely, Singapore port (0.167) has a low centrality level when (α) = 0, but 
when α < 1, the port becomes the most safety critical port in the MPTN (see Figure 
3.12). 
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Figure 3.12: Correlations between throughputs and degree centrality when β=0 
Port Betweenness Centrality 
To identify the petroleum ports and route criticality within the MPTN, centrality has 
been examined from the potential perspective of being intermediary between ports. 
Betweenness centrality represents the likelihood of ports and routes being applied as 
intermediary points in the MPTN within petroleum transportation network. Ports and 
routes with high centrality values are likely to have extra traffic if they are favoured by 
transportation carriers as important points in the network. Through assigning different 
values to the tuning parameter (α), the safety critical ports and routes within the MPTN 
have been evaluated by Equation (3.10) (see Table 3.9). 
Table 3.9: Betweenness centrality scores sample with different values of tuning 
parameter 
  Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline 
16 16 16 16 
Cape of Good Hope 137 153 162 162 
Strait of Hormuz 234 234 234 234 
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According to the results (see Appendix 1.12), when α = 0, traditional choke points like 
the Strait of Hormuz (1) and Strait of Malacca (0.94) are the two central routes in the 
PTS. When the network is weighted (i.e. α = 0.5, 1, and 1.5), the Strait of Hormuz and 
Strait of Malacca retain their importance in the network. Therefore, with respect to the 
change of the tuning parameters’ values, the Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca are 
the safest and most strategic routes in the network. This result is mainly attributed to 
their dominant role in the petroleum network, in which they connect many other ports 
(see Figure 3.13). Therefore, any major incident/accident in these two routes (e.g. 
piracy) leading to a disruption would affect the petroleum throughput within the MPTN.  
 
Figure 3.13: Correlations between throughputs and betweenness centrality 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter was motivated by the need to develop a quantitative analysis framework 
for safety analysis of ports and transportation modes within PTSs. This chapter 
established the basis for evaluating PTSs as complete systems. Thus, the result of this 
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chapter helps to identify the safety critical ports and routes within MPTNs. This result 
could be analysed in further research by applying risk assessment techniques. In this 
study, the most popular centrality measures developed in social network analysis have 
been categorised and reviewed. To apply centrality measures to a maritime PTS, a set 
of criteria was identified based on the characteristics of shipping flow through a 
network. Hence, the criteria were the ability to connect two ports via direct connections 
and the strategic position (i.e. status as an intermediary) in the network. The degree and 
betweenness centrality measures were selected in order to analyse the safety criticality 
of ports and routes. 
For measuring the critical ports and routes in weighted MPTNs, Freeman’s degree and 
betweenness centrality measures were adopted. A tuning parameter with different 
values (i.e. 0, 0.5, 1, and 1.5) was added to measure the importance of the port and route 
through considering both the weight and the number of connections. 
The formulas of Freeman’s degree and betweenness measures were adopted to meet the 
needs of examining a weighted and directed network. In case 1 and case 2, a parameter 
with a set of results generated by adopting the two measures shows the following:  
 Centrality measures are capable of identifying the safety critical ports and routes 
of maritime PTSs at both regional and global levels. 
 Shipping capacity has a direct effect on the port centrality results based on the 
available inflow and outflow. 
 Ras-Tanura port and Singapore port are safety critical ports regarding their 
degree centrality measure. 
 Routes and ports with high betweenness centrality are in critical positions, as 
they affect the flow of cargo (i.e. the Strait of Hormuz and Suez Canal/SUMED 
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Pipeline). 
Centrality measures present a useful tool for analysing and identifying the safety critical 
ports and routes within the MPTN. Based on the degree and betweenness centrality 
measures, Ras-Tanura port, Singapore port, and the Strait of Hormuz are identified as 
the critical ports and routes in the analysed MPTN. 
This chapter mainly focused on evaluating the global level of PTSs. However, ensuring 
PTSs operation in a safe condition, is a significant element for the safety of PTNs. In 
the following chapters, the global level of PTNs will be evaluated (chapter 5). While 
the network analysis technique was used to assess the global level of the PTSs, a hybrid 
Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning (FRBBR) approach is going to be applied, to 
identify and evaluate the operational hazards associated with PTSs (chapter 4). 
Moreover, other techniques, such as Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and 
Evidential Reasoning (ER), will be used as to evaluate the petroleum transportation as 
one complete system. 
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4 Chapter 4: A New Quantitative Hybrid Fuzzy Rule 
Based Bayesian Reasoning for PTSs Operations 
Petroleum transportation systems (PTSs) play an important role in the movement of the 
crude product from its production to the end user. To ensure an effective transportation 
system, port and transportation mode safety must not be neglected. A hybrid Fuzzy 
Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning (FRBBR) model is introduced in order to perform risk 
ranking due to the high level of uncertainty in petroleum transportation operations. 
This method combines the Fuzzy Rule-Based (FRB) approach and Bayesian Networks 
(BNs) to compensate for the disadvantages of each technique and benefit from each 
one’s advantages. The resulting technique can be used by decision makers to measure 
and improve PTSs safety. 
4.1 Introduction 
PTSs play a major role in global and local supply chain systems. Pipelines and tankers 
are used for inland and sea transportation, and ports link these transportation modes in 
the flow of crude oil from its production sites to the final customer. According to the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2014), 56.5 million barrels per day 
from the total worldwide production of crude oil, which is about 90.1 million barrels 
per day, was transported by sea in 2013. Therefore, about 63% of the transported crude 
oil passed through PTSs during its journey from the producer to the customer. Risk 
assessment is an important subject in the safe transportation of crude oil to ensure the 
safety and reliability of the petroleum industry as a whole. 
Petroleum ports and transportation modes operate in a dynamic environment. This 
environment raises a prime concern with regard to the hazards that might lead to 
accidents. Mokhtari et al. (2011) mentioned that an effective safety analysis and risk 
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management programme offers the possibility of avoiding all major accidents and loss 
of lives and resources. Therefore, risk assessment could provide a suitable and effective 
method of safety analysis. However, in several situations, it is better not to apply the 
traditional techniques because the output might be inaccurate due to non-existent data 
and the high level of uncertainty (Ren et al., 2009).  
Many methods have been developed to deal with uncertainty. These developed 
techniques are used to enhance the performance of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) in situations that deal with uncertainty (Yang et al., 2008). Fuzzy logic is one 
of the techniques that have been widely applied to enhance the performance of FMEA 
in situations of uncertainty. The technique of fuzzy logic has been applied to and 
involved in creating new techniques such as fuzzy TOPSIS, fuzzy rule-based Min-Max, 
and fuzzy evidential reasoning. However, criticisms of fuzzy logic relate to the complex 
calculation and the insufficient ability to express the real risk that each situation 
involves. 
This chapter aims to apply an advanced risk assessment technique for evaluating PTSs’ 
operational hazards. Therefore, in this chapter a method known by the name of Fuzzy 
Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning (FRBBR) is investigated for developing risk analysis 
techniques that support decision-makers in circumstances of uncertainty. Based on 
earlier studies (Yang et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2013; Alyami et al., 2014), FRBBR is a 
hybrid technique that utilises a combination of Fuzzy Rule-Based (FRB) approach and 
Bayesian Networks (BNs) to compensate for each respective method’s disadvantages. 
For example, a known disadvantage in BNs is that the methodology requires an amount 
of information that is commonly difficult or impossible to obtain in risk assessment; 
the relevant information is required to be presented in the form of prior probability 
(Alyami et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2008). By using the FRB approach, the FMEA 
  
102 
parameters (i.e. likelihood of the existence of failure, consequence severity, and 
probability of a failure going undetected) can be defined and evaluated. Additionally, 
by using a BN, all the FRB results of a failure can be aggregated to produce values that 
assist decision-makers in circumstances of vagueness. The proposed methodology is 
demonstrated by investigating a real PTSs. 
4.2 Background of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
According to Liu et al. (2013), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a step-
by-step procedure applicable to various businesses for evaluating safety and reliability 
failure modes and effects. FMEA is among the most widely used and effective analysis 
methods to define, identify, and eliminate expected and/or potential failure from a 
system.  
The aerospace industry in the1960s was the first field to adopt the method for increasing 
the safety and reliability level of a system (Ravi Sankar and Prabju, 2001). The FMEA 
has since been practically used to ensure the safety and reliability of production in many 
industries, such as the aerospace, automotive, nuclear, and medical industries. 
Traditional FMEA considers three factors (Yang et al., 2008): 
 Likelihood of failure existence (L) 
 Consequent severity of the failure (C) 
 Probability of a failure going undetected (P) 
These three factors determine the safety level of each failure mode and are used to 
calculate the Risk Priority Number (RPN) (Chin et al., 2009). The RPN, which 
determines the rank of the risks, is obtained by multiplying the Likelihood (L), 
Consequence (C), and Probability (P) scores (Chin et al., 2009). A high RPN for a 
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failure mode means that the failure mode is more risky and should take priority over 
other failure modes with a lower RPN. The RPN is formulated as follows (Chin et al., 
2009; Yang et al., 2008): 
𝑅𝑃𝑁 = 𝐿 × 𝐶 × 𝑃          4.1 
This clear and simple methodology has gained wide acceptance for hazard 
identification and risk analysis (Braglia et al., 2003). Moreover, FMEA can be extended 
for criticality analysis, specifically for identifying the critical components where failure 
might lead to an accident. This extension is known as Failure Modes and Effects 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) (Yang et al., 2008). 
Over the years, several variations of the traditional FMEA have been developed. For 
example, in the automotive industry, FMEA has been divided into two processes: 
FMEA design and FMEA process (Aldridge et al., 1991).  
 FMEA design is a procedure used during design to ensure that the right 
materials are being used to conform to customer satisfaction and that the 
regulations set by the government are being met. 
 FMEA process deals with manufacturing and assembly processes. 
Studies such as Price et al.’s (1992) research, which was the first and major step in 
automation of the FMEA process, describe the use of functional reasoning as a basis to 
perform failure mode analysis. Russomanno et al. (1992) discussed the use of an expert 
system for the automation of numeric and symbolic reasoning in the FMEA process. 
Bell et al. (1992) developed an automation tool built around a causal reasoning model 
for FMEA in the FMEA process. Price et al. (1995) described the use of a flame system 
which aimed to deliver a knowledge-based system for the automation of the FMEA 
process. Kara-Zaitri et al. (1992) presented an improved FMEA methodology. This 
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improved method was derived from the combination of an FMEA matrix and RPN 
technique and hence captured the benefits of these techniques in a single matrix, 
providing an organised and traceable analysis model from the component level to 
system-level failure effects.  
4.2.1 Drawbacks of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
Although extensively used in safety analysis, traditional FMEA suffered from some 
critical drawbacks. One of the critical problems is associated with the use of the RPN. 
The technique of using RPN has been widely criticised for the following reasons (Wang 
et al., 2009; Pillay and Wang, 2003; Chin et al., 2009). 
 The mathematical formula of the RPN may produce the same value in analysing 
different risks while using different sets for rating the L, C, and P. However, the 
risk implication of these similar RPNs might be very different. For example, 
consider two different events (i.e. 𝑅𝑃𝑁1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑃𝑁2). The L, C, and P values of 
the first and second events are 2, 4, 3 and 4, 1, 6 respectively. By using Equation 
4.1, the total value of these two events is the same, at 24 (𝑅𝑃𝑁1 = 2 × 4 × 3 =
24  and 𝑅𝑃𝑁2 = 4 × 1 × 6 = 24 ). However, the risk implication of these 
events might differ from each other with respect to the consequent severity of 
the failure differences. In some situations, this difference might lead to the high-
risk event going unnoticed or to a waste of resources and time. 
 The RPN only considers the L, C, and P factors. It neglects and does not 
consider other important risk factors and information such as the associated 
weights of these three parameters. 
 Information in FMEA can be expressed in linguistic variables such as remote, 
moderate, or very high. In contrast, the RPN only deals with numerical 
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evaluation. Therefore, the values of the factors may be inaccurate; moreover, it 
may be difficult to assign intangible quantities. 
To overcome these setbacks, many methods have been proposed to enhance the 
performance of FMEA. These incorporated methods are based on uncertainty 
modelling techniques such as fuzzy sets (Xu et al., 2002), Dempster–Shafer theory (Liu 
et al., 2005), grey theory (Pillay and Wang, 2003), evidential reasoning (Yang, 2001), 
Monte Carlo simulation (Bevilacqua et al., 2000), and artificial neural network (Keskin 
and Özkan, 2009). The enhanced FMEA has been used to assist its practical application 
in several fields such as in maritime and offshore engineering safety (Sii et al., 2001), 
system reliability and failure mode analysis (Braglia et al., 2003), engineering system 
safety (Garcia and Schirru, 2005), and maritime and port security (Yang et al., 2009b). 
4.2.2 Fuzzy Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
At the University of California in 1965, Prof. L Zadeh (1965) introduced fuzzy logic 
by extending possibility theory where its basis was formed from a fuzzy set (Riahi et 
al., 2012). Zadeh designed the theory to deal with the fuzziness of human judgment. 
Fuzzy logic allowed a mathematical approach to be applied for identifying fuzzy 
information, knowledge, and concepts (Riahi et al., 2012). In other words, in 
probability theory the values are indicated by numbers; however, in possibility theory 
the values are indicated by words, in natural or artificial language, to deal with 
uncertainty. Thus probability theory and possibility theory are distinct. Negligible, 
moderately likely, and highly unlikely are a sample of description variables that may 
be used for defining situations (Pillay and Wang, 2003; Sii, et al., 2001). These 
linguistic variables allow imprecise possibility statements to be mathematically 
described within fuzzy algorithms. From the beneficial characteristics of the linguistic 
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variables to the possibility theory, the technique developed in the 1960s (i.e. fuzzy 
logic) became one of the most widely known approaches in expert knowledge.  
According to Liu et al. (2004), fuzzy knowledge base/rule base is the core fuzzy logic 
structure. A fuzzy knowledge base/rule base is constructed by using experts’ knowledge 
and expertise about the failure in the form of fuzzy IF-THEN rules (Yang et al., 2008). 
A simple example of a fuzzy IF-THEN rule is as follows (Liu et al., 2004): 
𝐼𝐹 𝑥 𝑖𝑠 𝐴 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝐵          4.2 
where 𝐴 and 𝐵 represent the linguistic grades for rules 𝑥 and 𝑦 respectively. The first 
part of the fuzzy IF-THEN rule (i.e. the IF part) is known as the antecedent or premise, 
whilst the second part of the rule (i.e. the THEN part) is known as the consequence or 
conclusion (Liu et al., 2004). 
In a fuzzy rule base FMEA, the L, C, and P are represented in the IF, whilst the THEN 
represents the risk. An example of a fuzzy IF-THEN rule for safety analysis is as 
follows (Liu et al., 2004): 
Rule: IF the Failure Rate (FR) is frequent and the Consequence Severity (CS) is 
catastrophic and the Failure Consequence Probability (FRP) is likely, THEN the 
Safety Level (S) is poor 
Incompleteness is another type of uncertainty. This type of uncertainty occurs when the 
experts are incapable of creating a strong correlation between the IF and the THEN. In 
other words, it occurs when there is not enough available evidence, or when the experts’ 
belief in a particular hypothesis is not 100% certain, but only to a certain degree of 
belief (Liu et al., 2004). An example of a fuzzy IF-THEN rule with degree of belief for 
multiple possible consequence terms is as follows (Yang et al., 2008): 
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Rule: IF Likelihood (L) is Very Low, Consequence severity (C) is Negligible and chance 
of failure being undetected (P) is Reasonably Unlikely, THEN S is Good with 
0.91, Average with 0.09, Fair with 0 and Poor with 0 
where [(Good 0.91), (Average 0.09), (Fair 0), and (Poor 0)] is the expert degree of 
belief, which means that the experts are 91% sure that the safety level is Good, and 9% 
sure that the safety level is Average. 
The representation of knowledge and reasoning with rules-based structures is widely 
used in risk assessment due to the following factors (Rahman, 2012; Liu et al., 2004; 
John et al. 2014a): 
 The modularity of each rule, which can be seen as one unit of knowledge 
 The expressed knowledge in the rule, which is represented with the same 
formation 
 The natural formation of the rules in knowledge expression 
 The easiness and clarity of the expressed knowledge 
The incorporation of fuzzy logic and FMEA for enhancing the performance of FMEA 
has been widely applied. For example, an alternative multi-attribute decision-making 
method was proposed by Braglia et al. (2003), who termed the method the fuzzy 
Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) method. This 
decision-making method considers the three risk attributes (i.e. L, C, and P) as criteria, 
and the failure mode as an alternative. 
A fuzzy method and grey theory were proposed by Chang et al. (1999). To evaluate the 
risk attributes L, C, and P, the researchers applied fuzzy linguistic variables. However, 
the grey theory was used for determining the risk priority of potential failure. Pillay and 
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Wang (2003) developed a fuzzy rule-based approach that does not require a utility 
function for defining the risk factors and avoids using the traditional use of RPN. The 
linguistic variables in Pillay and Wang’s (2003) study that represented the three FMEA 
attributes were directly evaluated within this method. Other studies have assigned 
relative weighting coefficients using the grey theory to achieve an RPN. Similar studies, 
such as Sharma et al. (2008, 2007) and Chang et al. (2001), applied the fuzzy method 
and grey theory for ranking the failure mode in FMEA. 
A critical risk assessment approach was presented by Puente et al. (2002). The approach 
is qualitative rule-based, which provides a risk ranking for potential failures. Depending 
on the presented knowledge about the three risk factors (failure detection, frequency, 
and severity), a risk priority ranking is assigned to each failure cause in an FMEA. A 
total of 125 rules are then structured by using the IF-THEN rule formation in FMEA. 
All the rules are presented in a three-dimensional graph. Liu et al. (2015) combined 
interval 2-tuple linguistic variables with grey relational analysis to improve the 
effectiveness of the traditional FMEA in medical services. Jiang et al. (2017) developed 
an advance risk ranking method based on fuzzy evidential theory in a Micro-Electro-
Mechanical System (MEMS). Tazi et al. (2017) integrated cost factors to traditional 
FMEA to improve system design reliability of wind turbine systems. 
Among the developments in FMEA, a fuzzy rule-based Bayesian reasoning (FuRBaR) 
approach was developed by Yang et al. (2008) to prioritise failures in FMEA without 
compromising the simplicity of the traditional RPN approach. The researchers 
developed this hybrid technique to deal with some of the FMEA drawbacks regarding 
the use of conventional fuzzy rule-based methods. The connection between the L, C, 
and P parameters is established in a fuzzy IF-THEN rule with the degree of belief 
structure in FuRBaR defined by using domain experts’ knowledge. The approach 
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applies the mechanism of Bayesian reasoning to rank the potential failure modes 
through aggregating the relevant rules. 
For the purpose of this research, the technique of fuzzy rule-based Bayesian reasoning 
(FRBBR) is adopted. This hybrid technique analyses the risks associated with PTSs and 
provides a risk-ranking technique that is useful for decision-makers in uncertain 
situations. Therefore, it is important to understand the Bayesian Network (BN) 
mechanism for applying the FRBBR technique. 
4.3 Background of the Bayesian Network Method 
Bayesian Network (BN) which is also known as Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs), 
was developed based on the marriage of the basic Bayesian theory (i.e. which was 
developed by Bayes and later developed into a more applicable level in the late 1960s) 
and a networking technique. Therefore, BN was firstly developed at Stanford 
University in the 1970s (McCabe et al., 1998; Bernardo and Smith, 2009). The merging 
of these two techniques provides a strong framework for dealing with uncertainty 
problems (Yang et al., 2008). The BN presents the fundamental concepts of 
probabilistic graphical models, or probabilistic networks in a new picture. Probabilistic 
networks have become popular and are widely applied due to their ability to deal with 
decisions under uncertainty (Khakzad et al., 2013a; Montewka et al., 2014; Wu et al., 
2015; Riahi et al., 2013;) 
The BN have been defined by Eleye-Datubo et al. (2006), Khakzad et al. (2013a), 
Khakzad et al. (2013b), and Li et al. (2014) as sets of random variables represented in 
a probability graphical model that consists of two parts: 
 Conditional Probability Distribution (CPD), which specifies the relationship 
between the parent and child node quantitatively.   
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 Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), which is the directed representation of the 
network structure.  
The BN Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), consisting of a set of nodes (also known as 
vertices) and directed links (also known as edges). Nodes, which are usually drawn as 
circles, represent random variables, and connected arcs (edges or links) between a pair 
of nodes represent dependencies between these variables (Vinnem et al., 2012). 
According to Trucco et al. (2008), the relationship of each node to another node (i.e. 
the relationship between a parent node and a child node) is represented by an edge that 
connects the two nodes, where this edge starts from the parent node and ends with an 
arrowhead pointing to the child node. 
The BN technique has been widely used due to the following advantages (Ben-Gal, 
2007; Eleye-Datubo et al., 2006; Riahi et al., 2013; Rahman, 2012): 
 The output of the method is clearly understood. 
 Over time, the model has been continuously improved as new knowledge 
emerges.  
 The model makes it easy to pinpoint whether a specific piece of information has 
actually been taken into consideration. 
 The visual representation of the model provides a clear visualisation of the 
relationship between the nodes. 
 The graphical model enables direct representation of the relationship between 
the parent node and the child nodes. 
 Both qualitative and quantitative data can be analysed using the technique, 
which allows an easy understanding of the relationships among the factors.  
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The BN belongs to the family of probabilistic graphical models. Such models aim to 
provide a decision-support framework for problems involving uncertainty, complexity, 
and probabilistic reasoning (Ben-Gal, 2007). The BN technique is characterised as 
being naturally flexible in its network modelling. For dealing with uncertain knowledge, 
the technique has been extensively and successfully applied in various areas such as 
medical diagnosis (Spiegelhalter et al., 2013), image recognition (Booker and Hota, 
2013), language understanding (Charniak and Goldman, 1989; 2013), and search 
algorithms (Hansson and Mayer, 2013). Korb and Nicholson (2010) and Heckerman et 
al. (1995) provided a list of BN computer software applications to deal with BNs. Each 
of these computer tools has a unique interface. Analytica, BayesiaLab, Bayes Net 
Toolbox, GeNIe, Netica, HUGIN, JavaBayes, and MSBNx, are examples of computer 
software that deal with BNs. 
4.3.1 Definition and Characteristics of Bayesian Network 
Jordan (1998) defined BNs as  
“Graphical models are a marriage between probability theory 
and graph theory. They provide a natural tool for dealing with 
two problems that occur throughout applied mathematics and 
engineering “uncertainty and complexity” and in particular they 
are playing an increasingly important role in the design and 
analysis of machine learning algorithms. Fundamental to the idea 
of a graphical model is the notion of modularity; a complex 
system is built by combining simpler parts. Probability theory 
provides the glue whereby the parts are combined, ensuring that 
the system as a whole is consistent, and providing ways to 
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interface models to data. The graph theoretic side of graphical 
models provides both an intuitively appealing interface by which 
humans can model highly-interacting sets of variables as well as 
a data structure that lends itself naturally to the design of efficient 
general-purpose algorithms”. 
The BN approach produces a graph which contains nodes connected by links at the 
structural level. The network nodes are divided into four categories, which are listed as 
follows (Friis-Hansen, 2000; Ben-Gal, 2007) (see Figure 4.1): 
 
Figure 4.1: A BN sample 
 
 Parent nodes, which are the influencing nodes 
 Child nodes, which are the nodes influenced by the parent nodes 
 Root nodes, which are nodes that are not linked to any parent nodes 
 Leaf nodes, which are nodes that are not linked to any child nodes  
The BN variables are represented by the nodes, and the relationships between these 
variables are represented by the links (Ben-Gal, 2007). A complete set of events, which 
are also known as states, levels, values, choices, and options (Kjærulff and Madsen, 
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2005), is represented in each node. This set of values is referred to as the variable 
domain, where the domain can be disconnected or continuous. For example, a node Z 
contains three values, which are C, D, and E. Based on the technical information 
obtained from personal knowledge, reading materials, and experts’ knowledge, the 
names of the values can be determined (see Figure 4.1).  
Probability, which could be defined as the likelihood of an event taking place, is another 
characteristic of a node in a network. Conditional and unconditional (marginal) are two 
ways to describe the probability distribution of a node. If a node has parents, it is 
described as having conditional probability; otherwise it is unconditional (Friis-Hansen, 
2000; Ben-Gal, 2007; Riahi et al., 2013). An example for the probability distribution 
of Figure 4.1 is as follows (Figure 4.2): 
Ƥ(𝐶) 
Ƥ(𝐷) 
Ƥ(𝐸) 
Ƥ(𝑍|𝐶, 𝐷, 𝐸) 
Figure 4.2: Conditional and unconditional probabilities of Figure 4.1 
 
4.3.2 HUGIN Expert Software  
HUGIN software is an advanced decision-supporting software package which was 
established by a group of researchers in 1989 based on BN technology (HUGIN expert, 
n.d.). An easy-to-use graphical user interface is provided with the software. In addition, 
HUGIN (which stands for Handling Uncertainty In General Inference Network) 
software provides an applicable programmer interface. The software provides a 
graphical representation for each node within the network and simplifies the method of 
inputting the data and reading the outputs. In this chapter, the software is used to 
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compute the probability values of each node. To construct a network using HUGIN 
software, the following steps should be taken (Riahi, 2010; Andersen et al., 2013): 
 The BN nodes must be mapped out. 
 The node states must be defined. 
 The probability of each state must be determined. 
4.4 Methodology  
For the purposes of this study, a model was constructed. An amalgamation of FRB 
approach and the belief structure in FMEA and BN was used to analyse the risks 
associated with the petroleum ports and transportation modes within PTSs. The analysis 
procedure is presented in Figure 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.3: The PTSs operational hazards assessment model flow chart 
An FRB approach was employed to formulate the conditional statements comprising 
the complete knowledge base. Moreover, a BN was used to provide a decision-
supporting framework for evaluation of the petroleum ports’ and transportation modes’ 
operation within PTSs through the use of probabilistic reasoning. The steps in analysing 
Step 1
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the risks in a petroleum terminal, petroleum ship, and petroleum pipeline within the 
PTSs are listed as follows: 
 Identification of the PTSs Hazards 
 Application of FRB approach with belief structure in FMEA 
 BN model development 
 Application of the BN to aggregate the rules 
 Prioritisation of the failure factors 
 Sensitivity analysis 
4.4.1 Step I: Identify the PTSs Hazards 
In the construction process of a model, causality plays an important role. For example, 
consider the nodes germs and sickness. Common sense tells us that germs are a cause 
of sickness, not the other way around. Therefore, to determine the hazards that affect 
the safe operation of a PTS, a cause and effect analysis technique has been used (Chang 
and Lin, 2006). This technique has great potential to address the aims and objectives of 
this study. In addition, the technique can be applied in a multidisciplinary way to 
stimulate systematic thinking, especially in the engineering field (Chang and Lin, 
2006). Therefore, the analysis technique of cause and effect has the potential to address 
the requirements of this study.  
The hazards in PTSs operations that can lead to a crude oil spill were identified through 
conducting an extensive literature review (i.e. Section 2.8) (Ceyhun, 2014; Vinnem et 
al., 2012; Ismail and Karim, 2013; Cai et al., 2013). This hazard identification process 
helps decision makers in identifying any risk scenarios that affect the safety of PTSs 
operations. The literature review allowed the author to identify the hazards events that 
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affect the safe operation of crude oil terminals, pipelines, and ships. As there are limited 
studies on operational risks in petroleum terminals, the author extended the literature 
review to include studies on operational risks in general supply chains as well (Thorsen 
and Dalva, 1995; Ronza et al., 2006; Rømer et al., 1993; Rømer et al., 1995; Trbojevic 
and Carr, 2000).  
By using a brainstorming technique, the literature review identified hazards that have 
been validated by experts. It was then determined whether the identified hazards related 
to PTSs operations and whether any other unidentified hazards exist in real-life 
practices that should be included in the study. To validate these results, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted. The advantage of using face-to-face meetings is that they 
can help the researcher to achieve deeper and clearer understanding of the issue of risk 
from experts’ perspectives. It is reasonable to believe that any discoveries gained from 
face-to-face interviews with experts are more relevant and reliable for research. In this 
study, the experts were selected based on their active working experience in petroleum 
or refined petroleum products’ terminals, in pipeline and ship operation, and/or in 
research on petroleum transportation. Each expert was required to have at least 20 
years’ relevant experience. These meetings took place in 2015. In the meetings, open 
questions were used. The interviewees were asked to give their comments on the list of 
hazards that had already been found through the literature review. The interviewees 
were also questioned about the hazards that they had faced in real-life practice and that 
they believed should be included in the list. Based on the results of these meetings, 
Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 present a hierarchical structure of the hazards identified and 
those hazards’ effects on the operation of PTSs.  
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Figure 4.4: Hierarchical structure of hazards associated with the operation of 
petroleum terminals 
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Figure 4.5: Hierarchical structure of hazards associated with the ship 
transportation operation 
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Figure 4.6: Hierarchical structure of hazards associated with the pipeline 
operation 
4.4.2 Step II: Establish an FRB with Belief Structure in FMEA  
As mentioned earlier in Section 4.3, L, C, and P are the three risk parameters that are 
used to evaluate the safety level of the failure mode in the traditional FMEA. For 
constructing a fuzzy IF-THEN rule with a belief structure for PTSs, the occurrence 
probability of a risk event during the process of oil transport (Pl), the consequence 
severity that the risk event would cause if it occurs (Sc), and the probability that the risk 
event cannot be detected before it occurs (Dp) were employed as the FMEA factors. Pl, 
Sc, and Dp are the three risk parameters that were used in the IF part. The risk level (R) 
represented the THEN part. For describing Pl, Sc, Dp, and R, a set of linguistic grades 
(i.e. Very High, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low) was employed (Mokhtari et al., 
2012; John et al., 2014a; Liu et al., 2011b; Pillay and Wang, 2003; Alghanmi et al., 
2017). These grades describe the linguistic variables of each attribute associated with 
the PTSs’ hazards (see Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3) (Pillay and Wang, 2003; Sii et al., 2001; 
Liu et al., 2011b; Yang et al., 2008; Zaman et al., 2015). Through considering the 
experts’ judgments, the degree of each parameter has been valued for each hazard, such 
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that each parameter is defined based on knowledge accrued from PTSs’ historical PTSs’ 
events (see Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3). 
Table 4.1: Linguistic grades for the likelihood parameter for each hazard in the 
IF part  
Occurrence 
Probability of a 
Hazard 
Description 
Very Low 
The probability of occurrence is unlikely to occur but 
possible 
Low The probability of occurrence is likely once per year 
Medium The probability of occurrence is likely once per quarter 
High The probability of occurrence is likely once per month 
Very High The probability of occurrence is expected once per month 
 
Table 4.2: Linguistic grades for the consequence parameter for each hazard in 
the IF part  
Consequence 
Severity of a 
Hazard 
Description 
Very Low 
At most minor injury involved and negligible damage to the 
system; no damage to the environment 
Low 
Minor medical treatment required; slight equipment or 
system damage but still fully functional and serviceable; 
minor environmental damage 
Medium 
Minor injury; moderate incapacity of systems, equipment, or 
facilities that disrupts operations; moderate damage to the 
environment 
High 
Permanent total disability; damage to major facilities; severe 
environmental damage 
Very High Death; loss of major facilities; major environmental damage 
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Table 4.3: Linguistic grades for the probability parameter for each hazard in the 
IF part  
Probability of a 
Hazard being 
Undetected  
Description 
Very Low Possible to detect without checks or maintenance 
Low Possible to detect through regular checks or maintenance 
Medium Possible to detect through intensive checks or maintenance 
High 
Difficult to detect through intensive or regular checks or 
maintenance 
Very High 
Impossible to detect even through intensive or regular checks 
or maintenance 
 
In the FRB approach, a belief structure was utilised to model the THEN part in the IF-
THEN rule as shown in the following example (Alyami et al., 2014): 
 Rule 1: IF Pl is Very High, Sc is Very High and Dp is Very High, THEN R is 
Very High with 100%, High with 0%, Medium with 0%, Low with 0% and Very 
Low with 0%. 
 Rule 2: IF Pl is Very High, Sc is Very High and Dp is High, THEN R is Very 
High with 67%, High with 33%, Medium with 0%, Low with 0% and Very Low 
with 0%. 
 Rule 3: IF Pl is Very High, Sc is Very High and Dp is Medium, THEN R is Very 
High with 67%, High with 0%, Medium with 33%, Low with 0% and Very Low 
with 0%. 
 Rule 4: IF Pl is Very High, Sc is Very High and Dp is Low, THEN Rs is Very 
High with 67%, High with 0%, Medium with 0%, Low with 33% and Very Low 
with 0%. 
As is clear from the above four rules, a proportion method has been used to assign the 
belief degree in the THEN part for each of the linguistic variables (Alyami et al., 2014). 
To simplify this method, the risk factors that receive similar grades in the IF part are 
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divided by the total number of parameters. This process identifies the degree of belief 
belonging to a particular grade in the THEN part for each rule and uses the following 
equation (Alyami et al., 2014):  
𝐷(𝑥) =
∑ 𝑎𝑖(𝑥)
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
          4.3 
where 𝐷(𝑥) is the belief degree for Very High, High, Medium, Low, or Very Low in 
the THEN part, n is the total number of risk parameters in the IF part, and 
𝑎𝑖(𝑥) describes the grades of a specific linguistic variable of each attribute associated 
with the hazards. For example, three risk parameters receive the Very High grade in the 
IF part for Rule 1. Therefore, the belief degree for Very High in the THEN part is 
calculated as 100% (3/3 = 100%). Conversely, for Rule 2, two risk parameters get the 
Very High grade and one gets the High grade in the IF part. Therefore, the belief degrees 
belonging to Very High and High in the THEN part are 67% (2/3 = 67%) and 33% (1/3 
= 33%) respectively. For risk evaluation of a petroleum port, pipeline, and ship, 125 
rules (5 × 5 × 5) with their belief degrees have been established (Alyami et al., 2014) 
(see Table 4.4 and Appendix 2.1). 
4.4.3 Step III: Develop a BN Model   
After identifying the PTSs’ hazards and establishing the FRB model with belief 
structure in FMEA, the relationship between the hazards was confirmed, and a 
qualitative network was built to represent all the hazards and their dependencies (i.e. 
the three risk parameters). The BN graphical model enables a clear and direct statement 
of the relationships between the parent (i.e. Pl, Sc, and Dp) and child (i.e. hazard) nodes. 
An example of the BN model is shown in Figure 4.1.  
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4.4.4 Step IV: Aggregate the Rules by using a BN 
BNs are known for their ability to capture non-linear causal relationships and model 
the degree of belief in the THEN part of FRB models (Yang et al., 2008; Alyami et al., 
2014). In this step, various BN models were developed. Each model represents one of 
the PTSs’ hazard events identified in the first step.  
Table 4.4: The established IF-THEN rules with belief structure for PTSs risk 
evaluation 
Rule 
No 
Risk Parameters in the IF Part Belief Degree in the THEN Part 
Pl Sc DP VH H M L VL 
1 VH(P1) VH(S1) VH(D1) 1 0 0 0 0 
2 VH(P1) VH(S1) H(D2) 0.67 0.33 0 0 0 
3 VH(P1) VH(S1) M(D3) 0.67 0 0.33 0 0 
4 VH(P1) VH(S1) L(D4) 0.67 0 0 0.33 0 
5 VH(P1) VH(S1) VL(D5) 0.67 0 0 0 0.33 
.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 
.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 
.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 
121 VL(P5) VL(S5) VH(D1) 0.33 0 0 0 0.67 
122 VL(P5) VL(S5) H(D2) 0 0.33 0 0 0.67 
123 VL(P5) VL(S5) M(D3) 0 0 0.33 0 0.67 
124 VL(P5) VL(S5) L(D4) 0 0 0 0.33 0.67 
125 VL(P5) VL(S5) VL(D5) 0 0 0 0 1 
To aggregate the rules by using a BN, firstly the rule bases developed in Step 2 had to 
be represented in the form of conditional probabilities. For example, the established 
Rule 2 in Table 4.4 was presented in an IF-THEN rule as follows: 
R2: IF Very High (P1), Very High (S1) and High (D2), THEN {(0.67, Very High 
(R1)), (0.33, High (R2)), (0, Medium (R3)), (0, Low (R4)), (0, Very Low (R5)),}. 
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From that, the conditional probability of R2 could be expressed as follows: 
Given P1, S1, and D2, the probability of Rh (h = 1,…,5) is (0.67, 0.33, 0, 0, 0) or  
Ƥ(𝑅ℎ|𝑃1, 𝑆1, 𝐷2) = (0.67, 0.33, 0, 0, 0),       4.4 
where “  ” symbolises conditional probability.   
The established IF-THEN rules within FMEA for evaluation of the risks associated 
with PTSs were modelled and transferred by using the BN technique in four nodes. 
Three parent nodes were included, namely the Pl, Sc and Dp of each hazard; these three 
parent nodes each connected to one child node (Node R), which in turn represented one 
of the PTSs’ hazard. Once the overall rule base was converted into a customised BN 
model, the marginal probability of the H (i.e. child node) was then computed by 
simplifying the risk inference mechanism of the rule-base failure criticality evaluation. 
Through Appendix 2.1 and Equation 4.4, the needed conditional probability table of 
Node R, P(RhPl, Sc, Dp), was achieved (see Appendix 2.2). That table symbolises a 5 × 
5 × 5 × 5 table containing values P(RhPl, Sc, Dp) (h, l, c, p = 1,…,5) (Yang et al., 2008; 
Alyami et al., 2014). 
Through using subjective judgments based on real comments, each of the PTSs’ hazards 
can be evaluated by risk analysts through considering the hazards’ Pl, Sc, and Dp and 
the hazards’ related linguistic ratings, which have already been defined in Tables 4.2, 
4.3, and 4.4. Moreover, to support the calculation of the prior probabilities [i.e. P(Pl), 
P(Sc), and P(Dp)] of the three parent nodes Pl, Sc, and Dp, the views of multiple experts 
were applied in the evaluation, and the averaging technique described above was used 
for assigning the belief degree of the linguistic grades of each individual parameter. 
Therefore, the marginal probability of H (Rh) can be detected as follows (Yang et al., 
2008; Alyami et al., 2014): 
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4.4.5 Step V: Prioritise the PTSs Hazards  
The results from the rules aggregated by using the BN are presented in the form of five 
linguistic variables (i.e. Very High, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low). For a decision 
maker, it is more useful that these results are presented in single value for ranking the 
failures and for comparison purposes. To accomplish that, it was necessary to assign 
appropriate utility values to prioritise the failures 𝑅ℎ (ℎ = 1,… ,5). Therefore, utility 
values of each linguistic term are symbolised by 𝑈𝑅ℎ , which was determined by using 
decision makers’ preference (Riahi et al., 2012; Yang, 2001; Yang et al., 2008; John et 
al., 2014a). Still, due to the unavailability of the preference information, the utility 
value of each linguistic term was presumed equidistantly distributed in a normalised 
utility space and calculated as follows (Riahi et al., 2012): 
 𝑈𝑅ℎ = 
(𝑅ℎ−𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛)
(𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛)
            4.6 
where 𝑅ℎ is the ranking value of the selected linguistic term, 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the ranking value 
of the highest linguistic term, and 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the ranking value of the lowest linguistic 
term. Consequently, the hazards can be ranked through calculating the utility as follows 
(Riahi et al., 2012; Yang, 2001): 
𝑅𝐻 =  ∑ Ƥ(𝛽ℎ) 𝑈𝑅ℎ
5
ℎ=1          4.7 
where the larger the value of RH, the more significant the risk level of a hazard. 
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4.4.6 Step VI: Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is a widely used validation method (Riahi et al., 2012; Alyami et 
al., 2014; John et al., 2014a). According to Forrester et al. (2001), sensitivity analysis 
is usually performed by a series of tests analysing how sensitive the model is to different 
parameter values. Forrester et al. (2001) noted that sensitivity analysis studies the 
uncertainties that are often associated with the model parameters in order to increase 
confidence in the model. Conducting sensitivity analysis of the present model thus 
allowed determination of the accuracy level of the parameters, making the model 
sufficiently useful and valid. Literature such as that from Pearl (1986, 2014), Lauritzen 
and Spiegelhalter (1988), and Castillo et al. (2012) provides additional details and 
explanation about sensitivity analysis. 
4.5 Case Study and Results Analysis 
For the purpose of this research, a case study has been carried out to demonstrate how 
the methodology can be employed to evaluate the hazards associated with PTSs. The 
case study has been conducted based on the analysis procedure presented in Figure 4.3. 
The petroleum ports’ operational hazards have been selected as a sample to present the 
following evaluation steps. 
4.5.1 Identification of the PTSs Hazards 
The risk scenarios that affect the safety of PTSs operations were identified. First, an 
extensive literature review was conducted to identify the hazards that are connected 
with PTSs operations. Then the identified hazards were discussed with selected experts 
who are involved in the operation practices of PTSs in several leading petroleum 
companies. These consultation meetings took place in UK and Saudi Arabia in 2015 
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and 2016 with nineteen petroleum/refined petroleum products’ terminal managers, 
pipeline and ship operators, and scholars. The experts added or recommended dropping 
hazard events based on at least two decades of experience. The final result yielded 42, 
61, and 10 operation hazards within port, ship, and pipeline sub-systems respectively 
(see Table 4.5).  
Table 4.5: Hazards associated with the operation of each system within PTSs 
 Seaport System Ship Transportation System Pipeline Transportation 
System 
H 1  Company Policies  Ship Collision due to Main 
Engine Failure  
Sabotage 
H 2 Company Standards Ship Collision due to Bridge 
Navigation Equipment 
Failure  
Workers Actions 
H 3 Management Procedure Ship Collision due to 
Communication System 
Failure  
Weather Condition 
H 4 Inattention  Ship Collision due to Wrong 
use of Navigation Equipment  
Geological Hazards 
H 5 Neglect Ship Collision due to Lack of 
Communication  
Material Failure 
H 6 Fatigue Ship Collision due to Failure 
to Follow Operational 
Procedure  
Construction Failure 
H 7 Skills Action To Avoid Collision  Maintenance Failure 
H 8 Overfill Ship Collision due to Human 
Inattention  
Failure to Follow Procedure 
H 9 SOPs (Standard Operating 
Procedures) Not Followed  
Ship Collision due to Human 
Neglect  
Internal Corrosion 
H 10 Overpressure  Ship Collision due to Human 
Fatigue  
External Corrosion 
H 11 Release From Loading 
Arm/SBM  
Ship Collision due to Human 
Skills  
 
H 12 Understaffing  Ship Collision due to 
Weather Condition  
 
H 13 Breakdown of 
Communication  
Ship Collision due to Third 
Party Activity  
 
H 14 Communication 
Misunderstanding  
Ship Grounding due to Main 
Engine Failure  
 
H 15 Wrong Signals  Ship Grounding due to 
Communication System 
Failure 
 
H 16 Procedural Failure  Ship Grounding due to 
Bridge Navigation 
Equipment Failure 
 
H 17 Collision between Ship and 
Other Ship/Berth  
Ship Grounding due to 
Wrong use of Navigation 
Equipment 
 
H 18 Lack of Tools/Spare Parts Ship Grounding due to Lack 
of Communication  
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H 19  Inappropriate maintenance 
practice  
Ship Grounding due to 
Failure to Follow Operational 
Procedure  
 
H 20 Use of Inappropriate 
Tools/Spare Parts  
Ship Grounding due to Route 
Selection  
 
H 21 Maintenance Omission  Ship Grounding due to Using 
Inappropriate Chart  
 
H 22 Lack of Communication 
System  
Ship Grounding due to 
Human Inattention  
 
H 23 Lack of Lighting System  Ship Grounding due to 
Human Neglect  
 
H 24 Lack of Movable Facilities  Ship Grounding due to 
Human Fatigue  
 
H 25 A/C System Failure  Ship Grounding due to 
Human Skills  
 
H 26 Control System Failure  Ship Grounding due to 
Weather Condition  
 
H 27 Instrument Failure  Ship Grounding due to Third 
Party Activity  
 
H 28 Valve Failure  Ship Grounding due to Water 
Depth  
 
H 29 Hose/Pump Failure  Hull Failure due to 
Construction Damage  
 
H 30 Gasket Failure  Hull Failure due to Hull 
Corrosion  
 
H 31 Pipeline Failure  Hull Failure due to 
Maintenance Failure  
 
H 32 Loading Arm/SBM Failure  Hull Failure due to Stowage 
Planning Failure  
 
H 33 Power Failure  Hull Failure due to Collision   
H 34 Cathodic Protection Failure  Hull Failure due to 
Grounding  
 
H 35 Heavy Rainfall  Fire/Explosion due to Human 
Inattention  
 
H 36 Flood  Fire/Explosion due to Human 
Neglect  
 
H 37 Snow  Fire/Explosion due to Human 
Skills  
 
H 38 Hurricane  Fire/Explosion due to Inert 
Gas/Ventilation System 
Failure 
 
H 39 Tornadoes  Fire/Explosion due to 
Electric Failure  
 
H 40  Lightning  Fire/Explosion due to 
Pumping Room Failure  
 
H 41 Earthquake  Fire/Explosion due to Main 
Engine Failure  
 
H 42 Tsunami  Fire/Explosion due to 
Heating system Failure  
 
H 43   Fire/Explosion due to Spread 
of Fire From Other Object  
 
H 44  Fire/Explosion due to 
Sabotage  
 
H 45  Fire/Explosion due to 
Weather Condition  
 
H 46  Equipment  Failure due to 
Pipe Failure  
 
H 47  Equipment  Failure due to 
Valve Failure  
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H 48  Equipment  Failure due to 
Pump Failure 
 
H 49  Equipment  Failure due to 
Tank Gauging System  
 
H 50  Equipment  Failure due to 
Manifold Failure  
 
H 51  Equipment  Failure due to 
Power Failure  
 
H 52  Equipment  Failure due to 
Heating System Failure  
 
H 53  Equipment  Failure due to 
Loading Computer  
 
H 54  Equipment  Failure due to 
Maintenance Error  
 
H 55  Equipment  Failure due to 
Maintenance Omission  
 
H 56  Equipment  Failure due to 
Lack of Communication 
 
H 57  Equipment  Failure due to 
Procedural Failure  
 
H 58  Equipment  Failure due to 
Human Inattention  
 
H 59  Equipment  Failure due to 
Human Neglect  
 
H 60  Equipment  Failure due to 
Human Fatigue  
 
H 61   Equipment  Failure due to 
Human Skills  
 
4.5.2 Application of FRB Approach with Belief Structure in FMEA 
In this step, the established FRB table in Section 4.6.2 was used. Moreover, a 
questionnaire was constructed and introduced to twenty-seven experts (nine from each 
operational sector) with the aim of collecting the failure information from their 
evaluation of hazards in petroleum ports, ships, and pipelines. The following three 
points were considered when building the questionnaire (Burgess, 2001; Taylor-
Powell, 1998; Oppenheim, 2000): 
 The questionnaire questions had to be simple and clear for the experts. 
 The survey had to be constructed in various sections that each assisted in 
reaching the research goals. 
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 The information, such as years of experience and education of each participant, 
had to be kept in mind, as this information may have affected each participant’s 
way of thinking. 
The questionnaire was constructed in four sections. The first section asked about the 
experts’ personal information with the aim of evaluating each participant’s expertise. 
The questions concerned the experts’ experiences, academic knowledge, and industrial 
background. The second section of the questionnaire provided a description of the 
hazard events’ attributes (i.e. Pl, Sc, and Dp). The experts responded to each attribute 
based on their knowledge of similar past events through using the proportion technique. 
Namely, each attribute was defined by five linguistic terms (i.e. Very High, High, 
Medium, Low, and Very Low) based on past events. The same proportion technique, 
based on a description of each attribute, was applied in the final two sections of the 
questionnaire as well. An example of how to fill in the questionnaire is contained in 
every questionnaire, which is represented in section three, so the expert has a clear 
understanding of the measurement used in this study. The fourth section of the 
questionnaire contained three parts, each one referring to one of the hazards in each 
system (see Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6). Each part of this section contained a matrix to be 
filled out. The questionnaire was piloted with people from both university and industry 
sectors and then refined before being sent to the experts. Three academics, two 
engineers, and one ship captain helped to refine the questionnaire.  
All participants are experts with at least a Bachelor’s degree (i.e. BSc) in a petroleum 
industry-related field. Each expert has over 20 years’ experience in the operation of 
tankers, pipelines, and/or inshore and offshore terminals and petroleum ports 
(Abubakar, 2014). In addition, the twenty seven selected experts (i.e. nine experts for 
port transportation systems and nine experts for ship and pipeline transportation 
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systems) are still actively working and holding different positions in different 
operational fields in PTSs (see Table 4.6). Based on these criteria, the experts have 
equal weights.  
Table 4.6: PTSs experts’ experience 
Expert 
Pipeline Transportation 
System 
Port Transportation System Ship Transportation System 
A 
Operation superintendent who 
has been primarily involved in 
crude and refined pipeline 
system safety operation for 
over 20 years 
With over 20 years of 
experience, head of Safety 
department who has been 
involved in crude and refined 
petroleum system safety 
operation for several 
crude/refined petroleum 
terminals 
Ship Captain who has been 
involved in transporting crude 
and refined petroleum products 
for several shipping lines for 
over 20 years 
B 
Operation foreman who 
worked in several crude oil 
pipeline systems safety 
operation for over 20 years 
Worked in several crude oil 
terminals as a safety officer 
with a working experience over 
20 years 
Captain of an oil tanker with an 
extended working experience 
over 20 years serving on board 
for several shipping lines 
C 
Operation foreman who has 
been primarily involved in 
crude oil pipeline system safety 
operation for over 20 years 
Senior safety engineer who has 
worked in crude oil safety 
operation for several petroleum 
terminals for over 20 years 
Ship Captain with over 20 
years work on board for several 
shipping lines for transporting 
crude and refined petroleum 
products 
D 
Worked for several petroleum  
pipeline transportation systems 
as a control room engineer with 
a working experience over 20 
years 
Safety officer who has been 
involved in crude and refined 
petroleum system safety 
operation for several 
crude/refined petroleum 
terminals for over 20 years 
With over 20 years of 
experience, Ship Captain who 
has worked on board 
for several shipping lines for 
transporting crude and refined 
petroleum products 
E 
Operation foreman with over 
20 years work for several 
companies for transporting 
crude and refined petroleum 
products via pipeline systems 
Senior safety engineer with 
over 20 years work for several 
crude oil terminals 
An oil tanker Captain has been 
involved in transporting crude 
and refined petroleum products 
for several shipping lines for 
over 20 years 
F 
Control room engineer with an 
extended working experience 
over 20 years worked for 
several companies for 
transporting crude oil via 
pipeline systems 
Senior safety engineer of crude 
oil terminals with an extended 
working experience over 20 
years for several petroleum 
terminals 
 
Ship Captain with over 20 
years worked on board for 
several shipping lines for 
transporting crude and refined 
petroleum products 
G 
With over 20 years of 
experience, Operation 
superintendent who has been 
primarily involved in crude and 
refined pipeline system safety 
operation for over 20 years 
Safety officer with over 20 
years work for several 
petroleum terminals for 
transporting crude and refined 
petroleum products 
Worked for several shipping 
lines as a Captain of an oil 
tanker with a working 
experience over 20 years 
 
H 
Operation foreman who 
worked in several crude and 
refined pipeline systems safety 
operation for over 20 years 
Worked in several leading 
crude oil terminals as a safety 
officer with a working 
experience over 20 years 
Ship Captain who has been 
involved in transporting crude 
and refined petroleum products 
for several shipping lines for 
over 20 years 
I 
Control room engineer who has 
been primarily involved in 
crude and refined pipeline 
system safety operation for 
over 20 years 
Safety officer who has been 
primarily involved in crude oil 
terminal system safety 
operation with a working 
experience over 20 years 
Captain of an oil tanker with an 
extended working experience 
over 20 years serving on board 
for several shipping lines 
After the researcher received the completed questionnaires from all the participants, the 
arithmetic mean of each risk parameter was calculated. By using the arithmetic mean, 
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the responses from the received questionnaires from all participants were calculated. 
The resulting values were then used further in the form of prior probabilities (step 4). 
An example of the combination of the nine experts’ judgments by using the arithmetic 
averaging technique for the hazard of Company Policies (MRHAA) is presented in 
Table 4.7. The parameter Pl is one example for calculating the average of the nine 
experts as follows: 
𝐿𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ =
∑ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ9𝐸=1
𝐸
=
5 + 10 + 10 + 20 + 5 + 10 + 5 + 10 + 5
9
 
       = 8.8889 
Each of the nine values for each parameter reflect the expert belief degree of the 
identified hazard. These experts are still actively working and holding different 
operational positions in different petroleum ports around the world within the PTNs 
(see Table 4.6). Similarly, the values of the three parameters for MRHAA are shown in 
Table 4.7 and were calculated as follows: 
Table 4.7: Prior Probability of Pl, Sc and Dp when evaluating the MRHAA 
Risk Parameters 
Experts Average 
degree of 
belief in % A B C D E F G H I 
Pl 
Very High 5 10 10 20 5 10 5 10 5 8.8889 
High 15 20 10 10 10 10 15 10 10 12.2222 
Medium 20 30 20 10 25 20 20 20 25 21. 1111 
Low 35 30 40 30 30 40 40 30 30 33. 8889 
Very Low 25 10 20 30 30 20 20 30 30 23.8889 
Sc 
Very High 0 10 10 20 15 10 5 10 10 10 
High 10 20 10 20 10 10 15 10 10 12. 7778 
Medium 20 20 30 20 25 30 30 20 10 22. 7778 
Low 30 30 30 20 35 30 30 30 30 29.4444 
Very Low 40 20 20 20 15 20 20 30 40 25 
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Dp 
Very High 0 10 0 3 10 0 0 10 20 5.8889 
High 10 10 20 25 10 20 20 10 20 16.1111 
Medium 10 10 30 32 20 30 30 30 30 24.6667 
Low 30 30 30 15 30 30 30 30 20 27.2222 
Very Low 50 40 20 25 30 20 20 20 10 26.1111 
The same technique was applied to calculate the combined belief degree for each of the 
113 hazards (i.e. 42 (port) + 61 (ship) + 10 (pipeline)), as shown in Table 4.8 and 
Appendices 2.3 – 2.8. 
Table 4.8: Prior Probability of Pl, Sc and Dp for the petroleum port hazards 
 Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 MRHAA 
8.8889,12.2222,21.1111,
33.8889,23.8889 
10,12.7778,22.7778,29.444
4,25 
5.8889,16.1111,24.6667,27.2
222,26.1111 
H2 MRHAB 
13.8889,20,26.6667,26.1
111,13.3333 
15,16.6667,31.1111,22.222
2,15 
10.5556,18.3333,27.2222,23.
8889,20 
H3 MRHAC 
11.6667,19.4444,23.8889
,31.1111,13.8889 
13.3333,20.5556,27.7778,2
0.5556,17.7778 
13.3333,18.3333,27.7778,28.
3333,12.2222 
H4 MRHBA 
10.5556,28.3333,24.4444
,25,11.6667 
15,15,26.6667,30.5556,12.
7778 
10,18.3333,26.1111,34.4444,
11.1111 
H5 MRHBB 
11.6667,16.6667,29.4444
,30.5556,11.6667 
13.3333,20.5556,28.8889,2
7.2222,10 
10.5556,13.8889,34.4444,30.
5556,10.5556 
H6 MRHBC 
10.5556,10.5556,25,28.3
333,25.5556 
12.7778,14.4444,28.3333,3
0,14.4444 
10.5556,16.1111,33.8889,27.
7778,11.6667 
H7 MRHBD 
14.4444,18.3333,27.7778
,26.1111,13.3333 
13.8889,19.4444,28.8889,2
2.7778,15 
13.3333,12.7778,27.7778,32.
7778,13.3333 
H8 MRHCA 
10.5556,16.6667,23.3333
,34.4444,15 
12.7778,14.4444,26.1111,2
8.8889,17.7778 
8.3333,10,31.6667,31.1111,1
8.8889 
H9 MRHCB 
12.7778,18.3333,23.3333
,33.8889,11.6667 
13.8889,22.7778,25.5556,2
3.8889,13.8889 
10.5556,17.2222,25,31.1111,
16.1111 
H10 MRHCC 
10,11.6667,28.8889,34.4
444,15 
12.2222,19.4444,26.6667,2
3.8889,17.7778 
16.6667,17.2222,27.2222,26.
1111,12.7778 
H11 MRHCD 
11.1111,15,30,28.3333,1
5.5556 
8.3333,15.5556,28.3333,27
.7778,20 
10,8.8889,28.3333,37.7778,1
5 
H12 MRHCE 
13.3333,13.3333,28.3333
,33.3333,11.6667 
12.2222,20,30.5556,26.666
7,10.5556 
11.6667,17.7778,30,28.3333,
12.2222 
H13 MRHCFA 
22.7778,27.7778,24.4444
,21.1111,3.8889 
10.5556,19.4444,28.8889,2
7.7778,13.3333 
10,11.6667,27.7778,35.5556,
15 
H14 MRHCFB 
16.1111,26.1111,23.8889
,22.2222,11.6667 
11.1111,27.2222,25,26.666
7,10 
11.6667,18.8889,28.8889,28.
3333,12.2222 
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H15 MRHCFC 
14.4444,20.5556,27.7778
,22.7778,14.4444 
11.1111,20,31.1111,27.777
8,10 
10.5556,18.8889,25,32.2222,
13.3333 
H16 MRHDA 
11.6667,12.7778,17.7778
,20,37.7778 
29.4444,28.8889,19.4444,1
2.2222,10 
30,31.1111,16.1111,11.6667,
11.1111 
H17 MRHDB 
12.2222,12.2222,16.6667
,20.5556,38.3333 
27.2222,28.8889,21.6667,1
1.6667,10.5556 
30.5556,30,14.4444,13.8889,
11.1111 
H18 CRHAAC 
13.3333,18.3333,20.5556
,26.1111,21.6667 
11.6667,25.5556,21.6667,3
0,11.1111 
11.1111,18.3333,29.4444,28.
8889,12.2222 
H19 CRHAAB 
13.8889,18.3333,20.5556
,31.1111,16.1111 
11.6667,17.7778,30,30.555
6,10 
11.1111,18.3333,28.8889,30,
11.6667 
H20 CRHAAA 
17.7778,23.8889,19.4444
,22.7778,16.1111 
11.6667,26.6667,23.8889,2
7.7778,10 
12.2222,18.3333,30,29.4444,
10 
H21 CRHAB 
10.5556,15,25,28.8889,2
0.5556 
11.6667,18.8889,29.4444,2
8.8889,11.1111 
12.2222,12.7778,35.5556,28.
8889,10.5556 
H22 CRHBAA 
22.2222,24.4444,20.5556
,21.6667,11.1111 
12.2222,20,22.7778,32.777
8,12.2222 
14.4444,15,32.7778,26.6667,
11.1111 
H23 CRHBAB 
3.8889,4.4444,21.1111,3
3.8889,36.6667 
18.8889,20,28.3333,21.111
1,11.6667 
22.7778,26.1111,23.3333,20.
5556,7.2222 
H24 CRHBAC 
6.1111,8.3333,20.5556,3
5.5556,29.4444 
15,14.4444,28.3333,25,17.
2222 
11.1111,18.3333,25.5556,29.
4444,15.5556 
H25 CRHBAD 
12.7778,11.1111,25,22.7
778,28.3333 
4.4444,7.2222,28.3333,34.
4444,25.5556 
11.6667,25.5556,35.5556,17.
2222,10 
H26 CRHBBA 
23.8889,25,18.8889,17.7
778,14.4444 
13.8889,18.8889,29.4444,2
7.2222,10.5556 
10.5556,12.2222,27.7778,37.
7778,11.6667 
H27 CRHBBB 
11.1111,16.1111,25,27.7
778,20 
32.7778,28.3333,15.5556,1
3.3333,10 
5.5556,12.7778,22.7778,53.3
333,5.5556 
H28 CRHBBC 
10,11.1111,25.5556,33.3
333,20 
19.4444,17.7778,27.7778,2
6.6667,8.3333 
6.2222,13.2222,28.3333,36.6
667,15.5556 
H29 CRHBBD 
8.8889,15,22.7778,30,23.
3333 
5.5556,10,20,22.2222,42.2
222 
2.2222,5.5556,22.2222,38.33
33,31.6667 
H30 CRHBBE 
11.1111,16.1111,25.5556
,26.1111,21.1111 
19.4444,26.1111,28.3333,1
4.4444,11.6667 
28.3333,24.4444,16.1111,18.
3333,12.7778 
H31 CRHBBF 
6.1111,11.6667,16.6667,
28.3333,37.2222 
13.8889,20.5556,46.1111,1
1.1111,8.3333 
18.8889,18.3333,28.3333,28.
3333,6.1111 
H32 CRHBBG 
8.3333,9.4444,19.4444,4
2.2222,20.5556 
33.3333,36.6667,13.3333,1
0.5556,6.1111 
5,8.3333,26.6667,41.6667,18
.3333 
H33 CRHBBH 
9.4444,14.4444,26.1111,
26.6667,23.3333 
13.3333,33.8889,31.6667,1
5,6.1111 
35,21.1111,16.6667,20.5556,
6.6667 
H34 CRHBBI 
10.5556,16.6667,25,25,2
2.7778 
13.8889,18.8889,29.4444,2
7.7778,10 
10,13.3333,35,30.5556,11.11
11 
H35 NRHAA 
8.3333,10.5556,21.6667,
23.3333,36.1111 
5,11.1111,23.8889,30,30 
12.2222,35,36.1111,10,6.666
7 
H36 NRHAB 
0,2.2222,7.2222,18.3333,
72.2222 
8.8889,18.8889,25.5556,25
,21.6667 
10.5556,33.3333,35.5556,10,
10.5556 
H37 NRHAC 
0.5556,0.5556,3.3333,8.8
889,86.6667 
3.3333,4.4444,7.2222,8.33
33,76.6667 
11.1111,33.3333,37.2222,10,
7.7778 
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H38 NRHBA 
2.2222,2.7778,18.3333,3
4.4444,42.2222 
5.5556,12.2222,24.4444,30
,27.7778 
10,15.5556,28.8889,33.8889,
11.6667 
H39 NRHBC 
2.7778,6.6667,20,43.888
9,26.6667 
10.5556,18.3333,30,32.777
8,8.3333 
3.8889,9.4444,33.3333,43.33
33,10 
H40 NRHBB 
0,0.5556,1.1111,10,88.33
33 
47.2222,23.3333,13.8889,9
.4444,6.1111 
4.4444,8.3333,36.1111,39.44
44,11.6667 
H41 NRHCA 
0.3333,0.5556,6.1111,13,
80 
47.7778,26.6667,13.8889,8
.3333,3.3333 
2.7778,3.3333,40,42.7778,11
.1111 
H42 NRHCB 
0.3333,0.5556,1.6667,9.6
667,87.7778 
48.8889,25.5556,13.8889,7
.7778,3.8889 
2.7778,3.3333,40,42.7778,11
.1111 
 
4.5.3 BN Model Development 
In this step, various BN models were developed. Each model represents one of the 
hazard events that were identified in the first step. Each hazard (child node) is connected 
to three parent nodes (i.e. three risk parameters); the states of the nodes were identified 
in the second step. The BN models were developed to represent PTSs’ hazards and their 
dependencies in order to analyse these hazards. For example, the node MRHAA is 
influenced by three parent nodes, which are the occurrence probability of a risk event 
during the process of oil transport (Pl), the consequence severity should the risk event 
cause if it were to occur (Sc), and the probability that the risk event would not be 
detected before it occurred (Dp). Each of the parent nodes is independent: There is no 
direct connection between the Pl, Sc, and Dp. For instance, if Pl = Very High, node Sc 
could be Very High, High, Medium, Low, or Very Low. The same applies to node Dp. 
4.5.4 Application of the BN to Aggregate the Rules 
To demonstrate the calculation process for aggregating the rules by BN, the hazard 
(MRHAA) was examined (see Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.7: BN model of the MRHAA hazard 
The degree of belief table for likelihood (without conditions) is shown below:  
Likelihood  
Very High 8.8889 
High 12.2222 
Medium 21. 1111 
Low 33. 8889 
Very Low 23.8889 
For example, Ƥ(𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 = 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ) = 8.8889 
The degree of belief table for consequences (without conditions):  
Consequences  
Very High 10 
High 12.7778 
Medium 22.7778 
Low 29.4444 
Very Low 25 
For example, Ƥ(Consequences = 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ) = 10 
The degree of belief table for probability (without conditions):  
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Probability  
Very High 5.8889 
High 16.1111 
Medium 24.6667 
Low 27.2222 
Very Low 26.1111 
For example, Ƥ(Probability = 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ) = 5.8889 
The degree of belief table for MRHAA (without conditions) (see Appendix 2.2 for the 
full table):  
Probability Very High 
Very 
Low 
Consequences Very High  High … 
Very 
Low 
Likelihood 
Very 
High 
High Medium Low 
Very 
Low 
Very 
High 
High … 
Very 
Low 
Very High 1 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 0.3333 … 0 
High 0 0.3333 0 0 0 0.3333 0.6667 … 0 
Medium 0 0 0.3333 0 0 0 0 … 0 
Low 0 0 0 0.3333 0 0 0 … 0 
Very Low 0 0 0 0 0.3333 0 0 … 1 
Ƥ(MRHAA = 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ │ 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 = 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, Consequences 
= 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, Probability = 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ) = 1 
Using the prior probabilities values of each node, the marginal probability of MRHAA 
can be calculated with Equation 4.5. MRHAA = 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ is used as an example. It 
is calculated as follows (see Figure 4.8): 
The same technique could be applied to calculate Ƥ(MRHAA𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ ) , 
Ƥ(MRHAA𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚), Ƥ(MRHAA𝐿𝑜𝑤) and Ƥ(MRHAA𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑜𝑤). For an easier and faster 
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way to perform this calculation, a computer software tool (i.e. HUGIN software) is used 
to compute this hazard BN model. As a result, the risk analysis value of MRHAA is as 
follows (see Figure 4.8):  
 
Figure 4.8: The analysis of MRHAA by HUGIN software 
As a result, the analysis values of MRHAA can be expressed by using Equation 4.4 as 
follows: 
 Ƥ(𝑅|𝐿, 𝐶, 𝑃) =  (8.2593, 13.7037, 22.8519, 30.1852, 25) 
The risk evaluation of the failure MRHAA can be explained as follows: 
(8.2593 Very High, 13.7037 High, 22.8519 Medium , 30.1852 Low, 25 Very Low) 
By using the same technique, the risk analysis values for all the hazards are identified 
in Table 4.10 and Appendices 2.9 – 2.10. 
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4.5.5 Prioritisation of the Failure Factors  
For a decision-maker, it is much easier and more practical to prioritise the hazards based 
on a single value. Therefore, the utility value technique has been applied to obtain a 
single value for ranking the PTSs’ hazards.  
The output values of MRHAA were presented by five linguistic terms (i.e. Very High, 
High, Medium, Low, and Very Low). “Very High” is the highest preference linguistic 
term (i.e. equal to five), and “Very Low” is the lowest preference linguistic term (i.e. 
equal to one). By using Equations (4.6) and (4.7), the utility value of MRHAA is 
calculated as follows (see Table 4.9): 
Table 4.9: The steps for calculating the utility value of MRHAA 
𝑅ℎ Very High High Medium Low Very Low 
𝑉ℎ 5 4 3 2 1 
𝑈𝑅ℎ 
5 − 1
5 − 1
= 1 
4 − 1
5 − 1
= 0.75 
3 − 1
5 − 1
= 0.5 
2 − 1
5 − 1
= 0.25 
1 − 1
5 − 1
= 0 
Ƥ(𝑅ℎ) 8.2593% 13.7037% 22.8519% 30.1851% 25% 
∑ Ƥ(𝑅ℎ) = 8.2593% + 13.7037% + 22.8519% + 30.1851% + 25% = 100%
5
ℎ=1
 
Ƥ(𝑅ℎ) 𝑈𝑟ℎ 8.2593% 10.2778% 11.4260% 7.5463% 0 
𝑅𝐻MRHAA = ∑ Ƥ(𝑅ℎ) 𝑈𝑟ℎ
5
ℎ=1
= 37.5093 
By using the same technique, the utility value for the petroleum terminal, ship, and 
pipeline hazards are identified and ranked in Table 4.10, Appendix 2.11, and Appendix 
2.12 respectively. 
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Table 4.10: Analysis values of the 42 hazards by HUGIN software 
 Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Utility 
value 
Ranking 
VH H M L VL 
H1 
Company Policies 
(MRHAA) 
8.2593 13.7037 22.8519 30.1852 25 37.5093 38 
H2 
Company Standards 
(MRHAB) 
13.1482 18.3333 28.3333 24.0741 16.1111 47.0833 17 
H3 
Management Procedure 
(MRHAC) 
12.7778 19.4444 26.4815 26.6667 14.6296 47.2685 16 
H4 Inattention (MRHBA) 11.8519 20.5555 25.7407 30 11.8519 47.6389 12 
H5 Neglect (MRHBB) 11.8519 17.0371 30.9259 29.4444 10.7408 47.4537 13 
H6 Fatigue (MRHBC) 11.2963 13.7037 29.0741 28.7037 17.2222 43.2870 28 
H7 Skills (MRHBD) 13.8889 16.8518 28.1482 27.2222 13.8889 47.4074 14 
H8 Overfill (MRHCA) 10.5556 13.7037 27.0370 31.4815 17.2222 42.2222 29 
H9 
SOPs Not Followed 
(MRHCB) 
12.4074 19.4444 24.6296 29.6296 13.8889 46.7130 19 
H10 
Overpressure 
(MRHCC) 
12.9630 16.1111 27.5926 28.1481 15.1852 45.8796 24 
H11 
Release From Loading 
Arm/SBM (MRHCD) 
9.8148 13.1482 28.8889 31.2963 16.8519 41.9444 30 
H12 
Understaffing 
(MRHCE) 
12.4074 17.0370 29.6296 29.4444 11.4815 47.3611 15 
H13 
Breakdown of 
Communication 
(MRHCFA) 
14.4445 19.6296 27.0370 28.1482 10.7407 49.7222 8 
H14 
Communication 
Misunderstanding 
(MRHCFB) 
12.9630 24.0741 25.9259 25.7407 11.2963 50.4167 6 
H15 
Wrong Signals 
(MRHCFC) 
12.0370 19.8148 27.9630 27.5926 12.5926 47.7778 11 
H16 
Procedural Failure 
(MRHDA) 
23.7037 24.2593 17.7778 14.6296 19.6296 54.4444 1 
H17 
Collision between Ship 
and Other Ship/Berth 
(MRHDB) 
23.3333 23.7037 17.5926 15.3704 20 53.7500 3 
H18 
Lack of Tools/Spare 
Parts(CRHAAA) 
13.8889 22.9630 24.4444 26.6667 12.0370 50 7 
H19 
Inappropriate 
Maintenance Practice 
(CRHAAB) 
12.2222 18.1481 26.4815 30.5556 12.5926 46.7130 19 
H20 
Use Inappropriate 
Tools/Spare Parts 
(CRHAAC) 
12.0370 20.7407 23.8889 28.3333 15 46.6204 21 
H21 
Maintenance Omission 
(CRHAB) 
11.4815 15.5556 30 28.8889 14.0741 45.3704 26 
H22 
Lack of 
Communication System 
(CRHBAA) 
16.2963 19.8148 25.3704 27.0371 11.4815 50.6019 5 
H23 
Lack of Lighting 
System (CRHBAB) 
15.1852 16.8518 24.2592 25.1852 18.5185 46.2500 23 
H24 
Lack of Movable 
Facilities (CRHBAC) 
10.7407 13.7037 24.8148 30 20.7407 40.9259 33 
H25 
A/C System Failure 
(CRHBAD) 
9.6296 14.6296 29.6296 24.8148 21.2963 41.6204 31 
H26 
Control System Failure 
(CRHBBA) 
16.1111 18.7037 25.3704 27.5926 12.2222 49.7222 8 
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H27 
Instrument Failure 
(CRHBBB) 
16.4815 19.0741 21.1111 31.4815 11.8519 49.2130 10 
H28 
Valve Failure 
(CRHBBC) 
11.8889 14.0370 27.2222 32.2222 14.6296 44.0833 27 
H29 
Hose/Pump Failure 
(CRHBBD) 
5.5556 10.1852 21.6667 30.1852 32.4074 31.5741 41 
H30 
Gasket Failure 
(CRHBBE) 
19.6296 22.2222 23.3333 19.6296 15.1852 52.8704 4 
H31 
Pipeline Failure 
(CRHBBF) 
12.9630 16.8519 30.3704 22.5926 17.2222 46.4352 22 
H32 
Loading Arm/SBM 
Failure (CRHBBG) 
15.5555 18.1482 19.8148 31.4815 15 46.9444 18 
H33 
Power Failure 
(CRHBBH) 
19.2592 23.1481 24.8148 20.7408 12.0370 54.2130 2 
H34 
Cathodic Protection 
Failure (CRHBBI) 
11.4815 16.2963 29.8148 27.7778 14.6296 45.5556 25 
H35 
Heavy Rainfall 
(NRHAA) 
8.5185 18.8889 27.2222 21.1111 24.2593 41.5741 32 
H36 Flood (NRHAB) 6.4815 18.1481 22.7778 17.7778 34.8148 35.9259 39 
H37 Snow (NRHAC) 5 12.9630 15.9259 9.0741 57.0371 24.9537 42 
H38 Hurricane (NRHBA) 5.9259 10.1852 23.8889 32.7778 27.2222 33.7037 40 
H39 Tornadoes (NRHBB) 17.2222 10.7407 17.0370 19.6296 35.3704 38.7037 36 
H40 Lightning (NRHBC) 5.7408 11.4815 27.7778 40 15 38.2407 37 
H41 Earthquake (NRHCA) 16.9630 10.1852 20 21.3704 31.4815 39.9444 34 
H42 Tsunami (NRHCB) 17.3333 9.8148 18.5185 20.0741 34.2593 38.9722 35 
Within the port transportation system, based on the results in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.9, 
the hazard Procedural Failure (MRHDA) is the most important hazard in the port sector, 
followed by Power Failure (CRHBBH), Collision between Ship and Other Ship/Berth 
(MRHDB), Gasket Failure (CRHBBE), and Lack of Communication System 
(CRHBAA). After applying the same technique to each of the hazards within ship and 
pipeline transportation systems, the belief degree of the five linguistics grades were 
combined into one crisp number. Ship Collision due to Human Fatigue (SCHF), Action 
to Avoid Collision (SCAAC), and Ship Collision due to Main Engine Failure (SCMEF), 
were the top ranked hazards within ship transportation systems (see Appendix 2.11). 
On the other hand, Geological Hazards (PTGH), followed by Sabotage (PTSH) and 
Construction Failure (PTCF), were the most important hazards within the pipeline 
transportation sector (see Appendix 2.12). After utilising the belief degree of the 
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hazards associated with PTSs (i.e. port and transportation modes hazards) to achieve 
one value, namely a crisp value of 54.44, the hazard MRHDA was identified as the 
most significant hazard within PTSs (see Appendixes 2.11 and 2.12, Table 4.10 and 
Table 4.11). 
 
Figure 4.9: Utility Value of the 42 petroleum port hazards 
Table 4.11: Utility Value of the most significant hazards in each operational 
system within the PTSs 
 Hs Utility Value Ranking 
H16 Procedural Failure (port system) 54.44 1 
H 33 Power Failure (port system) 54.21 2 
H 17 Collision between Ship and Other Ship/Berth (port system) 53.75 3 
H 10 Human Fatigue (Collision) (ship system) 50.05 4 
H 7 Action To Avoid Collision (Collision) (ship system) 49.26 5 
H 1 Main Engine Failure (Collision) (ship system) 48.75 6 
H 4 Geological Hazards (pipeline system) 38.96 7 
H 1 Sabotage (pipeline system) 38.89 8 
H 6 Construction Failure (pipeline system) 34.48 9 
4.5.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
To partially validate the developed approach, sensitivity analysis was carried out. To 
test the sensitivity of the model, two axioms were conducted. These two axioms tested 
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the sensitivity of the model in terms of the changes that happened to the output of the 
risk evaluation when the prior probability changed. The model of MRHAA was 
examined as follows: 
 
Figure 4.10: The analysis of MRHAA by HUGIN software given the evidence for 
node “𝑳𝒊𝒌𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒅𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎%" 
The prior probability value of the node "likelihood" was updated to 100% “Very High” 
(see Figures 4.10). As a result, the output value of the node MRHAA𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ increased 
from 8.26% to 38.63%. The response indicates that a slight change in the prior 
probability value of each input node affects the value of the output node, causing a 
relative increase/decrease of the output value (axiom 1) (see Figures 4.8 and 4.10). 
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Figure 4.11: The analysis of MRHAA by HUGIN software given the evidence for 
node “𝑳𝒊𝒌𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒅𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎%” and “𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎%” 
 
Changing the prior probability value of the node "Probability" and the node 
"Likelihood" to be set at 100% “Very High”, led to a change in the posterior probability 
value of the output "MRHAA𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ " (see Figure 4.11). This change resulted in a 
further increase of the posterior probability value of the output "MRHAA𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ " 
from 8.26 % to 70%, as shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.11. Therefore, the output value of 
"MRHAA𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ " in Figure 4.11 is higher than the output value in both Figures 4.8 
and 4.10. This result means that the total influence magnitude of the combination of the 
probability variation, namely the influence of both attributes at once on the values, is 
always greater than that of any single attribute (axiom 2). 
By performing axiom 1 (i.e. increasing the belief degree of Likelihood𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ =
100%" ) and axiom 2 (i.e. increasing the belief degree for both 
“Likelihood𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ and “Probability𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ = 100%")  for all the hazards, the 
results of these axioms showed the sensitivity of the models (see Figure 4.12). For 
example, the posterior probability value of the output H13 (i.e. Breakdown of 
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Communication (MRHCFA)) increased from 14.44% to 40.19% when the prior 
probability value of the node "Likelihood" was changed to be set at 100%, “Very High”. 
Moreover, by changing the prior probability value of the nodes "Likelihood" and 
"Probability" to be set at 100%, “Very High”, the output value of H13 increased from 
14.44% to 70.19%, as shown in Figure 4.12. 
 
Figure 4.12: The sensitivity analysis of the 42 hazards 
4.6 Conclusion 
This is one of the first studies that deals with data uncertainty problems in PTSs through 
developing a new integrated model. This new model integrates fuzzy rule-based (FRB) 
approach and Bayesian Network (BN) to analyse petroleum ports and transportation 
modes failures. The fuzzy rule-based Bayesian reasoning (FRBBR) method uses 
domain expert knowledge in the form of fuzzy IF-THEN rules. Output degree (i.e. 
belief degree) of the FMEA parameters was integrated by using a BN for risk ranking 
to provide a supporting system for decision-makers in analysing the failures. After 
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utilising the belief degree of the hazards associated with PTSs (i.e. port and 
transportation modes hazards), Procedural Failure (MRHDA), Ship Collision due to 
Human Fatigue (SCHF) and Geological Hazards (PTGH), were the most important 
hazards in port, ship and pipeline transportation systems. Based on the ranked outputs 
of this method, the most significant hazard within the PTSs was recognised (i.e. 
Procedural Failure (54.44)). The output of this technique may be changed based on 1) 
experts’ backgrounds and 2) number of participant experts (i.e. more or less than nine), 
and different inputs can be included. 
The proposed assessment methodology highlights the issues associated with PTSs. The 
proposed method shows more realistic and flexible results by describing the failure 
information based on real-life situations. Additionally, the proposed method provides a 
decision-support system for enhancing the safety practices of petroleum ports and other 
engineering and management systems through providing decision-makers with a 
reliable risk-ranking technique. 
This chapter mainly focused on evaluating the local levels of PTSs. In addition, a brief 
discussion of Chapter 4 is presented in Chapter 7.   However, controlling the operational 
risk at the local level may not ensure the safety of PTSs. In the following chapters, the 
global level of PTSs will be evaluated. While the FRBN technique was used to assess 
the local level of the PTSs, the Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach is going to be 
applied to accomplish the PTSs evaluation, due to the approach’s capability in 
synthesising the risk from the local level to the system level. Moreover, other 
techniques, such as Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and network analysis 
technique, will be used as well. 
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5 Chapter 5: An Advanced Risk Assessment Framework 
for PTNs using Evidential Reasoning Approach 
Petroleum transportation systems (PTSs) play an important role in the flow of crude 
product from its place of production to the customer. In order to ensure an effective 
port-to-port transportation system, safety of the PTSs is a key element that must not be 
neglected for the successful petroleum transportation networks (PTNs). This chapter 
proposes a novel mathematical model that assesses PTSs locally and globally. An 
Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach is introduced due to the technique’s ability to 
combine the local/internal and global/external levels of PTSs. This chapter’s novel 
approach starts with the identification of the petroleum transportation hazards and 
finishes with the model validation process. Whilst the hybrid Fuzzy Rule-Based 
Bayesian Reasoning (FRBBR), Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), and Evidential 
Reasoning (ER) approaches are used at the internal level, the network analysis 
technique is used for the external level. The results gained from using these techniques 
can be used by decision makers to measure and improve PTSs safety. 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning (FRBBR) was used to 
evaluate the identified hazards in order to enhance the safety practices of petroleum 
transportation systems (PTSs). However, the phrase ‘PTSs’ clarifies that there is more 
than just one system. PTSs contain two focal points that are linked to each other in order 
to complete the product transportation cycle. These focal points are ports and 
transportation modes.  
PTSs play an important role in the flow of petroleum product from the production phase 
to the refinery or customer. If there is no preparation built into the system, or if the 
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system lacks facilities, it might be too late to take emergency actions if a failure strikes. 
A disruption in a PTS will affect the overall supply chain’s desired functions, which 
can result in various failures (Baublys, 2007). For example, factors such as planning 
and scheduling may influence the operation of the supply chain and may cause a 
breakdown in the fluency of the product’s movement (Ding and Tseng, 2013; 
Grossmann, 2005; Shah et al., 2010). Safety in design and operation is a prime concern 
for operating companies because the hazards could have a high economical and 
financial impact apart from causing other failures (Elsayed et al., 2009). With regard to 
the safety of petroleum transportation as a complete system, risk assessment is an 
important tool for maintaining the safety and reliability of the petroleum industry. 
Therefore, this chapter proposes a novel risk evaluation model in order to enhance the 
safety of the PTSs and applies that model in a real transportation system. To reach this 
goal, this chapter is organised as follows: the second sub-section provides a literature 
review for the approaches introduced in this chapter, Evidential Reasoning (ER) and 
Analytical Hierarchy Process, (AHP). The third sub-section is a step-by-step 
explanation of the techniques that have been used to evaluate PTSs. This section begins 
by identifying the petroleum transportation hazards and finishes with the validation 
process. A real-life case study is presented in the fourth sub-section to demonstrate the 
methodology proposed in this chapter. Finally, the conclusion is presented in the fifth 
sub-section.  
5.2 Evidential Reasoning (ER) Background and Approach 
The ER approach, which is often referred to as the Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence 
or D–S theory, was firstly generated by Dempster in 1967 and extended and refined by 
Shafer in 1976 (Rahman, 2012; Riahi et al., 2012). The approach was developed in the 
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1990s to deal with Multi Attribute Decision Analysis (MADA) problems that have both 
qualitative and quantitative data under uncertainty based on the D-S theory. This 
revised approach has been widely applied in recent years for its ability to deal with 
Multi Attribute Decision Making (MADM) problems qualitatively and quantitatively 
under uncertainties (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993). The approach is particularly useful for 
dealing with both qualitative and quantitative criteria under uncertainty, as it utilises 
individuals’ knowledge, expertise, and experience in the form of belief structures (Kong 
et al., 2012). 
The development of the ER approach has passed through several stages. These stages 
are highlighted as follows (Yang and Xu, 2004; Xu, 2012): 
 The ER algorithm was first generated and published in the early 1990s by Yang 
and Singh (1994). This version of ER employed the evidence combination rule 
of the D–S theory for criteria aggregation and introduced criteria weight. 
 The algorithm was next updated by Yang (2001) and further modified by Yang 
and Xu (2002). This newer version of ER employed a new evidence 
combination rule established by reversing the evidence combination rule of the 
D–S theory. 
 Finally, a computer software program known by the name IDS (Intelligent 
Decision System) was developed to assist ER approach calculations. 
As mentioned earlier, the ER approach deals with Multi Attribute Decision Making 
(MADM) for qualitative and quantitative problems under uncertainties (Keeney and 
Raiffa, 1993). The ER approach algorithm was created on the basis of the multi-
attribute problem analysis framework and on the evidence combination rule of the D–
S theory (Liu et al., 2004; Yang, 2001). The approach is unlike the majority of MADM 
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techniques. The following advantages distinguish the ER approach from other MADM 
techniques (Li and Liao, 2007; Riahi, 2010): 
 ER offers greater flexibility to its users as it enables them to express their 
judgements subjectively and quantitatively.  
 In addition to handling complete and precise data, ER, unlike all other MADM 
approaches, is capable of handling incomplete, uncertain and vague data 
through allowing the decision maker to illustrate a belief degree less than 1.  
 ER is capable of accommodating or representing the uncertainty and risk that is 
inherent in decision analysis.  
 The ER approach is capable of offering a rational and reproducible methodology 
through its hierarchical evaluation process to aggregate the assessed data.  
 By using calculating software, called the Intelligent Decision System (IDS), the 
ER approach is capable of reaching the output of the assessment model. 
The ER approach has been widely and successfully used in several fields for dealing with 
MADM problems under uncertainty in a reliable, transparent, and reasonable way. For 
example, Yeo et al. (2014) highlighted the advantage of using a Fuzzy Evidential 
Reasoning (FER) approach. To illustrate this, according to Yeo et al. (2014), FER is a 
reasonable solution and provides an appropriate foundation to model any type of port 
selection scenarios under uncertainties. Yang et al. (2009a) confirmed the ability of FER 
to deal with MADM problems in selecting appropriate vessels for shipping activities. Liu 
et al. (2004) used the FER approach to model the safety of an engineering system with 
various types of uncertainties. John et al. (2014a) applied the ER approach to evaluate 
seaport operations, due to the high level of uncertainty in these operations. Xu (2012) 
provided a list of multiple-criteria decision computer software, for example, Intelligent 
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Decision System (IDS), Expert Choice (EC), Logical Decisions (LD), and Banxia 
Decision Explorer (BDE).  
When using an ER approach with a Multi Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) problem, 
the following steps need to be carried out (Xu and Yang, 2001; Chen et al., 2014; 
Alyami et al., 2016): 
 Identification and analysis of the hierarchal structure of the problem. This step 
includes identifying the problem and modelling the problem by using the belief 
matrix, which includes the decision-makers’ preferences with regard to weight 
of criteria and utility or value.  
 Use of rule- or utility-based evidence transformation procedures to transfer 
various belief structures to a unified belief structure. 
 Aggregation of the hierarchal criteria by using the evidential algorithm. 
 Use of validation analysis and utility scores to validate the ER algorithm 
outcomes and analysis reports.  
To aggregate the hierarchal criteria using the ER algorithm, a software package known 
as IDS is used. The software package in the case study section is used firstly for data 
aggregation followed by sensitivity analysis.  
5.2.1 Intelligent Decision System Software 
Intelligent Decision System (IDS) is a computer software program developed in the late 
1990s on the basis of the ER approach (Xu, 2012). This Windows-based software has 
been developed to assist Multi Attribute Decision Analysis (MADA), or Multi Criteria 
Decision Making (MCDM). The software simplifies the complexity of the aggregation 
process of the ER algorithm. The software makes it easier to present the hierarchical 
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structure, to key in that structure’s inputs, and to read the outputs of the structure. In 
addition, there is no limit to the number of attributes in the IDS hierarchy. The software 
will be used for the following aggregation process of the ER approach. To apply the 
IDS software for the aggregation process of the ER approach, the following steps 
should be taken (Xu and Yang, 2005): 
 The hierarchy attributes must be mapped out. 
 The attributes’ data must be defined. 
 The attributes’ weight must be defined. 
For the purpose of this research, the ER technique is adopted. This method evaluates 
the safety of petroleum transportation as a complete system in uncertain situations. 
Moreover, for weighting each criterion, an adoption of AHP was employed in this 
chapter. Therefore, it is important to understand the AHP method for applying the ER 
technique in the transportation system. 
5.3 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) Background and Approach 
In the 1970s, Thomas L. Saaty introduced a Multi Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) 
approach known as AHP. Saaty developed this approach while he was directing 
research projects in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Alexander, 
2012). According to Saaty (2000), AHP is “a framework of logic and problem-solving 
that spans the spectrum from instant awareness to fully integrated consciousness by 
organising perceptions, feelings, judgments and memories into a hierarchy of forces 
that influence decision results.” 
The AHP approach is a powerful technique which has been extensively used for its 
capability in dealing with complex systems, which includes choosing an alternative 
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from several alternatives and also providing a comparison of the considered options. 
Moreover, the technique has the ability to deal with large numbers of decision-making 
criteria of both a quantitative and a qualitative nature, and it also simplifies the decision-
making problem with its hierarchical structure formation (Cheng et al., 2002). The 
technique has been widely applied in different fields due to its simplicity in calculation 
and the advantages it offers as a decision-making tool and mechanism for weighting 
the risk factors, such as in engineering (Katarne and Negi, 2013; Triantaphyllou and 
Mann, 1995), healthcare (Pecchia et al., 2011), marketing (Wickramasinghe and 
Takano, 2009), and accounting (Apostolou and Hassell, 1993).  
When using the AHP approach in a MCDM problem, four steps need to be considered: 
 Establish the hierarchy structure of the problem through breaking it down into 
lower criteria. 
 Collect input data by performing a pairwise comparison.  
 Calculate the criteria relative weights to obtain scores and rank the criteria. 
 Perform a consistency test to determine whether the input is consistent or not. 
According to Zahedi (1986), creating a hierarchy structure of the problem is the first 
step in the AHP process. This step is the graphical representation of the problem in 
terms of main goal, criteria, and decision alternative. For the purpose of this example, 
the hierarchy structure of the problem is based on Figure 5.1.   
As per the decision-makers’ pairwise comparisons for a group of criteria, each criterion 
is evaluated by its weight, as generated from the technique. A criterion with a higher 
weight is considered more important than a criterion with a lower weight (for example, 
criterion A is more important than criterion B). 
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Figure 5.1: The hierarchical structure of AHP (Source: Tzeng and Huang, 2011) 
The AHP technique has been widely applied in various studies as a weighting technique 
due to the following advantages (Zahir, 1999; Ishizaka et al., 2011; Kabli, 2009): 
 The AHP technique helps the decision maker to take its advice into account 
without totally overriding the initial, tentative choice. 
 The AHP is suitable for analysing both qualitative and quantitative decision-
making criteria. 
 The AHP technique supports group decision making through consensus by 
calculating the geometric mean of the individual pairwise comparisons. 
 The AHP technique can consider a large quantity of criteria to reform pairwise 
comparisons. 
 The AHP technique is able to present a graphical representation of the decision-
making problem to clarify the construction of a hierarchy.  
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 The AHP technique uses the consistency index to determine whether the 
provided judgements are consistent or need reassessment.  
 The AHP technique has been widely accepted and successfully applied in many 
different fields. 
5.4 Methodology 
Figure 5.2 illustrates a flow chart of the methodology used for this chapter. The 
procedure contains four parts: 1) the list of techniques used for the local/internal 
evaluation of the transportation system (steps 1, 2, 3, and 4); 2) the global/external 
evaluation (step 5); 3) the merging of the internal and external evaluation (steps 6 and 
7); and 4) the validation process (step 8). The flow chart begins by identifying the 
hazards associated with petroleum transportation as a complete system and sets a goal 
that needs to be accomplished. This step is followed by the evaluation processes of both 
internal and external systems. The application of ER is then also highlighted for 
aggregating the internal and external evaluations. Finally, the diagram ends with the 
validation process of the model. 
The steps in analysing petroleum transportation as a system are listed as follows: 
 Hazard hierarchy development: Identify the operational hazards within the 
PTSs and present them in a hierarchical structure. 
 Application of AHP: Apply the AHP method to determine the weight of the 
hierarchical criteria. 
 Application of FRBBR: Apply established Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian 
Reasoning (FRBBR) to measure the internal operational risks. 
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 Aggregation of risks through ER: Apply the ER approach to aggregate the 
assessed risks. 
 Application of network analysis. Apply a network analysis technique to 
determine the weight of the ports and transportation modes within the PTNs. 
 Aggregation of internal and external analysis through ER: Aggregate the 
internal and external analysis of the transportation system by using the ER 
approach. 
 Application of utility approach: Obtain a crisp value for the petroleum 
transportation network by using a utility approach. 
 Sensitivity analysis: perform a series of tests to determine how sensitive the 
developed model is. 
Identifying the operational hazards within the petroleum 
transportation network and presenting them in a hierarchical structure
Applying the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method to determine 
the weight of the hierarchical criteria
Applying Established Fuzzy Rule Based Bayesian Reasoning 
(FRBBR) to measure the internal operational risks
Applying the ER approach to aggregate the assessment risks
Applying the network analysis technique to determine the weight of the 
ports and transportation modes within the petroleum transportation system
Aggregating the internal and external analysis of the transportation 
system by using the ER approach
Obtaining a crisp value for the petroleum transportation network by 
using a utility approach
Sensitivity analysis
Internal Evaluation
External Evaluation
Aggregation of 
Internal and 
External Evaluation
Validation Process
 
Figure 5.2: The PTSs assessment methodology structure 
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5.4.1 Step I: Identifying the Hazards within the Petroleum Transportation 
Network and Presenting them in a Hierarchical Structure 
Decision-makers should have a clear understanding of the hazards associated with the 
working environment to ensure the safety of the system. In the case of PTS safety, it is 
important to identify the hazards that may lead to crude oil spill whilst the product is 
being transported. The identified hazards are presented in a hierarchical structure to 
provide a clear picture to decision-makers to assist them in solving the problem.  
The hierarchical structure of Petroleum Transportation Networks (PTNs) hazards is 
presented in Figures 5.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. The first level represents the goal. The second 
level represents crude oil transportation system criteria; these criteria include petroleum 
port operation, ship transportation operation, and pipeline transportation operation 
hazards. For a petroleum spill caused during the operational process, accidents are often 
initiated by errors induced by machinery failures, human failures, or a combination of 
the two. As a result, level two criteria are broken into lower levels, which allows 
decision makers to have a more complete understanding of PTSs hazards to make a 
practical decision 
Petroleum Transportation System 
(PTS) 
Petroleum 
Terminal Operation 
Ship 
Transportation 
Operation 
Pipeline 
Transportation 
Operation 
Machine-Related Hazards
Human-Related Hazards
Nature-Related Hazards
Hull Failure
Collision
Grounding
Fire/Explosion
Equipment Failure
Internal Hazards
External Hazards
Main Goal Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
 
Figure 5.3: Main hieratical structure of the risk in Petroleum Transportation 
Networks (PTNs) 
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The operational hazards that lead to oil spill within the PTNs were identified through 
conducting an extensive literature review for each of the criteria in level zero separately 
(e.g. Kim et al., 2014; Ceyhun, 2014; Vinnem et al., 2012; Yuhua and Datao, 2005; 
ITOPF, 2015; Ismail and Karim, 2013). This stage allowed the researcher to identify 
the hazards in the PTNs. With respect to operational activities that occur in PTNs, oil 
spill is a widespread hazard associated with various hazards events within the PTSs. 
The identified hazards were also validated by experts to improve the quality of the 
identification process. The validation process benefits from the experts’ personal 
perspectives regarding whether the identified hazards are related to petroleum 
transportation or not, and the experts also added other hazards that exist in real life that 
had not been addressed by the literature review.  
5.4.2 Step II: Applying the Analytical Hierarchy Process Method to Determine 
the Weight of the Hierarchical Criteria 
To identify the relative importance of each criterion within PTSs that was identified in 
the first step and that criterion’s contribution to the upper level, the weight of the 
criterion had to be taken into consideration. Therefore, the AHP approach was applied 
to identify the weight of the PTSs hierarchy criteria. The weighting process involved 
experts’ judgement presented in a pairwise comparison method. The technique was 
used on each group of criteria to form a matrix. A questionnaire was built and sent to 
PTSs experts to weight the hierarchical criteria. The PTSs experts selected a set of 
pairwise comparisons by using a preference scale (see Table 5.1). The process of 
building a pairwise comparison matrix is as follows: First, n criteria need to be present 
in an n x n matrix. Applying a ratio scale assessment enables all the n criteria to perform 
the pairwise comparison. Before answering the questionnaire, each expert had to 
  
159 
understand the preference scale. For comparison purposes, Saaty (1980) introduced a 
pairwise comparison scale. The presented scale consists of two parts that represent the 
importance and the unimportance of the attributes (see Table 5.1). The first part is a 1 
to 9 scale which lies between equally important and extremely important; the second 
part is a 1 to 1/9 scale that lies between equally unimportant and extremely unimportant 
(Wu, 2007). Therefore, when the importance/unimportance of one of the PTSs factor 
to another factor in the same level was given, then the importance/unimportance of the 
second factor to the first factor was recognised. For example, if the importance of A to 
B was given as 1 (i.e. Equally important) then the importance of B to A was recognised 
as the same (i.e. Equally important). 
Table 5.1: The ratio scale for the pairwise comparison 
Attribute’s 
relative 
importance 
Linguistic Explanation 
 
Attribute’s 
relative 
unimportance 
Linguistic Explanation 
1 Equally important 1 Equally unimportant 
3 Somewhat important 1/3 Somewhat unimportant 
5 Important 1/5 Unimportant 
7 Very important 1/7 Very unimportant 
9 Extremely important 1/9 Extremely unimportant 
2, 4, 6, 8 
Intermediate values of 
importance between the 
two adjacent judgements 
1/2, 1/4, 1/6, 1/8 
Intermediate values of 
unimportance between the 
two adjacent judgements 
To determine the priorities, a pairwise comparison matrix had to be constructed (i.e. 
Equation 5.1). Therefore, an n x n matrix was constructed to represent the judgement 
on pairs of PTSs criteria (Ci and Cj). Equation 5.1 shows an n x n matrix C as follows: 
𝐶 = (𝑐𝑖𝑗) =
[
 
 
 
 
1 𝑐12 … 𝑐1𝑛
𝑐
𝑐12⁄ 1 … 𝑐2𝑛
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
1
𝑐1𝑛⁄
1
𝑐2𝑛⁄ … 1 ]
 
 
 
 
       5.1 
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where 𝑖, j = 1, 2, 3, …, n and each 𝑐𝑖𝑗 represents the relative importance of criteria C𝑖 
to criteria C𝑗. 
For a matrix of order n, (n(n−1)/2), comparisons are required. According to Pam (2010), 
the weight indicates the importance of each element in the pairwise comparison matrix 
in terms of its overall contribution to the decision-making process. The weight value of 
each factor within PTSs was calculated using the following equation (Saaty, 1990): 
𝑊𝑘 = 
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑎𝑘𝑗
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)𝑛𝑗=1      (𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, … , 𝑛)   5.2 
where 𝑎𝑖𝑗 stands for the entry of row i and column j in a comparison matrix of order n. 
In this research, a group of decision makers presented their judgement. Therefore, an 
averaging technique was required to combine all the experts’ judgements. The 
arithmetic mean takes the sum of the data, and then divides the sum by the total number 
of values in the set. The arithmetic mean can be calculated by using the following 
equation: 
𝐴(𝑛) =
∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
           5.3 
To ensure the consistency of the judgement comparison, the obtained weight in the 
pairwise comparison matrix had to be checked by using a Consistency Ratio (CR). The 
CR was calculated by using the following equations (Saaty, 1990): 
𝐶𝑅 =
𝐶𝐼
𝑅𝐼
           5.4 
𝐶𝐼 =
λ𝑚𝑎𝑥 −𝑛
𝑛 − 1
 
λ𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
∑
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑎𝑗𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
          5.5 
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where n is the number of items being compared, λ𝑚𝑎𝑥 represents the maximum weight 
value of the n ×n comparison matrix, RI is the average random index (see Table 5.2), 
and CI represents the consistency index. 
Table 5.2: Random Index (RI) values (Saaty, 2013) 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RI 0 0 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.4 1.45 1.49 
The CR was designed in such a way that a value had to be in an acceptable range. 
Therefore, if the CR was 0.10 or less (CR ≤ 0.10), the consistency of the pairwise 
comparisons was considered reasonable. However, if the CR was greater than 0.10 (CR 
> 0.10), the pairwise comparison was considered unreasonable (inconsistency) (Saaty, 
1980). 
5.4.3 Step III: Applying Established Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning to 
Measure the Internal Operational Risks 
After the identification process (i.e. step 1), a hybrid technique known as Fuzzy Rule-
Based Bayesian Reasoning (FRBBR) was used to analyse the identified hazards of 
petroleum ports and petroleum transportation modes. This technique defined and 
evaluated the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) parameters (i.e. occurrence 
probability of a risk event during the process of oil transportation (Pl), consequence 
severity that the risk event causes when it occurs (Sc), and probability that the risk event 
cannot be detected before it occurs (Dp)) by using a Fuzzy Rule Based (FRB) approach 
with a belief structure. Furthermore, the relevant rules of a failure were aggregated by 
using a Bayesian Network (BN) mechanism. The steps of this technique are explained 
in depth in Section 4.4.  
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5.4.4 Step IV: Applying the Evidential Reasoning Approach to Aggregate the 
Assessment Risks 
ER was developed in 1976 by Shafer (1976) from the approach introduced by 
Dempster. The theory, which is also known as the Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence, 
is used to aggregate criteria starting from the lowest level criteria that are related to the 
criteria in the upper level.  
To simplify the explanation of the aggregation process of ER, suppose the hierarchical 
structure of a PTS consists of two levels. The operational risk 𝑅 is the first level in the 
hierarchy (i.e. general attribute). 𝑅 is associated with two hazards in the second level 
(i.e. sub-criteria), which are given by 𝑅1 and 𝑅2. 
𝑅 is identified by aggregating the hazards (i.e. criteria) in level two. Each 𝑅1 and 𝑅2 is 
defined by five risk expressions (i.e. Very High, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low), 
which are associated with the belief degree. As a result 𝑅, 𝑅1, and 𝑅2 are expressed as 
follows (Yang and Xu, 2002): 
𝑅 = {(𝛽1 "𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ"), (𝛽2 "𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ"), (𝛽3 "𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚"), (𝛽4 "𝐿𝑜𝑤"), (𝛽5 "𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑜𝑤")} 
𝑅1 = {(𝛽1
1 "𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ"), (𝛽1
2 "𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ"), (𝛽1
3 "𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚"), (𝛽1
4 "𝐿𝑜𝑤"), (𝛽1
5 "𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑜𝑤")} 
𝑅2 = {(𝛽2
1 "𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ"), (𝛽2
2 "𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ"), (𝛽2
3 "𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚"), (𝛽2
4 "𝐿𝑜𝑤"), (𝛽2
5 "𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑜𝑤")} 
𝑤1 and 𝑤2 are the associated weights of 𝑅1 and 𝑅2 respectively. The weights of 𝑅1 and 
𝑅2 were established by using the AHP technique (i.e. step 2), where the sum of 𝑤1 and 
𝑤2 is equal to 1 (𝑤1 + 𝑤2 =1). Suppose the individual degree for each of the five risk 
parameters (Very High, High, Medium, Low, Very Low) is identified as 𝐷𝑛
ℎ, where h 
is the risk expression and n is the assigned criterion. Therefore, the individual degrees 
for each of 𝑅1 and 𝑅2 are identified as follows (Yang and Xu, 2002; Riahi et al., 2012):  
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𝐷1
ℎ = 𝑤1𝛽1
ℎ 
𝐷2
ℎ = 𝑤2𝛽2
ℎ          5.6 
(ℎ = 1, … ,5)    
Suppose 𝐻𝑛  represents the remaining belief values that are unassigned for 𝐷𝑛
ℎ . 
Therefore, the individual remaining belief values for both 𝐻1 and 𝐻2 are identified as 
follows (Yang, 2001): 
𝐻1 = ?̅?1 + ?̃?1 
𝐻2 = ?̅?2 + ?̃?2           5.7 
where ?̅?𝑛 (n = 1 or 2) represents the degree to which the other assessor can play a role 
in the assessment. However, ?̃?𝑛 (n = 1 or 2) is caused by the possible incompleteness 
in the subsets 𝑅1 and 𝑅2. To identify the value of ?̅?𝑛 (n = 1 or 2) and ?̃?𝑛 (n = 1 or 2), 
they are calculated as follows (Yang and Xu, 2002; Riahi et al., 2012): 
?̅?1 = 1 − 𝑤1 = 𝑤2 
?̅?2 = 1 − 𝑤2 = 𝑤1 
?̃?1 = 𝑤1(1 − ∑ 𝛽1
ℎ5
ℎ=1 )   
?̃?2 = 𝑤2(1 − ∑ 𝛽2
ℎ5
ℎ=1 )        5.8 
Suppose the non-normalised degree to which the risk assessment is confirmed for each 
of the five risk expressions as a result of the synthesis of the judgements produced by 
assessors 1 and 2 is presented by 𝛽ℎ̀(ℎ = 1,… ,5) . On the other hand, the non-
normalised remaining belief unassigned after the commitment of belief to the five risk 
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expressions because of the synthesis of the judgements produced by assessors 1 and 2 
is presented by 𝐻𝑈̀ . Therefore, the ER is calculated as follows (Yang and Xu, 2002): 
𝛽ℎ̀ = 𝐾(𝐷1
ℎ𝐷2
ℎ + 𝐷1
ℎ𝐻2 + 𝐷2
ℎ𝐻1)  
?̅??́? = 𝐾(?̅?1?̅?2)  
?̃??́? = 𝐾(?̃?1?̃?2 + ?̃?1?̅?1 + ?̃?2?̅?1)  
𝐾 = [1 − ∑ ∑ 𝑀1
𝑇𝑀2
𝑅5
𝑅=1
𝑅≠𝑇
5
𝑇=1 ]
−1
       5.9 
Finally, by assigning ?̅??́? to the five linguistic risk terms, the combined belief degree 
could be generated by using the normalisation process, which could be calculated as 
follows (Yang and Xu, 2002): 
𝛽ℎ =
𝛽ℎ̀
(1−?̅??́?)
  (ℎ = 1,… ,5)  
𝐻𝑈 =
?̃??́?
(1−?̅??́?)
                    5.10 
where 𝐻𝑈 is the unassigned degree of belief for any individual assessment after all the 
R subsets have been assessed. It represents the extent of incompleteness in the overall 
assessment. The above explanation was for the aggregation process of two sub-criteria. 
However, if there were three sub-criteria, any two of the three criteria were combined, 
and the result of this combination was synthesised with the last sub-criteria by using 
the above process (Riahi et al., 2012).   
  
165 
5.4.5 Step V: Applying Network Analysis Technique to Determine the Weight 
of the Ports and Transportation Modes within the Petroleum 
Transportation Network 
A network is a representation of a system (Benzi and Klymko, 2013). PTNs consist of 
ports connected by transportation modes (i.e. nodes and links). To identify the safety 
of the transportation system within the petroleum supply chain, the weight of each port 
and transportation mode was considered. Therefore, centrality measures were applied 
to identify the weight of the ports and transportation modes within PTNs. The weighting 
process contained real data provided from trusted sources. Section 3.5 explained in 
depth the weighting process for the safety of the petroleum ports within the 
transportation system.  
5.4.6 Step VI: Aggregation of Internal and External Analysis through 
Evidential Reasoning Approach 
The ER approach was applied in this step to aggregate the internal and external 
evaluation of the transportation system (i.e. port and transportation modes). The internal 
evaluation step was performed by applying ER to aggregate the internal evaluation of 
the port and each transportation mode (step 4). The external evaluation step was 
performed by applying the centrality measure (step 5) to identify the safety of the 
petroleum ports and transportation modes within PTNs. Therefore, with the application 
of ER, the evaluated values of steps 4 and 5 were aggregated to evaluate the safety of 
petroleum transportation as a complete system. The steps of the ER aggregation process 
were briefly explained in step 4. 
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5.4.7 Step VII: Obtaining a Crisp Number for the Petroleum Transportation 
Network by using a Utility Approach 
Presenting the results of the aggregation process in one single value is more useful for 
decision makers. Therefore, in this step the results of step 6 were presented in one value 
rather than in the formation of five linguistic variables (i.e. Very High, High, Medium, 
Low, and Very Low). To accomplish this, a utility values approach (URh) developed by 
Yang (2001) was used. Consequently, the output belief degree of PTNs was synthesised 
in one single value as follows: 
𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑁 = ∑ Ƥ(𝛽ℎ) 𝑈𝑅ℎ
5
ℎ=1                   5.14 
where P(βh) is the assigned belief degree for each linguistic term within the PTNs. UR 
= (1,2,3,4,5), and URh  = (0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1). RPTN is the utility of the evaluated network. 
The higher the RPTN value is, the more significant the level of risk of the PTN. 
5.4.8 Step VIII: Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is a powerful validation tool that has been widely used to analyse 
the sensitivity of a model through performing a series of tests (Riahi et al., 2012; 
Alyami et al., 2014; John et al., 2014a). This partially validation technique is explained 
at greater depth in Section 4.4.6. For the purpose of this study, two axioms were used 
to partially validate the model. These two axioms are listed as follows (Yang, et al., 
2009b): 
Axiom 1: A slight increase or decrease in the belief degree of any of the linguistic 
variables associated with the system hazards impacts the system with an increase or 
decrease in its belief degree. 
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Axiom 2: If any increase or decrease occurs to any of the system hazards, input data 
(i.e. belief degree) should impact the system overall output average. 
5.5 Case Study and Results Analysis 
A case study was conducted in this chapter to evaluate the safety of PTNs. This 
assessment determined the safety of the local transportation system for one of the 
world’s major petroleum producers. The system contains four petroleum ports and two 
transportation modes (i.e. ship transportation and pipeline transportation). For the 
evaluation process, the petroleum ports’ operational hazards (see Figure 4.4) were 
selected as an example to present the complexity of evaluating petroleum transportation 
as a complete system. 
5.5.1 Hazard Hierarchy Development  
According to Sii et al. (2001), all the hazards that may lead to a major accident that are 
associated with a particular system should be managed and reduced to a low level to 
ensure the safety of the system. Therefore, in the first step, all the hazards associated 
with PTSs were identified through conducting an extensive literature review. 
The operational port, ship, and pipeline transportation hazards were then discussed with 
experts, and each criterion was validated by an expert in a relevant field to ensure the 
efficiency of the model. The expert participants in this study are involved in the 
operation practices of petroleum transportation in several leading companies. The 
experts were able to add or recommend dropping any of the hazard events based on 
their previous experience. After discussions with the selected experts in several 
meetings in 2015 and 2016, the PTN hazards were identified through a combination of 
the literature review and experts’ suggestions (see Figures 5.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6). To 
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present the evaluation process in this case study, a petroleum port operation evaluation 
was carried out as an example. 
5.5.2 Application of Analytical Hierarchy Process 
In this step, the weight of the hierarchical criteria was identified by applying the AHP 
technique. The experts played a role in implementing the pairwise comparison 
technique by analysing the importance of each criterion through considering the 
pairwise comparison ratio scale (see Table 5.1). 
For the criteria to be evaluated and for comparisons to be drawn, three questionnaires 
were designed and sent to twenty-seven experts (nine from each operational sector). 
The first questionnaire was for evaluating the port criteria. It was sent to experts in the 
port operation sector. The second was for evaluating the ship criteria and was sent to 
ship captains. The final questionnaire was for evaluating the pipeline criteria and was 
sent to experts in the pipeline operation sector.  
Each questionnaire was constructed in four sections. The first section asked about the 
experts’ personal information. The questions involved in this part were asked in order 
to identify the experts’ experience, academic knowledge, and industrial background. 
The second section presented the ratio scale. Each comparison in the fourth section was 
answered using this ratio scale; the experts responded based on their knowledge of 
similar past events. An example of how to fill in the questionnaire was included in every 
questionnaire (i.e. section three), so each expert had a clear understanding of the 
measurement used in this study. The fourth section of the questionnaire contained 
several parts, each part referring to one of the hierarchical levels (see Figures 4.4, 4.5, 
and 4.6). Each part of this section contained a matrix to be filled out by each expert. 
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Once completed, the researcher collected the questionnaires in order to calculate and 
analyse the data received from the experts. 
All participants in all three sectors are experts with long experience in port, ship, and 
pipeline operations in the involved systems in this case study. All participants are still 
actively working in and holding different managerial positions at these systems. For 
more detail on the criteria for selecting these experts, see Chapter 4. 
After receiving the completed questionnaires from all the participants, the hierarchy 
criteria were weighted by applying the AHP technique. To demonstrate the calculation 
process of this step, a 3×3 pairwise comparison matrix was developed to obtain the 
weight of the Machine Related Hazards (MRH), Human Related Hazards (HRH) and 
Nature Related Hazard (NRH) criteria as a sample of the calculation process. 
P(𝑀𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑁𝑅𝐻) is a pairwise comparison matrix expressing qualified judgement with 
regard to the relative priority of MRH, HRH and NRH (Table 5.3). Therefore, firstly a 
3×3 pairwise comparison matrix had to be formed, as follows: 
Table 5.3: Pairwise comparison matrix for the main criteria 
P (𝑀𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑁𝑅𝐻) = 
 HRH MRH NRH 
HRH 1.0000 2.4495 6.0701 
MRH 0.4082 1.0000 3.2187 
NRH 0.1647 0.3107 1.0000 
SUM 1.5730 3.7602 10.2888 
Before calculating the weight of each criterion, the performance ratio rate of 
P(𝑀𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑁𝑅𝐻) is calculated as shown in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4: The performance ratio of each criterion 
HRH 1 ÷ 1.5730 = 0.6357 2.4495 ÷ 3.7602 = 0.6514 6.0701 ÷ 10.2888 = 0.59 
MRH 0.4082 ÷ 1.5730 = 0.2595 1 ÷ 3.7602 = 0.2659 3.2187 ÷ 10.2888 = 0.3128 
NRH 0.1647 ÷ 1.5730 = 0.1047 0.3107 ÷ 3.7602 = 0.0826 1 ÷ 10.2888 = 0.0972 
Secondly, the weighting of each criterion is calculated by Equation 5.2, as follows: 
𝑊𝐻𝑅𝐻 =
0.6357 + 0.6514 + 0.59
3
= 0.6257 
Similarly, the weights of each criterion are shown in Table 5.5 as follows: 
Table 5.5: The weight value of each criterion 
    Weight value 
HRH 0.6357 0.6514 0.5900 0.6257 
MRH 0.2595 0.2659 0.3128 0.2794 
NRH 0.1047 0.0826 0.0972 0.0948 
After calculating the weight of each criterion, the experts judgment consistency was 
identified by using Equation 5.4. To find the Consistency Ratio (CR), the CI and λ𝑚𝑎𝑥 
had to be identified by using Equations 5.4 and 5.5. Therefore, the CR is calculated as 
follows: 
To calculate λ𝑚𝑎𝑥, firstly each value in the 3×3 pairwise comparison matrix (i.e. Table 
5.3) was multiplied by the weight (i.e. Table 5.5) as follows: 
 HRH  MRH  NRH 
 1.0000  2.4495  6.0701 
0.6257 0.4082 + 0.2794 1.0000 + 0.0948 3.2187 
 0.1647  0.3107  1.0000 
The results of these calculations are summarised in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6: The calculation results 
    Total 
HRH 0.6257 0.6845 0.5757 1.8859 
MRH 0.2554 0.2794 0.3053 0.8402 
NRH 0.1031 0.0868 0.0948 0.2847 
By using Equation 5.5, the λ𝑚𝑎𝑥is calculated as follows: 
λ𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
1.8859
0.6257 +
0.8402
0.2794 +
0.2847
0.0948
3
=
9.0228
3
= 3.0076 
Next 𝐶𝐼 was calculated by using Equation 5.4 as follows: 
𝐶𝐼 =
3.0076 − 3
3 − 1
= 0.0038 
Based on the Random Index (RI) values table (i.e. Table 5.2), RI = 0.52. Therefore, CR 
is identified by using Equation 5.4 as follows: 
𝐶𝑅 =
0.0038
0.52
= 0.0073 
The same technique could be applied to calculate the weight of each criterion. For an 
easier and faster way to perform this calculation, a computer software tool (i.e. AHP 
calc. version 12.08.13) was used to analyse the weight of the hierarchy criteria. As a 
result, the weight values of the model are shown in Table 5.7 and Appendix 3.39 - 3.45 
as follows: 
Table 5.7: Weight of port operation criteria in each level  
Level 1 Weight Level 2 Weight Level 3 Weight Level 4 Weight 
MRH 0.2794 MRHD 0.1628 MRHDA 0.6772   
    MRHDB 0.3228   
  MRHC 0.1894 MRHCA 0.2067   
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    MRHCB 0.218   
    MRHCC 0.1789   
    MRHCD 0.1632   
    MRHCE 0.1121   
    MRHCF 0.1219 MRHCFA 0.4709 
      MRHCFB 0.2518 
      MRHCFC 0.2773 
  MRHB 0.2759 MRHBA 0.4121   
    MRHBB 0.2784   
    MRHBC 0.1999   
    MRHBD 0.1096   
  MRHA 0.3718 MRHAA 0.3719   
    MRHAB 0.2854   
    MRHAC 0.3427   
NRH 0.0948 NRHA 0.3121 NRHAA 0.4882   
    NRHAB 0.3561   
    NRHAC 0.1557   
  NRHB 0.3848 NRHBA 0.5039   
    NRHBC 0.2219   
    NRHBB 0.2742   
  NRHC 0.3031 NRHCA 0.7691   
    NRHCB 0.2309   
HRH 0.6257 HRHA 0.5635 HRHAA 0.6101 HRHAAA 0.4154 
      HRHAAB 0.3134 
      HRHAAC 0.2712 
    HRHAB 0.3899   
  HRHB 0.4365 HRHBA 0.5794 HRHBAA 0.3798 
      HRHBAB 0.2929 
      HRHBAC 0.14 
      HRHBAD 0.1874 
    HRHBB 0.4206 HRHBBA 0.1846 
      HRHBBB 0.0853 
      HRHBBC 0.0819 
      HRHBBD 0.0932 
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5.5.3 Application of Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning 
This step utilises steps 2, 3, and 4, which were established in Section 4.4. Three 
questionnaires were constructed, one each for port, ship, and pipeline operator. The 
questionnaires were then given to experts in these fields (i.e. twelve experts for port 
transportation systems and six experts for ship and pipeline transportation systems), 
with the aim of collecting the failure information from the experts’ evaluation of 
hazards in PTSs.  
For the evaluation process of this case study, twelve selected experts (three from each 
port) evaluated the operational hazards within the four petroleum ports by using the 
linguistic variables described in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. Based on the experts’ 
knowledge of similar past events, the experts provided an appropriate answer for the 
attributes (i.e. the occurrence probability of a risk event during the process of oil 
transport (Pl), consequence severity that the risk event causes when it occurs (Sc), and 
probability that the risk event cannot be detected before it occurs (Dp)) of each hazard 
through using the proportion technique in order to evaluate the petroleum ports.  
Based on expert evaluation, the degree of belief for occurrence probability of a risk 
event during the process of oil transport (Pl), consequence severity that the risk event 
causes when it occurs (Sc), and probability that the risk event cannot be detected before 
it occurs (Dp) of port B hazards was identified and presented in Table 5.8 (for other 
ports, ships and pipelines belief degrees, see Appendixes 3.1-3.29). 
      HRHBBE 0.0896 
      HRHBBF 0.1417 
      HRHBBG 0.0935 
      HRHBBH 0.2015 
      HRHBBI 0.0287 
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Table 5.8: Prior probability of Pl, Sc and Dp for petroleum port B hazards 
 Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 MRHAA 
10, 12.5, 20.8333, 35, 
21.6667 
11.6667, 14.1667, 25.8333, 
29.1667, 19.1667 
3.8333, 17.5, 25.3333, 
27.5, 25.8333 
H2 MRHAB 
10.8333, 20.8333, 28.3333, 
27.5, 12.5 
12.5, 15.8333, 36.6667, 
21.6667, 13.3333,  
10, 22.5, 28.3333, 20.8333, 
20.8333, 18.3333 
H3 MRHAC 
9.1667, 19.1667, 23.3333, 
34.1667, 14.1667 
11.6667, 21.6667, 30.8333, 
20.8333, 15 
10, 19.1667, 28.3333, 
31.6667, 10.8333 
H4 MRHBA 
10, 30.8333, 23.3333, 27.5, 
8.3333 
11.6667, 12.5, 27.5, 
35.8333, 12.5 
10, 19.1667, 22.5, 37.5, 
10.8333 
H5 MRHBB 
11.6667, 17.5, 30.8333, 
31.6667, 8.3333 
10.8333, 20.8333, 28.3333, 
29.1667, 10.8333 
10.83333, 12.5, 35, 
31.6667, 10 
H6 MRHBC 
9.1667, 10.8333, 28.3333, 
30, 21.6667 
10.8333, 11.6667, 28.3333, 
35.8333, 13.3333 
11.6667, 15, 35.8333, 
25.8333, 11.6667 
H7 MRHBD 
13.3333, 18.3333, 27.5, 
29.1667, 11.6667 
13.3333, 18.3333, 30, 
21.6667, 16.6667 
11.6667, 10.8333, 28.3333, 
38.3333, 10.8333 
H8 MRHCA 11.6667, 20, 25, 35, 8.3333 
13.3333, 15, 30, 25.8333, 
15.8333 
9.1667, 10.8333, 37.5, 30, 
12.5 
H9 MRHCB 
10.83333, 18.3333, 22.5, 
36.6667, 11.6667 
12.5, 20, 26.6667, 25.8333, 
15 
12.5, 19.1667, 28.3333, 
30.8333, 9.1667 
H10 MRHCC 
11.6667, 10.8333, 29.1667, 
36.6667, 11.6667 
12.5, 19.1667, 29.1667, 
23.3333, 15.8333 
14.1667, 17.5, 29.1667, 
28.3333, 10.8333 
H11 MRHCD 
10.83333, 17.5, 30.8333, 
30, 10.8333 
5, 15.8333, 30.8333, 
28.3333, 20 
10.8333, 11.6667, 28.3333, 
39.1667, 10 
H12 MRHCE 
11.6667, 10.8333, 28.3333, 
37.5, 11.6667 
11.6667, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
29.1667, 12.5 
11.6667, 18.3333, 30.8333, 
29.1667, 10 
H13 MRHCFA 
25.8333, 30.83333, 
23.3333, 19.1667, 0.8333 
10.8333, 19.1667, 29.1667, 
30.8333, 10 
10, 10.8333, 29.1667, 
39.1667, 10.8333 
H14 MRHCFB 
17.5, 28.3333, 22.5, 
20.8333, 10.8333 
10, 27.5, 23.3333, 29.1667, 
10 
10.8333, 19.1667, 29.1667, 
28.3333, 12.5 
H15 MRHCFC 
16.6667, 22.5, 28.3333, 
21.6667, 10.8333 
11.6667, 18.3333, 30.8333, 
29.1667, 10 
10.8333, 19.1667, 23.3333, 
36.6667, 10 
H16 MRHDA 
10.8333, 14.1667, 20, 
21.6667, 33.3333 
30, 29.1667, 19.1667, 
11.6667, 10 
34.1667, 35.8333, 15.8333, 
7.5, 6.6667 
H17 MRHDB 
12.5, 13.3333, 18.3333, 
20.83333, 35 
28.3333, 30.8333, 21.6667, 
10, 9.1667 
36.6667, 35.8333, 12.5, 
9.1667, 7.5 
H18 HRHAAC 
13.3333, 20, 21.6667, 
24.1667, 20.8333 
11.6667, 28.3333, 20, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
11.6667, 18.333, 30.8333, 
27.5, 11.6667 
H19 HRHAAB 
14.1667, 20.8333, 22.5, 30, 
12.5 
11.6667, 18.3333, 30.8333, 
29.1667, 10 
11.6667, 18.3333, 29.1667, 
30, 10.8333 
H20 HRHAAA 
20.8333, 28.3333, 
20.83333, 20, 10 
11.6667, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
28.3333, 8.3333 
11.6667, 19.1667, 30, 
28.3333, 10.8333 
H21 HRHAB 
13.3333, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
30, 10 
11.6667, 18.3333, 29.1667, 
30, 10.8333 
10.8333, 12.5, 36.6667, 
29.1667, 10.8333 
H22 HRHBAA 
26.6667, 28.3333, 20.8333, 
19.1667, 5 
11.6667, 18.3333, 21.6667, 
36.6667, 11.6667 
14.1667, 15, 34.1667, 
26.6667, 10 
H23 HRHBAB 
3.3333, 3.3333, 25.8333, 
37.5, 30 
20.8333, 21.6667, 28.3333, 
19.1667, 10 
24.1667, 30, 20.83333, 
19.1667, 5.8333 
H24 HRHBAC 
6.6667, 8.3333, 20.8333, 
35.8333, 28.3333 
12.5, 13.3333, 28.3333, 
26.6667, 19.1667 
11.6667, 18.3333, 23.3333, 
28.3333, 18.3333 
H25 HRHBAD 
14.1667, 15, 27.5, 16.6667, 
26.6667 
1.6667, 3.3333, 29.1667, 
37.5, 28.3333 
10.8333, 29.1667, 37.5, 
12.5, 10 
H26 HRHBBA 
29.1667, 30, 20.8333, 17.5, 
2.5 
11.6667, 18.3333, 30, 
29.1667, 10.8333 
10.8333, 11.6667, 28.3333, 
38.3333, 10.8333 
H27 HRHBBB 
12.5, 19.1667, 30, 28.3333, 
10 
37.5, 30, 11.6667, 10.8333, 
10 
10, 12.5, 35.8333, 30, 
11.6667 
H28 HRHBBC 
13.3333, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
29.1667, 10.8333 
17.5, 18.3333, 27.5, 
28.3333, 8.3333 
7.5, 11.6667, 20, 52.5, 
8.3333 
H29 HRHBBD 
11.6667, 12.5, 29.1667, 
35.8333, 10.8333 
2.5, 5.8333, 19.1667, 22.5, 
50 
6.3333, 12.8333, 28.3333, 
38.3333, 14.1667 
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H30 HRHBBE 
10.8333, 19.1667, 26.6667, 
34.1667, 9.1667 
20, 26.6667, 28.3333, 
13.3333, 11.6667 
0, 2.5, 22.5, 41.6667, 
33.3333 
H31 HRHBBF 
13.3333, 18.3333, 29.1667, 
28.3333, 10.8333,  
10.8333, 18.3333, 49.1667, 
12.5, 9.1667 
34.1667, 28.3333, 13.3333, 
12.5, 11.6667 
H32 HRHBBG 
5.8333, 13.3333, 19.1667, 
26.6667, 35 
2.5, 24.1667, 48.3333, 
23.3333, 1.6667 
20, 20.8333, 29.1667, 
26.6667, 3.3333 
H33 HRHBBH 
10, 10.8333, 20, 45, 
14.1667 
33.3333, 40, 11.6667, 
10.8333, 4.1667 
10.8333, 10.83333, 
29.1667, 30, 19.1667 
H34 HRHBBI 
11.6667, 16.6667, 29.1667, 
27.5, 15 
10.8333, 37.5, 35, 12.5, 
4.1667 
39.1667, 24.1667, 16.6667, 
15.8333, 4.1667 
H35 NRHAA 
10.8333, 11.6667, 19.1667, 
21.6667, 36.6667 
3.3333, 9.1667, 24.1667, 
30, 33.3333 
10.8333, 43.3333, 40, 
3.3333, 2.5 
H36 NRHAB 
0, 1.6667, 4.1667, 15, 
79.1667 
7.5, 20, 25.8333, 25, 
21.6667 
9.1667, 41.6667, 40, 5, 
4.1667 
H37 NRHAC 0, 0, 0, 5, 95 
3.3333, 10.8333, 25, 
30.8333, 30 
9.1667, 41.6667, 38.3333, 
5.8333, 5 
H38 NRHBA 
2.5, 4.1667, 19.1667, 37.5, 
36.6667 
3.3333, 10.8333, 24.1667, 
30, 31.6667 
10.8333, 17.5, 29.1667, 
35.8333, 6.6667 
H39 NRHBC 
3.3333, 7.5, 21.6667, 52.5, 
15 
9.1667, 19.1667, 30.8333, 
35, 5.8333 
3.3333, 10, 35.8333, 
46.6667, 4.1667 
H40 NRHBB 0, 0, 0, 10, 90 
55.8333, 22.5, 12.5, 5, 
4.1667 
3.3333, 6.6667, 43.3333, 
45, 1.6667 
H41 NRHCA 
0.5, 0.8333, 2.5, 3.6667, 
92.5 
58.3333, 26.6667, 10.8333, 
2.5, 1.6667 
2.5, 4.1667, 45.8333, 
44.1667, 3.3333 
H42 NRHCB 
0.5, 0.8333, 2.5, 4.5 
91.6667 
59.16667, 25, 10.8333, 
3.3333, 1.6667 
2.5, 4.1667, 45.8333, 
44.1667, 3.3333 
To analyse these hazards, various BN models have been developed for aggregating the 
rules. Therefore, by using HUGIN software, the risk analysis values for all the hazards 
are identified and presented in the form of belief degree in Table 5.9 (for other ports, 
ships and pipelines belief degrees, see Appendixes 3.30-3.38). 
Table 5.9: Analysis of petroleum port B hazards by HUGIN software 
 Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
H1 MRHAA 0.0850 0.1472 0.2400 0.3056 0.2222 
H2 MRHAB 0.1111 0.1972 0.3111 0.2333 0.1472 
H3 MRHAC 0.1028 0.2000 0.2750 0.2889 0.1333 
H4 MRHBA 0.1056 0.2083 0.2444 0.3361 0.1056 
H5 MRHBB 0.1111 0.1694 0.3139 0.3083 0.0972 
H6 MRHBC 0.1056 0.1250 0.3083 0.3056 0.1556 
H7 MRHBD 0.1278 0.1583 0.2861 0.2972 0.1306 
H8 MRHCA 0.1139 0.1528 0.3083 0.3028 0.1222 
H9 MRHCB 0.1194 0.1917 0.2583 0.3111 0.1194 
H10 MRHCC 0.1278 0.1583 0.2917 0.2944 0.1278 
H11 MRHCD 0.0889 0.1500 0.3000 0.3250 0.1361 
H12 MRHCE 0.1167 0.1583 0.2917 0.3194 0.1139 
H13 MRHCFA 0.1556 0.2028 0.2722 0.2972 0.0722 
H14 MRHCFB 0.1278 0.2500 0.2500 0.2611 0.1111 
  
176 
H15 MRHCFC 0.1306 0.2000 0.2750 0.2917 0.1028 
H16 MRHDA 0.2500 0.2639 0.1833 0.1361 0.1667 
H17 MRHDB 0.2563 0.2647 0.1743 0.1328 0.1718 
H18 HRHAAA 0.1472 0.2528 0.2472 0.2556 0.0972 
H19 HRHAAB 0.1250 0.1917 0.2750 0.2972 0.1111 
H20 HRHAAC 0.1222 0.2222 0.2417 0.2667 0.1472 
H21 HRHAB 0.1194 0.1639 0.3139 0.2972 0.1056 
H22 HRHBAA 0.1750 0.2056 0.2556 0.2750 0.0889 
H23 HRHBAB 0.1611 0.1833 0.2500 0.2528 0.1528 
H24 HRHBAC 0.1028 0.1333 0.2417 0.3028 0.2194 
H25 HRHBAD 0.0889 0.1583 0.3139 0.2222 0.2167 
H26 HRHBBA 0.1722 0.2000 0.2639 0.2833 0.0806 
H27 HRHBBB 0.1944 0.2000 0.2000 0.3083 0.0972 
H28 HRHBBC 0.1183 0.1456 0.2833 0.3417 0.1111 
H29 HRHBBD 0.0444 0.0917 0.2278 0.3278 0.3083 
H30 HRHBBE 0.2250 0.2444 0.2361 0.1806 0.1139 
H31 HRHBBF 0.1222 0.1750 0.3250 0.2194 0.1583 
H32 HRHBBG 0.1639 0.1944 0.1945 0.3389 0.1083 
H33 HRHBBH 0.2056 0.2611 0.2694 0.1861 0.0778 
H34 HRHBBI 0.1139 0.1667 0.3222 0.2889 0.1083 
H35 NRHAA 0.0833 0.2139 0.2778 0.1833 0.2417 
H36 NRHAB 0.0556 0.2111 0.2333 0.1500 0.3500 
H37 NRHAC 0.0417 0.1750 0.2111 0.1389 0.4333 
H38 NRHBA 0.0556 0.1083 0.2417 0.3444 0.2500 
H39 NRHBB 0.1972 0.0972 0.1861 0.2000 0.3194 
H40 NRHBC 0.0528 0.1222 0.2944 0.4472 0.0833 
H41 NRHCA 0.2044 0.1056 0.1972 0.1678 0.3250 
H42 NRHCB 0.2072 0.1000 0.1972 0.1733 0.3222 
 
5.5.4 Aggregation of Risks through Evidential Reasoning Approach 
To demonstrate how to aggregate the rules by ER, the Ship/Port Interference (MRHD) 
failure, which were associated with port B, were examined by aggregating the 
Procedural Failure hazard (MRHDA) and Collision between Ship and Other Ship/Berth 
hazard (MRHDB), as follows: 
The belief degrees for MRHDA and MRHDB were identified in step 3 as follows: 
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MRHDA = {(Very High, 0.25), (High, 0.2639), (Medium, 0.1833), (Low, 0.1361), 
(Very Low, 0.1667)} 
MRHDB = {(Very High, 0.2563), (High, 0.2647), (Medium, 0.1743), (Low, 0.1328), 
(Very Low, 0.1718)} 
The weight of these two hazards was identified in step 2 as follows: 
𝑤1= 0.6772, 𝑤2= 0.3228 
where 𝑤1and 𝑤2represent the assigned weight for MRHDA and MRHDB respectively. 
By using Equation (5.6), the individual degree values of MRHDA and MRHDB were 
calculated in Table 5.10 as follows: 
Table 5.10: The individual degree values of MRHDA and MRHDB 
h1 𝐷1
1 = 0.25 × 0.6772 = 0.1693 𝐷2
1 = 0.2564 × 0.3228 = 0.0827 
h2 𝐷1
2 = 0.2639 × 0.6772 = 0.1787 𝐷2
2 = 0.2647 × 0.3228 = 0.0854 
h3 𝐷1
3 = 0.1833 × 0.6772 = 0.1242 𝐷2
3 = 0.1743 × 0.3228 = 0.0563 
h4 𝐷1
4 = 0.1361 × 0.6772 = 0.0922 𝐷2
4 = 0.1328 × 0.3228 = 0.0429 
h5 𝐷1
5 = 0.1667 × 0.6772 = 0.1129 𝐷2
5 = 0.17181 × 0.3228 = 0.0555 
where 𝐷1
ℎand 𝐷2
ℎrepresent the assigned degree for MRHDA and MRHDB respectively. 
𝐻1 represents the remaining belief values that are unassigned for 𝐷1
ℎ, and 𝐻2 represents 
the remaining belief values that are unassigned for 𝐷2
ℎ. The individual remaining belief 
values for both 𝐻1 and 𝐻2 were identified by Equation 5.7 as follows: 
𝐻1 = ?̅?1 + ?̃?1 
𝐻2 = ?̅?2 + ?̃?2 
By using Equation 5.8, ?̅?1, ?̅?2, ?̃?1and ?̃?2 were calculated as follows: 
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𝐻1 = 1 − 𝑤1 = 1 − 0.6772 = 0.3228 
𝐻2 = 1 − 𝑤2 = 1 − 0.3228 = 0.6772 
𝐻1 = 𝑤1 (1 − ∑ 𝛽1
ℎ
5
ℎ=1
) = 0.6772 × (1 − (0.25 + 0.2639 + 0.1833 + 0.1361 + 0.1667)) = 0 
𝐻2 = 𝑤2 (1 − ∑ 𝛽2
ℎ
5
ℎ=1
) = 0.3228 × (1 − (0.2564 + 0.2647 + 0.1743 + 0.1328 + 0.1718)) = 0 
Therefore, both 𝐻1 and 𝐻2 were identified as follows: 
𝐻1 = ?̅?1 + ?̃?1 = 0.3228 + 0 = 0.3228 
𝐻2 = ?̅?2 + ?̃?2 = 0.6772 + 0 = 0.6772 
Before using Equation 5.10 to find  𝛽ℎ,  Equation 5.9 was used to 
calculate 𝛽ℎ̀, ?̅??́?, ?̃??́?, 𝐾 as follows: 
Firstly, 𝐾 was calculated as follows: 
𝐾 = [1 − ∑ ∑ 𝑀1
𝑇𝑀2
𝑅
5
𝑅=1
𝑅≠𝑇
5
𝑇=1
]
−1
= 
𝐾 = 
[
 
 
 
 
 
1 −
      − + 𝐷1
1𝐷2
2 + 𝐷1
1𝐷2
3 + 𝐷1
1𝐷2
4 + 𝐷1
1𝐷2
5 +
𝐷1
2𝐷2
1 +       −  + 𝐷1
2𝐷2
3 + 𝐷1
2𝐷2
4 + 𝐷1
2𝐷2
5 +
𝐷1
3𝐷2
1 +
𝐷1
4𝐷2
1 +
𝐷1
5𝐷2
1 +
𝐷1
3𝐷2
2 +
𝐷1
4𝐷2
2 +
𝐷1
5𝐷2
2 +
      − +
𝐷1
4𝐷2
3 +
𝐷1
5𝐷2
3 +
𝐷1
3𝐷2
4 + 𝐷1
3𝐷2
5 +
      −  + 𝐷1
4𝐷2
5 +
𝐷1
5𝐷2
4 +            − ]
 
 
 
 
 
−1
 
𝐾 = [1 − ( 0.0406 + 0.0424 + 0.0331 + 0.0258 + 0.0302)]−1 = 1.2079 
𝐾 = 1.2079 
Secondly, ?̅??́? was calculated as follows: 
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?̅??́? = 𝐾(?̅?1?̅?2) = 1.2079(0.3228 × 0.6772) 
?̅??́? = 0.2640 
Thirdly, ?̃??́? is calculated as follows: 
?̃??́? = 𝐾(?̃?1?̃?2 + ?̃?1?̅?1 + ?̃?2?̅?1)
= 1.2079[(0 × 0.6772) + (0 × 0.3228) + (0 × 0.3228) 
?̃??́? = 0 
Then 𝛽ℎ̀ is calculated as follows: 
𝛽1̀ = 𝐾(𝐷1
1𝐷2
1 + 𝐷1
1𝐻2 + 𝐷2
1𝐻1)
=  1.2079[(0.1693 × 0.0827) + (0.1693 × 0.6772) + (0.0827 × 0.3228)]
= 0.1877 
𝛽2̀ = 𝐾(𝐷1
2𝐷2
2 + 𝐷1
2𝐻2 + 𝐷2
2𝐻1)
=  1.2079[(0.1787 × 0.0854) + (0.1787 × 0.6772) + (0.0854 × 0.3228)]
= 0.1979 
𝛽3̀ = 𝐾(𝐷1
3𝐷2
3 + 𝐷1
3𝐻2 + 𝐷2
3𝐻1)
=  1.2079[(0.1242 × 0.0563) + (0.1242 × 0.6772) + (0.0563 × 0.3228)]
= 0.1319 
𝛽4̀ = 𝐾(𝐷1
4𝐷2
4 + 𝐷1
4𝐻2 + 𝐷2
4𝐻1)
=  1.2079[(0.0922 × 0.0429) + (0.0922 × 0.6772) + (0.0429 × 0.3228)]
= 0.0969 
𝛽5̀ = 𝐾(𝐷1
5𝐷2
5 + 𝐷1
5𝐻2 + 𝐷2
5𝐻1)
=  1.2079[(0.1129 × 0.0555) + (0.1129 × 0.6772) + (0.0555 × 0.3228)]
= 0.1215 
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By applying Equation 5.10 the results of 𝛽ℎ are identified as follows: 
𝛽1 =
𝛽1̀
(1 − ?̅??́?)
=
0.1877
(1 − 0.2640)
= 0.2550 
𝛽2 =
𝛽2̀
(1 − ?̅??́?)
=
0.1979
(1 − 0.2640)
= 0.2690 
𝛽3 =
𝛽3̀
(1 − ?̅??́?)
=
0.1319
(1 − 0.2640)
= 0.1793 
𝛽4 =
𝛽4̀
(1 − ?̅??́?)
=
0.0969
(1 − 0.2640)
= 0.1317 
𝛽5 =
𝛽5̀
(1 − ?̅??́?)
=
0.1215
(1 − 0.2640)
= 0.1651 
As a result, 
MRHD = {(Very High, 0.2550), (High, 0.2690), (Medium, 0.1793), (Low, 0.1317), 
(Very Low, 0.1651)} 
By using the same technique, other criteria were aggregated until the goal was reached. 
For an easier and faster ER aggregation process, a computer software tool (i.e. IDS 
software) was used. The degrees of belief for the ports hierarchy criteria are identified 
in Table 5.11. 
Table 5.11: Internal evaluation of the petroleum ports hazards by IDS software 
 Ports 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
P1 A 0.1191 0.1801 0.2834 0.2848 0.1326 
P2 B 0.1115 0.1788 0.2793 0.2949 0.1353 
P3 C 0.1164 0.1931 0.2737 0.2687 0.1481 
P4 D 0.1045 0.1651 0.2723 0.2864 0.1717 
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5.5.5 Application of Network Analysis 
This case study evaluated the local network of one of the major petroleum producing 
countries (for security purposes, the country name and ports and the collected data are 
not revealed). The local network contains four petroleum seaports. The ports are 
connected by two transportation modes (i.e. pipeline and ship transportation). These 
connections were weighted by the network’s throughput value (i.e. million barrel). 
The first petroleum seaport is port A. It is located in the east side of the country, and it 
has two major petroleum terminals: an onshore terminal and an offshore terminal. Port 
A is counted as a major petroleum seaport for exporting crude oil not only locally but 
also internationally. The second petroleum seaport is port D, which is located in the 
west side of the country. Port D is used for importing crude oil for industries 
consumptions. Port B is the third petroleum seaport. It is located in the northwest area 
of the country. It is used for importing and exporting crude oil for business purposes, 
both locally and internationally. The final port is port C, which is located in the west 
side of the country. Port C is used for importing crude oil for industrial purposes. The 
four petroleum seaports (i.e. ports A to D) are connected by shipping transportation 
and/or pipeline transportation systems. 
By feeding the collected information into R computer software, the weights of the ports 
and transportation modes were identified and presented in normalised values in Table 
5.12. 
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Table 5.12: Normalised values of the external evaluation of the local PTN  
 
Binary Weight Normalised Weight 
Port A 4 291.688 0.2642 
Port B 5 232.104 0.2102 
Port C 3 42.035 0.0381 
Port D 2 20.59 0.0186 
Pipeline A 2 184.069 0.1667 
Pipeline B 2 265.098 0.2401 
Pipeline C 2 39.035 0.0354 
Shipping Route A 2 6 0.0054 
Shipping Route B 2 19.59 0.0177 
Shipping Route C 2 1 0.0009 
Shipping Route D 2 1 0.0009 
Shipping Route E 2 2 0.0018 
5.5.6 Aggregation of Internal and External Analysis through Evidential 
Reasoning Approach  
Given the weights of the external evaluation and the degrees of belief of the internal 
evaluation, the aggregation process for the internal and external evaluation was 
conducted by using Equations 5.6–5.10. The degrees of belief of the internal evaluation 
and the external evaluation weights, which were determined in steps 4 and 5 
respectively, were input into the IDS software for further aggregation in order to reach 
the result (i.e. to determine the risk level of the PTN). The result of the PTN aggregation 
is presented in Table 5.13 (see Figure 5.4). 
Table 5.13: The degree of belief of the PTN 
 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
PTN 0.0919 0.1345 0.2365 0.2681 0.2691 
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5.5.7 Application of Utility Approach 
The main purpose of obtaining an individual crisp number by using the utility value 
approach was to enable decision makers to evaluate the goal (i.e. PTNs safety). By 
using Equation 5.14, the utility values of the investigated PTS were identified. 
 
Figure 5.4: The degree of belief of the PTN by IDS software 
 
The risk assessment values of the goal were presented in five linguistic terms (i.e. Very 
High, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low). To obtain a crisp number for the 
investigated network, “Very High”, which was the highest-preference linguistic term, 
was made equal to five. “Very Low”, which was the lowest-preference linguistic term, 
was made equal to one. As a result, by using IDS software, the utility value of the local 
PTN is 0.3780 (see Table 5.14). 
 
  
184 
Table 5.14: The steps for calculating the utility value of PTS 
𝑅ℎ Very High High Medium Low Very Low 
𝑉ℎ 5 4 3 2 1 
𝑈𝑅ℎ 
5 − 1
5 − 1
= 1 
4 − 1
5 − 1
= 0.75 
3 − 1
5 − 1
= 0.5 
2 − 1
5 − 1
= 0.25 
1 − 1
5 − 1
= 0 
Ƥ(𝑅ℎ) 0.0919 0.1345 0.2365 0.2681 0.2691 
∑ Ƥ(𝑅ℎ) = 0.0919 + 0.1345 + 0.2365 + 0.2681 + 0.2691 = 1
5
ℎ=1
 
Ƥ(𝑅ℎ) 𝑈𝑅ℎ 0.0919 0.1009 0.1183 0.0670 0 
𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑁 = ∑ Ƥ(𝛽ℎ) 𝑈𝑅ℎ
5
ℎ=1
= 0.3781 ≈ 0.3780 
5.5.8 Sensitivity Analysis 
To partially validate the developed approach, a sensitivity analysis has been carried out. 
Two axioms have been used to carry out this partially validation process. As is clear 
from Table 5.15, the degrees of belief that are associated with the highest-preference 
linguistic variables of all port B lowest-level criteria (hazards) have decreased by 0.1, 
0.2, and 0.3. These decreases led to an increase of all lowest-level criteria by 0.1, 0.2, 
and 0.3 in their degrees of belief associated with the lowest-preference linguistic 
variables.  
As a result, the increases of the lowest-level criteria, which increased by 0.1, 0.2, and 
0.3 respectively, led to a decrease in the upper value (the goal's utility value), as 
presented in Table 5.15. For instance, the failure probability utility value of the 
evaluated PTSs has changed due to increasing the hazard Procedural Failure (MRHDA) 
belief degrees by 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 respectively. This increasing led to a decreasing in 
failure probability utility value PTSs from 0.3755 to 0.3713. This highlights that the 
safety of the PTNs overall system is affected by any of the three systems’ hazards 
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events. Figure 5.5 shows the belief degree changes for the lowest-level criteria of the 
linguistic variables, which decreased by 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3. From Figure 5.5, it is obvious 
that the model output is sensitive to the changes that occur in it. 
Table 5.15: Sensitivity analysis of all lowest-level criteria while decreasing 
highest preference linguistic variable by 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 
  Hs 
The RPTN value of the PTN due to an increase in the degree of belief 
associated with the lowest-preference linguistic variable of port B’s 
lowest-level criteria  
0.1 0.2 0.3 
H1 MRHAA 0.3753 0.3729 0.371 
H2 MRHAB 0.3761 0.3744 0.3727 
H3 MRHAC 0.3757 0.3737 0.3718 
H4 MRHBA 0.3758 0.3739 0.3721 
H5 MRHBB 0.3768 0.3757 0.3747 
H6 MRHBC 0.3772 0.3765 0.3759 
H7 MRHBD 0.3776 0.3772 0.3769 
H8 MRHCA 0.3774 0.3769 0.3764 
H9 MRHCB 0.3774 0.3768 0.3762 
H10 MRHCC 0.3775 0.377 0.3766 
H11 MRHCD 0.3776 0.3772 0.3768 
H12 MRHCE 0.3777 0.3775 0.3772 
H13 MRHCFA 0.3779 0.3777 0.3775 
H14 MRHCFB 0.378 0.3779 0.3778 
H15 MRHCFC 0.378 0.3779 0.3778 
H16 MRHDA 0.3755 0.3734 0.3713 
H17 MRHDB 0.3774 0.3768 0.3763 
H18 CRHAAC 0.3775 0.3771 0.3767 
H19 CRHAAB 0.3774 0.3769 0.3764 
H20 CRHAAA 0.3771 0.3763 0.3756 
H21 CRHAB 0.3771 0.3764 0.3756 
H22 CRHBAA 0.3775 0.377 0.3766 
H23 CRHBAB 0.3777 0.3774 0.3771 
H24 CRHBAC 0.3779 0.3778 0.3777 
H25 CRHBAD 0.3778 0.3777 0.3775 
H26 CRHBBA 0.3779 0.3778 0.3777 
H27 CRHBBB 0.378 0.3779 0.3779 
H28 CRHBBC 0.378 0.3779 0.3779 
H29 CRHBBD 0.378 0.3779 0.3779 
H30 CRHBBE 0.378 0.3779 0.3779 
H31 CRHBBF 0.3779 0.3779 0.3778 
H32 CRHBBG 0.378 0.3779 0.3779 
H33 CRHBBH 0.3779 0.3777 0.3776 
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H34 CRHBBI 0.378 0.378 0.3779 
H35 NRHAA 0.3778 0.3776 0.3774 
H36 NRHAB 0.3779 0.3778 0.3777 
H37 NRHAC 0.378 0.3779 0.3779 
H38 NRHBA 0.3777 0.3775 0.3773 
H39 NRHBC 0.3779 0.3778 0.3777 
H40 NRHBB 0.3779 0.3779 0.3778 
H41 NRHCA 0.3777 0.3773 0.377 
H42 NRHCB 0.378 0.3779 0.3779 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Sensitivity analysis output 
5.6 Conclusion 
To carry out the safety evaluation process for evaluating the risk level of PTNs, this 
chapter was divided into three sections. The first section introduced the ER and AHP 
methods. This introduction provided an explanation of these two techniques and how 
they have been used in previous studies. Furthermore, the introduction explained how 
to use ER to aggregate relative weights with belief degrees. Chapter 4 explained how 
to evaluate hazards’ degree of belief. A brief review of the computer software (i.e. IDS) 
0.37
0.371
0.372
0.373
0.374
0.375
0.376
0.377
0.378
0.379
H1 H3 H5 H7 H9 H11H13H15H17H19H21H23H25H27H29H31H33H35H37H39H41
0.1 Decrease 0.2 Decrease 0.3 Decrease
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was also provided; this review covered how this software was used for the aggregation 
described in this chapter. 
The second section provided a brief explanation of the PTNs evaluation process. This 
evaluation process included internal evaluation and external evaluation. Firstly, for 
evaluating the system internally, the evaluation process contained four steps: 1) 
Identifying the operational hazards within the PTNs. 2) Determining the weight of the 
hierarchical criteria by using the AHP technique. 3) Applying the established FRBBR 
to measure the belief degree of the internal operational hazards. 4) Finally, applying the 
ER approach to aggregate the assessment. Secondly, for evaluating the system 
externally, the evaluation process contained one step: applying a network analysis 
technique to determine the weight of the ports and the transportation modes within the 
PTNs. The ER technique was then used to aggregate both the internal and external 
evaluation for the PTNs, and the belief degree of this evaluation was presented in a 
crisp value by using the utility approach. Finally, the model was validated by using 
sensitivity analysis.  
In the final section, a real-life case study was performed on a PTN of one of the major 
petroleum producing countries. In fact, the model and methodology can be applied in 
any transportation system, both locally and/or internationally, to evaluate the safety 
level or the riskiness of the tested PTNs. Within this case study, the petroleum port risk 
factors are presented as an example in the evaluation process to explain the evaluating 
steps. Based on the ER aggregation mechanism, the failure probability of the local 
PTNs was identified as 0.0919, 0.1345, 0.2365, 0.2681, and 0.2691. After performing 
the utility approach by using IDS software, the utility value of the local PTN was found 
to be 0.3780. In addition, a brief discussion for Chapter 5 is further presented in Chapter 
7.   
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This chapter has proposed more realistic and flexible results by describing the failure 
information of the PTNs based on real-life situations. Additionally, the proposed 
method provides a decision-support system for enhancing the safety practices of the 
transportation system in general and particularly for the PTS through providing 
decision-makers with a reliable risk evaluation technique. 
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6 Chapter 6: Developing a Risk Based Decision Making 
Modelling to Enhance Safety in PTSs Operations   
In the previous chapters, the hazards associated with petroleum transportation systems 
(PTSs) were identified. Each of these hazards was individually analysed in order to 
identify the most significant one in relation to this transportation system. Furthermore, 
the risk level of PTSs was evaluated after combining the local and global assessment. 
To enhance the safety of PTSs, the safety level of the most significant hazard needs to 
be improved. To research this goal, a list of alternatives and criteria was determined. 
Within this chapter, a VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje 
(VIKOR) technique is introduced in order to rank the risk-control options. With the 
VIKOR technique, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is used to estimate the weight 
of each criterion.  
6.1 Introduction 
Since the 19th century, the petroleum industry has become one of the fastest growing 
businesses. The total volume of petroleum production and movement has increased and 
is expected to continue increasing in the next years due to the critical role that this 
natural resource plays in world development (UNCTAD, 2017; OPEC, 2016; IEA, 
2017). As a result, the safety operations of Petroleum Transportation Systems (PTSs) 
are continuously challenged. 
As described in the previous chapters, Petroleum Transportation Networks (PTNs) 
contain two focal points, which are ports and transportation modes. Each hazard within 
these transportation systems has been evaluated individually in order to identify the 
most significant hazard that influences the safe operation of PTNs. Furthermore, the 
transportation system has been evaluated in order to assess the risk level of petroleum 
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transportation as one complete system. To complete the assessment, this chapter aims 
to investigate the most significant hazard, namely procedural failure during ship/port 
interference, to determine how to control it in order to enhance the safety level of PTNs.  
To investigate the safety control measures of this hazard, a combination of 
VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR) method and 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is used (Fouladgar et al., 2012). VIKOR is a Multi 
Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) technique used in this chapter in order to rank the 
determined options (alternatives) for the decision-maker for mitigating and/or 
eliminating the hazard. The technique has been applied in different fields due to its 
simplicity in calculation and the advantages it offers as a decision-making tool due to 
its mechanism for ranking the system control options, such as in engineering systems 
(Yazdani-Chamzini et al., 2013; Bazzazi et al., 2011), problems (Sanayei et al., 2010; 
Jahan et al., 2011), management (Rezaie et al., 2014) and finance (Yalcin et al., 2012). 
This chapter aims to ensure that PTSs operate at an optimal level by offering the best 
risk-control options. To achieve the objective of this chapter, a brief literature review 
of VIKOR approach and why the technique is used is firstly introduced in the following 
section. The third section of the chapter provides step-by-step explanations of the 
evaluation process. This section identifies the hazard and then outlines the ranking 
process for the alternatives. A case study is presented in the fourth section to 
demonstrate the methodology proposed in this chapter. Finally, the conclusion is 
presented in the final section. The chapter shows overall how this hybrid approach 
(VIKOR-AHP) can provide a proper method to select a suitable risk-control option. 
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6.2 VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje 
Background and Review  
VIKOR, which is a Serbian term that means multicriteria optimisation and compromise 
solution, was devised by Opricovic in 1998 and then further developed by Opricovic 
and Tzeng in 2004 (Tzeng and Huang, 2011; Tzeng et al., 2005; Kaya and Kahraman, 
2011). The developed approach is a compromise ranking method that was established 
to deal with Multi Attribute Decision Making (MADM) problems. Opricovic in 1998 
and Opricovic and Tzeng in 2004 developed the VIKOR technique from the basis of 
the compromise solution created by Yu (1973) and Zeleny (1982), which was in turn 
developed for distance function from the 𝐿𝑝 -metric (Opricovic and Tzeng, 2004). 
VIKOR technique was built around the concept of distance from the Ideal Solution for 
ranking the alternatives, where the preferred alternative is the one nearest to the ideal 
solution (Opricovic and Tzeng, 2004; Rezaie et al., 2014; Ebrahimnejad et al., 2012). 
Unlike other MCDM techniques (e.g. AHP, ELECTRE, TOPSIS), VIKOR formula 
introduced the ranking index (VIKOR index), which is a collection of all criteria, the 
relative importance of the criteria, and a balance between total and individual 
satisfaction, which determines a compromise solution, based on each solution’s 
distance from the ideal solution (Chu et al., 2007; Tzeng and Huang, 2011). In other 
words, VIKOR is a decision-making tool that ranks a list of solutions, after taking into 
account their closeness to the ideal solution. The VIKOR technique has been 
extensively used because it offers the following advantages (Tzeng and Huang, 2011; 
Tzeng et al., 2005 Chu et al., 2007; Mir et al., 2016): 
 VIKOR presents the criteria and solutions (alternatives) in one clear hierarchal 
structure. 
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 VIKOR has a clear, simple, and short calculation process.  
 VIKOR takes into consideration the weight of each criterion in the evaluation 
process. 
 The output of VIKOR makes it clear how to rank alternatives to avoid as much 
risk as possible. 
 VIKOR takes into consideration the alternative distances to the ideal solutions 
in order to rank the alternatives. 
 VIKOR has been widely accepted and successfully applied in many different 
fields. 
Due to these advantages, VIKOR has become one of the techniques used in recent years 
for dealing with multi-attribute decision-making problems.  
VIKOR is in the MADM family of techniques. MADM techniques are defined by Yoon 
and Kim (1989) as “technical decision aids for evaluating alternatives which are 
characterised by multiple attributes”. Both quantitative and qualitative data are present 
in MADM problems, especially in the field of engineering (Guo et al., 2009). The 
VIKOR decision-making technique has been commonly used in engineering and other 
fields for identifying the best and the worst risk-control options and presenting those 
options in a ranking order.   
VIKOR has nine steps for addressing a multi-attribute decision-making problem: 
1. Identifying the hierarchal structure of the MCDM problem. This step includes 
the identification of the problem and its related criteria and alternatives.  
2. Collecting the input data. 
3. Developing the VIKOR decision matrix. 
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4. Normalising the VIKOR decision matrix. 
5. Determining the weight of each criterion by using the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) technique. 
6. Determining the minimum and maximum criterion function. 
7. Determining the utility measure. 
8. Determining the regret measure. 
9. Determining the maximum and minimum utility and regret measures. 
10. Determining the VIKOR index. 
11. Ranking all the alternatives in order. 
VIKOR technique is a powerful technique which has been extensively used for its 
capability in dealing with complex systems. It enables selection of the best alternative 
from several alternatives in a system. VIKOR mechanism provides decision makers 
with an advanced tool to rank risk-control options. Researchers such as Chu et al. 
(2007) highlighted the advantage of this technique over other multi-attribute decision-
making approaches for ranking alternatives (i.e. Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) 
and Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS)). To 
illustrate VIKOR’s superiority, Chu et al. (2007) conducted a comparative analysis 
using these three techniques in order to rank the system alternatives. Liu et al. (2012) 
applied VIKOR approach to prioritise the failures within a medical system after 
performing a risk evaluation using Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). 
Emovon et al. (2015) confirmed the ability of the VIKOR technique to deal with 
MADM problems in prioritising the risk in marine machinery systems. Liou et al. 
(2011) proposed the VIKOR approach within an airline system to improve the service 
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quality of domestic airlines. The results of this model provided the solution that was 
closest to the optimum solution as the best alternative for improving the service. 
6.3 Risk Mitigation  
Risk mitigation is a selecting and implementing process for managing and controlling 
risks in order to eliminate the frequency of occurrence and minimise the consequences 
of unwanted hazards (Lassen, 2008). According to MSA (1993), mitigation is one of 
the major elements that needed to be considered for controlling and improving the 
safety of systems. 
Risk mitigation is defined as a decision-making process that takes place after the 
assessment phase for taking actions relating to the non-acceptable risks. This process 
aims to decrease the probability of a failure occurring or to minimise the losses if an 
accident happens. Usually, Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is combined with this process 
so decision-makers can reach the best decision. 
CBA, which is also known as Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA), is a widely known method 
for supporting decisions. According to the Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited 
(RSSB) (2014), “Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) weighs the expected costs of one or more 
options against the expected benefits to support a decision as to which option(s) should 
be implemented.” In other words, CBA identifies the best benefit-to-cost alternatives 
for the decision maker. UNCTAD (2006) explained that CBA was first introduced and 
approved by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in Formal Safety 
Assessment (FSA) in 2001. Later on the technique was approved in agendas such as 
regulatory assessment of maritime security (UNCTAD, 2006).   
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Several techniques to manage the risks within a system have been identified and 
evaluated in earlier chapters. According to Irukwu (1991), all those techniques fall into 
one or more of the following four categories: 
 Avoidance (eliminate, withdraw, or do not become involved). 
 Reduction (optimise – mitigate). 
 Sharing (transfer – outsource or insure). 
 Retention (accept and budget). 
In this research, all of the recognised risk factors identified in the literature review and 
in the discussion meetings with experts were assessed, evaluated, and analysed in 
Chapters 4 and 5. To complete the cycle of this study, a mitigation process was required 
to enhance the safety of the system.  
Main Goal 
Criterion 3Criterion 2 Criterion …Criterion 1 
Alternative 1 Alternative 3Alternative 2 Alternative 4 Alternative ...
 
Figure 6.1: The hierarchical structure of the AHP-VIKOR for safety 
improvement of the hazards 
The mitigation process first entailed identifying the most significant hazard that affects 
the safety of PTSs. Based on this result, different criteria and alternatives were set, and 
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then an appropriate decision-making technique was employed to prioritise these 
strategic decisions and control the hazard. As explained in Figure 4.3, the PTSs were 
affected by different sources of risks and uncertainties. These sources were divided into 
three main categories: port-related hazards, ship-related hazards, and pipeline-related 
hazards. The lower level hazards (hazards events) in each category were evaluated in 
an earlier chapter (Chapter 4) to identify the most significant hazard within PTSs. To 
control this identified hazard for an optimal operation and to improve the safety level 
within PTNs, it was also necessary to evaluate the risk-control options (alternatives) in 
light of CBA to identify the best ideal solution for mitigation. Figure 6.1 illustrates a 
decision hierarchy structured for selection of the best strategies to mitigate the hazards 
within the PTSs. 
6.4 Methodology 
For the purposes of this study, the VIKOR technique was used to identify the best 
solution for controlling the hazards associated with PTSs. The flow chart for the 
evaluation procedure is presented in Figure 6.2.  
 
Figure 6.2: The risk-control assessment model flow chart 
 
Step 1
Identification of 
the goal 
Step 2
Identification of 
the possible 
criteria and 
alternatives for 
mitigating the risk
Step 3
Model 
development 
Step 4
Identification of 
the best 
alternative by 
using VIKOR
Step 5
Sensitivity 
analysis
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The evaluation process contained five steps. The procedure began by identifying the 
most significant hazard affecting the safety of PTSs. It concluded by identifying the 
best alternative for eliminating and/or mitigating this hazard. Within this process, the 
AHP technique for determining the weight of the hierarchal criteria was used. 
The steps for hazard controlling improvement are listed as follows: 
 Identify the system’s most significant hazard.  
 Identify the possible criteria and alternatives for mitigating the risk 
 Model development  
 Identify the best alternative by using VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I 
Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR) 
 Sensitivity analysis 
6.4.1 Step 1: Identify the Goal 
Decision makers need to have a clear understanding of the most significant decision-
making problem that affects the safety operation of the PTNs. Through the evaluation 
process performed in Chapter 3 (i.e. determining the most significant hazards that affect 
the safe operation of PTSs), the goal of this study was identified. The ultimate goal is 
to address the problem that has the greatest influence on the safe operation of PTNs. 
Therefore, to eliminate and/or mitigate that hazard, decision makers first have to 
identify the criteria and the solution required to ensure the safety of the PTSs. 
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6.4.2 Step 2: Identification of the Possible Criteria and Alternatives for 
Mitigating the Risk  
To accomplish this step, firstly a set of criteria must be identified and satisfied to fulfil 
the goal. Secondly, a number of possible alternatives need to be identified for 
eliminating and/or mitigating the risk. At the end of the evaluation process, these 
identified alternatives were ranked by considering the collected data. Both the criteria 
and the alternatives were defined by conducting a brainstorming session and a literature 
review of previous related studies. The identified criteria and alternatives for the most 
significant hazard were discussed with operational experts to ensure the efficiency of 
the presented solutions. As a result, a list of criteria and alternatives for eliminating 
and/or mitigating the risk was produced (see Table 6.1). 
6.4.3 Step 3: Model Development 
After setting the goal and defining the criteria and alternatives associated with the goal, 
a hierarchal structure was built to represent the relationship between these three levels 
(see Figure 6.1). The purpose of this graphical model was to present a clear picture of 
how to eliminate and/or mitigate the risk through considering the relationship between 
each level.  
6.4.4 Step 4: Identification of the Best Alternative by using VIKOR 
To rank the risk-control options and identify which alternative is the best solution for 
mitigating the hazards within this system, the VIKOR technique was applied. The final 
result indicated the best alternative for mitigating the most significant hazard. To 
achieve the objective of this step, the following sub-steps, namely the steps of VIKOR, 
were conducted: 
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6.4.4.1 Step 1: Developing the VIKOR decision matrix 
To determine the best alternative for mitigating the risk, firstly a decision matrix had to 
be constructed (see Equation 6.1). This decision matrix was constructed considering the 
number of alternatives (𝐴𝑎), criteria (𝐶𝑐), and decision-makers (d). Equation 6.1 shows 
the decision matrix: 
𝐷𝑑 =
𝐴1
𝐴2
⋮
𝐴𝑎
𝐶1 𝐶2 … 𝐶𝑐
[
𝑛11 𝑛21 … 𝑛1𝑐
𝑛21 𝑛22 … 𝑛2𝑐
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝑛𝑎1 𝑛𝑎2 … 𝑛𝑎𝑐
]
 𝑖 = 1,2,3,…,a; ,j = 1,2,3,…,c    6.1 
where 𝑖=1,2,3,…,a and j=1,2,3,…,c represent the number of alternatives and criteria 
respectively. Moreover, 𝑛𝑎𝑐  presents the rate of the alternative 𝐴𝑎  with respect to each 
criterion, which is identified by its average when more than one expert was involved. 
6.4.4.2 Step 2: Normalising the VIKOR decision matrix 
This step aimed to change the attribute from its original formation (i.e. attribute 
dimensions) to non-dimensional attributes. This process was achieved by dividing the 
rating of each attribute 𝑛𝑎𝑐  by its average. Therefore, the normalised decision matrix 
𝑁𝑎𝑐 was calculated by using the following equation (Opricovic and Tzeng, 2004): 
𝑁𝑎𝑐 =
𝑛𝑎𝑐
√∑ 𝑛𝑎𝑐
2𝑎
𝑖=1
    𝑖 = 1,2,3,…,a; ,j = 1,2,3,…,c    6.2 
6.4.4.3 Step 3: Determining the weight of each criterion by using the AHP 
technique 
In this step, all the identified criteria were weighted by using a weighting technique to 
identify the importance of each criterion compared to another. The AHP approach was 
applied for weighting the criteria. The process started with a pairwise comparison 
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technique for data collection and then progressed to measuring the consistency, as 
explained in depth in Section 5.4.2. 
6.4.4.4 Step 4: Determining the minimum and maximum criterion function 
The maximum function gathers together the maximum rates for all considered criteria 
(Tzeng and Huang, 2011; Opricovic and Tzeng, 2004). In this study, both the maximum 
Criterion Function (𝐶𝐹+) and the minimum Criterion Function (𝐶𝐹−) were determined 
based on the results of step 2 in VIKOR. The following equations (i.e. Equations 6.3 
and 6.4) were used to determine the CF−and CF+  respectively (Tzeng and Huang, 
2011): 
𝐶𝐹+ = [𝐶𝐹1
+, 𝐶𝐹2
+, 𝐶𝐹3
+, … , 𝐶𝐹𝑎
+] = [(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑗|𝑗 ∈ 𝐽)], [(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑗|𝑗 ∈ 𝐽′)]         6.3 
𝐶𝐹− = [𝐶𝐹1
−, 𝐶𝐹2
−, 𝐶𝐹3
−, … , 𝐶𝐹𝑎
−] = [(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑗|𝑗 ∈ 𝐽)], [(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑗|𝑗 ∈ 𝐽′)]         6.4 
where 𝐽 represents the benefit criteria, and 𝐽′  represents the cost criteria 
(Mahmoodzadeh et al., 2007).  
6.4.4.5 Step 5: Determining the utility measure  
The utility measure was determined after VIKOR steps 2, 3, and 4 were completed (i.e. 
normalising the decision matrix, identifying the weight of each criterion, and 
determining the minimum and maximum criterion function). The formula for 
determining the utility measure (𝑈𝑀𝑎𝑐) for the alternative (𝑎) was calculated as follows 
(Opricovic and Tzeng, 2004): 
𝑈𝑀𝑎𝑐 = ∑ 𝑊𝑗(𝐶𝐹𝑎
+ − 𝐶𝐹𝑗)
𝑐
𝑗=1 /(𝐶𝐹𝑎
+ − 𝐶𝐹𝑎
−)     
     𝑖 = 1,2,3,…,a; ,j = 1,2,3,…,c    6.5 
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6.4.4.6 Step 6: Determining the regret measure (𝑹𝑴𝒂𝒄) 
This step aimed to determine the alternative regret measure. The alternative utility 
measure identified (i.e. step 5) previously was used to identify the regret measure 
(𝑅𝑀𝑎𝑐) by applying the following equation (Opricovic and Tzeng, 2004): 
𝑅𝑀𝑎𝑐 = Max
𝑗
[𝑊𝑗(𝐶𝐹𝑎
+ − 𝐶𝐹𝑗)/(𝐶𝐹𝑎
+ − 𝐶𝐹𝑎
−)]  
𝑖 = 1,2,3,…,a; ,j = 1,2,3,…,c    6.6 
6.4.4.7 Step 7: Determining the VIKOR index   
The results for the regret measure were used in this step to identify the best risk-control 
option for the hazard. To determine the VIKOR index, firstly the maximum and 
minimum utility and regret measure values were identified by using Equations 6.7, 6.8, 
6.9, and 6.10 as follows (Opricovic and Tzeng, 2004): 
𝑈𝑀+ = Max
𝑗
𝑈𝑀𝑖 = [𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑈𝑀𝑖|𝑖 =  1,2,3, … , 𝑎)]      6.7 
𝑈𝑀− = Min
𝑗
𝑈𝑀𝑖 = [𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑈𝑀𝑖|𝑖 =  1,2,3, … , 𝑎)]      6.8 
𝑅𝑀+ = Max
𝑗
𝑅𝑀𝑖 = [𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑅𝑀𝑖|𝑖 =  1,2,3, … , 𝑎)]      6.9 
𝑅𝑀− = Min
𝑗
𝑅𝑀𝑖 = [𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑅𝑀𝑖|𝑖 =  1,2,3,… , 𝑎)]               6.10 
The results of Equations 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10 were used to calculate the VIKOR 
index of each solution (𝑉𝐼𝑎𝑐) as follows (Opricovic and Tzeng, 2004): 
𝑉𝐼𝑎𝑐 = 𝑣(𝑈𝑀𝑎𝑐 − 𝑈𝑀
− 𝑈𝑀+ − 𝑈𝑀−⁄ ) + (𝑣 − 1)(𝑅𝑀𝑎𝑐 − 𝑅𝑀
− 𝑅𝑀+ − 𝑅𝑀−⁄ )            
                     6.11 
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where 𝑣 and 1- 𝑣 represent the weight for the maximum value of group utility and the 
weight of the individual regret respectively, where the value of 𝑣 is set to 0.5 (Tzeng 
and Huang, 2011).  
6.4.4.8 Step 8: Ranking the alternatives for mitigating the risk 
The results from determining the VIKOR index were finally used to rank the 
alternatives, where the lower the value of VI, the higher the alternative for mitigating 
the risk (Opricovic and Tzeng, 2004). 
6.4.5 Step 5: Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis was explained in depth in Section 4.4.6. To partially validate the 
model, the weighted results obtained from the AHP (step 3 of VIKOR) were slightly 
increased; this increase was performed on each criterion individually (John et al., 
2014b). 
6.5 Case Study and Results Analysis 
For the purpose of this research, a case study was carried out to demonstrate how the 
methodology can be employed to mitigate the evaluated hazards associated with PTSs. 
Based on the analysis procedure presented in Figure 6.2, the case study was conducted 
as follows. 
6.5.1 Identification of the Goal 
In Chapter 4, the hazards associated with PTSs were identified. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, PTSs contain ports and transportation modes. The hazards within these two 
systems were evaluated by experts in their fields. All the experts have a great deal of 
experience in operations and are still actively working in their fields. For more details 
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on the criteria for choosing these experts, see Chapter 4. This evaluation process 
indicated that procedural failure during ship/port interference has the highest risk within 
PTSs. Due to the present safety level of this hazard, a list of risk-control measures had 
to be identified to improve the safety practice for an optimal operation of this identified 
hazard. 
6.5.2 Identification of Possible Criteria and Alternatives for Mitigating the 
Risk 
The goal of this chapter is to improve the safety operations regarding the hazard of 
procedural failure during ship/port interference. In accomplishing this goal, it was 
necessary to consider the many criteria that have an effect on the evaluation of the 
alternatives in order to identify which solution (alternative) would be the best one. 
Through conducting an extensive literature review (John et al., 2014b; Vugrin et al., 
2011; Hollnagel et al., 2007; Omer et al., 2012; Wang and Chang, 2007), the criteria 
and alternatives were identified. The criteria were categorised either as “Benefit” or 
“Cost” (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2).  
Then the identified criteria and alternatives were discussed with petroleum ports 
operational experts. These consultation meetings took place in 2017, with nine 
petroleum/refined products’ terminal managers, and scholars. With the help of experts, 
by using a brainstorming technique, the obtained results from the identified criteria and 
alternatives were validated. 
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Table 6.1: List of criteria with an explanation of each one 
Level number Criteria Explanation Category 
Level 1 
(Criteria) 
Operating Safety 
(OS) 
Safety level offered by 
applying any of the 
alternatives 
Benefit 
Operating Costs (OC) 
Cost of applying any of the 
alternatives 
Cost 
Operating Time (OT) 
Cost attributed to period 
during which infrastructure 
is working effectively 
Cost 
Operating Quality 
(OQ) 
Quality of operation from 
applying any of the 
alternatives 
Benefit 
Table 6.2: List of alternatives with an explanation of each one 
Level number Alternatives Explanation 
Level 2 (Alternatives) 
Hiring qualified labour 
(A1) 
Raising the minimum 
qualifications a new employee 
is required to have before 
being hired 
Hiring highly qualified 
labour (A2) 
Hiring only specialists who are 
competent and have over 7 
years’ experience and multiple 
certifications  
Labour training 
programme (A3) 
Implementing training 
programmes that new and 
current workers are required to 
take to improve their 
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knowledge, skills and 
experience 
Enhancing work force 
capacity (A4) 
Increasing the number of 
workers involved in the 
operation 
Requiring 
loading/discharging 
terminal supervision 
officer (A5) 
Posting an operator (port 
representative) from the port 
side to represent the port on 
the ship during ship-board 
operations to ensure the safety 
of the loading and unloading 
operation 
Intensive regulation for 
safety and security 
checks (A6)  
Requiring an intensive 
checklist before, during, and 
after the operating process to 
ensure the safety of the loading 
and unloading operation 
Apply new equipment 
(A7) 
Renewing the equipment 
(Loading Arm/SBM) involved 
in the loading/unloading 
process 
Regulate an intensive 
maintenance program 
(A8) 
Implementing an intensive 
maintenance plan to ensure the 
safety and quality operation of 
the equipment  
Requiring visual 
operating signs (A9) 
Implementing visual guides  to 
assist the workers during the 
operation process 
  
206 
The PTSs assessment indicated that the most significant hazard was within the port 
transportation system, so twelve actively working experts from the port sector were 
recruited to participate in this study. For more details on the criteria for choosing these 
experts, see Chapter 4. Through using a brainstorming technique, the experts were 
invited to discuss whether the identified criteria and control options addressed in the 
literature review aligned with real-life decision-making regarding the hazard of 
procedural failure during ship/port interference. The experts were also asked to address 
whether other criteria or alternatives not revealed in the literature review existed in real-
life practice and should be included in the study. The resulting list of criteria is 
presented in Table 6.1, and a list of alternatives is presented in Table 6.2. 
6.5.3 Model Development 
In this step, the identified goal, criteria, and alternatives were presented in a hierarchal 
striation. The identified criteria and alternatives in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are shown in 
Figure 6.3. The hierarchal striation comprises three levels: 1) the goal, which is located 
at the top; 2) the criteria, which are located in the middle where each criterion is 
connected to the goal; and 3) the alternatives, which are at the bottom of the hierarchy, 
where each alternative is connected with every criterion. This step aimed to use the 
models to represent the goal, criteria, and alternatives and their dependencies in order 
to achieve the goal.  
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Eliminating and/or Mitigating Human Accidental 
Performance Error during the Ship/Port 
Interference 
Operating Risk 
Reduction
Operating Costs Operating TimeOperating Quality
Hiring Qualified 
Labour 
Labour Training 
Program 
Port 
Representative on 
Ship
Number of 
Labour 
Safety and 
Security Checks
Maintenance Equipment
Hiring Highly 
Qualified Labour 
Operating Signs
 
Figure 6.3: The hierarchical structure for mitigating the hazard of procedural 
failure during ship/port interference 
6.5.4 Identification of the Best Alternative by using VIKOR 
This step aimed to identify the best alternative in order to improve the safety level of 
the hazard of procedural failure during ship/port interference by applying the VIKOR 
technique. Accordingly, the nine steps of VIKOR were applied. However, before 
starting, a questionnaire was devised for petroleum port operation experts and its results 
were collected; the criteria for selecting these experts are explained in depth in Chapter 
4. Moreover, a pilot test was carried out on this questionnaire to make sure it was clear 
and easy for the experts to complete. 
The questionnaire was constructed in three sections. The first section, as in the previous 
questionnaires, requested personal information. The second section presented an 
example of how to fill in the questionnaire. The final section contained four parts, with 
each part referring to one of the criteria. Each expert was required to fill in each part by 
using a rating scale ranging from 0 to 10 (see Table 6.3). Once the experts had 
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completed the questionnaires, the researcher collected them and ranked the alternatives 
to improve the safety operations at petroleum ports. 
Table 6.3: Rating scale for benefit criteria  
0 
Low 
1 2 3 4 
5 
Medium 
6 7 8 9 
10 
High 
 
6.5.4.1 Step 1: Developing the VIKOR decision matrix 
After receiving the questionnaires from all the participants, the VIKOR technique was 
applied to rank the alternatives. The alternatives were rated with respect to the criteria. 
In order to demonstrate the calculation process of this step, a 9×4 decision matrix was 
developed by using Equation 6.1 as follows (Table 6.4):  
Table 6.4: VIKOR decision matrix 
 OS OC OT OQ 
HQL (A1) 8.0833 7.8333 6.6667 9.2500 
VQL (A2) 7.9167 6.6667 6.7500 8.4167 
LTP (A3) 8.0000 6.5833 6.0833 8.5833 
NL (A4) 7.5000 7.7500 6.5833 6.5000 
PRS (A5) 7.6667 6.7500 5.9167 7.8333 
SSC (A6) 9.0833 5.7500 5.0000 8.9167 
MS (A7) 8.0000 6.9167 5.5000 8.6667 
RE (A8) 7.2500 9.0833 5.6667 9.3333 
OS (A9) 6.1667 5.6667 4.9167 7.0833 
 
The rate of OS with respect to SSC was used as an example in designing the decision 
matrix. After collecting the responses for all experts, an arithmetic averaging technique 
was used in order to combine the judgements of all twelve experts. Therefore, the rate 
of SSC in respect to OS was calculated as follows: 
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𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑆 =
∑ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑆12𝐸=1
𝐸
=
9 + 9 + 8 + 9 + 10 + 9 + 10 + 10 + 8 + 8 + 9 + 10
12
 
       = 9.0833 
Similarly, the values of the other criteria within this decision matrix were calculated by 
using the same technique, as is clear in Table 6.4. 
6.5.4.2 Step 2: Normalising the VIKOR decision matrix 
In this step, Equation 6.2 was used to normalise the decision matrix presented in step 
2. The rate of the alternative SSC with respect to the criterion OS is presented here as 
an example of the normalisation process. The normalisation value of the alternative 
SSC with respect to criterion OS was calculated as follows: 
𝑁𝑎𝑐 =
𝑛𝑎𝑐
√∑ 𝑛𝑎𝑐2
𝑎
𝑖=1
=
9.0833
√544.1389
= 0.3894 
Through applying the same normalisation procedure, the normalised decision matrix 
for all the alternatives with respect to all the criteria is presented in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: Normalisation of the VIKOR decision matrix 
 OS OC OT OQ 
A1 0.3465 0.3691 0.3745 0.3698 
A2 0.3394 0.3142 0.3792 0.3365 
A3 0.3430 0.3102 0.3417 0.3432 
A4 0.3215 0.3652 0.3698 0.2599 
A5 0.3287 0.3181 0.3324 0.3132 
A6 0.3894 0.2710 0.2809 0.3565 
A7 0.3430 0.3259 0.3090 0.3465 
A8 0.3108 0.4281 0.3183 0.3732 
A9 0.2644 0.2670 0.2762 0.2832 
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6.5.4.3 Step 3: Determining the weight of each criterion by using the AHP 
technique 
This step utilised the AHP technique, which was established in Section 5.4.2. 
Identifying the weight of each of the identified criteria influences the detection of the 
ideal risk control option for mitigating the risk (Step 8). Therefore, a questionnaire was 
constructed and sent to experts in order to identify the weight of each criterion. Section 
5.5.2 explained the questionnaire structure in depth. After the experts had completed 
the questionnaires and the resulting responses had been reviewed by the researcher, the 
steps to calculate the weight of each criterion by using the AHP technique were 
performed. The steps of this process were explained in depth in Section 5.5.2. 
The weight of the P(𝑂𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑄) is presented in Table 6.6.: 
Table 6.6: AHP Weight of cost criteria 
 Weight Rank 
OS 0.3399 1 
OC 0.2578 2 
OT 0.1895 4 
OQ 0.2128 3 
This VIKOR step aimed to identify the weight of four criteria. Therefore, for detecting 
the Consistency Ratio (CR), the Random Index (RI) value was 0.89 (see Table 5.2). 
Consequently, by using Equation 5.4, CR is 0.1. 
6.5.4.4 Step 4: Determining the minimum and maximum criterion function 
Based on the outputs of VIKOR steps 1, 2, and 3, the maximum and minimum criterion 
functions were identified. This step took into consideration whether the criterion is a 
cost or a benefit criterion for identifying the maximum and minimum criterion 
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functions. By applying Equations 6.3 and 6.4 to the results in Table 6.5, the maximum 
and minimum criterion function values were identified as shown in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7: Maximum criterion function and minimum criterion function values 
 OS OC OT OQ 
Max 0.3894 0.4281 0.3792 0.3732 
Min 0.2644 0.2670 0.2762 0.2599 
6.5.4.5 Step 5: Determining the utility measure  
To begin this step, steps 2, 3, and 4 in VIKOR (i.e. normalising the decision matrix, 
identifying the weight of each criterion, and identifying both the maximum and 
minimum criterion function) first had to be completed. The alternative SSC (A6) was 
presented as a sample for how to calculate utility measure. By using Equation 6.5, the 
utility measure of the alternative A6 was calculated as follows: 
𝑈𝑀𝑎𝑐 = ∑ 𝑊𝑗(𝐶𝐹𝑎
+ − 𝐶𝐹𝑗)
𝑐
𝑗=1 /(𝐶𝐹𝑎
+ − 𝐶𝐹𝑎
−) = 0 + 0.0063 + 0.0086 + 0.0313  
= 0.0462 
The measure of the criterion with respect to each alternative is presented in Table 6.8 
as follows: 
Table 6.8: The criterion function with respect to each alternative 
 OS OC OT OQ 
HQL 0.1165 0.1635 0.1809 0.0063 
VQL 0.1360 0.0755 0.1895 0.0688 
LTP 0.1262 0.0692 0.1206 0.0563 
NL 0.1845 0.1572 0.1723 0.2128 
PRS 0.1651 0.0817 0.1034 0.1127 
SSC 0 0.0063 0.0086 0.0313 
MS 0.1262 0.0943 0.0603 0.0501 
RE 0.2137 0.2578 0.0775 0 
OS 0.3399 0 0 0.1690 
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By using the same technique, the utility measure of other alternatives (i.e. A1, A2, A3, 
A4, A5, A6, A7, A8, and A9) is presented in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9: The utility measure values  
 S 
A1 0.4672 
A2 0.4698 
A3 0.3723 
A4 0.7268 
A5 0.4629 
A6 0.0462 
A7 0.3309 
A8 0.5490 
A9 0.5089 
 
6.5.4.6 Step 6: Determining the regret measure  
With the utility measure values identified, the regret measure was determined by using 
Equation 6.6. By using the values in Table 6.8, the regret measure is identified in Table 
6.10 as follows: 
Table 6.10: The regret measure values  
 R 
A1 0.1809 
A2 0.1895 
A3 0.1262 
A4 0.2128 
A5 0.1651 
A6 0.0313 
A7 0.1262 
A8 0.2578 
A9 0.3399 
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6.5.4.7 Step 7: Determining the VIKOR index  
After identifying the regret measure, the VIKOR index of each solution was identified 
by using Equation 6.11. To find the VIKOR index (VI), the maximum and minimum 
utility and regret measure values firstly had to be identified by using Equations 6.7, 6.8, 
6.9, and 6.10 (see the highlighted results in Tables 6.9 and 6.10). As a sample, the VI 
of the alternative SSC was calculated as follows: 
𝑉𝐼𝑎𝑐 = 𝑣(𝑈𝑀𝑎𝑐 − 𝑈𝑀
− 𝑈𝑀+ − 𝑈𝑀−⁄ ) + (𝑣 − 1)(𝑅𝑀𝑎𝑐 − 𝑅𝑀
− 𝑅𝑀+ − 𝑅𝑀−⁄ )  
= 0.5(0.0462−0.0462 0.7268 − 0.0462⁄ ) + (0.5 − 1)(0.0313 − 0.0313 0.3399 − 0.0313⁄ ) 
= 0 
The resulting VI for each of the alternatives (i.e. A1-A9) is presented in Table 6.11 as 
follows: 
Table 6.11: VIKOR index values 
 VK Rank 
A1 0.5516 5 
A2 0.5675 6 
A3 0.3934 3 
A4 0.7941 8 
A5 0.5229 4 
A6 0.0000 1 
A7 0.3630 2 
A8 0.7364 7 
A9 0.8399 9 
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6.5.4.8 Step 8: Ranking the alternatives for mitigating the risk 
The identified VI of each alternative was used for ranking the alternatives starting from 
the best solution down to the worst solution: the lower the VI value, the higher the 
alternative for mitigating the risk. The result from Table 6.11 can be used by decision 
makers in order to mitigate procedural failure hazard during ship/port interference. As 
a result of this evaluation, with a value of 0 and rank of 1, the alternative SSC was 
identified as the best risk control option in order to improve the safety level of the 
identified hazard. Based on the alternative VIs (see Table 6.11), the solutions going 
from the top to the bottom were ranked as follows: 
A6 > A7 > A3 > A5 > A1 > A2 > A8 > A4 > A9 
6.5.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
To partially validate the sensitivity of the model, the weight of each criterion (i.e. 
Operating Safety (OS), Operating Cost (OC), Operating Time (OT), and Operating 
Quality (OQ)) was increased by 20% in this step. As a result, the increases of the criteria 
weight, which increased by 0.2, led to a change in the VIKOR index, as presented in 
Table 6.12. For instance, the VIKOR index of the evaluated A7 has impacted due to 
increasing the criteria OS weight by 0.2 (from 0.3630 to 0.3756). Furthermore, the 
analysis revealed that the weight increment by, 20% has not affected the final ranking 
of the best alternatives for the investigated PTS hazard. 
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Table 6.12: Sensitivity analysis of all alternatives after increasing the weight of 
each criterion by 0.2 
 Original VK 20% OS 20% OC 20% OT 20% OQ 
A1 0.5516 0.50821 0.585445 0.62021 0.527128 
A2 0.5675 0.524162 0.564014 0.639984 0.551922 
A3 0.3934 0.404473 0.392116 0.428058 0.377624 
A4 0.7941 0.752435 0.794074 0.794074 0.860257 
A5 0.5229 0.534862 0.520502 0.522123 0.512863 
A6 0 0 0 0 0 
A7 0.3630 0.375621 0.366533 0.360674 0.347875 
A8 0.7364 0.680872 0.83967 0.729064 0.710507 
A9 0.8399 0.869819 0.82459 0.823115 0.841917 
Based on the result obtained from this analysis, the best control options for the 
investigated PTS hazard (procedural failure during ship/port interference) are A6 
(intensive safety and security checks), A7 (renewing the operational equipment), and 
A3 (Labour training programme). 
 
Figure 6.4: Sensitivity analysis output 
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6.6 Conclusion 
The petroleum industry benefits from enhancing its safety level and eliminating the 
hazards associated with the system’s operation and thereby avoiding any unexpected 
disasters within its supply chain. This goal could be reached by identifying the 
mitigation solutions and applying multi-attribute decision-making tools. This study is 
one of the first studies that employed an AHP–VIKOR technique within the petroleum 
industry in order to identify which control option is the best one for 
eliminating/mitigating the hazards associated with PTNs. Based on expert judgements, 
AHP was employed to identify the weight of each criterion, whilst VIKOR was used to 
rank the solutions.  
Finally, the proposed methodology was applied to mitigate the hazards that had been 
evaluated for the PTSs which were presented in Chapter 4. From Chapter 4, the most 
significant hazard within the system was identified, followed by the identification of a 
list of alternatives and a list of criteria in order to mitigate and/or eliminate this hazard. 
Using the VIKOR index (VI), the solution with the lowest VI value was ranked as the 
most important one and vice versa. Therefore, A6, which was ranked as 1, is a more 
effective option than the other risk-control options (i.e. A9 ranks 9) in enhancing PTS 
operations (a brief discussion is further presented in Chapter 7). 
This work has presented a platform that can support decision makers in the petroleum 
transportation industry in dealing with problems. This model has presented control 
options for the system’s most significant hazards. The proposed methodology is not 
only suitable for enhancing the safety of PTNs. In fact, the methodology can be applied 
in any system in order to evaluate the alternatives of the tested system. The proposed 
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method provides a decision-support system for enhancing the safety practices of the 
transportation system in general and particularly for the PTSs. 
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7 Chapter 7: Discussion  
This chapter briefly summarises and discusses all the developed models and techniques 
presented in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 for the petroleum terminals and transportation 
modes operational safety as one complete system. Moreover, it further discusses the 
research contribution of this study and proposes recommendations for future studies 
for improving the developed framework.  
7.1 Research Implication 
This research comprises four technical chapters. These four chapters are discussed in 
more detail as follows: 
7.1.1 Discussion of Applying Network Analysis Techniques for Analysing Nodes’ 
Vulnerability within Petroleum Transportation Systems (PTSs) 
Traditional risk assessment techniques generally cannot handle big, complex systems. 
Chapter 3 aimed to produce assessment techniques that could perform a safety 
evaluation of Petroleum Transportation Systems (PTSs) externally/globally. Network 
analysis techniques were employed for analysis of the node situation within Petroleum 
Transportation Networks (PTNs’) operational network. Centrality measures are known 
for their ability in measuring nodes’ importance based on nodes’ strategic location 
within a network. The PTSs network representation structure in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 
highlights that every two nodes (ports) within PTNs are connected to each other by a 
transportation mode.  If this connection does not exist, the flow of product between two 
ports might not occur. Therefore, this chapter aimed to detect node centrality (ports and 
transportation modes) within PTNs. 
Assessing nodes’ importance within a system is a challenging task. The challenge is 
related to identifying the existing connections between the evaluated PTSs and 
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collecting the data of these connections to analyse the evaluated network. Therefore, 
centrality measures were introduced in order to evaluate PTSs’ safety based on the 
importance of ports and routes regarding direct connections between pairs of nodes and 
nodes’ strategic position in the network. Two maritime PTNs cases were analysed to 
demonstrate the technique’s ability in measuring the complicity of PTSs. 
The steps of identifying the importance of each port and shipping route using centrality 
measures are highlighted in Figure 3.2. As illustrated Case Study 1 in Appendixes 1.5 
and 1.6, with respect to ports’ importance to other ports within the Maritime Petroleum 
Transportation Networks (MPTNs), in terms of ports’ outgoing service (β = 1), Ras-
Tanura port is the most important port, followed by Basrah Oil Terminal, Malongo port 
area, and Mina al-Ahmadi. When the network is weighted for the safety of the MPTN, 
Ras-Tanura port is still considered to be the most critical port, followed by Jebel 
Dhanna port, Puerta la Cruz port, and Mina al-Ahmadi. Ras-Tanura port’s dominant 
role is due to it attracting significant cargos’ capacity from inland systems. In contrast, 
ports such as Wilhelmshaven port and other ports from different regions have low 
centrality scores across the changes of MPTN parameters (see Figure 3.7). Based on 
the ports’ effect on inland transportation, Mundra seaport (1) is the most central port, 
followed by several ports located in the east of Asia such as Zhanjiang port Taesan port 
and Osaka Sakai port. However, when the network is weighted for the safety of the 
MPTN, Mundra seaport loses this importance to other ports (i.e. α ≤ 1). In a vice versa 
result, the port of Singapore ranks low in importance (0.667 and 0.877). However, when 
α ≤ 1, the same port has a high level of criticality in the crude oil maritime transportation 
network. This highlights that any risk factor striking Singapore port will have a 
significant impact on the petroleum throughput to its inland market. 
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On the other hand, measuring the safety criticality of involved ports and choke points 
in the weighted MPTN (case study 2) assuming different parameters (see Appendix 
1.10), and based on the network assessment, with respect to nodes outflow, the Strait 
of Malacca (1), Cape of Good Hope route (0.7), Malongo port area (0.55), and Puerta 
la Cruz port (0.55) were considered to be the most important ports and shipping routes 
within the MPTN. These ports and routes lost their advantages to Strait of Hormuz and 
Ras-Tanura port upon analysing the safety of the ports and routes within the MPTN. 
Nevertheless, the Strait of Malacca, Cape of Good Hope route, Malongo port area, and 
Puerta la Cruz port still obtain safety criticality levels that ranked them in the top critical 
points. Turning to the nodes’ effect on outflow, as represented in Appendix 1.11, the 
Strait of Hormuz (1) and Cape of Good Hope route (0.667) are the two most critical 
routes. In the ports sector, Rotterdam (0.667) and Arthur (0.667) ports obtain a high 
importance level across the network. However, when the network is weighted for the 
safety of the MPTN, the Strait of Malacca and Singapore port overtakes them and 
becomes the most safety critical port and shipping route within the MPTN. 
In addition, betweenness centrality measured the petroleum ports’ and routes’ potential 
as intermediaries within the MPTN. With respect to the changes in the parameters’ 
values, the Strait of Hormuz is the most critical node within the MPTN. This importance 
is mainly due to its critical position in the petroleum transportation flow, which allows 
it to attract significant shipping capacity. Therefore, any incident or accident in the 
Strait of Hormuz shipping route would affect the petroleum flow within the MPTN. 
Moreover, the Strait of Malacca (0.94) is ranked as the second most critical route in the 
MPTN (see Appendix 1.12). The Cape of Good Hope and Bab El-Mandab maintain 
relatively stable positions, ranking third and fourth across the changes of parameter. 
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Chapter 3 presented a measurement platform to support decision makers within the 
petroleum transportation industries and other transportation system industries. This 
platform can be used in various complex industries for analysis of the node situation 
within a network. The novelty of this chapter was applying the concept of centrality 
measures to PTNs. The success of this measuring technique within the complex system 
of PTSs was confirmed in this chapter. 
7.1.2 Discussion of an Advanced Risk Assessment Approach for Petroleum 
Transportation using Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning 
Chapter 4 produced estimations through analysing the local level of each system within 
PTSs (i.e. port transportation, ship transportation, and pipeline transportation). The 
chapter also ranked the identified hazards in the systems such as ship collision due to 
bridge navigation equipment failure, pipeline transportation system failure due to 
sabotage, release from port loading arm/SBM, tanker tank gauging system failure, and 
ship or port communication system failure. The work was assessed by the hybrid Fuzzy 
Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning (FRBBN) methodology and twenty-seven experts’ 
judgement. The FRBBN technique is a combination of a Fuzzy Rule-Based (FRB) 
method and Bayesian Network (BN) techniques for the determination of handling the 
vagueness that is inherent in PTSs’ operational hazards/failure modes data. This hybrid 
method is an advance technique capable of assessing and ranking the hazards associated 
with PTSs operation. The resulting mathematical model was conducted with the aid of 
the hazards’ three FMEA risk factors: the occurrence probability of a risk event during 
the process of oil transport (Pl), the consequence severity of the risk event should the 
event occur (Sc), and the probability that the risk event would not be detected before it 
occurs (Dp). The participant experts in the study are actively working at inshore and 
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offshore terminals and petroleum ports, tankers, and pipeline systems. Each expert 
provided his/her experience to this study in the hazard identification process. 
The constructed Fuzzy IF-THEN rule with a belief structure for PTSs was built on two 
parts (i.e. the IF part and the THEN part). While the risk level (R) was represented in 
the THEN part, Pl, Sc, and Dp are the IF part parameters. Five variable grades (Very 
High, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low) were used for defining each of the IF-THEN 
parameters (Pl, Sc Dp, and R). These grades describe the linguistic variables of each 
attribute associated with the PTSs’ hazards. Each of the IF part parameters was 
described based on knowledge accrued from past events. However, for assigning the 
belief degrees in the THEN part, the proportion method was used. Table 4.4 presents 
125 rules (5 × 5 × 5) and their belief degrees for risk assessment of petroleum port, 
pipeline, and ship systems. 
In the assessment of the 113 PTSs operation identified hazards (42, 61, and 10 hazards 
within port, ship, and pipeline systems respectively), the arithmetic mean was employed 
to evaluate the collected failure information. The collected failure information was 
gathered through the twenty-seven participating experts (nine from each operational 
sector). All the experts completed three constructed questionnaires (each questionnaire 
represents one of the three PTSs). The average values were then used in the form of 
prior probabilities for each of the developed BN models for each hazard in order to 
aggregate the rules using a BN mechanism. For example, the Company Policies (PPHC) 
hazard assessed by nine experts from the seaport operation section. The experts’ 
assessment for the hazard parameter P Very High was 5%, 10%, 10%, 5%, 20%, 10%, 5% 
10% and 5%. By using the arithmetic mean, the average degree of belief was 8.89% 
(see Table 4.7). HUGIN software, a computer software tool, was used to compute the 
marginal probability for each of the 113 developed BN models. For example, the 
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marginal probability of PPHC was described in the five linguistics as {(8.25, “very 
high”), (13.7, “high”), (22.85, “medium”), (30.18, “low”), (25, “very low”)}. 
The utility theory method was used to convert the degree of belief for each of the 
hazards threatening PTSs safety to one crisp value. Presenting degree of belief values 
in one single value is more helpful for decision makers looking to prioritise the system 
hazards. The higher the utility value, the riskier the hazard is. Therefore, the utility 
values for port operational failure due to procedural failure, ship collision due to human 
fatigue, pipeline transportation system failure due to system sabotage, lack of 
communication system (port system), and main engine failure (ship collision) are 54.4, 
50.1, 38.9, 50.6, and 48.8 respectively as illustrated in Appendixes 2.11 and 2.12 and 
Table 4.10. Based on these identified crisp values, the hazards procedural failure (port 
transportation system), human fatigue (ship transportation system), sabotage (pipeline 
transportation system), lack of communication system (port transportation system), and 
main engine failure (ship transportation system) are ranked as 1, 3, 5, 2, and 4 
respectively. As a result, port operational failure due to procedural failure is considered 
to be the most significant hazard within PTSs. This finding reveals that hazards such as 
human fatigue and geological hazards are the most important hazards in ship and 
pipeline systems respectively, while port operational failure due to procedural failure is 
the most important one in ports and overall systems. The developed FRBBN method 
was proven successful in analysing and ranking the system failures in an uncertain 
environment. This developed technique can be used for evaluating the petroleum 
industry and other numerous industries with the aim of detecting which hazards are 
most likely to cause system failures. 
Finally, sensitivity analysis was performed on the established model to examine the 
output sensitivity after changing the inputs. This technique can be employed in the 
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HAZID and risk evaluation of various maritime, oil, and gas facilities by maritime and 
oil companies. Therefore, two axioms were accomplished in examining the marginal 
probability sensitivity for each of the hazards by changing its prior probability. By 
performing axiom 1 (i.e. increasing the belief degree of Likelihood𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ =
100%" ) and axiom 2 (i.e. increasing the belief degree for both 
“Likelihood𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ and “Probability𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ = 100%")  for all the hazards, the 
models’ sensitivity was illustrated (see Figure 4.11). 
7.1.3 Discussion of An Advanced Risk Assessment Framework for PTNs using 
Evidential Reasoning Approach 
Traditional techniques can sometimes produce inaccurate outputs when dealing with 
complex systems. Chapter 5 thus aimed to present a novel approach through margin 
internal and external evaluation. In the chapter, traditional risk/safety analysis (i.e. ER) 
was combined with Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), FRBBN, and centrality method 
to analyse PTSs’ operational safety. ER is known for its ability to integrate internal and 
external evaluation. The hierarchical structure of PTSs in Figure 5.3 revealed that the 
system failure might follow the occurrence of any number of port, ship, and/or pipeline 
transportation system hazard events such as Procedural Failure (port transportation 
system), Human Fatigue (ship transportation system), or Sabotage (pipeline 
transportation system).  
Estimating the failure probability for the safety of PTSs is a complex and challenging 
task. The challenge is associated with evaluating PTSs locally and globally followed 
by connecting these two evaluations to measure the failure probability of PTSs as one 
complete system. To perform the local evaluation incorporation of AHP, FRBBN and 
ER techniques were used. Via these three techniques, the failure potential of each of 
the PTSs within the PTN was estimated. Network analysis method was introduced for 
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the global evaluation. After accomplishing the local and the global assessment, ER was 
finally used to synthesise these evaluations and thereby assess PTSs as one complete 
system. A case study was conducted in the chapter to demonstrate how to measure the 
complexity of the PTN. Multiple ports, shipping lines, and pipeline transportation 
systems were involved within the analysed PTSs. 
The assessment for each of the local systems started with identifying the importance of 
each criterion mentioned in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 by using the AHP approach. The 
mechanism of this method was used to weight each criterion within a PTS hierarchy. 
For estimating the weights, three constricted surveys (one for each of the three systems) 
were completed by experts in each field. For example, Machine Related Hazards 
(MRH), Human Related Hazards (HRH) and Nature Related Hazards (NRH) were three 
hazards in the same level within the petroleum port system. Based on the assessment of 
these three hazards via AHP technique, with a CR of 0.0073, the Human Related 
hazards were ranked the most important hazard (0.6257), followed by Machine Related 
Hazards (0.2794), and Nature Related Hazards (0.0948) respectively as illustrated in 
Table 5.5. After accomplishing the weighting process, the hazards of the ports and ship 
and pipeline systems within PTSs were analysed by using the hybrid FRBBN 
methodology. It is noteworthy that all hazards failure probabilities were obtained from 
the synthesis of the experts’ judgements. 
The failure probability of each local system (ports and ship and pipeline systems) within 
PTSs was assessed using ER. The technique is well known for its ability to synthesise 
hierarchy levels, so it was used to analyse the operation of ports and transportation 
modes within PTSs. ER presented the failure probabilities of each system using the 
linguistic variables very low, low, average, high, and very high. IDS software was used 
to aggregate the hierarchal levels of each system in an easier and faster way. As 
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illustrated in Table 5.11, the assessment of the four ports was as follows: (0.119, 0.18, 
0.283, 0.285, 0.133), (0.112, 0.179, 0.279, 0.295, 0.135), (0.116, 0.193, 0.274, 0.269, 
0.148), and (0.105, 0.165, 0.272, 0.286, 0.171). 
After accomplishing the local evaluation, centrality measure mechanisms were applied 
to assess PTNs globally by identifying the importance of each port and transportation 
mode within the PTN. The centrality measures were capable of measuring the weights 
of each port and each ship and pipeline system within the PTN. For analysing the 
weights of the local evaluated PTN as one of the major petroleum producers, real data 
were provided from the company to support this study. The name of the country and 
the ports are not revealed to protect the country’s safety and security. Based on the 
network assessment, port A, ship B, and pipeline B are considered to be the most 
important ports and transportation modes within each system with normalised weights 
of 0.26, 0.02, and 0. 24 respectively (see Table 5.12). In the overall system, with four 
connections, port A was found to be the most important node within the PTN. This 
result highlights that the number of connections linked to a port does not necessarily 
indicate the importance of the node within the system. The same was true for port D, 
which had fewer links connected to it than other nodes. It is worth mentioning that all 
the values in Table 5.12 were obtained by measuring the nodes within the PTNs using 
the degree centrality measure. 
To evaluate the local PTN as one complete system, ER approach was used to aggregate 
the local and global assessments. The ER aggregation mechanism used five linguistic 
terms as shown in Figure 5.4 and Table 5.13. The failure probability of the local PTNs 
was identified as 0.0919, 0.1345, 0.2365, 0.2681, and 0.2691 respectively. After 
performing the utility approach by using IDS software, the utility value of the local 
PTN was found to be 0.3780 (see Table 5.14). These results highlight that consequences 
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of hazard events would be disastrous if the correct protective and mitigating measures 
for the identified hazards are not taken into consideration. 
Finally, two axioms were performed on the established model. Sensitivity analysis was 
performed on the model to examine the output sensitivity after changing the inputs. 
Performing axiom 1 and axiom 2 for all the hazards highlights that any change in the 
lower events (hazards) belief degree affects the failure probability of PTNs’ belief 
degree and the utility number with an increase or a decrease on the system output as 
illustrated in Figure 5.5 and Table 5.15. 
This research identified that hazards such as Procedural Failure (port transportation 
system), Human Fatigue (ship transportation system), and Sabotage (pipeline 
transportation system) are the most important ones in each system, while Procedural 
Failure (port transportation system) is the most significant one overall. The developed 
ER–FRBN approach is a novel approach for examining PTS operation at a systematic 
level. This approach can also be used in risk management studies for other industries 
that need to detect their system’s most important hazards and measures the operational 
system as one complete system. Therefore, risk-control measures must be addressed in 
order to mitigate and prevent future failures. 
7.1.4 Discussion of Developing a Risk Based Decision Making Modelling Tool 
to Enhance Safety in PTSs Operation 
Chapter 6 presented the combination of AHP and VIKOR techniques for selecting the 
most appropriate and most effective risk-control options for optimal operation 
regarding the most significant hazard within PTSs. Combining these multi-criteria 
decision making techniques has provided decision makers with an effective solution to 
overcome the system hazards identified within this study. The analyses presented in 
Chapter 3 estimated that procedural failure during ship/port interference within seaport 
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systems is considered as the most significant hazard within PTSs. The main challenge 
is to detect how to control this hazard to operate PTSs in an optimal manner. Therefore, 
based on the literature review and the experts’ judgement, several risk-control options 
and their relevant criteria were identified. Furthermore, the identified criteria and 
solutions were presented in a hierarchical structure by linking each of the identified 
criteria (i.e. OS, OC, OT, and OQ) to every alternative (i.e. A1 – A9). The AHP–
VIKOR technique was then performed to select the most efficient solutions as 
illustrated in Figure 6.3 and Tables 6.1 and 6.2. 
An AHP pair-wise comparison was also carried out to assess the weight of each 
criterion by comparing each criterion to others in the same level in the hierarchical 
structure. Twelve experts participated in analysing the best solution in this chapter. The 
experts’ judgements were calculated and used to assess the weights of each criterion. 
With a CR of 0.1, the weights of the Operating Safety (OS), Operating Costs (OC), 
Operating Time (OT), and Operating Quality (OQ) were found as 0.3399, 0.2578, 
0.1895, and 0.2128 respectively as evidenced in sub-section 6.5.4.3. These weights 
revealed that the criteria OS was considered to be the most important criteria, followed 
by OC, OQ, and OT respectively. 
The criteria’s weights were further combined with the experts’ judgment regarding each 
risk-control option by using VIKOR to identify the best solution most capable of 
mitigating the procedural failure during ship/port interference hazard. To detect the best 
hazard mitigation option, Tables 6.3 and 6.4 respectively illustrate a rating scale and 
VIKOR decision matrix. Each of the identified criteria was classified as cost or benefit 
in order to facilitate the maximum and minimum criterion functions, detection of the 
calculated utility measure, determination of the regret measure for each solution, and 
identification of the VIKOR index values (VI) of each solution. The VI values were 
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used for prioritising the alternatives starting from the best solution to the worst. VI 
values of A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, and A8 were revealed in Table 6.11 as 0.5516, 
0.5675, 0.3934, 0.7941, 0.5229, 0, 0.3630, 0.7364, and 0.8399 respectively. Based on 
VI, the solution with the highest VI value is ranked as the least important one and vice 
versa. Therefore, A6, which was ranked as 1, is a better option compared to the other 
risk-control options (i.e. A9 ranks 9) for enhancing PTS operations.  
Finally, a sensitivity analysis was performed to partially validate the sensitivity of the 
developed model. Performing axiom 1 (increases the criteria weight by 0.2) on all the 
risk control options highlights that any change in the criteria weight affects the VIKOR 
index of PTS’ risk control option with an increase or a decrease as presented in Table 
6.12. In addition, the modal outputs highlighted that the weight increasing by, 20% will 
not influence the position of the most efficient risk control option for the investigated 
PTS hazard. 
This work presented a platform that can support decision makers within the petroleum 
transportation industry in dealing with problems. This model presented control options 
for the system’s most significant hazards. In the real world, every hazard is controlled 
by different measures, so these control options might have different influences on 
improving the system safety level. 
7.2 Research Contribution 
This research’s main contribution was forming a novel risk assessment framework for 
estimating, controlling, and monitoring the operation risks in PTSs as one complete 
system. This advanced framework comprises relevant tools and techniques that are 
capable of performing an advanced risk assessment for measuring, evaluating, and 
controlling the operational hazards that affect the desired functions of PTSs. The study 
  
230 
integrated assessment of the involved operational systems (ports and transportation 
modes) for PTNs’ overall safety because these three operational systems work together 
to ensure that the product is flowing in a safe condition. The developed assessment 
models are powerful models tailored to the PTSs industry. The models can assist PTSs 
industrial risk management specialists toward managing safety and risk problems. 
Furthermore, the models present a chain of required steps that will help to direct PTSs 
safety officers in controlling and enhancing the overall safety of PTSs operation in 
uncertainty situations. 
The novelty and originality of this research comes from 1) identifying the gap that 
urgently needs to be filled, 2) developing the method that provided the ability to deal 
with the complexity of the PTSs as one complete system for the system safety, 3) 
estimating and controlling the failures that threaten the safety of PTSs, 4) providing 
decision makers with the tools to measure local and/or global levels of PTNs operation. 
The key achievement behind these accomplishments was the synthesis of several multi-
criteria decision-making approaches (i.e. ER, AHP, and FRBN) and integration of all 
three with a network analysis technique (i.e. centrality measures) to facilitate decision 
making for improving the safety operations of PTNs. In addition, a widely used 
validation method (Sensitivity analysis) was performed to measure the sensitivity of 
the developed model through performing a series of tests. The implemented framework 
has been developed into a sequence that aims to improve the safety operations to 
achieve a high level of safety for PTSs (Alghanmi et al., 2017). The shortage of risk 
assessment literature in particular for PTS operational safety as one complete system 
within the petroleum industry further highlights the significance of this research. 
Therefore, this study has enhanced the knowledge within the PTSs operational domain. 
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7.3 Research Limitations 
This study aims to develop a novel risk assessment framework for estimating, 
controlling, and monitoring operation risks in PTSs as a complete system. The 
investigated hazards do not cover operational accident scenarios related to storage 
tanks, bombing stations, ship manoeuvring at port areas, and ship tank gauge system 
failures. Due to the security and criticality involved in transporting the crude oil, it has 
not been possible to find risk assessment related results to fully validate the finding of 
this research. To overcome this limitation, sensitivity analyses are performed in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The connections among PTSs form a complex system. These 
systems are complex because they often operate in dynamic environments. Therefore, 
in Chapter 5 the research presented a case study to evaluate the local network of one of 
the major petroleum producing countries. Finally, the nature of operating PTSs within 
the petroleum industry highlights the difficulties with collecting secondary data for the 
identified PTSs hazards. 
7.4 Recommendations for Future Work 
The researcher has accomplished the aim of this research, which was to develop a novel 
risk assessment framework for estimating, controlling, and monitoring the operation 
risks in PTSs as one complete system. Nevertheless, this established framework is not 
an ultimate guideline for evaluating PTSs. During the research process, several critical 
concerns were raised, analysed, described, and amalgamated. Still, not all of the raised 
subjects were carried out due to the research scope and time. For that reason, these 
uncovered subjects are suggestions for further works which are listed as follows: 
 Investigation is needed of more operational risk scenarios that cause failures in 
each of the three operation systems. Such scenarios include the hazards 
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associated with storage tanks, bombing stations, ship manoeuvring at port areas, 
and ship tank gauge system failures. In addition, consideration of PTSs could 
be extended to include the operation of rail and truck transportation systems; an 
in-depth investigation could be conducted to identify the hazards associated 
with each of these systems. 
 Increasing the number of expert participants and comparing the results with 
those of this study would enable an examination of the effectiveness of the 
present study. It is recommended that the selected participant experts have 
operational experience in port, ship, and pipeline operation.  
 Proposed closeness and betweenness centrality measures could be used to 
analyse PTNs operations externally, and the results could be merged with results 
on the local level. Such an analysis would further enable measurement of PTSs 
as one complete system based on node critical position and distance. 
 Other multi-criteria decision-making techniques such as TOPSIS could be 
employed in order to measure risk-control options. Those options’ values could 
then be ranked and compare with the VIKOR ranking to obtain the ultimate 
solution to enhance the safety of the PTSs. 
 The findings on evaluated PTNs from small networks (local networks) could be 
extended to bigger networks (i.e. to a combination of local and global petroleum 
networks) to examine the model efficiency. Such an examination would 
encourage petroleum industry operators and other researchers to apply this 
proposed model to assess any network within PTNs. 
 Computer software could be developed to address the complexity of the analysis 
process. This software could then be continuously updated with historical and 
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up-to-date petroleum transportation data to help combat the lack of real data. 
This computer software would further improve PTNs safety and encourage 
other researchers to develop other assessment models to help evaluate other 
cargo transportation systems. 
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Appendix Chapter 3 
1.1: degree centrality calculation sample 
Through applying Equation 3.1, the degree centrality of 𝐶𝐷(𝑆) is as follows: 
𝑘𝑆 = 𝐶𝐷(𝑆) = ∑𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 7
𝑃
𝑗
 
Based on Equation 3.1, the Suez Canal/SUMED Pipeline links to seven ports (i.e. Ras-
Tanura port, Mina al-Ahmadi, Basrah Oil Terminal, Umm Said and Ras-Laffan 
Terminal, Jebel Dhanna port, Wilhelmshaven port, and Rotterdam port). 
In terms of safety network, Equation 3.2 measures the degree centrality of 𝐶𝐷
𝑊(𝑆) (i.e. 
weighted by throughput in terms of barrels instead of the number of links) as follows: 
𝑆𝑆 = 𝐶𝐷
𝑊(𝑆) = ∑𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝑃
𝑗
= 31.952 + 0.304 + 68.363 + 0.239 + 77.102 + 80.931 + 97.029
= 355.92 
Through introducing a tuning parameter (𝛼) to aggregate the values of Equations (3.1) 
and (3.2), Equation (3.3) analyses the centrality of (S) in the weighted MPTN 𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛼(𝑆) 
as follows: 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛼(𝑆) = 𝑘𝑆 × (
𝑠𝑆
𝑘𝑆
)
𝛼
= 7 × (
355.92
7
)
0
= 7 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛼(𝑆) = 𝑘𝑆 × (
𝑠𝑆
𝑘𝑆
)
𝛼
= 7 × (
355.92
7
)
0.5
= 49.914 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛼(𝑆) = 𝑘𝑆 × (
𝑠𝑆
𝑘𝑆
)
𝛼
= 7 × (
355.92
7
)
1.0
= 355.92 
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𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛼(𝑆) = 𝑘𝑆 × (
𝑠𝑆
𝑘𝑆
)
𝛼
= 7 × (
355.92
7
)
1.5
= 2537.93 
With respect to the direction of the network, Equations (3.4a) and (3.4b) analyse the 
safety centrality of (S) in the weighted MPTN.  
The safety out-degree centrality is as follows: 
𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆) = 𝑘𝑆
𝑜𝑢𝑡 × (
𝑠𝑆
𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝑆
𝑜𝑢𝑡)
𝛼
= 2 × (
177.96
2
)
0
= 2 
𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆) = 𝑘𝑆
𝑜𝑢𝑡 × (
𝑠𝑆
𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝑆
𝑜𝑢𝑡)
𝛼
= 2 × (
177.96
2
)
0.5
= 18.866 
𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆) = 𝑘𝑆
𝑜𝑢𝑡 × (
𝑠𝑆
𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝑆
𝑜𝑢𝑡)
𝛼
= 2 × (
177.96
2
)
1
= 177.96 
𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆) = 𝑘𝑆
𝑜𝑢𝑡 × (
𝑠𝑆
𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝑆
𝑜𝑢𝑡)
𝛼
= 2 × (
177.96
2
)
1.5
= 1678.683 
The safety in-degree centrality is as follows: 
𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆) = 𝑘𝑆
𝑖𝑛 × (
𝑠𝑆
𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑆
𝑖𝑛
)
𝛼
= 5 × (
177.96
5
)
0
= 5 
𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆) = 𝑘𝑆
𝑖𝑛 × (
𝑠𝑆
𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑆
𝑖𝑛
)
𝛼
= 5 × (
177.96
5
)
0.5
= 29.83 
𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆) = 𝑘𝑆
𝑖𝑛 × (
𝑠𝑆
𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑆
𝑖𝑛
)
𝛼
= 5 × (
177.96
5
)
1
= 177.96 
𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆) = 𝑘𝑆
𝑖𝑛 × (
𝑠𝑆
𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑆
𝑖𝑛
)
𝛼
= 5 × (
177.96
5
)
1.5
= 1061.692 
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Based on the result of Equations (3.4a) and (3.4b), Equation (3.5) introduced a 
parameter (𝛽) to aggregate the in and out values.  
The safety criticality when 𝛽 = 1 is as follows: 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛽(𝑆) =  [𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)]𝛽 × [𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)](1−𝛽) = 21 × 5(1−1) = 2 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛽(𝑆) =  [𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)]𝛽 × [𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)](1−𝛽) = 18.8661 × 29.83(1−1) = 18.866 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛽(𝑆) =  [𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)]𝛽 × [𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)](1−𝛽) = 177.961 × 177.96(1−1) = 177.96 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛽(𝑆) =  [𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)]𝛽 × [𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)](1−𝛽) = 1678.6831 × 1061.692(1−1)
= 1678.683 
The safety criticality when 𝛽 = 0 is as follows: 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛽(𝑆) =  [𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)]𝛽 × [𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)](1−𝛽) = 20 × 5(1−0) = 5 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛽(𝑆) =  [𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)]𝛽 × [𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)](1−𝛽) = 18.8660 × 29.83(1−0) = 29.83 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛽(𝑆) =  [𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)]𝛽 × [𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)](1−𝛽) = 177.960 × 177.96(1−0) = 177.96 
𝐶𝐷
𝑤𝛽(𝑆) =  [𝐶𝐷−𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)]𝛽 × [𝐶𝐷−𝑖𝑛
𝑤𝛼 (𝑆)](1−𝛽) = 1678.6830 × 1061.692(1−0)
= 1061.692 
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Appendix 1.2: Degree centrality scores with different values of turning 
parameter (case 1) 
 Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port area 34 213.9311 1346.074 8469.6204 
Umm Said and 
RasLaffan Terminal 
area 
14 56.2749 226.205 909.2625 
Mina al-Ahmadi area 25 103.6583 429.802 1782.1024 
Jebel dhanna port area 20 95.9467 460.288 2208.1546 
Basrah Oil Terminal 
area 
29 112.5927 437.142 1697.207 
Kharg Island area 20 71.3213 254.336 906.978 
Puerta la Cruz port 21 99.0519 467.204 2203.6884 
Malongo port Area 27 94.6453 331.768 1162.9736 
Niger Delta area 13 44.6094 153.077 525.2829 
Corpus Chris port 5 17.9102 64.154 229.8003 
Freeport port 3 12.1960 49.581 201.5637 
Houston port 6 24.907 103.393 429.2014 
Lake Charles port 4 17.5702 77.178 339.0083 
Morgan City port 6 27.4046 125.169 571.7018 
Philadelphia port 5 19.2703 74.269 286.2374 
Port Arthur port 6 34.7199 200.912 1162.6077 
Texas City port 6 17.515 51.129 149.2538 
Mangalore Sea 6 20.9567 73.197 255.6609 
Mumbai Sea 6 21.9116 80.02 292.2282 
Mundra Sea 9 45.9717 234.822 1199.4632 
Paradeep Sea 5 20.506 84.099 344.9064 
Vizag Sea 6 18.113 54.68 165.0696 
Onsan port 2 18.9338 179.244 1696.8832 
Taesan port 7 26.2638 98.541 369.723 
Ulsan port 6 34.4517 197.82 1135.8727 
Yosu port 5 31.0561 192.896 1198.1187 
Chiba port 7 31.145 138.573 616.5509 
Kagoshima port 6 22.6433 85.453 322.4893 
Kawasaki port 6 21.7623 78.933 286.294 
Mizushima port 6 20.8302 72.316 251.0591 
Osaka Sakai port 7 21.5682 66.455 204.7588 
Yokkaichi port 7 25.6770 94.187 345.4915 
Dalian port 6 29.5908 145.936 719.7274 
HangZhou port 6 21.9784 80.508 294.9055 
Ningbo port 7 39.7372 225.578 1280.5487 
Qingdao port 7 42.1242 253.492 1525.4479 
Shenzhen port 5 16.3686 53.586 175.4252 
Shijiazhuang port 4 14.3506 51.485 184.7103 
Tianjin port 7 18.7004 49.958 133.4623 
Xiamen port 4 15.7981 62.395 246.4306 
Zhanjiang port 8 32.6745 133.453 545.064 
Singapore port 6 40.3368 271.176 1823.0612 
Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline 
7 49.914 355.92 2537.93 
Wilhelmshaven port 
area 
4 24.9234 155.294 967.6137 
Rotterdam port area 4 24.1673 146.014 882.1892 
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Appendix 1.3: Out-Degree centrality scores with different values of 
turning parameter (case 1) 
 Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port area 34 213.9311 1346.074 8469.6204 
Umm Said and 
RasLaffan Terminal 
area 
14 56.2749 226.205 909.2625 
Mina al-Ahmadi area 25 103.6583 429.802 1782.1024 
Jebel dhanna port area 20 95.9467 460.288 2208.1546 
Basrah Oil Terminal 
area 
29 112.5927 437.142 1697.207 
Kharg Island area 20 71.3213 254.336 906.978 
Puerta la Cruz port 21 99.0519 467.204 2203.6884 
Malongo port Area 27 94.6453 331.768 1162.9736 
Niger Delta area 13 44.6094 153.077 525.2829 
Corpus Chris port 0 0 0 0 
Freeport port 0 0 0 0 
Houston port 0 0 0 0 
Lake Charles port 0 0 0 0 
Morgan City port 0 0 0 0 
Philadelphia port 0 0 0 0 
Port Arthur port 0 0 0 0 
Texas City port 0 0 0 0 
Mangalore Sea 0 0 0 0 
Mumbai Sea 0 0 0 0 
Mundra Sea 0 0 0 0 
Paradeep Sea 0 0 0 0 
Vizag Sea 0 0 0 0 
Onsan port 0 0 0 0 
Taesan port 0 0 0 0 
Ulsan port 0 0 0 0 
Yosu port 0 0 0 0 
Chiba port 0 0 0 0 
Kagoshima port 0 0 0 0 
Kawasaki port 0 0 0 0 
Mizushima port 0 0 0 0 
Osaka Sakai port 0 0 0 0 
Yokkaichi port 0 0 0 0 
Dalian port 0 0 0 0 
HangZhou port 0 0 0 0 
Ningbo port 0 0 0 0 
Qingdao port 0 0 0 0 
Shenzhen port 0 0 0 0 
Shijiazhuang port 0 0 0 0 
Tianjin port 0 0 0 0 
Xiamen port 0 0 0 0 
Zhanjiang port 0 0 0 0 
Singapore port 0 0 0 0 
Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline 
2 29.8295 177.96 1061.6921 
Wilhelmshaven port 
area 
0 0 0 0 
Rotterdam port area 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix 1.4: In-Degree centrality scores with different values of turning 
parameter (case 1) 
 Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port area 0 0 0 0 
Umm Said and 
RasLaffan Terminal 
area 
0 0 0 0 
Mina al-Ahmadi area 0 0 0 0 
Jebel dhanna port 
area 
0 0 0 0 
Basrah Oil Terminal 
area 
0 0 0 0 
Kharg Island area 0 0 0 0 
Puerta la Cruz port 0 0 0 0 
Malongo port Area 0 0 0 0 
Niger Delta area 0 0 0 0 
Corpus Chris port 5 17.9102 64.154 229.8003 
Freeport port 3 12.1960 49.581 201.5637 
Houston port 6 24.907 103.393 429.2014 
Lake Charles port 4 17.5702 77.178 339.0083 
Morgan City port 6 27.4046 125.169 571.7018 
Philadelphia port 5 19.2703 74.269 286.2374 
Port Arthur port 6 34.7199 200.912 1162.6077 
Texas City port 6 17.515 51.129 149.2538 
Mangalore Sea 6 20.9567 73.197 255.6609 
Mumbai Sea 6 21.9116 80.02 292.2282 
Mundra Sea 9 45.9717 234.822 1199.4632 
Paradeep Sea 5 20.506 84.099 344.9064 
Vizag Sea 6 18.113 54.68 165.0696 
Onsan port 2 18.9338 179.244 1696.8832 
Taesan port 7 26.2638 98.541 369.723 
Ulsan port 6 34.4517 197.82 1135.8727 
Yosu port 5 31.0561 192.896 1198.1187 
Chiba port 7 31.145 138.573 616.5509 
Kagoshima port 6 22.6433 85.453 322.4893 
Kawasaki port 6 21.7623 78.933 286.294 
Mizushima port 6 20.8302 72.316 251.0591 
Osaka Sakai port 7 21.5682 66.455 204.7588 
Yokkaichi port 7 25.6770 94.187 345.4915 
Dalian port 6 29.5908 145.936 719.7274 
HangZhou port 6 21.9784 80.508 294.9055 
Ningbo port 7 39.7372 225.578 1280.5487 
Qingdao port 7 42.1242 253.492 1525.4479 
Shenzhen port 5 16.3686 53.586 175.4252 
Shijiazhuang port 4 14.3506 51.485 184.7103 
Tianjin port 7 18.7004 49.958 133.4623 
Xiamen port 4 15.7981 62.395 246.4306 
Zhanjiang port 8 32.6745 133.453 545.064 
Singapore port 6 40.3368 271.176 1823.0612 
Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline 
5 29.8295 177.96 1061.6921 
Wilhelmshaven port 
area 
4 24.9234 155.294 967.6137 
Rotterdam port area 4 24.1673 146.014 882.1892 
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Appendix 1.5: Normalised degree safety criticality scores when β = 1 with 
different values of tuning parameter (case 1) 
 Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port  1 1 1 1 
Umm Said and Ras-
Laffan Terminal  
0.4118 0.2631 0.168 0.1074 
Mina al-Ahmadi  0.7353 0.4845 0.3193 0.2104 
Jebel Dhanna port  0.5882 0.4485 0.3419 0.2607 
Basrah Oil Terminal  0.8529 0.5263 0.3248 0.2004 
Kharg Island  0.5882 0.3334 0.1889 0.1071 
Puerta la Cruz port 0.6176 0.463 0.3471 0.2602 
Malongo port area 0.7941 0.4424 0.2465 0.1373 
Niger Delta area 0.3824 0.2085 0.1137 0.062 
Corpus Chris port 0 0 0 0 
Freeport port 0 0 0 0 
Houston port 0 0 0 0 
Lake Charles port 0 0 0 0 
Morgan City port 0 0 0 0 
Philadelphia port 0 0 0 0 
Arthur port 0 0 0 0 
Texas City port 0 0 0 0 
Mangalore Sea 0 0 0 0 
Mumbai Sea 0 0 0 0 
Mundra Sea 0 0 0 0 
Paradeep Sea 0 0 0 0 
Vizag Sea 0 0 0 0 
Onsan port 0 0 0 0 
Taesan port 0 0 0 0 
Ulsan port 0 0 0 0 
Yosu port 0 0 0 0 
Chiba port 0 0 0 0 
Kagoshima port 0 0 0 0 
Kawasaki port 0 0 0 0 
Mizushima port 0 0 0 0 
Osaka Sakai port 0 0 0 0 
Yokkaichi port 0 0 0 0 
Dalian port 0 0 0 0 
HangZhou port 0 0 0 0 
Ningbo port 0 0 0 0 
Qingdao port 0 0 0 0 
Shenzhen port 0 0 0 0 
Shijiazhuang port 0 0 0 0 
Tianjin port 0 0 0 0 
Xiamen port 0 0 0 0 
Zhanjiang port 0 0 0 0 
Singapore port 0 0 0 0 
Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline 
0.0588 0.0882 0.1322 0.1982 
Wilhelmshaven port  0 0 0 0 
Rotterdam port  0 0 0 0 
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Appendix 1.6: Normalised degree safety criticality scores when β = 0 with 
different values of tuning parameter (case 1). 
 Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port  0 0 0 0 
Umm Said and Ras-
Laffan Terminal 0 
0 0 0 
Mina al-Ahmadi  0 0 0 0 
Jebel Dhanna port  0 0 0 0 
Basrah Oil Terminal  0 0 0 0 
Kharg Island  0 0 0 0 
Puerta la Cruz port  0 0 0 0 
Malongo port area 0 0 0 0 
Niger Delta area 0 0 0 0 
Corpus Chris port 0.5556 0.3896 0.2366 0.1261 
Freeport port 0.3333 0.2653 0.1828 0.1106 
Houston port 0.6667 0.5418 0.3813 0.2354 
Lake Charles port 0.4444 0.3822 0.2846 0.1859 
Morgan City port 0.6667 0.5962 0.4616 0.3136 
Philadelphia port  0.5556 0.4192 0.2739 0.1570 
Arthur port 0.6667 0.7552 0.7409 0.6377 
Texas City port 0.6667 0.3810 0.1885 0.0819 
Mangalore Sea  0.6667 0.4559 0.2699 0.1402 
Mumbai Sea 0.6667 0.4767 0.2951 0.1603 
Mundra Sea 1 1 0.8659 0.6579 
Paradeep Sea 0.5556 0.4461 0.3101 0.1892 
Vizag Sea 0.6667 0.3940 0.2016 0.0905 
Onsan port 0.2222 0.4119 0.6610 0.9308 
Taesan port 0.7778 0.5713 0.3634 0.2028 
Ulsan port 0.6667 0.7494 0.7295 0.6231 
Yosu port 0.5556 0.6755 0.7113 0.6572 
Chiba port 0.7778 0.6775 0.5110 0.3382 
Kagoshima port 0.6667 0.4925 0.3151 0.1769 
Kawasaki port 0.6667 0.4734 0.2911 0.1570 
Mizushima port 0.6667 0.4531 0.2667 0.1377 
Osaka Sakai port 0.7778 0.4692 0.2451 0.1123 
Yokkaichi port 0.7778 0.5585 0.3473 0.1895 
Dalian port 0.6667 0.6437 0.5382 0.3948 
HangZhou port 0.6667 0.4781 0.2969 0.1618 
Ningbo port 0.7778 0.8644 0.8318 0.7024 
Qingdao port 0.7778 0.9163 0.9348 0.8367 
Shenzhen port 0.5556 0.3561 0.1976 0.0962 
Shijiazhuang port 0.4444 0.3122 0.1899 0.1013 
Tianjin port 0.7778 0.4068 0.1842 0.0732 
Xiamen port 0.4444 0.3436 0.2301 0.1352 
Zhanjiang port 0.8889 0.7107 0.4921 0.2990 
Singapore port 0.6667 0.8774 1 1 
Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline 
0.5556 0.6489 0.6563 0.5824 
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Wilhelmshaven port  0.4444 0.5421 0.5727 0.5308 
Rotterdam port  0.4444 0.5257 0.5384 0.4839 
Appendix 1.7: Normalised betweenness centrality scores with different 
values of tuning parameter (case 1). 
 Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port  0 0 0 0 
Umm Said and Ras-
Laffan Terminal  
0 0 0 0 
Mina al-Ahmadi  0 0 0 0 
Jebel Dhanna port  0 0 0 0 
Basrah Oil Terminal  0 0 0 0 
Kharg Island  0 0 0 0 
Puerta la Cruz port 0 0 0 0 
Malongo port area 0 0 0 0 
Niger Delta area 0 0 0 0 
Corpus Chris port 0 0 0 0 
Freeport port 0 0 0 0 
Houston port 0 0 0 0 
Lake Charles port 0 0 0 0 
Morgan City port 0 0 0 0 
Philadelphia port 0 0 0 0 
Arthur port 0 0 0 0 
Texas City port 0 0 0 0 
Mangalore Sea 0 0 0 0 
Mumbai Sea 0 0 0 0 
Mundra Sea 0 0 0 0 
Paradeep Sea 0 0 0 0 
Vizag Sea 0 0 0 0 
Onsan port 0 0 0 0 
Taesan port 0 0 0 0 
Ulsan port 0 0 0 0 
Yosu port 0 0 0 0 
Chiba port 0 0 0 0 
Kagoshima port 0 0 0 0 
Kawasaki port 0 0 0 0 
Mizushima port 0 0 0 0 
Osaka Sakai port 0 0 0 0 
Yokkaichi port 0 0 0 0 
Dalian port 0 0 0 0 
HangZhou port 0 0 0 0 
Ningbo port 0 0 0 0 
Qingdao port 0 0 0 0 
Shenzhen port 0 0 0 0 
Shijiazhuang port 0 0 0 0 
Tianjin port 0 0 0 0 
Xiamen port 0 0 0 0 
Zhanjiang port 0 0 0 0 
Singapore port 0 0 0 0 
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Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline 
1 1 1 1 
Wilhelmshaven port  0 0 0 0 
Rotterdam port  0 0 0 0 
Appendix 1.8: Out-Degree centrality scores with different values of 
turning parameter (case 2). 
  Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port  1 1 1346.074 49385.949 
Umm Said and Ras-
Laffan Terminal  
1 1 226.205 3402.1488 
Mina al-Ahmadi  1 1 429.802 8910.5118 
Jebel Dhanna port  1 1 460.288 9875.1677 
Basrah Oil Terminal  1 1 437.142 9139.7392 
Kharg Island  1 1 254.336 4056.129 
Puerta la Cruz port  11 11 467.204 3044.8331 
Niger Delta area 8 8 153.077 669.6069 
Malongo port area 11 11 331.768 1822.0295 
Strait of Hormuz 8 8 3153.849 62620.4741 
Cape of Good Hope 14 14 1023.75 8754.4094 
Strait of Malacca 20 20 2531.985 28488.9665 
Bab El-Mandab 1 1 177.96 2374.0157 
Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline 
2 2 177.96 1678.6826 
Mangalore Sea  0 0 0 0 
Mumbai Sea  0 0 0 0 
Mundra Sea  0 0 0 0 
Paradeep Sea  0 0 0 0 
Vizag Sea  0 0 0 0 
Rotterdam port  0 0 0 0 
Wilhelmshaven port  0 0 0 0 
Texas City port 0 0 0 0 
Freeport port 0 0 0 0 
Houston port 0 0 0 0 
Lake Charles port 0 0 0 0 
Morgan City port 0 0 0 0 
Philadelphia port 0 0 0 0 
Arthur port 0 0 0 0 
Corpus Chris port 0 0 0 0 
Dalian port 0 0 0 0 
HangZhou port 0 0 0 0 
Ningbo port 0 0 0 0 
Qingdao port 0 0 0 0 
Shenzhen port 0 0 0 0 
Shijiazhuang port 0 0 0 0 
Tianjin port 0 0 0 0 
Xiamen port 0 0 0 0 
Zhanjiang port 0 0 0 0 
Chiba port 0 0 0 0 
Kagoshima port  0 0 0 0 
Kawasaki port 0 0 0 0 
Mizushima port 0 0 0 0 
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Osaka Sakai port 0 0 0 0 
Yokkaichi port 0 0 0 0 
Onsan port 0 0 0 0 
Taesan port 0 0 0 0 
Ulsan port 0 0 0 0 
Yosu port 0 0 0 0 
Singapore port 0 0 0 0 
Appendix 1.9: In-Degree centrality scores with different values of turning 
parameter (case 2). 
  Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port  0 0 0 0 
Umm Said and Ras-
Laffan Terminal  
0 0 0 0 
Mina al-Ahmadi  0 0 0 0 
Jebel Dhanna port  0 0 0 0 
Basrah Oil Terminal  0 0 0 0 
Kharg Island  0 0 0 0 
Puerta la Cruz port  0 0 0 0 
Niger Delta area 0 0 0 0 
Malongo port area 0 0 0 0 
Strait of Hormuz 6 137.5612 3153.847 72307.8263 
Cape of Good Hope 4 63.9922 1023.75 16378.0004 
Strait of Malacca 2 71.1616 2531.987 90090.1291 
Bab El-Mandab 1 13.3402 177.96 2374.0157 
Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline 
1 13.3402 177.96 2374.0157 
Mangalore Sea  2 12.0994 73.197 442.8177 
Mumbai Sea  2 12.6507 80.02 506.1542 
Mundra Sea  2 21.6713 234.822 2544.4456 
Paradeep Sea  2 12.9691 84.099 545.3449 
Vizag Sea  2 10.4575 54.68 285.909 
Rotterdam port  4 24.1673 146.014 882.1892 
Wilhelmshaven port  4 24.9234 155.294 967.6137 
Texas City port 4 14.3009 51.129 182.7978 
Freeport port 3 12.1960 49.581 201.5637 
Houston port 4 20.3365 103.393 525.6622 
Lake Charles port 3 15.2162 77.178 391.453 
Morgan City port 4 22.3758 125.169 700.1888 
Philadelphia port 4 17.2359 74.269 320.0231 
Arthur port 4 28.3487 200.912 1423.8978 
Corpus Chris port 3 13.8730 64.154 296.6709 
Dalian port 1 12.0804 145.936 1762.9649 
HangZhou port 1 8.9726 80.508 722.3681 
Ningbo port 1 15.0192 225.578 3388.0133 
Qingdao port 1 15.9214 253.492 4035.9557 
Shenzhen port 1 7.32025 53.586 392.2627 
Shijiazhuang port 1 7.1753 51.485 369.4206 
Tianjin port 1 7.0681 49.958 353.108 
Xiamen port 1 7.8991 62.395 492.8613 
Zhanjiang port 1 11.5522 133.453 1541.6739 
Chiba port 1 11.7717 138.573 1631.2402 
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Kagoshima port  1 9.2441 85.453 789.9343 
Kawasaki port 1 8.8844 78.933 701.2743 
Mizushima port 1 8.5039 72.316 614.9667 
Osaka Sakai port 1 8.152 66.455 541.7407 
Yokkaichi port 1 9.705 94.187 914.0847 
Onsan port 1 13.3882 179.244 2399.7552 
Taesan port 1 9.9268 98.541 978.195 
Ulsan port 1 14.065 197.82 2782.3086 
Yosu port 1 13.8887 192.896 2679.0748 
Singapore port 1 16.4674 271.176 4465.5697 
Appendix 1.10: Normalised degree safety criticality scores when β = 1 with 
different values of tuning parameter (case2). 
  Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port  0.05 0.1631 0.4268 0.7886 
Umm Said and Ras-
Laffan Terminal  0.05 
0.0668 0.0717 0.0543 
Mina al-Ahmadi  0.05 0.0921 0.1363 0.1423 
Jebel Dhanna port  0.05 0.0953 0.1459 0.1577 
Basrah Oil Terminal  0.05 0.0929 0.1386 0.1459 
Kharg Island  0.05 0.0709 0.0806 0.0648 
Puerta la Cruz port  0.55 0.3186 0.1481 0.0486 
Niger Delta area 0.4 0.1555 0.0485 0.0107 
Malongo port area 0.55 0.2684 0.1052 0.0291 
Strait of Hormuz 0.4 0.7059 1 1 
Cape of Good Hope 0.7 0.5320 0.3246 0.1398 
Strait of Malacca 1 1 0.8028 0.4549 
Bab El-Mandab 0.05 0.0593 0.0564 0.0379 
Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline 0.1 0.0838 0.0564 0.0268 
Mangalore Sea  0 0 0 0 
Mumbai Sea  0 0 0 0 
Mundra Sea  0 0 0 0 
Paradeep Sea  0 0 0 0 
Vizag Sea  0 0 0 0 
Rotterdam port  0 0 0 0 
Wilhelmshaven port  0 0 0 0 
Texas City port 0 0 0 0 
Freeport port 0 0 0 0 
Houston port 0 0 0 0 
Lake Charles port 0 0 0 0 
Morgan City port 0 0 0 0 
Philadelphia port 0 0 0 0 
Arthur port 0 0 0 0 
Corpus Chris port 0 0 0 0 
Dalian port 0 0 0 0 
HangZhou port 0 0 0 0 
Ningbo port 0 0 0 0 
Qingdao port 0 0 0 0 
Shenzhen port 0 0 0 0 
Shijiazhuang port 0 0 0 0 
Tianjin port 0 0 0 0 
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Xiamen port 0 0 0 0 
Zhanjiang port 0 0 0 0 
Chiba port 0 0 0 0 
Kagoshima port  0 0 0 0 
Kawasaki port 0 0 0 0 
Mizushima port 0 0 0 0 
Osaka Sakai port 0 0 0 0 
Yokkaichi port 0 0 0 0 
Onsan port 0 0 0 0 
Taesan port 0 0 0 0 
Ulsan port 0 0 0 0 
Yosu port 0 0 0 0 
Singapore port 0 0 0 0 
Appendix 1.11: Normalised degree safety criticality scores when β = 0 with 
different values of tuning parameter (case 2). 
  Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port  0 0 0 0 
Umm Said and Ras-
Laffan Terminal  0 
0 0 0 
Mina al-Ahmadi  0 0 0 0 
Jebel Dhanna port  0 0 0 0 
Basrah Oil Terminal  0 0 0 0 
Kharg Island  0 0 0 0 
Puerta la Cruz port  0 0 0 0 
Niger Delta area 0 0 0 0 
Malongo port area 0 0 0 0 
Strait of Hormuz 1 1 1 0.8026 
Cape of Good Hope 0.6667 0.4652 0.3246 0.1818 
Strait of Malacca 0.3333 0.5174 0.8028 1 
Bab El-Mandab 0.1667 0.0970 0.0564 0.0263 
Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline 0.1667 0.0970 0.0564 0.0263 
Mangalore Sea  0.3333 0.0880 0.0232 0.0049 
Mumbai Sea 0.3333 0.0920 0.0254 0.0056 
Mundra Sea 0.3333 0.1575 0.0745 0.0282 
Paradeep Sea 0.3333 0.0943 0.0267 0.0061 
Vizag Sea 0.3333 0.0760 0.0173 0.0032 
Rotterdam port  0.6667 0.1757 0.0463 0.0098 
Wilhelmshaven port  0.6667 0.1812 0.0492 0.0107 
Texas City port 0.6667 0.1040 0.0162 0.0020 
Freeport port 0.5 0.0887 0.0157 0.0022 
Houston port 0.6667 0.1478 0.0328 0.0058 
Lake Charles port 0.5 0.1106 0.0245 0.0043 
Morgan City port 0.6667 0.1627 0.0397 0.0078 
Philadelphia port 0.6667 0.1253 0.0235 0.0035 
Arthur port 0.6667 0.2061 0.0637 0.0158 
Corpus Chris port 0.5 0.1008 0.0203 0.0033 
Dalian port 0.1667 0.0878 0.0463 0.0196 
HangZhou port 0.1667 0.0652 0.0255 0.0080 
Ningbo port 0.1667 0.1092 0.0715 0.0376 
Qingdao port 0.1667 0.1157 0.0804 0.0448 
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Shenzhen port 0.1667 0.0532 0.0170 0.0043 
Shijiazhuang port 0.1667 0.0522 0.0163 0.0041 
Tianjin port 0.1667 0.0514 0.0158 0.0040 
Xiamen port 0.1667 0.0574 0.0198 0.0055 
Zhanjiang port 0.1667 0.0840 0.0423 0.0171 
Chiba port 0.1667 0.0856 0.0439 0.0181 
Kagoshima port  0.1667 0.0672 0.0271 0.0088 
Kawasaki port 0.1667 0.0646 0.0250 0.0078 
Mizushima port 0.1667 0.0618 0.0229 0.0068 
Osaka Sakai port 0.1667 0.0593 0.0211 0.0060 
Yokkaichi port 0.1667 0.0705 0.0299 0.0101 
Onsan port 0.1667 0.0973 0.0568 0.0266 
Taesan port 0.1667 0.0722 0.0312 0.0109 
Ulsan port 0.1667 0.1022 0.0627 0.0309 
Yosu port 0.1667 0.1010 0.0612 0.0297 
Singapore port 0.1667 0.1198 0.0860 0.0496 
Appendix 1.12: Normalised Betweenness centrality scores with different 
values of tuning parameter (case 2). 
  Alpha 0.0 Alpha 0.5 Alpha 1.0 Alpha 1.5 
Ras-Tanura port  0 0 0 0 
Umm Said and Ras-
Laffan terminal  0 
0 0 0 
Mina al-Ahmadi  0 0 0 0 
Jebel Dhanna port  0 0 0 0 
Basrah Oil Terminal  0 0 0 0 
Kharg Island  0 0 0 0 
Puerta la Cruz port  0 0 0 0 
Niger Delta area 0 0 0 0 
Malongo port area 0 0 0 0 
Strait of Hormuz 1 1 1 1 
Cape of Good Hope 0.5855 0.6538 0.6923 0.6923 
Strait of Malacca 0.9402 0.9402 0.9402 0.9402 
Bab El-Mandab 0.0897 0.0897 0.0897 0.0897 
Suez Canal/SUMED 
Pipeline 0.0684 0.0684 0.0684 0.0684 
Mangalore Sea  0 0 0 0 
Mumbai Sea  0 0 0 0 
Mundra Sea  0 0 0 0 
Paradeep Sea  0 0 0 0 
Vizag sea  0 0 0 0 
Rotterdam port  0 0 0 0 
Wilhelmshaven port  0 0 0 0 
Texas City port 0 0 0 0 
Freeport port 0 0 0 0 
Houston port 0 0 0 0 
Lake Charles port 0 0 0 0 
Morgan City port 0 0 0 0 
Philadelphia port 0 0 0 0 
Arthur port 0 0 0 0 
Corpus Chris port 0 0 0 0 
Dalian port 0 0 0 0 
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HangZhou port 0 0 0 0 
Ningbo port 0 0 0 0 
Qingdao port 0 0 0 0 
Shenzhen port 0 0 0 0 
Shijiazhuang port 0 0 0 0 
Tianjin port 0 0 0 0 
Xiamen port 0 0 0 0 
Zhanjiang port 0 0 0 0 
Chiba port 0 0 0 0 
Kagoshima port  0 0 0 0 
Kawasaki port 0 0 0 0 
Mizushima port 0 0 0 0 
Osaka Sakai port 0 0 0 0 
Yokkaichi port 0 0 0 0 
Onsan port 0 0 0 0 
Taesan port 0 0 0 0 
Ulsan port 0 0 0 0 
Yosu port 0 0 0 0 
Singapore port 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire used for the purpose of Chapter 4 
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Dear Sir, 
My name is Ayman Fahad Alghanmi and I am a PhD student from Liverpool John 
Moores University. For my research project I am investigating the hazard that influence 
the operation at ship transportation system that might lead to crude oil spill. The results 
of this study will be used to determine the hazards that affect the operation at ship 
School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Byrom Street 
L3 3AF UK 
 
Phone : 0044 0151 231 2028 
Fax : 0044 0151 298 2624 
Email 
Date 
: A.F.Alghanmi@2013.ljmu.ac.uk 
:  
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transportation system. Because you are an expert in the petroleum transportation 
industry, I am inviting you to participate in this research study by completing the 
attached survey.  
The following questionnaire will takes a maximum of 30 minutes of your time. There 
is no compensation for responding nor is there any known risk. In order to ensure that 
all information will remain confidential, please do not include your name. If you choose 
to participate in this project, please answer all questions as honestly as possible and e-
mail me the completed questionnaires. Your participation in this project is entirely 
voluntary and you can withdraw from the study at any time.  
Thank you for taking the time to assist me in my educational endeavours. If you require 
additional information or have questions, please contact me at the number/e-mail listed 
below.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Ayman Fahad Alghanmi 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Tel: 074 7720 0174  
E-mail: A.F.Alghanmi@2013.ljmu.ac.uk 
SECTION 1: PERSONAL DETAILS 
- Please mark the appropriate answer for each question: 
1. Please mark your age range: 
A. Less than 30 years old 
B. Between 30 and 40 years old 
C. 40 years old or more 
2. Please mark your appropriate qualification: 
A. Diploma 
B. BSc 
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C. MSc 
D. PhD 
3. Please mark your work experiences: 
A. Work experience 1-5 Years 
B. Work experience 6-10 Years  
C. Work experience 11-15 Years 
D. Work experience 16-20 Years 
E. Work experience over 20 Years  
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SECTION 2: PARAMETERS DESCRIPTION  
Pl: The occurrence probability of a risk event during the process of oil transport 
      Description of the parameter Pl for each hazard where that: 
Occurrence 
Probability of a 
Hazard 
Description 
Very Low The probability of occurrence is unlikely to occur but possible 
Low The probability of occurrence is likely once per year 
Medium The probability of occurrence is likely once per quarter 
High The probability of occurrence is likely once per month 
Very High The probability of occurrence is expected once per month 
Sc: The consequence severity that the risk event would cause if it occurs  
      Description of the parameter Sc for each hazard where that: 
Consequence 
Severity of a Hazard 
Description 
Very Low 
At most minor injury involved and negligible damage to the 
system; no damage to the environment 
Low 
Minor medical treatment required; slight equipment or system 
damage but still fully functional and serviceable; minor 
environmental damage 
Medium 
Minor injury; moderate incapacity of systems, equipment, or 
facilities that disrupts operations; moderate damage to the 
environment 
High 
Permanent total disability; damage to major facilities; severe 
environmental damage 
Very High Death; loss of major facilities; major environmental damage 
Dp: The probability that the risk event cannot be detected before it occurs 
      Description of the parameter Sc for each hazard where that: 
Probability of a Hazard 
being Undetected  
Description 
Very Low Possible to detect without checks or maintenance 
Low Possible to detect through regular checks or maintenance 
Medium Possible to detect through intensive checks or maintenance 
High 
Difficult to detect through intensive or regular checks or 
maintenance 
Very High 
Impossible to detect even through intensive or regular checks or 
maintenance 
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SECTION 3: QUESTIONNAIRE EXAMPLE  
An expert is required to give a possible judgment to all questions based on his/her 
expertise and experience in the marine transportation industry. The judgement process 
has to be focussed on how to achieve the 21 respective goals (Part 1 until Part 61). The 
total assessment for each attribute must not be over 100%. For instance: 
Goal: To evaluate the risk of illness in winter 
 
            Risk Parameters 
Event 
Probability Consequences 
VH H M L VL VH H M L VL 
How likely to swim 
during cold weather? 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 90% 10% 0% 0% 0% 
How likely to eat ice 
cream during in winter? 
0% 0% 5% 10% 85% 0% 10% 40% 30% 20% 
 
The explanation of the above example, 
1. The probability of swim during cold weather is 100% Very Low because of the 
water temperature, and the consequences of swimming is 90% Very High, 
and10% High because the weather condition. That means the risk assessment of 
swimming during cold wither reasonably High risk, and recommended not to 
swim.  
2. The probability of eating ice cream during winter is 5% Medium, 10% Low, 
and 85% Very Low because of the water temperature, and the consequences of 
eating ice cream is 10% High, 40% Medium, 30% Low, and 20% Very Low 
because the weather condition. That means the risk assessment of eating ice 
cream during cold wither reasonably Medium risk, and recommended not to eat 
to avoid possible illness.  
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SECTION 4: QUESTIONNAIRE  
Part 1: Ship Collison hazards: 
 
Please indicate occurrence of 
hazard event: Machinery Failure 
cased because Main Engine 
Failure 
 Likelihood Consequences Probability 
 Very 
High 
   
 High    
 Medium    
 Low    
 Very Low    
Please indicate occurrence of 
hazard event: Machinery Failure 
cased because Bridge Navigation 
Equipment Failure 
 Likelihood Consequences Probability 
 Very 
High 
   
 High    
 Medium    
 Low    
 Very Low    
Please indicate occurrence of 
hazard event: Machinery Failure 
cased because Communication 
System Failure 
 Likelihood Consequences Probability 
 Very 
High 
   
 High    
 Medium    
 Low    
 Very Low    
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Appendix Chapter 4 
Appendix 2.1: The established FRB with belief structure for petroleum 
port risk evaluation 
Rule 
No 
Risk parameters in the IF part Belief degree in the THEN part 
L C P 
Very 
High 
High Medium Low 
Very 
Low 
1 Very High (L1) Very High (C1) Very High (P1) 1 0 0 0 0 
2 Very High (L1) Very High (C1) High (P2) 0.67 0.33 0 0 0 
3 Very High (L1) Very High (C1) Medium(P3) 0.67 0 0.33 0 0 
4 Very High (L1) Very High (C1) Low (P4) 0.67 0 0 0.33 0 
5 Very High (L1) Very High (C1) Very Low (P5) 0.67 0 0 0 0.33 
6 Very High (L1) High (C2) Very High (P1) 0.67 0.33 0 0 0 
7 Very High (L1) High (C2) High (P2) 0.33 0.67 0 0 0 
8 Very High (L1) High (C2) Medium(P3) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0 
9 Very High (L1) High (C2) Low (P4) 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0 
10 Very High (L1) High (C2) Very Low (P5) 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.33 
11 Very High (L1) Medium (C3) Very High (P1) 0.67 0 0.33 0 0 
12 Very High (L1) Medium (C3) High (P2) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0 
13 Very High (L1) Medium (C3) Medium(P3) 0.33 0 0.67 0 0 
14 Very High (L1) Medium (C3) Low (P4) 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 0 
15 Very High (L1) Medium (C3) Very Low (P5) 0.33 0 0.33 0 0.33 
16 Very High (L1) Low (C4) Very High (P1) 0.67 0 0 0.33 0 
17 Very High (L1) Low (C4) High (P2) 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0 
18 Very High (L1) Low (C4) Medium(P3) 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 0 
19 Very High (L1) Low (C4) Low (P4) 0.33 0 0 0.67 0 
20 Very High (L1) Low (C4) Very Low (P5) 0.33 0 0 0.33 0.33 
21 Very High (L1) Very Low (C5) Very High (P1) 0.67 0 0 0 0.33 
22 Very High (L1) Very Low (C5) High (P2) 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.33 
23 Very High (L1) Very Low (C5) Medium(P3) 0.33 0 0.33 0 0.33 
24 Very High (L1) Very Low (C5) Low (P4) 0.33 0 0 0.33 0.33 
25 Very High (L1) Very Low (C5) Very Low (P5) 0.33 0 0 0 0.67 
26 High (L2) Very High (C1) Very High (P1) 0.67 0.33 0 0 0 
27 High (L2) Very High (C1) High (P2) 0.33 0.67 0 0 0 
28 High (L2) Very High (C1) Medium(P3) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0 
29 High (L2) Very High (C1) Low (P4) 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0 
30 High (L2) Very High (C1) Very Low (P5) 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.33 
31 High (L2) High (C2) Very High (P1) 0.33 0.67 0 0 0 
32 High (L2) High (C2) High (P2) 0 1 0 0 0 
33 High (L2) High (C2) Medium(P3) 0 0.67 0.33 0 0 
34 High (L2) High (C2) Low (P4) 0 0.67 0 0.33 0 
35 High (L2) High (C2) Very Low (P5) 0 0.67 0 0 0.33 
36 High (L2) Medium (C3) Very High (P1) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0 
37 High (L2) Medium (C3) High (P2) 0 0.67 0.33 0 0 
38 High (L2) Medium (C3) Medium(P3) 0 0.33 0.67 0 0 
39 High (L2) Medium (C3) Low (P4) 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 
40 High (L2) Medium (C3) Very Low (P5) 0 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 
41 High (L2) Low (C4) Very High (P1) 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0 
42 High (L2) Low (C4) High (P2) 0 0.67 0 0.33 0 
43 High (L2) Low (C4) Medium(P3) 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 
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44 High (L2) Low (C4) Low (P4) 0 0.33 0 0.67 0 
45 High (L2) Low (C4) Very Low (P5) 0 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 
46 High (L2) Very Low (C5) Very High (P1) 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.33 
47 High (L2) Very Low (C5) High (P2) 0 0.67 0 0 0.33 
48 High (L2) Very Low (C5) Medium(P3) 0 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 
49 High (L2) Very Low (C5) Low (P4) 0 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 
50 High (L2) Very Low (C5) Very Low (P5) 0 0.33 0 0 0.67 
51 Medium (L3) Very High (C1) Very High (P1) 0.67 0 0.33 0 0 
52 Medium (L3) Very High (C1) High (P2) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0 
53 Medium (L3) Very High (C1) Medium(P3) 0.33 0 0.67 0 0 
54 Medium (L3) Very High (C1) Low (P4) 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 0 
55 Medium (L3) Very High (C1) Very Low (P5) 0.33 0 0.33 0 0.33 
56 Medium (L3) High (C2) Very High (P1) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0 
57 Medium (L3) High (C2) High (P2) 0 0.67 0.33 0 0 
58 Medium (L3) High (C2) Medium(P3) 0 0.33 0.67 0 0 
59 Medium (L3) High (C2) Low (P4) 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 
60 Medium (L3) High (C2) Very Low (P5) 0 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 
61 Medium (L3) Medium (C3) Very High (P1) 0.33 0 0.67 0 0 
62 Medium (L3) Medium (C3) High (P2) 0 0.33 0.67 0 0 
63 Medium (L3) Medium (C3) Medium(P3) 0 0 1 0 0 
64 Medium (L3) Medium (C3) Low (P4) 0 0 0.67 0.33 0 
65 Medium (L3) Medium (C3) Very Low (P5) 0 0 0.67 0 0.33 
66 Medium (L3) Low (C4) Very High (P1) 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 0 
67 Medium (L3) Low (C4) High (P2) 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 
68 Medium (L3) Low (C4) Medium(P3) 0 0 0.67 0.33 0 
69 Medium (L3) Low (C4) Low (P4) 0 0 0.33 0.67 0 
70 Medium (L3) Low (C4) Very Low (P5) 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 
71 Medium (L3) Very Low (C5) Very High (P1) 0.33 0 0.33 0 0.33 
72 Medium (L3) Very Low (C5) High (P2) 0 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 
73 Medium (L3) Very Low (C5) Medium(P3) 0 0 0.67 0 0.33 
74 Medium (L3) Very Low (C5) Low (P4) 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 
75 Medium (L3) Very Low (C5) Very Low (P5) 0 0 0.33 0 0.67 
76 Low (L4) Very High (C1) Very High (P1) 0.67 0 0 0.33 0 
77 Low (L4) Very High (C1) High (P2) 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0 
78 Low (L4) Very High (C1) Medium(P3) 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 0 
79 Low (L4) Very High (C1) Low (P4) 0.33 0 0 0.67 0 
80 Low (L4) Very High (C1) Very Low (P5) 0.33 0 0 0.33 0.33 
81 Low (L4) High (C2) Very High (P1) 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0 
82 Low (L4) High (C2) High (P2) 0 0.67 0 0.33 0 
83 Low (L4) High (C2) Medium(P3) 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 
84 Low (L4) High (C2) Low (P4) 0 0.33 0 0.67 0 
85 Low (L4) High (C2) Very Low (P5) 0 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 
86 Low (L4) Medium (C3) Very High (P1) 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 0 
87 Low (L4) Medium (C3) High (P2) 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 
88 Low (L4) Medium (C3) Medium(P3) 0 0 0.67 0.33 0 
89 Low (L4) Medium (C3) Low (P4) 0 0 0.33 0.67 0 
90 Low (L4) Medium (C3) Very Low (P5) 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 
91 Low (L4) Low (C4) Very High (P1) 0.33 0 0 0.67 0 
92 Low (L4) Low (C4) High (P2) 0 0.33 0 0.67 0 
93 Low (L4) Low (C4) Medium(P3) 0 0 0.33 0.67 0 
94 Low (L4) Low (C4) Low (P4) 0 0 0 1 0 
95 Low (L4) Low (C4) Very Low (P5) 0 0 0 0.67 0.33 
96 Low (L4) Very Low (C5) Very High (P1) 0.33 0 0 0.33 0.33 
97 Low (L4) Very Low (C5) High (P2) 0 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 
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98 Low (L4) Very Low (C5) Medium(P3) 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 
99 Low (L4) Very Low (C5) Low (P4) 0 0 0 0.67 0.33 
100 Low (L4) Very Low (C5) Very Low (P5) 0 0 0 0.33 0.67 
101 Very Low (L5) Very High (C1) Very High (P1) 0.67 0 0 0 0.33 
102 Very Low (L5) Very High (C1) High (P2) 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.33 
103 Very Low (L5) Very High (C1) Medium(P3) 0.33 0 0.33 0 0.33 
104 Very Low (L5) Very High (C1) Low (P4) 0.33 0 0 0.33 0.33 
105 Very Low (L5) Very High (C1) Very Low (P5) 0.33 0 0 0 0.67 
106 Very Low (L5) High (C2) Very High (P1) 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.33 
107 Very Low (L5) High (C2) High (P2) 0 0.67 0 0 0.33 
108 Very Low (L5) High (C2) Medium(P3) 0 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 
109 Very Low (L5) High (C2) Low (P4) 0 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 
110 Very Low (L5) High (C2) Very Low (P5) 0 0.33 0 0 0.67 
111 Very Low (L5) Medium (C3) Very High (P1) 0.33 0 0.33 0 0.33 
112 Very Low (L5) Medium (C3) High (P2) 0 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 
113 Very Low (L5) Medium (C3) Medium(P3) 0 0 0.67 0 0.33 
114 Very Low (L5) Medium (C3) Low (P4) 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 
115 Very Low (L5) Medium (C3) Very Low (P5) 0 0 0.33 0 0.67 
116 Very Low (L5) Low (C4) Very High (P1) 0.33 0 0 0.33 0.33 
117 Very Low (L5) Low (C4) High (P2) 0 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 
118 Very Low (L5) Low (C4) Medium(P3) 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 
119 Very Low (L5) Low (C4) Low (P4) 0 0 0 0.67 0.33 
120 Very Low (L5) Low (C4) Very Low (P5) 0 0 0 0.33 0.67 
121 Very Low (L5) Very Low (C5) Very High (P1) 0.33 0 0 0 0.67 
122 Very Low (L5) Very Low (C5) High (P2) 0 0.33 0 0 0.67 
123 Very Low (L5) Very Low (C5) Medium(P3) 0 0 0.33 0 0.67 
124 Very Low (L5) Very Low (C5) Low (P4) 0 0 0 0.33 0.67 
125 Very Low (L5) Very Low (C5) Very Low (P5) 0 0 0 0 1 
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Appendix 2.2: The degree of belief table for MRHAA 
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Appendix 2.3: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Ship transportation 
hazards (Collision)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 
2.2222, 18.8889, 22.2222, 
27.7778, 28.8889 
28.8889, 21.6667, 19.4444, 
12.2222, 17.7778 
22.2222, 24.4444, 16.6667, 20, 
16.6667 
H2 
4.4444, 10, 15.5556, 22.2222, 
47.7778 
36.6667, 22.7778, 20, 11.4444, 
9.1111 
11.1111, 15.5556, 27.7778, 25, 
20.5556 
H3 
3.3333, 6.6667, 12.2222, 
46.6667, 31.1111 
14.4444, 28.3333, 21.1111, 
22.5556, 13.5556 
21.1111, 23.3333, 19.4444, 
18.8889, 17.2222 
H4 
6.6667, 12.7778, 17.2222, 
24.4444, 38.8889 
27.7778, 33.3333, 15.5556, 
16.6667, 6.6667 
16.6667, 17.7778, 22.2222, 
16.6667, 26.6667 
H5 
3.3333, 3.3333, 17.7778, 
35.5556, 40 
23.8889, 20.5556, 26.6667, 
16.6667, 12.2222 
12.2222, 17.7778, 23.3333, 
26.6667, 20 
H6 
3.3333, 6.1111, 24.4444, 40, 
26.1111 
16.6667, 19.4444, 25.5556, 
19.4444, 18.8889 
15.5556, 14.4444, 22.2222, 
28.3333, 19.4444 
H7 
8.3333, 8.8889, 25, 35.5556, 
22.2222 
41.1111, 27.7778, 15.5556, 
11.1111, 4.4444 
10, 16.1111, 15, 37.2222, 
21.6667 
H8 
4.4444, 5.5556, 22.2222, 
25.5556, 42.2222 
38.8889, 21.6667, 15.5556, 15, 
8.8889 
7.7778, 11.1111, 21.1111, 
21.6667, 38.3333 
H9 
3.8889, 6.6667, 24.4444, 
41.6667, 23.3333 
36.6667, 21.1111, 17.7778, 
17.2222, 7.2222 
7.7778, 16.1111, 15, 35, 
26.1111 
H10 
5.5556, 20, 34.4444, 22.7778, 
17.2222 
33.8889, 24.4444, 15.5556, 
18.8889, 7.2222 
7.7777, 15.5556, 35.5556, 
18.8889, 22.2222 
H11 5, 6.6667, 40, 33.8889, 14.4444 
7.2222, 28.8889, 34.4444, 
21.1111, 8.3333 
12.2222, 10.5556, 29.4444, 
28.8889, 18.8889 
H12 
5.5556, 10.5556, 25.5556, 30, 
28.3333 
33.3333, 19.4444, 17.2222, 
17.7778, 12.2222 
15.5556, 17.2222, 28.8889, 20, 
18.3333 
H13 
3.3333, 5.5556, 21.1111, 
36.6667, 33.3333 
22.7778, 19.4444, 17.2222. 20. 
20.5556 
6.6667, 14.4444, 37.7778, 
19.4444, 21.6667 
Appendix 2.4: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Ship transportation 
hazards (Grounding)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H14 
5.5556, 11.1111, 24.4444, 
31.1111, 27.7778 
25.5556, 21.1111, 22.2222, 
16.1111, 15 
7.7778, 15.5556 ,34.4444, 
23.3333, 18.8889 
H15 
3.3333, 7.7778, 26.6667, 20, 
42.2222 
22.2222, 32.2222, 17.2222, 
16.1111, 12.2222 
8.8889, 20, 26.1111, 22.7778, 
22.2222 
H16 
3.3333, 6.6667, 27.7778, 30, 
32.2222 
23.3333, 27.7778, 21.1111, 
14.4444, 13.3333 
8.8889, 13.8889, 25, 28.8889, 
23.3333 
H17 
3.3333, 5.5556, 12.2222, 
42.2222, 36.6667 
26.6667, 23.3333, 18.8889, 
15.5556, 15.5556 
11.1111, 14.4444, 17.2222, 
41.6667, 15.5556 
H18 
3.3333, 5.5556, 21.1111, 
22.7778, 47.2222 
30.5556, 20, 20.5556, 14.4444, 
14.4444 
7.7778, 11.1111, 33.3333, 
21.1111, 26.6667 
H19 
3.3333, 4.4444, 14.4444, 
57.7778, 20 
30, 15.5556, 24.4444, 16.1111, 
13.8889 
10, 10.5556, 20, 17.7778, 
41.6667 
H20 
2.2222, 13.8889, 15.5556, 
32.7778, 35.5556 
40, 22.2222, 14.4444, 9.4444, 
13.8889 
12.2222, 15.5556, 26.1111, 
30.5556, 15.5556 
H21 
3.3333, 3.3333, 11.1111, 
38.8889, 43.3333 
37.7778, 20, 21.1111, 12.2222, 
8.8889 
6.1111, 12.7778, 23.8889, 
26.1111, 31.1111 
H22 
3.3333, 5.5556, 21.6667, 25, 
44.4444 
25.5556, 26.6667, 22.2222, 
12.2222, 13.3333 
5.5556, 13.3333, 24.4444, 25, 
31.6667 
H23 
5.5556, 5.5556, 28.3333, 
19.4444, 41.1111 
29.4444, 22.7778, 22.2222, 
16.6667, 8.8889 
5.5556, 15, 25, 24.4444, 30 
H24 
5.5556, 6.6667, 34.4444, 
33.3333, 20 
31.1111, 22.2222, 24.4444, 
13.3333, 8.8889 
5.5556, 16.6667, 31.1111, 
23.3333, 23.3333 
H25 
3.3333, 4.4444, 26.6667, 
33.3333, 32.2222 
26.6667, 22.7778, 20, 19.4444, 
11.1111 
8.3333, 13.8889, 20, 31.6667, 
26.1111 
H26 
7.7778, 8.3333, 24.44444, 
39.4444, 20 
13.3333, 24.4444, 21.1111, 30, 
11.1111 
14.4444, 15.5556, 32.7778, 
17.2222, 20 
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H27 
3.3333, 3.8889, 13.8889, 40, 
38.8889 
32.2222, 19.4444, 18.8889, 
18.3333, 11.1111 
11.1111, 17.7778, 22.2222, 
25.5556, 23.3333 
H28 
5, 6.6667, 29.4444, 30.5556, 
28.3333 
25.5556, 32.2222, 16.6667, 
15.5556, 10 
6.1111, 13.3333, 20, 32.2222, 
28.3333 
Appendix 2.5: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Ship transportation 
hazards (Hull Failure)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H29 
3.3333, 3.3333, 7.7778, 
26.6667, 58.8889 
21.1111, 32.2222, 23.3333, 
15.5556, 7.7778 
12.7778, 13.3333, 22.7778, 
23.8889, 27.2222 
H30 
8.8889, 11.1111, 14.4444, 
37.7778, 27.7778 
10, 24.4444, 31.1111, 22.2222, 
12.2222 
10, 10.5556, 23.8889, 34.4444, 
21.1111 
H31 
5.5556, 17.7778, 18.8889, 
21.1111, 36.6667 
13.3333, 21.1111, 31.1111, 
24.4444, 10 
10, 27.7778, 32.2222, 22.2222, 
7.7778 
H32 
5.5556, 9.4444, 16.1111, 30, 
38.8889 
15.5556, 41.1111, 18.8889, 
17.7778, 6.6667 
7.7778, 12.2222, 31.1111, 
26.6667, 22.2222 
H33 
3.3333, 5.5556, 8.8889, 
33.3333, 48.8889 
20, 28.8889, 27.7778, 14.4444, 
8.8889 
8.8889, 12.2222, 27.7778, 
26.6667, 24.4444 
H34 
4.4444, 18.8889, 16.6667, 
23.3333, 36.6667 
20, 34.4444, 22.2222, 15.5556, 
7.7778 
7.7778, 11.1111, 36.6667, 
21.6667, 22.7778 
Appendix 2.6: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Ship transportation 
hazards transportation hazards (Fire/Explosion)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H35 
3.3333, 6.6667, 18.8889, 
38.8889, 32.2222 
23.3333, 31.1111, 20, 10.5556, 
15 
7.7777, 16.6667, 28.8889, 20, 
26.6667 
H36 
4.4444, 6.6667, 12.7778, 
39.4444, 36.6667  
23.3333, 30, 22.2222, 11.6667, 
12.7778 
13.3333, 18.8889, 25.5556, 
18.8889, 23.3333 
H37 
4.4444, 6.6667, 12.2222, 
36.6667, 40 
23.3333, 31.1111, 21.1111, 
14.4444, 10 
7.7778, 15.8889, 23, 31.1111, 
22.2222 
H38 
5.5556, 8.8889, 17.2222, 
20.5556, 47.7778 
25.5556, 26.6667, 24.4444, 
12.2222, 11.1111 
8.8889, 28.8889, 31.1111, 
16.6667, 14.4444 
H39 
6.6667, 6.6667, 15, 36.1111, 
35.5556 
27.7778, 28.8889, 20, 12.2222, 
11.1111 
7.7778, 10.5556, 27.2222, 
30.5556, 23.8889 
H40 
1.1111, 3.8889, 11.1111, 
37.2222, 46.6667 
23.3333, 26.6667, 17.7778, 
17.7778, 14.4444 
7.7778, 16.1111, 22.7778, 
26.1111, 27.2222 
H41 3.3333, 5, 10, 30, 51.6667 
8.8889, 27.7778, 18.8889, 
17.7778, 26.6667 
10, 19.4444, 19.4444, 21.6667, 
29.4444 
H42 2.7778, 5, 10, 30, 52.2222 
13.3333, 11.1111, 23.3333, 
21.1111, 31.1111 
5.5556, 11.1111, 25.2222, 
25.7778, 32.3333 
H43 
3.3333, 5.5556, 13.3333, 
22.7778, 55 
21.1111, 27.7778, 21.1111, 
17.7778, 12.2222 
12.2222, 16.6667, 15.5556, 
25.5556, 30 
H44 
2.7778, 3.3333, 8.8889, 
22.2222, 62.7778 
38.8889, 16.6667, 13.3333, 10, 
21.1111 
11.6667, 13.3333, 21.1111, 
23.8889, 30 
H45 
3.3333, 4.4444, 10, 30.5556, 
51.6667 
13.3333, 32.2222, 21.1111, 
18.3333, 15 
10, 12.7778, 21.1111, 30, 
26.1111 
Appendix 2.7: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Ship transportation 
hazards (Equipment Failure)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H46 
3.3333, 5.5556, 15.5556, 30, 
45.5556 
14.4444, 21.1111, 23.8889, 
20.5556, 20 
7.7778, 15.5556, 32.2222, 
24.4444, 20 
H47 
3.3333, 6.6667, 19.4444, 
29.4444, 41.1111 
8.8889, 18.8889, 28.8889, 
22.2222, 21.1111 
7.7778, 15.5556, 28.3333, 
23.8889, 24.4444 
H48 
3.3333, 6.6667, 23.3333, 
27.2222, 39.4444 
11.1111, 16.6667, 27.7778, 20, 
24.4444 
11.1111, 16.6667, 37.7778, 
22.2222, 12.2222 
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H49 
3.3333, 5.5556, 14.4444, 
30.5556, 46.1111 
8.8889, 20, 15, 13.8889, 
42.2222 
7.7778, 13.3333, 31.6667, 
26.1111, 21.1111 
H50 
4.4444, 16.6667, 17.7778, 
26.6667, 34.4444 
8.8889, 41.1111, 13.3333, 
14.4444, 22.2222 
7.7778, 20, 31.1111, 25.5556, 
15.5556 
H51 
4.4444, 8.8889, 13.3333, 
39.4444, 33.8889 
7.7778, 30, 25.5556, 16.6667, 
20 
8.8889, 17.7778, 21.1111, 
28.8889, 23.3333 
H52 
3.3333, 7.7778, 14.4444, 30, 
44.4444 
12.2222, 25.5556, 18.8889, 
23.3333, 20 
7.7778, 13.3333, 21.1111, 
27.2222, 30.5556 
H53 
3.3333, 6.6667, 7.7778, 20, 
62.2222 
8.8889, 16.6667, 27.7778, 
23.3333, 23.3333 
7.7778, 14.4444, 17.2222, 
27.7778, 32.7778 
H54 
3.3333, 7.7778, 14.4444, 25, 
49.4444 
12.2222, 27.7778, 30, 14.4444, 
15.5556 
10, 19.4444, 25.5556, 22.2222, 
22.7778 
H55 
3.3333, 7.7778, 13.3333, 
31.6667, 43.8889 
8.8889, 22.7778, 30.5556, 
23.3333, 14.4444 
14.4444, 18.3333, 25.5556, 
18.3333, 23.3333 
H56 
3.3333, 8.8889, 17.2222, 
28.3333, 42.2222 
11.1111, 26.6667, 22.2222, 
17.7778, 22.2222 
10, 17.2222, 26.6667, 23.3333, 
22.7778 
H57 
4.4444, 7.7778, 21.1111, 
31.1111, 35.5556 
12.2222, 11.1111, 21.1111, 30, 
25.5556 
7.7778, 15.5556, 16.6667, 
28.8889, 31.1111 
H58 
4.4444, 8.8889, 13.3333, 
46.6667, 26.6667 
8.8889, 25, 21.6667, 26.1111, 
18.3333 
4.4444, 17.2222, 17.7778, 
34.4444, 26.1111 
H59 
3.3333, 6.6667, 21.1111, 
35.5556, 33.3333 
14.4444, 33.8889, 27.7778, 
12.7778, 11.1111 
9.4444, 17.7778, 22.2222, 
31.1111, 19.4444 
H60 
8.8889, 22.2222, 25.5556, 
23.3333, 20 
11.1111, 18.8889, 33.3333, 
21.1111, 15.5556 
8.8889, 26.6667, 31.1111, 20, 
13.3333 
H61 
4.4444, 7.7778, 15.5556, 
33.8889, 38.3333 
8.8889, 25, 18.3333, 22.2222, 
25.5556 
5.5556, 14.4444, 27.7778, 
25.8889, 26.3333 
Appendix 2.8: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Pipeline Transportation 
hazards  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 
3.3333, 5, 8.3333, 10.8333, 
72.5 
16.6667, 28.3333, 25.8333, 
15.8333, 13.3333 
16.6667, 18.3333, 21.6667, 
26.6667, 16.6667 
H2 
4.1667, 10.8333, 15, 20.8333, 
49.1667 
6.6667, 11.6667, 19.1667, 
21.6667, 40.8333 
13.3333, 18.3333, 16.6667, 
28.3333, 23.3333 
H3 
4.1667, 7.5, 10.8333, 20.8333, 
56.6667 
7.5, 10.8333, 15.8333, 21.6667, 
44.1667 
16.6667, 18.3333, 23.3333, 
21.6667, 20 
H4 
1.8333, 2.8333, 3.8333, 
10.6667, 80.8333 
15, 22.5, 25, 22.5, 15 38.3333, 12.6667, 12, 18, 19 
H5 
3.3333, 6.6667, 13.3333, 
23.3333, 53.3333 
9.1667, 12.5, 14.1667, 21.6667, 
42.5 
18.3333, 21.6667, 33.3333, 20, 
6.6667 
H6 4.1667, 7.5, 10, 13.3333, 65 7.5, 12.5, 17.5, 22.5, 40 
16.6667, 23.3333, 31.6667, 20, 
8.3333 
H7 6.6667, 10, 22.5, 28.3333, 32.5 
5, 9.1667, 13.3333, 22.5, 
49.1667 
11.6667, 16.6667, 31.6667, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
H8 
3.3333, 5.8333, 12.5, 26.6667, 
51.6667 
5.8333, 9.1667, 12.5, 23.3333, 
49.1667 
11.6667, 13.3333, 31.6667, 
23.3333, 20 
H9 
2.5, 5.8333, 10, 13.3333, 
63.3333 
4.1667, 9.1667, 18.3333, 
25.8333, 42.5 
26.6667, 23.3333, 25, 18.3333, 
6.6667 
H10 
3.3333, 6.6667, 14.1667, 30, 
45.8333 
6.6667, 9.1667, 15.8333, 
23.3333, 45 
11.6667, 16.6667, 31. 6667, 
23.3333, 16.6667 
Appendix 2.9: Analysis of Ship transportation hazards by Hugin software 
Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
H1 17.7776 21.6667 19.4444 20 21.1111 
H2 11.6241 20.2068 23.4439 19.7333 24.9922 
H3 12.9214 19.3613 17.4401 28.7881 21.4892 
H4 17.037 21.2963 18.3333 19.2593 24.0741 
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H5 13.1481 13.8889 22.5926 26.2963 24.0741 
H6 11.8365 13.3153 24.0505 29.2413 21.5564 
H7 19.8148 17.5926 18.5185 27.963 16.1111 
H8 17.1094 12.6319 19.5686 20.7687 29.8314 
H9 16.1111 14.6296 19.0741 31.2963 18.8889 
H10 15.7407 20 28.5185 20.1852 15.5555 
H11 8.1481 15.3704 34.6296 27.963 13.8889 
H12 18.148 15.7407 23.8889 22.5926 19.6296 
H13 10.9259 13.1481 25.3704 25.3704 25.1852 
H14 12.963 15.9259 27.037 23.5185 20.5555 
H15 11.4815 20 23.3333 19.6296 25.5555 
H16 11.8519 16.1111 24.6296 24.4444 22.9629 
H17 13.7037 14.4444 16.1111 33.1482 22.5926 
H18 13.8889 11.8518 22.7778 31.1111 20.3704 
H19 14.4444 10.1852 19.6296 30.5556 25.1852 
H20 18.1481 17.2222 18.7037 24.2593 21.6667 
H21 15.7407 12.0370 18.7037 25.7407 27.7778 
H22 11.4815 15.1852 22.7778 20.7407 29.8148 
H23 13.5185 14.4444 25.1852 20.1852 26.6667 
H24 14.0741 15.1852 30 23.3333 17.4074 
H25 12.7776 13.7037 22.2222 28.1481 23.1481 
H26 11.8518 16.1111 26.1111 28.8889 17.037 
H27 15.5556 13.7037 18.3333 27.963 24.4444 
H28 12.2222 17.4074 22.037 26.1111 22.2222 
H29 12.4074 16.2963 17.963 22.0371 31.2963 
H30 9.6296 15.3704 23.1481 31.4815 20.3704 
H31 9.6296 22.2222 27.4074 22.5926 18.1482 
H32 9.6296 20.9259 22.037 24.8148 22.5926 
H33 10.7407 15.5556 21.4815 24.8148 27.4074 
H34 10.7472 21.4815 25.1852 20.1852 22.4074 
H35 11.4814 18.1482 22.5926 23.1482 24.6296 
H36 13.7037 18.5185 20.1852 23.3333 24.2593 
H37 11.8518 17.8889 18.963 28.3333 22.963 
H38 13.3333 21.4815 24.2592 16.4815 24.4444 
H39 14.0741 15.3704 20.7407 26.2963 23.5185 
H40 10.7407 15.5556 17.2222 27.037 29.4444 
H41 7.4074 17.4074 16.1111 23.1482 35.9256 
H42 7.2222 9.0741 19.5185 25.6291 38.5555 
H43 12.2222 16.6667 16.6667 22.0371 32.4074 
H44 17.963 11.4815 14.8148 21.4815 34.2593 
H45 8.8889 16.4815 17.4074 26.2963 30.9259 
H46 8.5185 14.0741 23.8889 25 28.5185 
H47 6.6667 13.7037 25.5556 25.1852 28.8889 
H48 8.5185 13.3334 29.6296 23.1481 25.3703 
H49 6.6667 12.963 20.3704 23.5185 36.4815 
H50 7.037 25.926 20.7408 22.2221 24.0742 
H51 7.037 18.8889 20 28.3333 25.7407 
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H52 7.7778 15.5556 18.1481 26.8519 31.6667 
H53 6.6667 12.5926 17.5926 23.7037 39.4444 
H54 8.5185 18.3333 23.3333 20.5555 29.2593 
H55 8.8889 16.2963 23.1482 24.4444 27.2222 
H56 8.1481 17.5926 22.037 23.1481 29.0741 
H57 8.1481 11.4815 19.6296 30 30.7408 
H58 5.9259 17.037 17.5926 35.7407 23.7037 
H59 9.0741 19.4444 23.7037 26.4815 21.2963 
H60 9.6296 22.5926 30 21.4815 16.2963 
H61 6.2963 15.7407 20.5556 27.3333 30.0741 
Appendix 2.10: Analysis of Pipeline transportation hazards by Hugin 
software 
Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
H1 12.2222 17.2222 18.6111 17.7778 34.1667 
H2 8.0556 13.6111 16.9445 23.6111 37.7778 
H3 9.4445 12.2222 16.6666 21.3889 40.2778 
H4 18.3889 12.6667 13.6111 17.0556 38.2778 
H5 5.6944 8.1945 36.9444 16.6667 32.5 
H6 9.4445 14.4444 19.7222 18.6111 37.7778 
H7 7.4926 11.5428 21.4453 26.0055 33.5138 
H8 6.94444 9.4444 18.8889 24.4444 40.2778 
H9 11.155 12.8801 17.9532 19.4006 38.6111 
H10 7.2222 10.8333 20.5556 25.5555 35.8333 
Appendix 2.11: Utility value of the 61 Ship transportation hazards 
 Hs 
Utility 
value 
Ranking 
H 1 Main Engine Failure (Collision) 48.75 3 
H 2 Bridge Navigation Equipment Failure (Collision) 43.4344 17 
H 3 Communication System Failure (Collision) 43.3594 18 
H 4 Wrong use of Navigation Equipment (Collision) 46.9907 5 
H 5 Lack of Communication (Collision) 41.4352 31 
H 6 Failure to Follow Operational Procedure (Collision) 41.1586 33 
H 7 Action To Avoid Collision (Collision) 49.2593 2 
H 8 Human Inattention (Collision) 41.6048 30 
H 9 Human Neglect (Collision) 44.4445 12 
H 10 Human Fatigue (Collision) 50.0463 1 
H 11 Human Skills (Collision) 43.9815 15 
H 12 Weather Condition (Collision) 47.5463 4 
H 13 Third Party Activity (Collision) 39.8148 37 
H 14 Main Engine Failure (Grounding) 44.3056 13 
H 15 Communication System Failure (Grounding) 43.0556 19 
H 16 Bridge Navigation Equipment Failure (Grounding) 42.3611 24 
H 17 Wrong use of Navigation Equipment (Grounding) 40.8796 34 
H 18 Lack of Communication (Grounding) 41.9444 28 
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H 19 
Failure to Follow Operational Procedure 
(Grounding) 
39.5370 38 
H 20 Rout Selection (Grounding) 46.4815 7 
H 21 Using Inappropriate Chart (Grounding) 40.5556 36 
H 22 Human Inattention (Grounding) 39.4445 39 
H 23 Human Neglect (Grounding) 41.9908 24 
H 24 Human Fatigue (Grounding) 46.2963 8 
H 25 Human Skills (Grounding) 41.2037 32 
H 26 Weather Condition (Grounding) 44.2129 14 
H 27 Third Party Activity (Grounding) 41.9907 27 
H 28 Water Depth (Grounding) 42.8241 20 
H 29 Construction Failure (Hull Failure) 39.1204 42 
H 30 Corrosion (Hull Failure) 40.6019 35 
H 31 Maintenance Failure (Hull Failure) 45.6482 10 
H 32 Stowage Planning Failure  (Hull Failure) 42.5463 21 
H 33 Collision (Hull Failure) 39.3519 40 
H 34 Grounding (Hull Failure) 44.4907 11 
H 35 Human Inattention (Fire/Explosion) 42.1759 25 
H 36 Human Neglect (Fire/Explosion) 43.5185 16 
H 37 Human Skills (Fire/Explosion) 41.8333 29 
H 38 
Inert Gas/Ventilation System 
Failure(Fire/Explosion) 
45.6945 9 
H 39 Electric Failure (Fire/Explosion) 42.5463 22 
H 40 Pumping Room Failure (Fire/Explosion) 37.7778 49 
H 41 Main Engine Failure (Fire/Explosion) 34.3055 56 
H 42 Heating system Failure (Fire/Explosion) 30.1945 60 
H 43 Spread of Fire From Other Object (Fire/Explosion) 38.5648 46 
H 44 Sabotage (Fire/Explosion) 39.3518 41 
H 45 Weather Condition (Fire/Explosion) 36.5278 51 
H 46 Pipe Failure (Equipment  Failure) 37.2685 50 
H 47 Valve Failure (Equipment  Failure) 36.0185 53 
H 48 Pump Failure (Equipment  Failure) 39.1204 43 
H 49 Tank Gauging System (Equipment  Failure) 32.4537 58 
H 50 Manifold Failure (Equipment  Failure) 42.4074 23 
H 51 Power Failure (Equipment  Failure) 38.2870 47 
H 52 Heating System Failure (Equipment  Failure) 35.2315 54 
H 53 Loading Computer (Equipment  Failure) 30.8333 59 
H 54 Maintenance Error (Equipment  Failure) 39.0741 44 
H 55 Maintenance Omission (Equipment  Failure)  38.7963 45 
H 56 Lack of Communication (Equipment  Failure) 38.1481 48 
H 57 Procedural Failure (Equipment  Failure) 34.0741 57 
H 58 Human Inattention (Equipment  Failure) 36.4352 52 
H 59 Human Neglect (Equipment  Failure) 42.1296 26 
H 60 Human Fatigue (Equipment  Failure) 46.9444 6 
H 61 Human Skills (Equipment  Failure) 35.213 61 
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Appendix 2.12: Utility value of the 10 pipeline transportation hazards 
 Hs 
Utility 
value 
Ranking 
H 1 Sabotage 38.8889 2 
H 2 Workers Actions 32.6389 7 
H 3 Weather Condition 32.2917 8 
H 4 Geological Hazards 38.9583 1 
H 5 Material Failure 34.4792 6 
H 6 Construction Failure 34.7917 3 
H 7 Maintenance Failure 34.651 4 
H 8 Failure to Follow Procedure 29.5833 10 
H 9 Internal Corrosion 34.6418 5 
H 10 External Corrosion 32.0139 9 
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Questionnaire used for the purpose of Chapter 5 
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Dear Sir, 
My name is Ayman Fahad Alghanmi and I am a PhD student from Liverpool John 
Moores University. For my research project I am examining the risk factors that 
influence the operation at pipeline system that might lead to crude oil spill. The results 
of this study will be used to determine the factors that affect the operation at pipeline 
system. Because you are an expert in the petroleum transportation industry, I am 
inviting you to participate in this research study by completing the attached survey.  
The following questionnaire will takes a maximum of 20 minutes of your time. There 
is no compensation for responding nor is there any known risk. In order to ensure that 
all information will remain confidential, please do not include your name. If you choose 
to participate in this project, please answer all questions as honestly as possible and e-
mail me the completed questionnaires. Your participation in this project is entirely 
voluntary and you can withdraw from the study at any time.  
Thank you for taking the time to assist me in my educational endeavours. If you require 
additional information or have questions, please contact me at the number/e-mail listed 
below.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Ayman Fahad Alghanmi 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Tel: 074 7720 0174  
E-mail: A.F.Alghanmi@2013.ljmu.ac.uk 
School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Byrom Street 
L3 3AF UK 
 
Phone : 0044 0151 231 2028 
Fax : 0044 0151 298 2624 
Email 
Date 
: A.F.Alghanmi@2013.ljmu.ac.uk 
:  
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SECTION 1: PERSONAL DETAILS 
- Please mark the appropriate answer for each question: 
1. Please mark your age range: 
A. Less than 30 years old 
B. Between 30 and 40 years old 
C. 40 years old or more 
2. Please mark your appropriate qualification: 
A. Diploma 
B. BSc 
C. MSc 
D. PhD 
3. Please mark your work experiences: 
A. Work experience 1-5 Years 
B. Work experience 6-10 Years  
C. Work experience 11-15 Years 
D. Work experience 16-20 Years 
E. Work experience over 20 Years 
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SECTION 2: INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the research is to develop a novel risk assessment methodology for 
estimating, controlling and monitoring the operational risks in petroleum transportation 
systems. To achieve the aim of this study the most important factor that influences 
pipeline operation should be identify. These factors are considered to affecting the 
operation at pipeline which leads to an oil spill. Therefore, the criteria, sub-criteria and 
sub-sub-criteria listed in Table 1 are the parameters that need to be evaluated by using 
a “Pair-wise Comparisons” technique. 
Criteria Sub-criteria Sub-sub-criteria Sub-sub-sub-criteria 
Spill Due to Pipeline 
Failure 
Internal Factors 
Operator Failure 
Maintenance Failure 
Failure to Follow 
Procedure 
Structural Failure 
Material Failure 
Construction Failure 
Corrosion 
Internal Corrosion 
External Corrosion 
External Factors 
 
 
Natural Hazards 
Weather Condition 
Geological Hazards 
Third Party Activity 
Working Activity 
Sabotage 
Table 1: The list of criteria, sub-criteria and sub-sub criteria that influence pipeline safety   
Before proceeding with the “Pair-wise Comparisons” technique, an expert has to understand the 
ratio scale measurement used in this study (Table 2). This table contains two parts which describe 
the numerical assessment together with the linguistic meaning of each number. The first part is on 
the left side which explains “IMPORTANT”, while the right side is the second part of the table 
which describes “UNIMPORTANT”.  
 
Table 2: Ratio scale for pair-wise comparisons 
 
 
Numerical 
Assessment  
Linguistic meaning 
1 Equally important 
3 A little important 
5 Important 
7 Very important 
9 Extremely important 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values of 
importance 
Numerical 
Assessment  
Linguistic meaning 
1 Equally important 
1/3 A little unimportant 
1/5 Unimportant 
1/7 Very unimportant 
1/9 Extremely unimportant 
1/2, 1/4, 1/6, 1/8 Intermediate values of 
unimportance 
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SECTION 3: QUESTIONNAIRE EXAMPLE  
An expert is required to give a possible judgment to all questions based on his/her 
expertise and experience in the pipeline industry. The judgement process has to be 
focussed on how to achieve the 21 respective goals (Part A until Part S). Please tick (/) 
accordingly the rate of importance of each criteria, sub-criteria and sub-sub-criteria in 
the given column. For instance: 
Goal: To select the most important component of a computer 
1) Monitor 
 Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the above 
goal, how important 
is the Monitor 
compared to the 
Keyboard? 
          /       
To achieve the above 
goal, how important 
is the Monitor 
compared to the 
Mouse? 
             /    
To achieve the above 
goal, how important 
is the Monitor 
compared to Central 
Processing Unit 
(CPU)? 
/                 
 
The explanation of the above example, 
3. The monitor is 3 times more important than the keyboard. It is because we can 
still explore a computer by using a mouse. The only thing we cannot do without 
the keyboard is typing.  
4. The monitor is 6 times more important that the mouse. We can still do a lot of 
things by using a keyboard such as to open files by using arrow and enter key.  
5. The monitor is 1/9 times less unimportant than the CPU. The monitor is useless 
without the CPU.  
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SECTION 4: QUESTIONNAIRE  
PLEASE REFER TABLE 1 BEFORE ANSWERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE  
Part B: The most important factors that lead to Crude oil pipeline spill 
Goal: To select the most important Hazard that influence the internal Safety of Pipeline operation 
1) Operator Failure 
 Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the 
above goal how 
important is the 
Operator Failure 
compared to the 
Structural 
Failure? 
                 
To achieve the 
above goal how 
important is the 
Operator Failure 
compared to the 
Corrosion? 
                 
 
2) Structural Failure 
 Unimportant Equally 
Important 
Important 
 1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the 
above goal how 
important is the 
Structural Failure 
compared to the 
Corrosion? 
          /       
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Appendix Chapter 5 
Appendix 3.1: Prior probability of Pl, Sc and Dp for petroleum port A 
hazards 
 Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 MRHAA 
8.3333, 16.6667, 23.3333, 
33.3333, 18.3333 
7.3333, 14.3333, 23.3333, 
28.3333, 26.6667 
5, 13.3333, 20, 31.6667, 30 
H2 MRHAB 
15, 20, 25, 26.6667, 
13.3333 
11.6667, 20, 28.3333, 
23.3333, 16.6667 
10,16.6667, 26.6667, 25, 
21.6667 
H3 MRHAC 
6.6667, 23.3333, 28.3333, 
26.6667, 15 
11.6667, 25, 31.6667, 20, 
11.6667 
11.6667, 18.3333, 30, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
H4 MRHBA 
13.3333, 31.6667, 26.6667, 
20, 8.3333 
18.3333, 20, 23.3333, 
21.6667, 16.6667 
10, 20 26.6667, 33.3333, 10 
H5 MRHBB 
13.3333, 21.6667, 26.6667, 
30, 8.3333 
15, 23.3333, 26.6667, 25, 
10 
10, 16.6667, 33.3333, 30, 
10 
H6 MRHBC 
11.6667, 13.3333, 28.3333, 
25, 21.6667 
11.6667, 21.6667, 33.3333, 
21.6667, 11.6667 
8.3333, 15, 36.6667, 30, 10 
H7 MRHBD 
23.3333, 25, 30, 11.6667, 
10 
18.3333, 23.3333, 26.6667, 
21.6667, 10 
10, 11.6667, 28.3333, 35, 
15 
H8 MRHCA 
15, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
23.3333, 15 
13.3333, 21.6667, 23.3333, 
26.6667, 15 
8.3333, 11.6667, 33.3333, 
30, 16.6667 
H9 MRHCB 
12.3333, 23.3333, 25, 30, 
8.3333 
15, 23.3333, 30, 21.6667, 
10 
10, 16.6667, 23.3333, 
31.6667, 18.3333 
H10 MRHCC 
10, 11.6667, 28.3333, 35, 
15 
13.3333, 23.3333, 30, 
18.3333, 15 
23.3333, 20, 30, 16.6667, 
10 
H11 MRHCD 
10, 11.6667, 26.6667, 30, 
21.6667 
11.6667, 13.3333, 21.6667, 
30, 23.3333 
10, 11.6667, 30, 38.3333, 
10 
H12 MRHCE 
8.3333, 11.6667, 26.6667, 
35, 18.3333 
13.3333, 23.3333, 28.3333, 
25, 10 
8.3333, 20, 26.6667, 
33.3333, 11.6667 
H13 MRHCFA 
23.3333, 26, 23.3333, 
20.6667, 6.6667 
11.6667, 21.6667, 25, 
23.3333, 18.3333 
6.6667, 10, 26.6667, 
36.6667, 20 
H14 MRHCFB 
16.6667, 25, 23.3333, 
21.6667, 13.3333 
11.6667, 30, 25, 23.3333, 
10 
10.6667, 18.3333, 29.3333, 
28.3333, 13.3333 
H15 MRHCFC 
11.6667, 20, 25, 23.3333, 
20 
13.3333, 23.3333, 30, 
23.3333, 10 
6.6667, 16.6667, 20, 
36.6667, 20 
H16 MRHDA 
10.6667, 11, 20, 20.6667, 
37.6667 
28.3333, 31.6667, 21.6667, 
10, 8.3333 
40, 35, 10, 8.3333, 6.6667 
H17 MRHDB 
8.3333, 11.6667, 21.6667, 
23.3333, 35 
28.3333, 31.6667, 21.6667, 
10, 8.3333 
10, 18.3333, 31.6667, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
H18 HRHAAC 
16.6667, 18.333, 20, 
23.3333, 21.6667 
11.6667, 26.6667, 23.3333, 
26.6667, 11.6667 
8.3333, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
33.3333, 11.6667 
H19 HRHAAB 
13.3333, 18.3333, 21.6667, 
30, 16.6667 
11.6667, 20, 31.6667, 25, 
11.6667 
10, 18.3333, 31.6667, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
H20 HRHAAA 
15, 25, 21.6667, 23.3333, 
15 
11.6667, 26.6667, 23.3333, 
26.6667, 11.6667 
10, 11.6667, 38.3333, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
H21 HRHAB 
10, 18.3333, 28.3333, 30, 
13.3333 
11.6667, 20, 31.6667, 25, 
11.6667 
13.3333, 16.6667, 33.3333, 
26.6667, 10 
H22 HRHBAA 
23.3333, 25, 20, 18.3333, 
13.3333 
18.3333, 20, 31.6667, 
18.3333, 11.6667 
23.3333, 26.6667, 23.3333, 
20, 6.6667 
H23 HRHBAB 
8.3333, 11.6667, 15, 
36.6667, 28.3333 
10, 13.3333, 30, 28.3333, 
18.3333 
11.6667, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
30, 13.3333 
H24 HRHBAC 
6.6667, 11.6667, 20, 30, 
31.6667 
5, 8.3333, 25, 31.6667, 30 
10, 26.6667, 38.3333, 
16.6667, 8.3333 
H25 HRHBAD 
8.3333, 11.6667, 18.3333, 
28.3333, 33.3333 
15, 21.6667, 30, 23.3333, 
10 
8.3333, 11.6667, 26.6667, 
40, 13.3333 
H26 HRHBBA 26.6667, 30, 25, 10, 8.3333 
10, 16.6667, 26.6667, 30, 
16.6667 
10, 13.3333, 36.6667, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
H27 HRHBBB 
8.3333, 16.6667, 21.6667, 
28.3333, 25 
31.6667, 28.3333, 20, 
11.6667, 8.3333 
1.6667, 10, 21.6667, 
63.3333, 3.3333 
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H28 HRHBBC 
11.6667, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
28.3333, 15 
11.6667, 13.3333, 31.6667, 
26.6667, 16.6667 
5.3333, 8, 28.3333, 
31.6667, 26.6667 
H29 HRHBBD 
8.3333, 11.6667, 26.6667, 
36.6667, 16.6667 
3.3333, 8.3333, 13.3333, 
28.3333, 46.6667 
6.6667, 7.6667, 16.6667, 
35.6667, 33.3333 
H30 HRHBBE 
6.6667, 10, 23.3333, 
31.6667, 28.3333 
15, 26.6667, 31.6667, 
16.6667, 10 
36.6667, 30, 13.3333, 
11.6667, 8.3333 
H31 HRHBBF 
11.6667, 21.6667, 28.3333, 
25, 13.3333 
13.3333, 28.3333, 31.6667, 
16.6667, 10 
20, 20, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
8.3333 
H32 HRHBBG 
8.3333, 11.6667, 13.3333, 
30, 36.6667 
11.6667, 21.6667, 43.3333, 
18.3333, 5 
10, 10, 30, 30, 20 
H33 HRHBBH 
8.3333, 11.6667, 20, 
43.3333, 16.6667 
33.3333, 36.6667, 13.3333, 
8.3333, 8.3333 
3.3333, 13.3333, 26.6667, 
35, 21.6667 
H34 HRHBBI 
8.3333, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
30, 16.6667 
15, 36.6667, 26.6667, 
11.6667, 10 
56.6667, 20, 13.3333, 10, 0 
H35 NRHAA 
6.6667, 11.6667, 20, 
23.3333, 38.3333 
6.6667, 15, 20, 26.6667, 
31.6667 
20, 43.3333, 36.6667, 0, 0 
H36 NRHAB 1.6667, 10, 20, 30, 38.3333 
11.6667, 16.6667, 26.6667, 
21.6667, 23.3333 
20, 43.3333, 36.6667, 0, 0 
H37 NRHAC 0, 0, 0, 10, 90 
5, 13.3333, 21.6667, 
31.6667, 28.3333 
20, 43.3333, 36, 6667, 0, 0 
H38 NRHBA 1.6667, 5, 20, 28.3333, 45 
6.6667, 16.6667, 20, 25, 
31.6667 
10, 20, 30, 33.3333, 6.6667 
H39 NRHBC 
3.3333, 10, 20, 38.3333, 
28.3333 
11.6667, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
23.3333, 18.3333 
0, 10, 33.3333, 50, 6.6667 
H40 NRHBB 
1.6667, 1.6667, 3.3333, 15, 
78.3333 
41.6667, 31.6667, 9.6667, 
8.6667, 8.3333 
1.6667, 10, 36.6667, 
41.66667, 10 
H41 NRHCA 
1.6667, 1.6667, 6.6667, 
21.6667, 68.3333 
41.6667, 35, 11.6667, 10, 
1.6667 
0, 0, 46.6667, 50, 3.3333 
H42 NRHCB 
1.6667, 1.6667, 3.3333, 20, 
73.3333 
48.3333, 30, 10, 8.3333, 
3.3333 
0, 0, 46.6667, 50, 3.3333 
Appendix 3.2: Prior probability of Pl, Sc and Dp for petroleum port C 
hazards 
 Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 MRHAA 
6.6667, 11.6667, 21.6667, 
33.3333, 26.6667 
8.3333, 11.6667, 23.3333, 
30, 26.6667 
10, 16.6667, 30, 26.6667, 
16.6667 
H2 MRHAB 
11.6667, 20, 26.6667, 
31.6667, 10 
15, 20, 26.6667, 23.3333, 
15 
10, 15, 28.3333, 26.6667, 20 
H3 MRHAC 
11.6667, 21.6667, 23.3333, 
28.3333, 15 
13.3333, 23.3333, 30, 
18.3333, 15 
13.3333, 20, 28.3333, 25, 
13.3333 
H4 MRHBA 
10, 23.3333, 25, 23.3333, 
18.3333 
16.6667, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
26.6667, 10 
8.3333, 16.6667, 30, 
31.6667, 13.3333 
H5 MRHBB 
11.6667, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
25, 18.3333 
18.3333, 20, 28.3333, 
23.3333, 10 
10, 13.3333, 36.6667, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
H6 MRHBC 
10, 13.3333, 20, 30, 
26.6667 
11.6667, 16.6667, 26.6667, 
28.3333, 16.6667 
10, 16.6667, 33.3333, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
H7 MRHBD 
13.3333, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
26.6667, 15 
11.6667, 21.6667, 30, 
23.3333, 13.3333 
15, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
26.6667, 13.3333, 
H8 MRHCA 
6.6667, 15, 21.6667, 
38.3333, 18.3333 
6.6667, 11.6667, 21.6667, 
35, 25 
6.6667, 10, 28.3333, 
31.6667, 23.3333 
H9 MRHCB 
16.6667, 18.3333, 25, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
13.3333, 26.6667, 23.3333, 
21.6667, 15 
10, 16.6667, 25, 30, 18.3333 
H10 MRHCC 
6.6667, 13.3333, 28.3333, 
30, 21.6667 
11.6667, 20, 23.3333, 
26.6667, 18.3333 
15, 16.6667, 23.3333, 
26.6667, 18.3333 
H11 MRHCD 
11.6667, 13.3333, 28.3333, 
25, 21.6667 
13.3333, 20, 28.3333, 
23.3333, 15 
8.3333, 10, 26.6667, 
33.3333, 21.6667 
H12 MRHCE 
11.6667, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
30, 13.3333, 
13.3333, 23.3333, 33.3333, 
21.6667, 8.3333 
16.6667, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
26.6667, 16.6667 
H13 MRHCFA 
18.3333, 23.3333, 26.6667, 
25, 6.6667 
11.6667, 25, 31.6667, 
21.6667, 10 
11.6667, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
30, 13.3333 
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H14 MRHCFB 
11.6667, 21.6667, 28.3333, 
25, 13.3333 
11.6667, 26.6667, 30, 
21.6667, 10 
11.6667, 20, 28.3333, 
26.6667, 13.3333 
H15 MRHCFC 
13.3333, 20, 30, 23.3333, 
13.3333 
10, 23.3333, 31.6667, 25, 
10 
13.3333, 21.6667, 28.3333, 
26.6667, 10 
H16 MRHDA 
5, 11.6667, 16.6667, 20, 
46.6667 
26.6667, 28.3333, 21.6667, 
13.3333, 10 
23.3333, 25, 21.6667, 
18.3333, 11.6667 
H17 MRHDB 6.6667, 10, 13.3333, 20, 50 
25.26.6667, 21, 21.6667, 
15, 11.6667, 
28.3333, 26.6667, 21.6667, 
18.3333, 8.3333 
H18 HRHAAC 
10, 11.6667, 21.6667, 
33.3333, 23.3333 
11.6667, 20, 25, 33.3333, 
10 
10, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
31.6667, 13.3333 
H19 HRHAAB 
8.3333, 16.6667, 18.3333, 
33.3333, 23.3333 
11.6667, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
33.3333, 10 
10, 18.3333, 28.3333, 30, 
13.3333 
H20 HRHAAA 
11.6667, 18.3333, 20, 
28.3333, 21.6667 
11.6667, 23.3333, 25, 
26.6667, 13.3333 
13.3333, 18.3333, 30, 
28.3333, 10 
H21 HRHAB 
8.3333, 11.6667, 21.6667, 
26.6667, 31.6667 
11.6667, 20, 28.3333, 
26.6667, 13.3333 
13.3333, 15, 33.3333, 
26.6667, 11.6667 
H22 HRHBAA 
16.6667, 20, 23.3333, 30, 
10 
11.6667, 23.3333, 25, 
26.6667, 13.3333 
13.3333, 15, 31.6667, 
26.6667, 13.3333 
H23 HRHBAB 
3.3333, 5, 21.6667, 
36.6667, 30 
13.3333, 20, 28.3333, 
23.3333, 15 
20, 23.3333, 25, 23.3333, 
8.3333 
H24 HRHBAC 
5, 6.6667, 18.3333, 
38.3333, 31.6667 
18.3333, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
21.6667, 15 
10, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
31.6667, 13.3333, 
H25 HRHBAD 
8.3333, 6.6667, 23.3333, 
30, 31.6667 
8.3333, 13.3333, 28.3333, 
33.3333, 16.6667 
13.3333, 21.6667, 33.3333, 
21.6667, 10 
H26 HRHBBA 
16.6667, 20, 23.3333, 30, 
10 
15, 21.6667, 28.3333, 25, 
10 
10, 15, 30, 35, 10 
H27 HRHBBB 
8.3333, 16.6667, 26.6667, 
33.3333, 11.6667 
18.3333, 20, 28.3333, 
23.3333, 10 
10, 15, 33.3333, 31.6667, 10 
H28 HRHBBC 
8.3333, 15, 26.6667, 
33.3333, 16.6667 
26.6667, 25, 21.6667, 
16.6667, 10 
6.6667, 15, 26.6667, 
43.3333, 8.3333 
H29 HRHBBD 
8.3333, 11.6667, 26.6667, 
36.6667, 16.6667 
18.3333, 21.6667, 28.3333, 
25, 6.6667 
6.6667, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
38.3333, 8.3333 
H30 HRHBBE 
8.3333, 15, 26.6667, 
36.6667, 13.3333 
11.6667, 16.6667, 20, 
23.3333, 28.3333 
6.6667, 8.3333, 26.6667, 
38.3333, 20 
H31 HRHBBF 
8.3333, 15, 28.3333, 
33.3333, 15 
21.6667, 25, 28.3333, 15, 
10 
28.3333, 23.3333, 20, 
18.3333, 10 
H32 HRHBBG 
3.3333, 8.3333, 15, 
31.6667, 41.6667 
18.3333, 20, 40, 13.3333, 
8.3333 
13.3333, 15, 28.3333, 35, 
8.3333 
H33 HRHBBH 
6.6667, 10, 25, 41.6667, 
16.6667 
36.6667, 30, 16.6667, 10, 
6.6667 
3.3333. 3.3333. 26.6667. 
43.3333, 23.3333 
H34 HRHBBI 
6.6667, 13.3333, 30, 
33.3333, 16.6667 
18.3333, 26.6667, 28.3333, 
20, 6.6667 
33.3333, 25, 18.3333, 15, 
8.3333 
H35 NRHAA 
3.333, 6.6667, 21.6667, 30, 
38.3333 
11.6667, 13.3333, 25, 
33.3333, 16.6667 
5, 31.6667, 35, 16.6667, 
11.6667 
H36 NRHAB 0, 0, 6.6667, 18.3333, 75 
10, 18.3333, 26.6667, 25, 
20 
5, 31.6667, 36.6667, 
16.6667, 10 
H37 NRHAC 
0.6667, 1, 1.6667, 6.6667, 
90 
11.6667, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
33.3333, 10 
5, 31.6667, 35, 16.6667, 
11.6667 
H38 NRHBA 
0, 5, 6.6667, 21.6667, 
66.6667 
11.6667, 16.6667, 26.6667, 
30, 15 
5, 8.3333, 31.6667, 36.6667, 
18.3333 
H39 NRHBC 
1.6667, 5, 13.3333, 
33.3333, 46.6667 
13.3333, 15, 28.3333, 
30.3333, 10 
5, 6.6667, 35, 36.6667, 
16.6667 
H40 NRHBB 
0, 1.6667, 3.3333, 11.6667, 
83.3333 
36.6667, 21.6667, 18.3333, 
16.6667, 6.6667 
5, 6.6667, 35, 36.6667, 
16.6667 
H41 NRHCA 0, 0, 3.3333, 10, 86.6667 
40, 25, 16.6667, 11.6667, 
6.6667 
6.6667, 8.3333, 33.3333, 
38.3333, 13.3333 
H42 NRHCB 0, 0, 0, 11.6667, 88.3333 
36.6667, 26.6667, 18.3333, 
11.6667, 6.6667 
6.6667, 8.3333, 33.3333, 
38.3333, 13.3333 
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Appendix 3.3: Prior probability of Pl, Sc and Dp for petroleum port D 
hazards 
 Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 MRHAA 
8.3333, 13.3333, 21.6667, 
38.3333, 18.3333 
13.3333, 15, 26.6667, 25, 
20 
3.3333, 16.6667, 26.6667, 
30, 23.3333 
H2 MRHAB 
11.6667, 20, 28.3333, 
31.6667, 8.3333 
13.3333, 15, 33.3333, 
26.6667, 11.6667 
10, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
23.3333, 20 
H3 MRHAC 
13.3333, 21.6667, 23.3333, 
31.6667, 10 
15, 21.6667, 31.6667, 
18.3333, 13.3333 
10, 20, 28.3333, 31.6667, 10 
H4 MRHBA 
11.6667, 31.6667, 23.3333, 
20, 13.3333 
13.3333, 13.3333, 28.3333, 
33.3333, 11.6667 
10, 18.3333, 21.6667, 
38.3333, 11.6667 
H5 MRHBB 
13.3333, 23.3333, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 13.3333 
15, 25, 26.6667, 23.3333, 
10 
10, 11.6667, 36.6667, 
31.6667, 10 
H6 MRHBC 
11.6667, 15, 31.6667, 25, 
16.6667 
13.3333, 16.6667, 30, 
31.6667, 8.3333 
11.6667, 13.3333, 36.6667, 
26.6667, 11.6667 
H7 MRHBD 
13.3333, 21.6667, 31.6667, 
23.3333, 10 
11.6667, 20, 31.6667, 
23.3333, 13.3333 
10, 11.6667, 28.3333, 
38.3333, 11.6667 
H8 MRHCA 
10, 21.6667, 23.3333, 
33.3333, 11.6667 
15, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
26.6667, 13.3333 
8.3333, 11.6667, 38.3333, 
30, 11.6667 
H9 MRHCB 
13.3333, 21.6667, 25, 
31.6667, 8.3333 
15, 23.3333, 28.3333, 
21.6667, 11.6667 
11.6667, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
31.6667, 11.6667 
H10 MRHCC 
10, 11.6667, 28.3333, 35, 
15 
16.6667, 20, 28.3333, 20, 
15 
13.3333, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
31.6667, 10 
H11 MRHCD 
10, 18.3333, 26.6667, 30, 
15 
11.6667, 21.6667, 30, 
21.6667, 15 
10, 11.6667, 28.3333, 
38.3333, 11.6667 
H12 MRHCE 
8.3333, 13.3333, 26.6667, 
35, 16.6667 
18.3333, 20, 26.6667, 25, 
10 
13.3333, 16.6667, 31.6667, 
28.3333, 10 
H13 MRHCFA 
21.6667, 25, 23.3333, 
21.6667, 8.3333 
18.3333, 21.6667, 26.6667, 
25, 8.3333 
8.3333, 11.6667, 28.3333, 
40, 11.6667, 
H14 MRHCFB 
16.6667, 25, 21.6667, 
23.3333, 13.3333 
13.3333, 28.3333, 26.6667, 
21.6667, 10 
11.6667, 18.3333, 31.6667, 
28.3333, 10 
H15 MRHCFC 
15.18.3333, 28.3333, 
21.6667, 16.6667 
16.6667, 20, 31.6667, 
21.6667, 10 
11.6667, 18.3333, 23.3333, 
36.6667, 10 
H16 MRHDA 
10.6667, 11, 20, 20.6667, 
37.6667 
30, 30, 18.3333, 13.3333, 
8.3333 
36.6667, 38.3333, 13.3333, 
6.6667, 5 
H17 MRHDB 
10.6667, 11, 18.3333, 
21.6667, 38.3333 
25, 31.6667, 25, 10, 8.3333 
38.3333, 35, 13.3333, 10, 
3.3333 
H18 HRHAAC 
11.6667, 16.6667, 21.6667, 
26.6667, 23.3333 
13.3333, 23.3333, 25, 
26.6667, 11.6667 
13.3333, 16.6667, 31.6667, 
28.3333, 10 
H19 HRHAAB 
16.6667, 18.3333, 21.6667, 
30, 13.3333 
15.16.6667, 33.3333, 
23.3333, 11.6667, 
13.3333, 16.6667, 30, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
H20 HRHAAA 
15.6667, 25.3333, 22.3333, 
21.6667, 15 
15, 23.3333, 26.66667, 
23.3333, 11.6667 
13.3333, 16.6667, 30, 
28.3333, 10 
H21 HRHAB 
10, 18.3333, 28.3333, 30, 
13.3333 
15, 16.6667, 31.6667, 25, 
11.6667 
13.3333, 10, 36.6667, 30, 10 
H22 HRHBAA 
18.3333, 25, 23.3333, 
21.6667, 11.6667 
15, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
13.3333, 10, 36.6667, 30, 10 
H23 HRHBAB 
1.6667, 5, 28.3333, 
36.6667, 28.3333 
20, 21.6667, 28.3333, 
18.3333, 11.6667 
28.3333, 30, 21.6667, 
18.3333, 1.6667 
H24 HRHBAC 
5, 11.66667, 20, 33.3333, 
30 
13.3333, 16.6667, 26.6667, 
25, 18.3333 
13.3333, 16.6667, 23.3333, 
26.6667, 20 
H25 HRHBAD 
13.3333, 15, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 21.6667 
5, 6.6667, 25, 35, 28.3333 
11.6667, 28.3333, 38.3333, 
11.6667, 10 
H26 HRHBBA 
26.6667, 30, 25, 16.6667, 
1.6667 
16.6667, 18.3333, 30, 
23.3333, 11.6667 
11.6667, 13.3333, 26.6667, 
36.6667, 11.6667 
H27 HRHBBB 
11.6667, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
28.3333, 15 
11.6667, 15, 26.6667, 30, 
16.6667 
10, 11.6667, 38.3333, 30, 10 
H28 HRHBBC 
10, 18.3333, 31.6667, 
28.3333, 11 
33.3333, 28.3333, 18.3333, 
18.6667, 8.3333 
3.3333, 13.3333, 23.3333, 
56.6667, 3.3333 
H29 HRHBBD 
8.3333, 11.6667, 26.6667, 
36.6667, 16.6667 
18.3333, 21.6667, 30, 
23.3333, 6.6667 
3.3333, 13.3333, 28.3333, 
46.6667, 8.3333 
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H30 HRHBBE 
8.3333, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
36.6667, 10 
5, 6.6667, 21.6667, 
23.3333, 43.3333 
0, 0, 23.3333, 46.6667, 30 
H31 HRHBBF 
11.6667, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
26.6667, 15 
21.6667, 23.3333, 28.3333, 
18.3333, 8.3333 
38.3333, 31.6667, 13.3333, 
10, 6.6667 
H32 HRHBBG 
1.6667, 11.6667, 20, 30, 
36.6667 
10, 15, 55, 13.3333, 6.6667 23.3333, 20, 26.6667, 30 
H33 HRHBBH 
8.3333, 11.6667, 20, 
43.3333, 16.6667 
36.6667, 40, 13.3333, 
6.6667, 3.3333 
1.6667, 3.3333, 26.6667, 
56.6667, 11.6667 
H34 HRHBBI 
8.3333, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
30, 16.6667 
16.6667, 35, 30, 13.3333, 5 
28.3333, 31.6667, 20, 
18.3333, 1.6667 
H35 NRHAA 
8.3333, 10, 20, 23.3333, 
38.3333 
10, 18.3333, 21.6667, 
23.3333, 26.6667 
3.3333, 46.6667, 45, 3.3333, 
1.6667 
H36 NRHAB 
1.6667, 3.3333, 6.6667, 
16.6667, 71.6667 
6.6667, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
26.6667, 20 
3.3333, 43.3333, 46.6667, 5, 
1.6667 
H37 NRHAC 
1.6667. 3.3333. 5. 6.6667. 
83.3333 
8.3333, 16.6667, 25, 
28.3333, 21.6667 
5, 43.3333, 46.6667, 3.3333, 
1.6667 
H38 NRHBA 
3.3333, 5, 18.3333, 
28.3333, 45 
8.3333, 18.3333, 24, 25, 
24.3333 
8.3333, 18.3333, 30, 
38.3333, 5 
H39 NRHBC 3.3333, 10, 20, 45, 21.6667 
13.3333, 15, 26.6667, 
31.6667, 13.3333 
1.6667, 11.6667, 38.3333, 
46.6667, 1.6667 
H40 NRHBB 
1.6667, 1.6667, 3.3333, 15, 
78.3333 
60, 23.3333, 9.6667, 
3.6667, 3.3333 
1.6667, 3.3333, 43.3333, 
46.6667, 5 
H41 NRHCA 
1.6667, 1.6667, 3.3333, 
6.6667, 86.6667 
61. 6667, 26.6667, 6.6667, 
3.3333, 1.6667 
1.6667, 3.3333, 46.6667, 
43.3333, 3.3333 
H42 NRHCB 
1.6667, 1.6667, 3.3333, 5, 
88.3333 
61. 6667, 26.6667, 6.6667, 
3.3333, 1.6667 
1.6667, 3.3333, 46.6667, 
43.3333, 3.3333 
Appendix 3.4: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route A 
hazards (Collision)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 
2.5, 20, 21.6667, 26.6667, 
29.1667 
28.3333, 20.8333, 15.8333, 
13.3333, 21.6667 
23.3333, 24.1667, 16.6667, 
20.8333, 15 
H2 
5, 10.8333, 18.3333, 20, 
45.83333 
35, 22.5, 20, 12.1667, 
10.3333 
10, 13.3333, 29.1667, 
24.1667, 23.3333 
H3 
3.3333, 7.5, 13.3333, 
40.83333, 35 
13.3333, 29.1667, 21.6667, 
22.1667, 13.6667 
23.3333, 24.1667, 19.1667, 
17.5, 15.8333 
H4 
6.6667, 16.6667, 21.6667, 
20, 35 
26.6667, 35, 16.6667, 15, 
6.6667 
16.6667, 16.6667, 21.6667, 
18.3333, 26.6667 
H5 
3.3333, 3.3333, 16.6667, 35, 
41.6667 
22.5, 19.1667, 26.6667, 
18.3333, 13.3333 
10, 17.5, 25, 28.3333, 
19.1667 
H6 
5, 6.6667, 21.6667, 35.8333, 
30.8333 
17.5, 20, 25, 18.3333, 
19.1667 
13.3333, 12.5, 24.1667, 
28.3333, 21.6667 
H7 
10, 8.3333, 22.5, 35.83333, 
23.3333 
41.6667, 30, 15, 10, 3.3333 8.3333, 16.6667, 15, 35, 25 
H8 
5, 6.6667, 21.6667, 27.5, 
39.1667 
39.1667, 23.3333, 15, 
14.1667, 8.3333 
6.6667, 10, 23.3333, 22.5, 
37.5 
H9 
4.1667, 6.6667, 25, 39.1667, 
25 
38.3333, 23.3333, 16.6667, 
15.8333, 5.8333 
6.6667, 15, 18.3333, 32.5, 
27.5 
H10 
6.6667, 18.3333, 36.6667, 
20.8333, 17.5 
34.1667, 26.6667, 14.1667, 
19.1667, 5.8333 
6.6667, 13.3333, 33.3333, 
20.8333, 25.8333 
H11 
5.8333, 8.3333, 36.6667, 
34.1667, 15 
7.5, 31.6667, 35, 18.3333, 
7.5 
13.3333, 9.1667, 30.8333, 
27.5, 19.1667 
H12 
5, 9.1667, 30.8333, 29.1667, 
25.8333 
30, 22.5, 17.5, 18.3333, 
11.6667 
13.3333, 15, 30, 21.6667, 20 
H13 
3.3333, 5, 18.3333, 38.3333, 
35 
18.3333, 20, 18.3333, 
19.1667, 24.1667 
6.6667, 15, 35, 20, 23.3333 
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Appendix 3.5: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route A 
hazards (Grounding)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H14 
5, 10, 28.3333, 29.1667, 
27.5 
23.3333, 21.6667, 23.3333, 
16.6667, 15 
6.6667, 16.6667, 31.6667, 
25.8333, 19.1667 
H15 
3.3333, 8.3333, 28.3333, 
19.1667, 40.83333 
20, 31.6667, 18.3333, 
16.6667, 13.3333 
10, 20, 25.8333, 22.5, 
21.6667 
H16 
3.3333, 6.6667, 30, 26.6667, 
33.3333 
20, 30, 21.6667, 15, 13.3333 
8.3333, 11.6667, 26.6667, 
30, 23.3333 
H17 
3.3333, 5, 13.3333, 43.3333, 
35 
20, 25, 21.6667, 15, 18.3333 
11.6667, 14.1667, 19.1667, 
36.6667, 18.3333 
H18 
3.3333, 5, 20, 23.3333, 
48.3333 
25.8333, 20, 22.5, 15, 
16.6667 
6.6667, 10, 35, 21.6667, 
26.6667 
H19 
3.3333, 5.8333, 16.6667, 
55.8333, 18.3333 
26.6667, 16.6667, 25, 
15.8333, 15.8333 
8.3333, 9.1667, 25, 20, 37.5 
H20 2.5, 15, 15, 32.5, 35 38.3333, 25, 15.9.1667, 12.5 
13.3333, 15.8333, 24.1667, 
30, 16.6667 
H21 
3.3333, 3.3333, 13.3333, 
38.3333, 41.6667 
34.1667, 24.1667, 20.8333, 
12.5, 8.3333 
5.8333, 10.8333, 24.1667, 
27.5, 31.6667 
H22 
3.3333, 6.6667, 22.5, 27.5, 
40 
25.8333, 27.5, 20.8333, 
10.8333, 15 
5, 11.6667, 25, 25.8333, 
32.5 
H23 
6.6667, 5, 29.1667, 19.1667, 
40 
28.3333, 25, 21.6667, 15, 10 5, 12.5, 27.5, 25, 30 
H24 
6.6667, 6.6667, 36.6667, 
31.6667, 18.3333 
31.6667, 23.3333, 21.6667, 
13.3333, 10 
5, 15, 31.6667, 25, 23.3333 
H25 3.3333, 5, 25, 31.6667, 35 
23.3333, 25, 20.8333, 
19.1667, 11.6667 
7.5, 14.1667, 21.6667, 
30.8333, 25.8333 
H26 
8.3333, 8.3333, 28.3333, 
38.3333, 16.6667 
16.6667, 25, 20.8333, 27.5, 
10 
11.6667, 13.3333, 32.5, 
19.1667, 23.3333 
H27 3.3333, 5, 15, 40, 36.6667 
28.3333, 20.8333, 20, 
19.1667, 11.6667 
10, 17.5, 23.3333, 24.1667, 
25 
H28 
5.8333, 6.6667, 30.8333, 
29.1667, 27.5 
24.1667, 34.1667, 16.6667, 
15, 10 
5.8333, 12.5, 20, 34.1667, 
27.5 
Appendix 3.6: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route A 
hazards (Hull Failure)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H29 
3.3333, 3.3333, 8.3333, 25, 
60 
26.6667, 33.3333, 20, 
13.3333, 6.6667 
10.8333, 11.6667, 24.1667, 
27.5, 25.83333 
H30 8.3333, 10, 15, 36.6667, 30 
10, 23.3333, 33.3333, 
21.6667, 11.6667 
8.3333, 9.1667, 29.1667, 35, 
18.3333 
H31 
6.6667, 20, 21.6667, 20, 
31.6667 
13.3333, 23.3333, 30, 
23.3333, 10 
8.3333, 24.1667, 35.8333, 
23.3333, 8.3333 
H32 
5, 11.6667, 24.1667, 
29.1667, 30 
16.6667, 45, 17.5, 15.8333, 
5 
6.6667, 11.6667, 35, 
26.6667, 20 
H33 
3.3333, 6.6667, 10, 33.3333, 
46.6667 
21.6667, 28.3333, 26.6667, 
15, 8.3333 
8.3333, 11.6667, 28.3333, 
25, 26.6667 
H34 
5, 18.3333, 17.5, 22.5, 
36.6667 
21.6667, 33.3333, 21.6667, 
16.6667, 6.6667 
6.6667, 10, 36.6667, 22.5, 
24.1667 
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Appendix 3.7: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route A 
hazards (Fire/Explosion)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H35 
4.1667, 8.3333, 23.3333, 
36.6667, 27.5 
26.6667, 30, 18.3333, 
9.1667, 15.8333 
6.6667, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
20, 28.3333 
H36 
5.83333, 8.3333, 17.5, 
35.8333, 32.5 
25, 28.3333, 21.6667, 12.5, 
12.5 
15, 20, 24.1667, 17.5, 
23.3333 
H37 5, 8.3333, 15, 31.6667, 40 26.6667, 30, 20, 15, 8.3333 
6.6667, 17.1667, 23.6667, 
28.3333, 24.1667 
H38 
7.5, 11.6667, 18.3333, 20, 
42.5 
25, 28.3333, 24.1667, 12.5, 
10 
8.3333, 26.6667, 30, 
18.3333, 16.6667 
H39 
8.3333, 8.3333, 20, 33.3333, 
30 
26.6667, 30, 20.8333, 12.5, 
10 
6.6667, 9.1667, 26.6667, 
31.6667, 25.8333 
H40 
1.6667, 5.8333, 15, 33.3333, 
44.1667 
23.3333, 25, 17.5, 19.1667, 
15 
6.6667, 17.5, 23.3333, 25, 
27.5 
H41 
3.3333, 6.6667, 11.6667, 30, 
48.3333 
6.6667, 25, 18.33333, 
18.3333, 31.6667 
8.3333, 20.8333, 20.8333, 
20.8333, 29.1667 
H42 
3.3333, 5.8333, 10.83333, 
26.6667, 53.3333 
10, 8.3333, 26.6667, 
21.6667, 33.3333 
5, 10, 27.8333, 25.3333, 
31.8333 
H43 
3.3333, 8.3333, 14.1667, 
20.8333, 53.3333 
16.6667, 26.6667, 25, 20, 
11.6667 
13.3333, 18.3333, 16.6667, 
23.3333, 28.3333 
H44 
3.3333, 3.3333, 8.3333, 
21.6667, 63.3333 
33.3333, 18.3333, 13.3333, 
10, 25 
14.1667, 15, 21.6667, 22.5, 
26.6667 
H45 
3.3333, 5, 11.6667, 33.3333, 
46.6667 
10, 35, 20.83333, 18.3333, 
15.83333 
8.3333, 10.8333, 21.6667, 
30, 29.1667 
Appendix 3.8: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route A 
hazards (Equipment Failure)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H46 
3.3333, 6.6667, 18.3333, 
29.1667, 42.5 
15, 21.6667, 22.5, 19.1667, 
21.6667 
6.6667, 13.3333, 33.3333, 
26.6667, 20 
H47 
3.3333, 8.3333, 20.83333, 
26.6667, 40.8333 
6.6667, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
21.6667, 25 
6.6667, 13.3333, 27.5, 
25.8333, 26.6667 
H48 
3.3333, 8.3333, 25, 25.8333, 
37.5 
8.3333, 16.6667, 25, 
21.6667, 28.3333 
10, 15, 38.3333, 23.3333, 
13.3333 
H49 
3.3333, 6.6667, 18.3333, 
29.1667, 42.5 
6.6667, 23.3333, 15.8333, 
14.1667, 40 
6.6667, 11.6667, 32.5, 27.5, 
21.6667 
H50 
5, 18.3333, 20, 25.8333, 
30.8333 
6.6667, 36.6667, 15, 15, 
26.6667 
6.6667, 20, 31.6667, 25, 
16.6667 
H51 
5, 9.1667, 13.3333, 36.6667, 
35.8333 
6.6667, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
18.3333, 23.3333 
7.5, 18.3333, 22.5, 29.1667, 
22.5 
H52 3.3333, 7.5, 15, 29.1667, 45 10, 25, 18.3333, 25, 21.6667 
6.6667, 11.6667, 21.6667, 
29.1667, 30.8333 
H53 
3.3333, 6.6667, 8.3333, 
19.1667, 62.5 
6.6667, 16.6667, 30, 
21.6667, 25 
6.6667, 13.3333, 16.6667, 
30.8333, 32.5 
H54 
3.3333, 8.3333, 18.3333, 25, 
45 
11.6667, 26.6667, 31.6667, 
15, 15 
8.3333, 19.1667, 25.8333, 
24.1667, 22.5 
H55 
3.3333, 8.3333, 16.6667, 
28.3333, 43.3333 
6.6667, 25, 30, 23.3333, 15 
15, 17.5, 25.8333, 18.3333, 
23.3333 
H56 
3.3333, 10, 20.83333, 
28.3333, 37.5 
10, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
16.6667, 21.6667 
8.3333, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 23.3333 
H57 5, 8.3333, 20, 29.1667, 37.5 
11.6667, 8.3333, 25, 
31.6667, 23.3333 
6.6667, 16.6667, 18.3333, 
28.3333, 30 
  
319 
H58 
5, 10, 16.6667, 44.1667, 
24.1667 
6.6667, 29.1667, 22.5, 25, 
16.6667 
4.1667, 19.1667, 20, 
30.8333, 25.8333 
H59 
3.3333, 6.6667, 21.6667, 35, 
33.3333 
15, 34.1667, 26.6667, 
14.1667, 10 
10.8333, 18.3333, 22.5, 
27.5, 20.83333 
H60 
10, 21.6667, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 18.3333 
11.6667, 20, 33.3333, 
18.3333, 16.6667 
8.3333, 23.3333, 31.6667, 
20, 16.6667 
H61 5, 8.3333, 20, 32.5, 34.1667 
8.3333, 27.5, 20.8333, 20, 
23.3333 
5, 12.5, 28.3333, 26.3333, 
27.83333 
Appendix 3.9: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route B 
hazards (Collision) 
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 
2.5, 20, 21.6667, 26.6667, 
29.1667 
28.3333, 20.8333, 15.8333, 
13.3333, 21.6667 
23.3333, 24.1667, 16.6667, 
20.8333, 15 
H2 
5, 10.8333, 18.3333, 20, 
45.83333 
35, 22.5, 20, 12.1667, 
10.3333 
10, 13.3333, 29.1667, 
24.1667, 23.3333 
H3 
3.3333, 7.5, 13.3333, 
40.83333, 35 
13.3333, 29.1667, 21.6667, 
22.1667, 13.6667 
23.3333, 24.1667, 19.1667, 
17.5, 15.8333 
H4 
6.6667, 8.333, 17.5, 
29.1667, 38.3333 
26.6667, 35, 16.6667, 15, 
6.6667 
16.6667, 16.6667, 21.6667, 
18.3333, 26.6667 
H5 
3.3333, 3.3333, 16.6667, 35, 
41.6667 
22.5, 19.1667, 26.6667, 
18.3333, 13.3333 
10, 17.5, 25, 28.3333, 
19.1667 
H6 
3.3333, 6.6667, 21.6667, 
37.5, 30.8333 
17.5, 20, 25, 18.3333, 
19.1667 
13.3333, 12.5, 24.1667, 
28.3333, 21.6667 
H7 
4.1667, 6.6667, 23.3333, 
37.5, 28.3333 
41.6667, 30, 15, 10, 3.3333 8.3333, 16.6667, 15, 35, 25 
H8 
5, 6.6667, 21.6667, 27.5, 
39.1667 
39.1667, 23.3333, 15, 
14.1667, 8.3333 
6.6667, 10, 23.3333, 22.5, 
37.5 
H9 
4.1667, 6.6667, 25, 39.1667, 
25 
38.3333, 23.3333, 16.6667, 
15.8333, 5.8333 
6.6667, 15, 18.3333, 32.5, 
27.5 
H10 
6.6667, 18.3333, 36.6667, 
20.8333, 17.5 
34.1667, 26.6667, 14.1667, 
19.1667, 5.8333 
6.6667, 13.3333, 33.3333, 
20.8333, 25.8333 
H11 
5.8333, 8.3333, 36.6667, 
34.1667, 15 
7.5, 31.6667, 35, 18.3333, 
7.5 
13.3333, 9.1667, 30.8333, 
27.5, 19.1667 
H12 
5, 9.1667, 25.8333, 30.8333, 
29.1667 
30, 22.5, 17.5, 18.3333, 
11.6667 
13.3333, 15, 30, 21.6667, 20 
H13 
3.3333, 5, 18.3333, 38.3333, 
35 
18.3333, 20, 18.3333, 
19.1667, 24.1667 
6.6667, 15, 35, 20, 23.3333 
Appendix 3.10: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route B 
hazards (Grounding) 
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H14 
5, 10, 28.3333, 29.1667, 
27.5 
23.3333, 21.6667, 23.3333, 
16.6667, 15 
6.6667, 16.6667, 31.6667, 
25.8333, 19.1667 
H15 
3.3333, 8.3333, 28.3333, 
19.1667, 40.83333 
20, 31.6667, 18.3333, 
16.6667, 13.3333 
10, 20, 25.8333, 22.5, 
21.6667 
H16 
3.3333, 6.6667, 30, 26.6667, 
33.3333 
20, 30, 21.6667, 15, 13.3333 
8.3333, 11.6667, 26.6667, 
30, 23.3333 
H17 
3.3333, 5, 13.3333, 43.3333, 
35 
20, 25, 21.6667, 15, 18.3333 
11.6667, 14.1667, 19.1667, 
36.6667, 18.3333 
H18 
3.3333, 5, 20, 23.3333, 
48.3333 
25.8333, 20, 22.5, 15, 
16.6667 
6.6667, 10, 35, 21.6667, 
26.6667 
  
320 
H19 
3.3333, 4.1667, 16.6667, 
55.8333, 20 
26.6667, 16.6667, 25, 
15.8333, 15.8333 
8.3333, 9.1667, 25, 20, 37.5 
H20 
2.5, 10.8333, 15.8333, 
34.1667, 36.6667 
38.3333, 25, 15.9.1667, 12.5 
13.3333, 15.8333, 24.1667, 
30, 16.6667 
H21 
3.3333, 3.3333, 13.3333, 
38.3333, 41.6667 
34.1667, 24.1667, 20.8333, 
12.5, 8.3333 
5.8333, 10.8333, 24.1667, 
27.5, 31.6667 
H22 
3.3333, 6.6667, 22.5, 27.5, 
40 
25.8333, 27.5, 20.8333, 
10.8333, 15 
5, 11.6667, 25, 25.8333, 
32.5 
H23 
6.6667, 5, 29.1667, 19.1667, 
40 
28.3333, 25, 21.6667, 15, 10 5, 12.5, 27.5, 25, 30 
H24 
6.6667, 6.6667, 36.6667, 
31.6667, 18.3333 
31.6667, 23.3333, 21.6667, 
13.3333, 10 
5, 15, 31.6667, 25, 23.3333 
H25 3.3333, 5, 25, 31.6667, 35 
23.3333, 25, 20.8333, 
19.1667, 11.6667 
7.5, 14.1667, 21.6667, 
30.8333, 25.8333 
H26 
5.8333, 7.5, 27.5, 38.3333, 
20.8333 
16.6667, 25, 20.8333, 27.5, 
10 
11.6667, 13.3333, 32.5, 
19.1667, 23.3333 
H27 
3.3333, 4.1667, 14.1667, 40, 
38.3333 
28.3333, 20.8333, 20, 
19.1667, 11.6667 
10, 17.5, 23.3333, 24.1667, 
25 
H28 
5.8333, 6.6667, 30.8333, 
29.1667, 27.5 
24.1667, 34.1667, 16.6667, 
15, 10 
5.8333, 12.5, 20, 34.1667, 
27.5 
Appendix 3.11: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route B 
hazards (Hull Failure) 
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H29 
3.3333, 3.3333, 8.3333, 25, 
60 
26.6667, 33.3333, 20, 
13.3333, 6.6667 
10.8333, 11.6667, 24.1667, 
27.5, 25.83333 
H30 8.3333, 10, 15, 36.6667, 30 
10, 23.3333, 33.3333, 
21.6667, 11.6667 
8.3333, 9.1667, 29.1667, 35, 
18.3333 
H31 
6.6667, 20, 21.6667, 20, 
31.6667 
13.3333, 23.3333, 30, 
23.3333, 10 
8.3333, 24.1667, 35.8333, 
23.3333, 8.3333 
H32 
5, 10.8333, 20.8333, 
26.6667, 36.6667 
16.6667, 45, 17.5, 15.8333, 
5 
6.6667, 11.6667, 35, 
26.6667, 20 
H33 
3.3333, 6.6667, 10, 33.3333, 
46.6667 
21.6667, 28.3333, 26.6667, 
15, 8.3333 
8.3333, 11.6667, 28.3333, 
25, 26.6667 
H34 
5, 18.3333, 17.5, 22.5, 
36.6667 
21.6667, 33.3333, 21.6667, 
16.6667, 6.6667 
6.6667, 10, 36.6667, 22.5, 
24.1667 
Appendix 3.12: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route B 
hazards (Fire/Explosion) 
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H35 
4.1667, 8.3333, 23.3333, 
36.6667, 27.5 
26.6667, 30, 18.3333, 
9.1667, 15.8333 
6.6667, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
20, 28.3333 
H36 
5.83333, 8.3333, 17.5, 
35.8333, 32.5 
25, 28.3333, 21.6667, 12.5, 
12.5 
15, 20, 24.1667, 17.5, 
23.3333 
H37 5, 8.3333, 15, 31.6667, 40 26.6667, 30, 20, 15, 8.3333 
6.6667, 17.1667, 23.6667, 
28.3333, 24.1667 
H38 
7.5, 11.6667, 18.3333, 20, 
42.5 
25, 28.3333, 24.1667, 12.5, 
10 
8.3333, 26.6667, 30, 
18.3333, 16.6667 
H39 
5.8333, 10.8333, 17.5, 
34.1667, 31.6667 
26.6667, 30, 20.8333, 12.5, 
10 
6.6667, 9.1667, 26.6667, 
31.6667, 25.8333 
H40 
1.6667, 5, 13.3333, 34.1667, 
45.8333 
23.3333, 25, 17.5, 19.1667, 
15 
6.6667, 17.5, 23.3333, 25, 
27.5 
  
321 
H41 
3.3333, 5.8333, 11.6667, 30, 
49.1667 
6.6667, 25, 18.33333, 
18.3333, 31.6667 
8.3333, 20.8333, 20.8333, 
20.8333, 29.1667 
H42 
3.3333, 5.8333, 10.83333, 
26.6667, 53.3333 
10, 8.3333, 26.6667, 
21.6667, 33.3333 
5, 10, 27.8333, 25.3333, 
31.8333 
H43 
3.33335, 12.5, 21.6667, 57.5 
16.6667, 26.6667, 25, 20, 
11.6667 
13.3333, 18.3333, 16.6667, 
23.3333, 28.3333 
H44 
2.5, 3.3333, 8.3333, 
21.6667, 64.1667 
33.3333, 18.3333, 13.3333, 
10, 25 
14.1667, 15, 21.6667, 22.5, 
26.6667 
H45 
3.3333, 5, 11.6667, 30.8333, 
49.1667 
10, 35, 20.83333, 18.3333, 
15.83333 
8.3333, 10.8333, 21.6667, 
30, 29.1667 
Appendix 3.13: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route B 
hazards (Equipment Failure) 
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H46 
3.3333, 6.6667, 18.3333, 
29.1667, 42.5 
15, 21.6667, 22.5, 19.1667, 
21.6667 
6.6667, 13.3333, 33.3333, 
26.6667, 20 
H47 
3.3333, 8.3333, 20.83333, 
26.6667, 40.8333 
6.6667, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
21.6667, 25 
6.6667, 13.3333, 27.5, 
25.8333, 26.6667 
H48 
3.3333, 8.3333, 25, 25.8333, 
37.5 
8.3333, 16.6667, 25, 
21.6667, 28.3333 
10, 15, 38.3333, 23.3333, 
13.3333 
H49 
3.3333, 6.6667, 18.3333, 
29.1667, 42.5 
6.6667, 23.3333, 15.8333, 
14.1667, 40 
6.6667, 11.6667, 32.5, 27.5, 
21.6667 
H50 
5, 18.3333, 20, 25.8333, 
30.8333 
6.6667, 36.6667, 15, 15, 
26.6667 
6.6667, 20, 31.6667, 25, 
16.6667 
H51 
5, 9.1667, 13.3333, 36.6667, 
35.8333 
6.6667, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
18.3333, 23.3333 
7.5, 18.3333, 22.5, 29.1667, 
22.5 
H52 3.3333, 7.5, 15, 29.1667, 45 10, 25, 18.3333, 25, 21.6667 
6.6667, 11.6667, 21.6667, 
29.1667, 30.8333 
H53 
3.3333, 6.6667, 8.3333, 
19.1667, 62.5 
6.6667, 16.6667, 30, 
21.6667, 25 
6.6667, 13.3333, 16.6667, 
30.8333, 32.5 
H54 
3.3333, 8.3333, 18.3333, 25, 
45 
11.6667, 26.6667, 31.6667, 
15, 15 
8.3333, 19.1667, 25.8333, 
24.1667, 22.5 
H55 
3.3333, 8.3333, 16.6667, 
28.3333, 43.3333 
6.6667, 25, 30, 23.3333, 15 
15, 17.5, 25.8333, 18.3333, 
23.3333 
H56 
3.3333, 10, 20.83333, 
28.3333, 37.5 
10, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
16.6667, 21.6667 
8.3333, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 23.3333 
H57 5, 8.3333, 20, 29.1667, 37.5 
11.6667, 8.3333, 25, 
31.6667, 23.3333 
6.6667, 16.6667, 18.3333, 
28.3333, 30 
H58 
5, 10, 16.6667, 44.1667, 
24.1667 
6.6667, 29.1667, 22.5, 25, 
16.6667 
4.1667, 19.1667, 20, 
30.8333, 25.8333 
H59 
3.3333, 6.6667, 21.6667, 35, 
33.3333 
15, 34.1667, 26.6667, 
14.1667, 10 
10.8333, 18.3333, 22.5, 
27.5, 20.83333 
H60 
10, 21.6667, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 18.3333 
11.6667, 20, 33.3333, 
18.3333, 16.6667 
8.3333, 23.3333, 31.6667, 
20, 16.6667 
H61 5, 8.3333, 20, 32.5, 34.1667 
8.3333, 27.5, 20.8333, 20, 
23.3333 
5, 12.5, 28.3333, 26.3333, 
27.83333 
Appendix 3.14: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route C 
hazards (Collision)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 
2.5, 20, 21.6667, 26.6667, 
29.1667 
28.3333, 20.8333, 15.8333, 
13.3333, 21.6667 
23.3333, 24.1667, 16.6667, 
20.8333, 15 
  
322 
H2 
5, 10.8333, 18.3333, 20, 
45.83333 
35, 22.5, 20, 12.1667, 
10.3333 
10, 13.3333, 29.1667, 
24.1667, 23.3333 
H3 
3.3333, 7.5, 13.3333, 
40.83333, 35 
13.3333, 29.1667, 21.6667, 
22.1667, 13.6667 
23.3333, 24.1667, 19.1667, 
17.5, 15.8333 
H4 
6.6667, 16.6667, 21.6667, 
20, 35 
26.6667, 35, 16.6667, 15, 
6.6667 
16.6667, 16.6667, 21.6667, 
18.3333, 26.6667 
H5 
3.3333, 3.3333, 16.6667, 35, 
41.6667 
22.5, 19.1667, 26.6667, 
18.3333, 13.3333 
10, 17.5, 25, 28.3333, 
19.1667 
H6 
5, 6.6667, 21.6667, 35.8333, 
30.8333 
17.5, 20, 25, 18.3333, 
19.1667 
13.3333, 12.5, 24.1667, 
28.3333, 21.6667 
H7 
10, 8.3333, 22.5, 35.83333, 
23.3333 
41.6667, 30, 15, 10, 3.3333 8.3333, 16.6667, 15, 35, 25 
H8 
5, 6.6667, 21.6667, 27.5, 
39.1667 
39.1667, 23.3333, 15, 
14.1667, 8.3333 
6.6667, 10, 23.3333, 22.5, 
37.5 
H9 
4.1667, 6.6667, 25, 39.1667, 
25 
38.3333, 23.3333, 16.6667, 
15.8333, 5.8333 
6.6667, 15, 18.3333, 32.5, 
27.5 
H10 
6.6667, 18.3333, 36.6667, 
20.8333, 17.5 
34.1667, 26.6667, 14.1667, 
19.1667, 5.8333 
6.6667, 13.3333, 33.3333, 
20.8333, 25.8333 
H11 
5.8333, 8.3333, 36.6667, 
34.1667, 15 
7.5, 31.6667, 35, 18.3333, 
7.5 
13.3333, 9.1667, 30.8333, 
27.5, 19.1667 
H12 
5, 9.1667, 30.8333, 29.1667, 
25.8333 
30, 22.5, 17.5, 18.3333, 
11.6667 
13.3333, 15, 30, 21.6667, 20 
H13 
3.3333, 5, 18.3333, 38.3333, 
35 
18.3333, 20, 18.3333, 
19.1667, 24.1667 
6.6667, 15, 35, 20, 23.3333 
Appendix 3.15: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route C 
hazards (Grounding)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H14 
5, 10, 28.3333, 29.1667, 
27.5 
23.3333, 21.6667, 23.3333, 
16.6667, 15 
6.6667, 16.6667, 31.6667, 
25.8333, 19.1667 
H15 
3.3333, 8.3333, 28.3333, 
19.1667, 40.83333 
20, 31.6667, 18.3333, 
16.6667, 13.3333 
10, 20, 25.8333, 22.5, 
21.6667 
H16 
3.3333, 6.6667, 30, 26.6667, 
33.3333 
20, 30, 21.6667, 15, 13.3333 
8.3333, 11.6667, 26.6667, 
30, 23.3333 
H17 
3.3333, 5, 13.3333, 43.3333, 
35 
20, 25, 21.6667, 15, 18.3333 
11.6667, 14.1667, 19.1667, 
36.6667, 18.3333 
H18 
3.3333, 5, 20, 23.3333, 
48.3333 
25.8333, 20, 22.5, 15, 
16.6667 
6.6667, 10, 35, 21.6667, 
26.6667 
H19 
3.3333, 5.8333, 16.6667, 
55.8333, 18.3333 
26.6667, 16.6667, 25, 
15.8333, 15.8333 
8.3333, 9.1667, 25, 20, 37.5 
H20 2.5, 15, 15, 32.5, 35 38.3333, 25, 15.9.1667, 12.5 
13.3333, 15.8333, 24.1667, 
30, 16.6667 
H21 
3.3333, 3.3333, 13.3333, 
38.3333, 41.6667 
34.1667, 24.1667, 20.8333, 
12.5, 8.3333 
5.8333, 10.8333, 24.1667, 
27.5, 31.6667 
H22 
3.3333, 6.6667, 22.5, 27.5, 
40 
25.8333, 27.5, 20.8333, 
10.8333, 15 
5, 11.6667, 25, 25.8333, 
32.5 
H23 
6.6667, 5, 29.1667, 19.1667, 
40 
28.3333, 25, 21.6667, 15, 10 5, 12.5, 27.5, 25, 30 
H24 
6.6667, 6.6667, 36.6667, 
31.6667, 18.3333 
31.6667, 23.3333, 21.6667, 
13.3333, 10 
5, 15, 31.6667, 25, 23.3333 
H25 3.3333, 5, 25, 31.6667, 35 
23.3333, 25, 20.8333, 
19.1667, 11.6667 
7.5, 14.1667, 21.6667, 
30.8333, 25.8333 
H26 
8.3333, 8.3333, 28.3333, 
38.3333, 16.6667 
16.6667, 25, 20.8333, 27.5, 
10 
11.6667, 13.3333, 32.5, 
19.1667, 23.3333 
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H27 3.3333, 5, 15, 40, 36.6667 
28.3333, 20.8333, 20, 
19.1667, 11.6667 
10, 17.5, 23.3333, 24.1667, 
25 
H28 
5.8333, 6.6667, 30.8333, 
29.1667, 27.5 
24.1667, 34.1667, 16.6667, 
15, 10 
5.8333, 12.5, 20, 34.1667, 
27.5 
Appendix 3.16: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route C 
hazards (Hull Failure)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H29 
3.3333, 3.3333, 8.3333, 25, 
60 
26.6667, 33.3333, 20, 
13.3333, 6.6667 
10.8333, 11.6667, 24.1667, 
27.5, 25.83333 
H30 8.3333, 10, 15, 36.6667, 30 
10, 23.3333, 33.3333, 
21.6667, 11.6667 
8.3333, 9.1667, 29.1667, 35, 
18.3333 
H31 
6.6667, 20, 21.6667, 20, 
31.6667 
13.3333, 23.3333, 30, 
23.3333, 10 
8.3333, 24.1667, 35.8333, 
23.3333, 8.3333 
H32 
5, 11.6667, 24.1667, 
29.1667, 30 
16.6667, 45, 17.5, 15.8333, 
5 
6.6667, 11.6667, 35, 
26.6667, 20 
H33 
3.3333, 6.6667, 10, 33.3333, 
46.6667 
21.6667, 28.3333, 26.6667, 
15, 8.3333 
8.3333, 11.6667, 28.3333, 
25, 26.6667 
H34 
5, 18.3333, 17.5, 22.5, 
36.6667 
21.6667, 33.3333, 21.6667, 
16.6667, 6.6667 
6.6667, 10, 36.6667, 22.5, 
24.1667 
Appendix 3.17: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route C 
hazards (Fire/Explosion)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H35 
4.1667, 8.3333, 23.3333, 
36.6667, 27.5 
26.6667, 30, 18.3333, 
9.1667, 15.8333 
6.6667, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
20, 28.3333 
H36 
5.83333, 8.3333, 17.5, 
35.8333, 32.5 
25, 28.3333, 21.6667, 12.5, 
12.5 
15, 20, 24.1667, 17.5, 
23.3333 
H37 5, 8.3333, 15, 31.6667, 40 26.6667, 30, 20, 15, 8.3333 
6.6667, 17.1667, 23.6667, 
28.3333, 24.1667 
H38 
7.5, 11.6667, 18.3333, 20, 
42.5 
25, 28.3333, 24.1667, 12.5, 
10 
8.3333, 26.6667, 30, 
18.3333, 16.6667 
H39 
8.3333, 8.3333, 20, 33.3333, 
30 
26.6667, 30, 20.8333, 12.5, 
10 
6.6667, 9.1667, 26.6667, 
31.6667, 25.8333 
H40 
1.6667, 5.8333, 15, 33.3333, 
44.1667 
23.3333, 25, 17.5, 19.1667, 
15 
6.6667, 17.5, 23.3333, 25, 
27.5 
H41 
3.3333, 6.6667, 11.6667, 30, 
48.3333 
6.6667, 25, 18.33333, 
18.3333, 31.6667 
8.3333, 20.8333, 20.8333, 
20.8333, 29.1667 
H42 
3.3333, 5.8333, 10.83333, 
26.6667, 53.3333 
10, 8.3333, 26.6667, 
21.6667, 33.3333 
5, 10, 27.8333, 25.3333, 
31.8333 
H43 
3.3333, 8.3333, 14.1667, 
20.8333, 53.3333 
16.6667, 26.6667, 25, 20, 
11.6667 
13.3333, 18.3333, 16.6667, 
23.3333, 28.3333 
H44 
3.3333, 3.3333, 8.3333, 
21.6667, 63.3333 
33.3333, 18.3333, 13.3333, 
10, 25 
14.1667, 15, 21.6667, 22.5, 
26.6667 
H45 
3.3333, 5, 11.6667, 33.3333, 
46.6667 
10, 35, 20.83333, 18.3333, 
15.83333 
8.3333, 10.8333, 21.6667, 
30, 29.1667 
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Appendix 3.18: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route C 
hazards (Equipment Failure)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H46 
3.3333, 6.6667, 18.3333, 
29.1667, 42.5 
15, 21.6667, 22.5, 19.1667, 
21.6667 
6.6667, 13.3333, 33.3333, 
26.6667, 20 
H47 
3.3333, 8.3333, 20.83333, 
26.6667, 40.8333 
6.6667, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
21.6667, 25 
6.6667, 13.3333, 27.5, 
25.8333, 26.6667 
H48 
3.3333, 8.3333, 25, 25.8333, 
37.5 
8.3333, 16.6667, 25, 
21.6667, 28.3333 
10, 15, 38.3333, 23.3333, 
13.3333 
H49 
3.3333, 6.6667, 18.3333, 
29.1667, 42.5 
6.6667, 23.3333, 15.8333, 
14.1667, 40 
6.6667, 11.6667, 32.5, 27.5, 
21.6667 
H50 
5, 18.3333, 20, 25.8333, 
30.8333 
6.6667, 36.6667, 15, 15, 
26.6667 
6.6667, 20, 31.6667, 25, 
16.6667 
H51 
5, 9.1667, 13.3333, 36.6667, 
35.8333 
6.6667, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
18.3333, 23.3333 
7.5, 18.3333, 22.5, 29.1667, 
22.5 
H52 3.3333, 7.5, 15, 29.1667, 45 10, 25, 18.3333, 25, 21.6667 
6.6667, 11.6667, 21.6667, 
29.1667, 30.8333 
H53 
3.3333, 6.6667, 8.3333, 
19.1667, 62.5 
6.6667, 16.6667, 30, 
21.6667, 25 
6.6667, 13.3333, 16.6667, 
30.8333, 32.5 
H54 
3.3333, 8.3333, 18.3333, 25, 
45 
11.6667, 26.6667, 31.6667, 
15, 15 
8.3333, 19.1667, 25.8333, 
24.1667, 22.5 
H55 
3.3333, 8.3333, 16.6667, 
28.3333, 43.3333 
6.6667, 25, 30, 23.3333, 15 
15, 17.5, 25.8333, 18.3333, 
23.3333 
H56 
3.3333, 10, 20.83333, 
28.3333, 37.5 
10, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
16.6667, 21.6667 
8.3333, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 23.3333 
H57 5, 8.3333, 20, 29.1667, 37.5 
11.6667, 8.3333, 25, 
31.6667, 23.3333 
6.6667, 16.6667, 18.3333, 
28.3333, 30 
H58 
5, 10, 16.6667, 44.1667, 
24.1667 
6.6667, 29.1667, 22.5, 25, 
16.6667 
4.1667, 19.1667, 20, 
30.8333, 25.8333 
H59 
3.3333, 6.6667, 21.6667, 35, 
33.3333 
15, 34.1667, 26.6667, 
14.1667, 10 
10.8333, 18.3333, 22.5, 
27.5, 20.83333 
H60 
10, 21.6667, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 18.3333 
11.6667, 20, 33.3333, 
18.3333, 16.6667 
8.3333, 23.3333, 31.6667, 
20, 16.6667 
H61 5, 8.3333, 20, 32.5, 34.1667 
8.3333, 27.5, 20.8333, 20, 
23.3333 
5, 12.5, 28.3333, 26.3333, 
27.83333 
Appendix 3.19: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route D 
hazards (Collision) 
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 
2.5, 20, 21.6667, 26.6667, 
29.1667 
28.3333, 20.8333, 15.8333, 
13.3333, 21.6667 
23.3333, 24.1667, 16.6667, 
20.8333, 15 
H2 
5, 10.8333, 18.3333, 20, 
45.83333 
35, 22.5, 20, 12.1667, 
10.3333 
10, 13.3333, 29.1667, 
24.1667, 23.3333 
H3 
3.3333, 7.5, 13.3333, 
40.83333, 35 
13.3333, 29.1667, 21.6667, 
22.1667, 13.6667 
23.3333, 24.1667, 19.1667, 
17.5, 15.8333 
H4 
6.6667, 8.333, 17.5, 
29.1667, 38.3333 
26.6667, 35, 16.6667, 15, 
6.6667 
16.6667, 16.6667, 21.6667, 
18.3333, 26.6667 
H5 
3.3333, 3.3333, 16.6667, 35, 
41.6667 
22.5, 19.1667, 26.6667, 
18.3333, 13.3333 
10, 17.5, 25, 28.3333, 
19.1667 
H6 
3.3333, 6.6667, 21.6667, 
37.5, 30.8333 
17.5, 20, 25, 18.3333, 
19.1667 
13.3333, 12.5, 24.1667, 
28.3333, 21.6667 
H7 
4.1667, 6.6667, 23.3333, 
37.5, 28.3333 
41.6667, 30, 15, 10, 3.3333 8.3333, 16.6667, 15, 35, 25 
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H8 
5, 6.6667, 21.6667, 27.5, 
39.1667 
39.1667, 23.3333, 15, 
14.1667, 8.3333 
6.6667, 10, 23.3333, 22.5, 
37.5 
H9 
4.1667, 6.6667, 25, 39.1667, 
25 
38.3333, 23.3333, 16.6667, 
15.8333, 5.8333 
6.6667, 15, 18.3333, 32.5, 
27.5 
H10 
6.6667, 18.3333, 36.6667, 
20.8333, 17.5 
34.1667, 26.6667, 14.1667, 
19.1667, 5.8333 
6.6667, 13.3333, 33.3333, 
20.8333, 25.8333 
H11 
5.8333, 8.3333, 36.6667, 
34.1667, 15 
7.5, 31.6667, 35, 18.3333, 
7.5 
13.3333, 9.1667, 30.8333, 
27.5, 19.1667 
H12 
5, 9.1667, 25.8333, 30.8333, 
29.1667 
30, 22.5, 17.5, 18.3333, 
11.6667 
13.3333, 15, 30, 21.6667, 20 
H13 
3.3333, 5, 18.3333, 38.3333, 
35 
18.3333, 20, 18.3333, 
19.1667, 24.1667 
6.6667, 15, 35, 20, 23.3333 
Appendix 3.20: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route D 
hazards (Grounding) 
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H14 
5, 10, 28.3333, 29.1667, 
27.5 
23.3333, 21.6667, 23.3333, 
16.6667, 15 
6.6667, 16.6667, 31.6667, 
25.8333, 19.1667 
H15 
3.3333, 8.3333, 28.3333, 
19.1667, 40.83333 
20, 31.6667, 18.3333, 
16.6667, 13.3333 
10, 20, 25.8333, 22.5, 
21.6667 
H16 
3.3333, 6.6667, 30, 26.6667, 
33.3333 
20, 30, 21.6667, 15, 13.3333 
8.3333, 11.6667, 26.6667, 
30, 23.3333 
H17 
3.3333, 5, 13.3333, 43.3333, 
35 
20, 25, 21.6667, 15, 18.3333 
11.6667, 14.1667, 19.1667, 
36.6667, 18.3333 
H18 
3.3333, 5, 20, 23.3333, 
48.3333 
25.8333, 20, 22.5, 15, 
16.6667 
6.6667, 10, 35, 21.6667, 
26.6667 
H19 
3.3333, 4.1667, 16.6667, 
55.8333, 20 
26.6667, 16.6667, 25, 
15.8333, 15.8333 
8.3333, 9.1667, 25, 20, 37.5 
H20 
2.5, 10.8333, 15.8333, 
34.1667, 36.6667 
38.3333, 25, 15.9.1667, 12.5 
13.3333, 15.8333, 24.1667, 
30, 16.6667 
H21 
3.3333, 3.3333, 13.3333, 
38.3333, 41.6667 
34.1667, 24.1667, 20.8333, 
12.5, 8.3333 
5.8333, 10.8333, 24.1667, 
27.5, 31.6667 
H22 
3.3333, 6.6667, 22.5, 27.5, 
40 
25.8333, 27.5, 20.8333, 
10.8333, 15 
5, 11.6667, 25, 25.8333, 
32.5 
H23 
6.6667, 5, 29.1667, 19.1667, 
40 
28.3333, 25, 21.6667, 15, 10 5, 12.5, 27.5, 25, 30 
H24 
6.6667, 6.6667, 36.6667, 
31.6667, 18.3333 
31.6667, 23.3333, 21.6667, 
13.3333, 10 
5, 15, 31.6667, 25, 23.3333 
H25 3.3333, 5, 25, 31.6667, 35 
23.3333, 25, 20.8333, 
19.1667, 11.6667 
7.5, 14.1667, 21.6667, 
30.8333, 25.8333 
H26 
5.8333, 7.5, 27.5, 38.3333, 
20.8333 
16.6667, 25, 20.8333, 27.5, 
10 
11.6667, 13.3333, 32.5, 
19.1667, 23.3333 
H27 
3.3333, 4.1667, 14.1667, 40, 
38.3333 
28.3333, 20.8333, 20, 
19.1667, 11.6667 
10, 17.5, 23.3333, 24.1667, 
25 
H28 
5.8333, 6.6667, 30.8333, 
29.1667, 27.5 
24.1667, 34.1667, 16.6667, 
15, 10 
5.8333, 12.5, 20, 34.1667, 
27.5 
Appendix 3.21: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route D 
hazards (Hull Failure) 
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H29 
3.3333, 3.3333, 8.3333, 25, 
60 
26.6667, 33.3333, 20, 
13.3333, 6.6667 
10.8333, 11.6667, 24.1667, 
27.5, 25.83333 
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H30 8.3333, 10, 15, 36.6667, 30 
10, 23.3333, 33.3333, 
21.6667, 11.6667 
8.3333, 9.1667, 29.1667, 35, 
18.3333 
H31 
6.6667, 20, 21.6667, 20, 
31.6667 
13.3333, 23.3333, 30, 
23.3333, 10 
8.3333, 24.1667, 35.8333, 
23.3333, 8.3333 
H32 
5, 10.8333, 20.8333, 
26.6667, 36.6667 
16.6667, 45, 17.5, 15.8333, 
5 
6.6667, 11.6667, 35, 
26.6667, 20 
H33 
3.3333, 6.6667, 10, 33.3333, 
46.6667 
21.6667, 28.3333, 26.6667, 
15, 8.3333 
8.3333, 11.6667, 28.3333, 
25, 26.6667 
H34 
5, 18.3333, 17.5, 22.5, 
36.6667 
21.6667, 33.3333, 21.6667, 
16.6667, 6.6667 
6.6667, 10, 36.6667, 22.5, 
24.1667 
Appendix 3.22: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route D 
hazards (Fire/Explosion) 
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H35 
4.1667, 8.3333, 23.3333, 
36.6667, 27.5 
26.6667, 30, 18.3333, 
9.1667, 15.8333 
6.6667, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
20, 28.3333 
H36 
5.83333, 8.3333, 17.5, 
35.8333, 32.5 
25, 28.3333, 21.6667, 12.5, 
12.5 
15, 20, 24.1667, 17.5, 
23.3333 
H37 5, 8.3333, 15, 31.6667, 40 26.6667, 30, 20, 15, 8.3333 
6.6667, 17.1667, 23.6667, 
28.3333, 24.1667 
H38 
7.5, 11.6667, 18.3333, 20, 
42.5 
25, 28.3333, 24.1667, 12.5, 
10 
8.3333, 26.6667, 30, 
18.3333, 16.6667 
H39 
5.8333, 10.8333, 17.5, 
34.1667, 31.6667 
26.6667, 30, 20.8333, 12.5, 
10 
6.6667, 9.1667, 26.6667, 
31.6667, 25.8333 
H40 
1.6667, 5, 13.3333, 34.1667, 
45.8333 
23.3333, 25, 17.5, 19.1667, 
15 
6.6667, 17.5, 23.3333, 25, 
27.5 
H41 
3.3333, 5.8333, 11.6667, 30, 
49.1667 
6.6667, 25, 18.33333, 
18.3333, 31.6667 
8.3333, 20.8333, 20.8333, 
20.8333, 29.1667 
H42 
3.3333, 5.8333, 10.83333, 
26.6667, 53.3333 
10, 8.3333, 26.6667, 
21.6667, 33.3333 
5, 10, 27.8333, 25.3333, 
31.8333 
H43 
3.33335, 12.5, 21.6667, 57.5 
16.6667, 26.6667, 25, 20, 
11.6667 
13.3333, 18.3333, 16.6667, 
23.3333, 28.3333 
H44 
2.5, 3.3333, 8.3333, 
21.6667, 64.1667 
33.3333, 18.3333, 13.3333, 
10, 25 
14.1667, 15, 21.6667, 22.5, 
26.6667 
H45 
3.3333, 5, 11.6667, 30.8333, 
49.1667 
10, 35, 20.83333, 18.3333, 
15.83333 
8.3333, 10.8333, 21.6667, 
30, 29.1667 
Appendix 3.23: Prior Probability of L, C and P for D Shipping Route 
hazards (Equipment Failure) 
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H46 
3.3333, 6.6667, 18.3333, 
29.1667, 42.5 
15, 21.6667, 22.5, 19.1667, 
21.6667 
6.6667, 13.3333, 33.3333, 
26.6667, 20 
H47 
3.3333, 8.3333, 20.83333, 
26.6667, 40.8333 
6.6667, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
21.6667, 25 
6.6667, 13.3333, 27.5, 
25.8333, 26.6667 
H48 
3.3333, 8.3333, 25, 25.8333, 
37.5 
8.3333, 16.6667, 25, 
21.6667, 28.3333 
10, 15, 38.3333, 23.3333, 
13.3333 
H49 
3.3333, 6.6667, 18.3333, 
29.1667, 42.5 
6.6667, 23.3333, 15.8333, 
14.1667, 40 
6.6667, 11.6667, 32.5, 27.5, 
21.6667 
H50 
5, 18.3333, 20, 25.8333, 
30.8333 
6.6667, 36.6667, 15, 15, 
26.6667 
6.6667, 20, 31.6667, 25, 
16.6667 
H51 
5, 9.1667, 13.3333, 36.6667, 
35.8333 
6.6667, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
18.3333, 23.3333 
7.5, 18.3333, 22.5, 29.1667, 
22.5 
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H52 3.3333, 7.5, 15, 29.1667, 45 10, 25, 18.3333, 25, 21.6667 
6.6667, 11.6667, 21.6667, 
29.1667, 30.8333 
H53 
3.3333, 6.6667, 8.3333, 
19.1667, 62.5 
6.6667, 16.6667, 30, 
21.6667, 25 
6.6667, 13.3333, 16.6667, 
30.8333, 32.5 
H54 
3.3333, 8.3333, 18.3333, 25, 
45 
11.6667, 26.6667, 31.6667, 
15, 15 
8.3333, 19.1667, 25.8333, 
24.1667, 22.5 
H55 
3.3333, 8.3333, 16.6667, 
28.3333, 43.3333 
6.6667, 25, 30, 23.3333, 15 
15, 17.5, 25.8333, 18.3333, 
23.3333 
H56 
3.3333, 10, 20.83333, 
28.3333, 37.5 
10, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
16.6667, 21.6667 
8.3333, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 23.3333 
H57 5, 8.3333, 20, 29.1667, 37.5 
11.6667, 8.3333, 25, 
31.6667, 23.3333 
6.6667, 16.6667, 18.3333, 
28.3333, 30 
H58 
5, 10, 16.6667, 44.1667, 
24.1667 
6.6667, 29.1667, 22.5, 25, 
16.6667 
4.1667, 19.1667, 20, 
30.8333, 25.8333 
H59 
3.3333, 6.6667, 21.6667, 35, 
33.3333 
15, 34.1667, 26.6667, 
14.1667, 10 
10.8333, 18.3333, 22.5, 
27.5, 20.83333 
H60 
10, 21.6667, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 18.3333 
11.6667, 20, 33.3333, 
18.3333, 16.6667 
8.3333, 23.3333, 31.6667, 
20, 16.6667 
H61 5, 8.3333, 20, 32.5, 34.1667 
8.3333, 27.5, 20.8333, 20, 
23.3333 
5, 12.5, 28.3333, 26.3333, 
27.83333 
Appendix 3.24 Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route E 
hazards (Collision)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 
2.5, 20, 21.6667, 26.6667, 
29.1667 
28.3333, 20.8333, 15.8333, 
13.3333, 21.6667 
23.3333, 24.1667, 16.6667, 
20.8333, 15 
H2 
5, 10.8333, 18.3333, 20, 
45.83333 
35, 22.5, 20, 12.1667, 
10.3333 
10, 13.3333, 29.1667, 
24.1667, 23.3333 
H3 
3.3333, 7.5, 13.3333, 
40.83333, 35 
13.3333, 29.1667, 21.6667, 
22.1667, 13.6667 
23.3333, 24.1667, 19.1667, 
17.5, 15.8333 
H4 
6.6667, 16.6667, 21.6667, 
20, 35 
26.6667, 35, 16.6667, 15, 
6.6667 
16.6667, 16.6667, 21.6667, 
18.3333, 26.6667 
H5 
3.3333, 3.3333, 16.6667, 35, 
41.6667 
22.5, 19.1667, 26.6667, 
18.3333, 13.3333 
10, 17.5, 25, 28.3333, 
19.1667 
H6 
5, 6.6667, 21.6667, 35.8333, 
30.8333 
17.5, 20, 25, 18.3333, 
19.1667 
13.3333, 12.5, 24.1667, 
28.3333, 21.6667 
H7 
10, 8.3333, 22.5, 35.83333, 
23.3333 
41.6667, 30, 15, 10, 3.3333 8.3333, 16.6667, 15, 35, 25 
H8 
5, 6.6667, 21.6667, 27.5, 
39.1667 
39.1667, 23.3333, 15, 
14.1667, 8.3333 
6.6667, 10, 23.3333, 22.5, 
37.5 
H9 
4.1667, 6.6667, 25, 39.1667, 
25 
38.3333, 23.3333, 16.6667, 
15.8333, 5.8333 
6.6667, 15, 18.3333, 32.5, 
27.5 
H10 
6.6667, 18.3333, 36.6667, 
20.8333, 17.5 
34.1667, 26.6667, 14.1667, 
19.1667, 5.8333 
6.6667, 13.3333, 33.3333, 
20.8333, 25.8333 
H11 
5.8333, 8.3333, 36.6667, 
34.1667, 15 
7.5, 31.6667, 35, 18.3333, 
7.5 
13.3333, 9.1667, 30.8333, 
27.5, 19.1667 
H12 
5, 9.1667, 30.8333, 29.1667, 
25.8333 
30, 22.5, 17.5, 18.3333, 
11.6667 
13.3333, 15, 30, 21.6667, 20 
H13 
3.3333, 5, 18.3333, 38.3333, 
35 
18.3333, 20, 18.3333, 
19.1667, 24.1667 
6.6667, 15, 35, 20, 23.3333 
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Appendix 3.25: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route E 
hazards (Grounding)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H14 
5, 10, 28.3333, 29.1667, 
27.5 
23.3333, 21.6667, 23.3333, 
16.6667, 15 
6.6667, 16.6667, 31.6667, 
25.8333, 19.1667 
H15 
3.3333, 8.3333, 28.3333, 
19.1667, 40.83333 
20, 31.6667, 18.3333, 
16.6667, 13.3333 
10, 20, 25.8333, 22.5, 
21.6667 
H16 
3.3333, 6.6667, 30, 26.6667, 
33.3333 
20, 30, 21.6667, 15, 13.3333 
8.3333, 11.6667, 26.6667, 
30, 23.3333 
H17 
3.3333, 5, 13.3333, 43.3333, 
35 
20, 25, 21.6667, 15, 18.3333 
11.6667, 14.1667, 19.1667, 
36.6667, 18.3333 
H18 
3.3333, 5, 20, 23.3333, 
48.3333 
25.8333, 20, 22.5, 15, 
16.6667 
6.6667, 10, 35, 21.6667, 
26.6667 
H19 
3.3333, 5.8333, 16.6667, 
55.8333, 18.3333 
26.6667, 16.6667, 25, 
15.8333, 15.8333 
8.3333, 9.1667, 25, 20, 37.5 
H20 2.5, 15, 15, 32.5, 35 38.3333, 25, 15.9.1667, 12.5 
13.3333, 15.8333, 24.1667, 
30, 16.6667 
H21 
3.3333, 3.3333, 13.3333, 
38.3333, 41.6667 
34.1667, 24.1667, 20.8333, 
12.5, 8.3333 
5.8333, 10.8333, 24.1667, 
27.5, 31.6667 
H22 
3.3333, 6.6667, 22.5, 27.5, 
40 
25.8333, 27.5, 20.8333, 
10.8333, 15 
5, 11.6667, 25, 25.8333, 
32.5 
H23 
6.6667, 5, 29.1667, 19.1667, 
40 
28.3333, 25, 21.6667, 15, 10 5, 12.5, 27.5, 25, 30 
H24 
6.6667, 6.6667, 36.6667, 
31.6667, 18.3333 
31.6667, 23.3333, 21.6667, 
13.3333, 10 
5, 15, 31.6667, 25, 23.3333 
H25 3.3333, 5, 25, 31.6667, 35 
23.3333, 25, 20.8333, 
19.1667, 11.6667 
7.5, 14.1667, 21.6667, 
30.8333, 25.8333 
H26 
8.3333, 8.3333, 28.3333, 
38.3333, 16.6667 
16.6667, 25, 20.8333, 27.5, 
10 
11.6667, 13.3333, 32.5, 
19.1667, 23.3333 
H27 3.3333, 5, 15, 40, 36.6667 
28.3333, 20.8333, 20, 
19.1667, 11.6667 
10, 17.5, 23.3333, 24.1667, 
25 
H28 
5.8333, 6.6667, 30.8333, 
29.1667, 27.5 
24.1667, 34.1667, 16.6667, 
15, 10 
5.8333, 12.5, 20, 34.1667, 
27.5 
Appendix 3.26: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route E 
hazards (Hull Failure)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H29 
3.3333, 3.3333, 8.3333, 25, 
60 
26.6667, 33.3333, 20, 
13.3333, 6.6667 
10.8333, 11.6667, 24.1667, 
27.5, 25.83333 
H30 8.3333, 10, 15, 36.6667, 30 
10, 23.3333, 33.3333, 
21.6667, 11.6667 
8.3333, 9.1667, 29.1667, 35, 
18.3333 
H31 
6.6667, 20, 21.6667, 20, 
31.6667 
13.3333, 23.3333, 30, 
23.3333, 10 
8.3333, 24.1667, 35.8333, 
23.3333, 8.3333 
H32 
5, 11.6667, 24.1667, 
29.1667, 30 
16.6667, 45, 17.5, 15.8333, 
5 
6.6667, 11.6667, 35, 
26.6667, 20 
H33 
3.3333, 6.6667, 10, 33.3333, 
46.6667 
21.6667, 28.3333, 26.6667, 
15, 8.3333 
8.3333, 11.6667, 28.3333, 
25, 26.6667 
H34 
5, 18.3333, 17.5, 22.5, 
36.6667 
21.6667, 33.3333, 21.6667, 
16.6667, 6.6667 
6.6667, 10, 36.6667, 22.5, 
24.1667 
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Appendix 3.27: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route E 
hazards (Fire/Explosion)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H35 
4.1667, 8.3333, 23.3333, 
36.6667, 27.5 
26.6667, 30, 18.3333, 
9.1667, 15.8333 
6.6667, 16.6667, 28.3333, 
20, 28.3333 
H36 
5.83333, 8.3333, 17.5, 
35.8333, 32.5 
25, 28.3333, 21.6667, 12.5, 
12.5 
15, 20, 24.1667, 17.5, 
23.3333 
H37 5, 8.3333, 15, 31.6667, 40 26.6667, 30, 20, 15, 8.3333 
6.6667, 17.1667, 23.6667, 
28.3333, 24.1667 
H38 
7.5, 11.6667, 18.3333, 20, 
42.5 
25, 28.3333, 24.1667, 12.5, 
10 
8.3333, 26.6667, 30, 
18.3333, 16.6667 
H39 
8.3333, 8.3333, 20, 33.3333, 
30 
26.6667, 30, 20.8333, 12.5, 
10 
6.6667, 9.1667, 26.6667, 
31.6667, 25.8333 
H40 
1.6667, 5.8333, 15, 33.3333, 
44.1667 
23.3333, 25, 17.5, 19.1667, 
15 
6.6667, 17.5, 23.3333, 25, 
27.5 
H41 
3.3333, 6.6667, 11.6667, 30, 
48.3333 
6.6667, 25, 18.33333, 
18.3333, 31.6667 
8.3333, 20.8333, 20.8333, 
20.8333, 29.1667 
H42 
3.3333, 5.8333, 10.83333, 
26.6667, 53.3333 
10, 8.3333, 26.6667, 
21.6667, 33.3333 
5, 10, 27.8333, 25.3333, 
31.8333 
H43 
3.3333, 8.3333, 14.1667, 
20.8333, 53.3333 
16.6667, 26.6667, 25, 20, 
11.6667 
13.3333, 18.3333, 16.6667, 
23.3333, 28.3333 
H44 
3.3333, 3.3333, 8.3333, 
21.6667, 63.3333 
33.3333, 18.3333, 13.3333, 
10, 25 
14.1667, 15, 21.6667, 22.5, 
26.6667 
H45 
3.3333, 5, 11.6667, 33.3333, 
46.6667 
10, 35, 20.83333, 18.3333, 
15.83333 
8.3333, 10.8333, 21.6667, 
30, 29.1667 
Appendix 3.28: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Shipping Route E 
hazards (Equipment Failure)  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H46 
3.3333, 6.6667, 18.3333, 
29.1667, 42.5 
15, 21.6667, 22.5, 19.1667, 
21.6667 
6.6667, 13.3333, 33.3333, 
26.6667, 20 
H47 
3.3333, 8.3333, 20.83333, 
26.6667, 40.8333 
6.6667, 18.3333, 28.3333, 
21.6667, 25 
6.6667, 13.3333, 27.5, 
25.8333, 26.6667 
H48 
3.3333, 8.3333, 25, 25.8333, 
37.5 
8.3333, 16.6667, 25, 
21.6667, 28.3333 
10, 15, 38.3333, 23.3333, 
13.3333 
H49 
3.3333, 6.6667, 18.3333, 
29.1667, 42.5 
6.6667, 23.3333, 15.8333, 
14.1667, 40 
6.6667, 11.6667, 32.5, 27.5, 
21.6667 
H50 
5, 18.3333, 20, 25.8333, 
30.8333 
6.6667, 36.6667, 15, 15, 
26.6667 
6.6667, 20, 31.6667, 25, 
16.6667 
H51 
5, 9.1667, 13.3333, 36.6667, 
35.8333 
6.6667, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
18.3333, 23.3333 
7.5, 18.3333, 22.5, 29.1667, 
22.5 
H52 3.3333, 7.5, 15, 29.1667, 45 10, 25, 18.3333, 25, 21.6667 
6.6667, 11.6667, 21.6667, 
29.1667, 30.8333 
H53 
3.3333, 6.6667, 8.3333, 
19.1667, 62.5 
6.6667, 16.6667, 30, 
21.6667, 25 
6.6667, 13.3333, 16.6667, 
30.8333, 32.5 
H54 
3.3333, 8.3333, 18.3333, 25, 
45 
11.6667, 26.6667, 31.6667, 
15, 15 
8.3333, 19.1667, 25.8333, 
24.1667, 22.5 
H55 
3.3333, 8.3333, 16.6667, 
28.3333, 43.3333 
6.6667, 25, 30, 23.3333, 15 
15, 17.5, 25.8333, 18.3333, 
23.3333 
H56 
3.3333, 10, 20.83333, 
28.3333, 37.5 
10, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
16.6667, 21.6667 
8.3333, 18.3333, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 23.3333 
H57 5, 8.3333, 20, 29.1667, 37.5 
11.6667, 8.3333, 25, 
31.6667, 23.3333 
6.6667, 16.6667, 18.3333, 
28.3333, 30 
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H58 
5, 10, 16.6667, 44.1667, 
24.1667 
6.6667, 29.1667, 22.5, 25, 
16.6667 
4.1667, 19.1667, 20, 
30.8333, 25.8333 
H59 
3.3333, 6.6667, 21.6667, 35, 
33.3333 
15, 34.1667, 26.6667, 
14.1667, 10 
10.8333, 18.3333, 22.5, 
27.5, 20.83333 
H60 
10, 21.6667, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 18.3333 
11.6667, 20, 33.3333, 
18.3333, 16.6667 
8.3333, 23.3333, 31.6667, 
20, 16.6667 
H61 5, 8.3333, 20, 32.5, 34.1667 
8.3333, 27.5, 20.8333, 20, 
23.3333 
5, 12.5, 28.3333, 26.3333, 
27.83333 
Appendix 3.29: Prior Probability of L, C and P for Pipelines 
Transportation hazards  
  
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
Likelihood Consequences Probability 
H1 
3.3333, 5, 8.3333, 10.8333, 
72 
13.3333, 18.3333, 16.6667, 
20, 31.6667 
30, 7.6667, 17, 21.3333, 24 
H2 
4.1667, 10.8333, 15, 
20.8333, 49.1667 
6.6667, 10, 16.6667, 
23.3333, 43.3333 
18.3333, 10, 18.3333, 
23.3333, 30 
H3 
4.1667, 7.5, 10.8333, 
20.8333, 56.6667  
9.1667, 12.5, 14.1667, 
21.6667, 42.5 
21.6667, 15, 18.3333, 
18.3333, 26.6666 
H4 
1.8333, 2.8333, 3.8333, 
10,6667, 80.8333 
10,6667, 14.6667, 17, 
9.3333, 48.3333 
36.6667, 11, 12, 14.6667, 
25.6667 
H5 
3.3333, 6.6667, 14.1667, 
30, 45.8333 
6.6667, 10, 15, 23.3333, 45 
20, 20, 28.3333, 23.3333, 
8.3333 
H6 4.1667, 7.5, 10, 13.3333, 65 7.5, 12.5, 17.5, 22.5, 40 
18.3333, 15, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 16.6667 
H7 
6.6667, 10, 22.5, 28.3333, 
32.5 
5.8333, 9.1667, 13.3333, 
22.5, 49.1667 
11.6667, 16.6667, 31.6667, 
28.3333, 11.6667 
H8 
3.3333, 5.8333, 12.5, 
26.6667, 51.6667 
5.8333, 9.1667, 12.5, 
23.3333, 49.1667 
18.3333, 11.6667, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 20 
H9 
2.5, 5.8333, 10, 13.3333, 
68.3333 
3.3333, 8.3333, 15, 25, 
48.3333 
26.6667, 23.3333, 25, 
18.3333, 6.6667 
H10 
3.3333, 6.6667, 13.3333, 
23.3333, 53.3333 
6.6667, 8.3333, 15, 20, 50 
18.3333, 15, 26.6667, 
23.3333, 16.6667 
Appendix 3.30: Analysis of petroleum port A hazards by HUGIN software 
 Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
H1 MRHAA 0.0689 0.1478 0.2222 0.3111 0.2500 
H2 MRHAB 0.1222 0.1889 0.2667 0.2500 0.1722 
H3 MRHAC 0.1000 0.2222 0.3000 0.2500 0.1278 
H4 MRHBA 0.1389 0.2389 0.2556 0.2500 0.1167 
H5 MRHBB 0.1278 0.2056 0.2889 0.2833 0.0944 
H6 MRHBC 0.1056 0.1667 0.3278 0.2556 0.1444 
H7 MRHBD 0.1722 0.2000 0.2833 0.2278 0.1167 
H8 MRHCA 0.1222 0.1722 0.2833 0.2667 0.1556 
H9 MRHCB 0.1278 0.2111 0.2611 0.2778 0.1222 
H10 MRHCC 0.1556 0.1833 0.2944 0.2333 0.1333 
H11 MRHCD 0.1056 0.1222 0.2611 0.3278 0.1833 
H12 MRHCE 0.1000 0.1833 0.2722 0.3111 0.1333 
H13 MRHCFA 0.1389 0.1922 0.2500 0.2689 0.1500 
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H14 MRHCFB 0.1300 0.2444 0.2589 0.2444 0.1222 
H15 MRHCFC 0.1056 0.2000 0.2500 0.2778 0.1667 
H16 MRHDA 0.2633 0.2589 0.1722 0.1300 0.1756 
H17 MRHDB 0.2500 0.2611 0.1833 0.1389 0.1667 
H18 HRHAAA 0.1222 0.2333 0.2556 0.2611 0.1278 
H19 HRHAAB 0.1111 0.1889 0.2722 0.2944 0.1333 
H20 HRHAAC 0.1278 0.2111 0.2500 0.2611 0.1500 
H21 HRHAB 0.1056 0.1667 0.3278 0.2778 0.1222 
H22 HRHBAA 0.1611 0.2111 0.2556 0.2556 0.1167 
H23 HRHBAB 0.1667 0.1944 0.2333 0.2500 0.1556 
H24 HRHBAC 0.0944 0.1444 0.2556 0.2944 0.2111 
H25 HRHBAD 0.0778 0.1556 0.2722 0.2556 0.2389 
H26 HRHBBA 0.1667 0.2111 0.2722 0.2444 0.1056 
H27 HRHBBB 0.1500 0.1889 0.2278 0.3444 0.0889 
H28 HRHBBC 0.0844 0.1100 0.2889 0.3167 0.2000 
H29 HRHBBD 0.0556 0.0867 0.1778 0.3189 0.3611 
H30 HRHBBE 0.2111 0.2611 0.2444 0.1778 0.1056 
H31 HRHBBF 0.1389 0.2000 0.2444 0.2333 0.1833 
H32 HRHBBG 0.1500 0.2056 0.2000 0.2889 0.1556 
H33 HRHBBH 0.2667 0.2500 0.2222 0.1722 0.0889 
H34 HRHBBI 0.0944 0.1556 0.2833 0.2889 0.1778 
H35 NRHAA 0.1111 0.2333 0.2556 0.1667 0.2333 
H36 NRHAB 0.1111 0.2333 0.2778 0.1722 0.2056 
H37 NRHAC 0.0833 0.1889 0.1944 0.1389 0.3944 
H38 NRHBA 0.0611 0.1389 0.2333 0.2889 0.2778 
H39 NRHBB 0.1500 0.1444 0.1656 0.2178 0.3222 
H40 NRHBC 0.0500 0.1278 0.2722 0.3722 0.1778 
H41 NRHCA 0.1444 0.1222 0.2167 0.2722 0.2444 
H42 NRHCB 0.1667 0.1056 0.2000 0.2611 0.2667 
Appendix 3.31: Analysis of petroleum port C hazards by HUGIN software 
  Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
H1 MRHAA 0.0833 0.1333 0.2500 0.3000 0.2333 
H2 MRHAB 0.1222 0.1833 0.2722 0.2722 0.1500 
H3 MRHAC 0.1278 0.2167 0.2722 0.2389 0.1444 
H4 MRHBA 0.1167 0.1944 0.2778 0.2722 0.1389 
H5 MRHBB 0.1333 0.1722 0.3056 0.2556 0.1333 
H6 MRHBC 0.1056 0.1556 0.2667 0.2889 0.1833 
H7 MRHBD 0.1333 0.1833 0.2889 0.2556 0.1389 
H8 MRHCA 0.0667 0.1222 0.2389 0.3500 0.2222 
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H9 MRHCB 0.1333 0.2056 0.2444 0.2667 0.1500 
H10 MRHCC 0.1111 0.1667 0.2500 0.2778 0.1944 
H11 MRHCD 0.1111 0.1444 0.2778 0.2722 0.1944 
H12 MRHCE 0.1222 0.1889 0.3000 0.2611 0.1278 
H13 MRHCFA 0.1389 0.2167 0.2889 0.2556 0.1000 
H14 MRHCFB 0.1167 0.2278 0.2889 0.2444 0.1222 
H15 MRHCFC 0.1222 0.2167 0.3000 0.2500 0.1111 
H16 MRHDA 0.1833 0.2167 0.2000 0.1722 0.2278 
H17 MRHDB 0.1970 0.2082 0.1866 0.1758 0.2324 
H18 HRHAAA 0.1222 0.2000 0.2500 0.2778 0.1500 
H19 HRHAAB 0.1000 0.1722 0.2500 0.3222 0.1556 
H20 HRHAAC 0.1056 0.1667 0.2444 0.3278 0.1556 
H21 HRHAB 0.1111 0.1556 0.2778 0.2667 0.1889 
H22 HRHBAA 0.1389 0.1944 0.2667 0.2778 0.1222 
H23 HRHBAB 0.1226 0.1617 0.2525 0.2820 0.1812 
H24 HRHBAC 0.1111 0.1389 0.2444 0.3056 0.2000 
H25 HRHBAD 0.1000 0.1389 0.2833 0.2833 0.1944 
H26 HRHBBA 0.1389 0.1889 0.2722 0.3000 0.1000 
H27 HRHBBB 0.1389 0.1833 0.2500 0.3111 0.1167 
H28 HRHBBC 0.1111 0.1722 0.2778 0.3333 0.1056 
H29 HRHBBD 0.0889 0.1333 0.2444 0.3278 0.2056 
H30 HRHBBE 0.1944 0.2111 0.2556 0.2222 0.1167 
H31 HRHBBF 0.1167 0.1444 0.2778 0.2667 0.1944 
H32 HRHBBG 0.1556 0.1444 0.2278 0.3167 0.1556 
H33 HRHBBH 0.1944 0.2167 0.2556 0.2278 0.1056 
H34 HRHBBI 0.1232 0.1741 0.2975 0.2983 0.1069 
H35 NRHAA 0.0667 0.1722 0.2722 0.2667 0.2222 
H36 NRHAB 0.0500 0.1667 0.2333 0.2000 0.3500 
H37 NRHAC 0.0578 0.1700 0.2111 0.1889 0.3722 
H38 NRHBA 0.0556 0.1000 0.2222 0.2889 0.3333 
H39 NRHBB 0.1389 0.1000 0.1889 0.2167 0.3556 
H40 NRHBC 0.0667 0.0944 0.2444 0.3444 0.2500 
H41 NRHCA 0.1556 0.1111 0.1778 0.2000 0.3556 
H42 NRHCB 0.1444 0.1167 0.1722 0.2056 0.3611 
Appendix 3.32: Analysis of petroleum port D hazards by HUGIN software 
 Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
H1 MRHAA 0.0833 0.1500 0.2500 0.3111 0.2056 
H2 MRHAB 0.1167 0.1778 0.3000 0.2722 0.1333 
H3 MRHAC 0.1278 0.2111 0.2778 0.2722 0.1111 
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H4 MRHBA 0.1167 0.2111 0.2444 0.3056 0.1222 
H5 MRHBB 0.1278 0.2000 0.3000 0.2611 0.1111 
H6 MRHBC 0.1222 0.1500 0.3278 0.2778 0.1222 
H7 MRHBD 0.1167 0.1778 0.3056 0.2833 0.1167 
H8 MRHCA 0.1111 0.1722 0.2944 0.3000 0.1222 
H9 MRHCB 0.1333 0.2111 0.2667 0.2833 0.1056 
H10 MRHCC 0.1333 0.1611 0.2833 0.2889 0.1333 
H11 MRHCD 0.1056 0.1722 0.2833 0.3000 0.1389 
H12 MRHCE 0.1333 0.1667 0.2833 0.2944 0.1222 
H13 MRHCFA 0.1611 0.1944 0.2611 0.2889 0.0944 
H14 MRHCFB 0.1389 0.2389 0.2667 0.2444 0.1111 
H15 MRHCFC 0.1444 0.1889 0.2778 0.2667 0.1222 
H16 MRHDA 0.2578 0.2644 0.1722 0.1356 0.1700 
H17 MRHDB 0.2467 0.2589 0.1889 0.1389 0.1667 
H18 HRHAAA 0.1474 0.2187 0.2650 0.2460 0.1228 
H19 HRHAAB 0.1500 0.1722 0.2833 0.2722 0.1222 
H20 HRHAAC 0.1278 0.1889 0.2611 0.2722 0.1500 
H21 HRHAB 0.1278 0.1500 0.3222 0.2833 0.1167 
H22 HRHBAA 0.1556 0.1778 0.2889 0.2667 0.1111 
H23 HRHBAB 0.1130 0.1315 0.2370 0.2963 0.2222 
H24 HRHBAC 0.1056 0.1500 0.2333 0.2833 0.2278 
H25 HRHBAD 0.1000 0.1667 0.3000 0.2333 0.2000 
H26 HRHBBA 0.1833 0.2056 0.2722 0.2556 0.0833 
H27 HRHBBB 0.1556 0.2000 0.2444 0.3222 0.0778 
H28 HRHBBC 0.1000 0.1556 0.2833 0.3556 0.1056 
H29 HRHBBD 0.0444 0.0833 0.2389 0.3556 0.2778 
H30 HRHBBE 0.2389 0.2444 0.2333 0.1833 0.1000 
H31 HRHBBF 0.1167 0.1556 0.3389 0.2444 0.1444 
H32 HRHBBG 0.1556 0.1833 0.2000 0.3556 0.1056 
H33 HRHBBH 0.1778 0.2833 0.2556 0.2056 0.0778 
H34 HRHBBI 0.1111 0.1500 0.3056 0.2944 0.1389 
H35 NRHAA 0.0722 0.2500 0.2889 0.1667 0.2222 
H36 NRHAB 0.0389 0.2167 0.2722 0.1611 0.3111 
H37 NRHAC 0.0667 0.1056 0.1944 0.2444 0.3889 
H38 NRHBA 0.0667 0.1389 0.2411 0.3056 0.2478 
H39 NRHBB 0.2111 0.0944 0.1878 0.2178 0.2889 
H40 NRHBC 0.0611 0.1222 0.2833 0.4111 0.1222 
H41 NRHCA 0.2168 0.1057 0.1915 0.1802 0.3057 
H42 NRHCB 0.2168 0.1057 0.1915 0.1747 0.3113 
  
334 
Appendix 3.33: Analysis of Shipping Route A hazards by Hugin software 
Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
H1 0.0944 0.2083 0.2556 0.2361 0.2056 
H2 0.1111 0.1556 0.2167 0.2444 0.2722 
H3 0.1111 0.2056 0.2528 0.2056 0.2250 
H4 0.0889 0.1417 0.2583 0.3111 0.2000 
H5 0.1361 0.1611 0.1750 0.2194 0.3083 
H6 0.0944 0.2250 0.2917 0.2222 0.1667 
H7 0.1806 0.2167 0.1806 0.2028 0.2194 
H8 0.1333 0.2028 0.1806 0.2683 0.2150 
H9 0.1667 0.1556 0.2250 0.1878 0.2650 
H10 0.1667 0.2000 0.1861 0.2083 0.2389 
H11 0.1194 0.1333 0.2278 0.2722 0.2472 
H12 0.1139 0.1306 0.2361 0.2806 0.2389 
H13 0.1806 0.1778 0.1778 0.2750 0.1889 
H14 0.1583 0.1944 0.2806 0.2028 0.1639 
H15 0.0889 0.1639 0.3417 0.2667 0.1389 
H16 0.1639 0.1500 0.2000 0.2917 0.1944 
H17 0.1694 0.1333 0.2000 0.2139 0.2833 
H18 0.1333 0.1611 0.2556 0.2417 0.2083 
H19 0.0944 0.1333 0.2389 0.2583 0.2750 
H20 0.1167 0.1611 0.2778 0.2389 0.2056 
H21 0.1111 0.2000 0.2417 0.1944 0.2528 
H22 0.1056 0.1611 0.2611 0.2389 0.2333 
H23 0.1167 0.1472 0.1806 0.3167 0.2389 
H24 0.1194 0.1167 0.2583 0.2000 0.3056 
H25 0.1278 0.1000 0.2222 0.3056 0.2444 
H26 0.1583 0.1778 0.1889 0.2500 0.2250 
H27 0.1444 0.1278 0.1944 0.2611 0.2722 
H28 0.1444 0.1500 0.3000 0.2333 0.1722 
H29 0.1139 0.1472 0.2250 0.2722 0.2417 
H30 0.1333 0.1417 0.2611 0.1972 0.2667 
H31 0.1139 0.1528 0.2278 0.2139 0.2917 
H32 0.1139 0.1528 0.2694 0.2833 0.1806 
H33 0.1389 0.1417 0.1917 0.2778 0.2500 
H34 0.1194 0.1778 0.2250 0.2611 0.2167 
H35 0.1278 0.1850 0.1956 0.2500 0.2417 
H36 0.1528 0.1889 0.2111 0.2194 0.2278 
H37 0.1250 0.1833 0.2333 0.2194 0.2389 
H38 0.1361 0.2222 0.2417 0.1694 0.2306 
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H39 0.1306 0.1667 0.2167 0.2611 0.2250 
H40 0.0611 0.0806 0.2178 0.2456 0.3950 
H41 0.1056 0.1611 0.1861 0.2583 0.2889 
H42 0.0611 0.1750 0.1694 0.2306 0.3639 
H43 0.0722 0.1694 0.1806 0.2722 0.3056 
H44 0.1111 0.1667 0.1806 0.2167 0.3250 
H45 0.1667 0.1222 0.1444 0.1806 0.3861 
H46 0.0833 0.1389 0.2472 0.2500 0.2806 
H47 0.0556 0.1333 0.2556 0.2472 0.3083 
H48 0.0722 0.1333 0.2944 0.2361 0.2639 
H49 0.0556 0.1389 0.2222 0.2361 0.3472 
H50 0.0611 0.2500 0.2222 0.2194 0.2472 
H51 0.0639 0.1861 0.1972 0.2806 0.2722 
H52 0.0667 0.1472 0.1833 0.2778 0.3250 
H53 0.0556 0.1222 0.1833 0.2389 0.4000 
H54 0.0778 0.1806 0.2528 0.2139 0.2750 
H55 0.0833 0.1694 0.2417 0.2333 0.2722 
H56 0.0722 0.1889 0.2361 0.2278 0.2750 
H57 0.0778 0.1111 0.2111 0.2972 0.3028 
H58 0.1000 0.2167 0.3056 0.2056 0.1722 
H59 0.0611 0.1611 0.2306 0.2628 0.2844 
H60 0.0972 0.1972 0.2361 0.2556 0.2139 
H61 0.0528 0.1944 0.1972 0.3333 0.2222 
Appendix 3.34: Analysis of Shipping Route B hazards by Hugin software 
Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
H1 0.1806 0.2167 0.1806 0.2028 0.2194 
H2 0.1333 0.2028 0.1806 0.2683 0.2150 
H3 0.1667 0.1556 0.2250 0.1878 0.2650 
H4 0.1667 0.2278 0.2000 0.1778 0.2278 
H5 0.1194 0.1333 0.2278 0.2722 0.2472 
H6 0.1194 0.1306 0.2361 0.2750 0.2389 
H7 0.2000 0.1833 0.1750 0.2694 0.1722 
H8 0.1583 0.1944 0.2806 0.2028 0.1639 
H9 0.0889 0.1639 0.3417 0.2667 0.1389 
H10 0.1639 0.1500 0.2000 0.2917 0.1944 
H11 0.1694 0.1333 0.2000 0.2139 0.2833 
H12 0.1333 0.1611 0.2722 0.2361 0.1972 
H13 0.0944 0.1333 0.2389 0.2583 0.2750 
H14 0.1167 0.1611 0.2778 0.2389 0.2056 
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H15 0.1111 0.2000 0.2417 0.1944 0.2528 
H16 0.1056 0.1611 0.2611 0.2389 0.2333 
H17 0.1167 0.1472 0.1806 0.3167 0.2389 
H18 0.1194 0.1167 0.2583 0.2000 0.3056 
H19 0.1278 0.1056 0.2222 0.3056 0.2389 
H20 0.1583 0.1917 0.1861 0.2444 0.2194 
H21 0.1444 0.1278 0.1944 0.2611 0.2722 
H22 0.1444 0.1500 0.3000 0.2333 0.1722 
H23 0.1139 0.1472 0.2250 0.2722 0.2417 
H24 0.1333 0.1417 0.2611 0.1972 0.2667 
H25 0.1139 0.1528 0.2278 0.2139 0.2917 
H26 0.1222 0.1556 0.2722 0.2833 0.1667 
H27 0.1389 0.1444 0.1944 0.2778 0.2444 
H28 0.1194 0.1778 0.2250 0.2611 0.2167 
H29 0.0944 0.2111 0.2667 0.2444 0.1833 
H30 0.1111 0.1556 0.2167 0.2444 0.2722 
H31 0.1111 0.2056 0.2528 0.2056 0.2250 
H32 0.0889 0.1417 0.2583 0.3111 0.2000 
H33 0.1361 0.1611 0.1750 0.2194 0.3083 
H34 0.0944 0.2250 0.2917 0.2222 0.1667 
H35 0.1278 0.1850 0.1956 0.2500 0.2417 
H36 0.1528 0.1889 0.2111 0.2194 0.2278 
H37 0.1250 0.1833 0.2333 0.2194 0.2389 
H38 0.1361 0.2222 0.2417 0.1694 0.2306 
H39 0.1389 0.1583 0.2250 0.2583 0.2194 
H40 0.0611 0.0806 0.2178 0.2456 0.3950 
H41 0.1056 0.1611 0.1861 0.2583 0.2889 
H42 0.0611 0.1750 0.1694 0.2306 0.3639 
H43 0.0722 0.1694 0.1806 0.2722 0.3056 
H44 0.1111 0.1778 0.1861 0.2139 0.3111 
H45 0.1694 0.1222 0.1444 0.1806 0.3833 
H46 0.0833 0.1389 0.2472 0.2500 0.2806 
H47 0.0556 0.1333 0.2556 0.2472 0.3083 
H48 0.0722 0.1333 0.2944 0.2361 0.2639 
H49 0.0556 0.1389 0.2222 0.2361 0.3472 
H50 0.0611 0.2500 0.2222 0.2194 0.2472 
H51 0.0639 0.1861 0.1972 0.2806 0.2722 
H52 0.0667 0.1472 0.1833 0.2778 0.3250 
H53 0.0556 0.1222 0.1833 0.2389 0.4000 
H54 0.0778 0.1806 0.2528 0.2139 0.2750 
H55 0.0833 0.1694 0.2417 0.2333 0.2722 
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H56 0.0722 0.1889 0.2361 0.2278 0.2750 
H57 0.0778 0.1111 0.2111 0.2972 0.3028 
H58 0.1000 0.2167 0.3056 0.2056 0.1722 
H59 0.0611 0.1611 0.2306 0.2628 0.2844 
H60 0.0972 0.1972 0.2361 0.2556 0.2139 
H61 0.0528 0.1944 0.1972 0.3333 0.2222 
Appendix 3.35: Analysis of Shipping Route C hazards by Hugin software 
Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
H1 0.0944 0.2083 0.2556 0.2361 0.2056 
H2 0.1111 0.1556 0.2167 0.2444 0.2722 
H3 0.1111 0.2056 0.2528 0.2056 0.2250 
H4 0.0889 0.1417 0.2583 0.3111 0.2000 
H5 0.1361 0.1611 0.1750 0.2194 0.3083 
H6 0.0944 0.2250 0.2917 0.2222 0.1667 
H7 0.1806 0.2167 0.1806 0.2028 0.2194 
H8 0.1333 0.2028 0.1806 0.2683 0.2150 
H9 0.1667 0.1556 0.2250 0.1878 0.2650 
H10 0.1667 0.2000 0.1861 0.2083 0.2389 
H11 0.1194 0.1333 0.2278 0.2722 0.2472 
H12 0.1139 0.1306 0.2361 0.2806 0.2389 
H13 0.1806 0.1778 0.1778 0.2750 0.1889 
H14 0.1583 0.1944 0.2806 0.2028 0.1639 
H15 0.0889 0.1639 0.3417 0.2667 0.1389 
H16 0.1639 0.1500 0.2000 0.2917 0.1944 
H17 0.1694 0.1333 0.2000 0.2139 0.2833 
H18 0.1333 0.1611 0.2556 0.2417 0.2083 
H19 0.0944 0.1333 0.2389 0.2583 0.2750 
H20 0.1167 0.1611 0.2778 0.2389 0.2056 
H21 0.1111 0.2000 0.2417 0.1944 0.2528 
H22 0.1056 0.1611 0.2611 0.2389 0.2333 
H23 0.1167 0.1472 0.1806 0.3167 0.2389 
H24 0.1194 0.1167 0.2583 0.2000 0.3056 
H25 0.1278 0.1000 0.2222 0.3056 0.2444 
H26 0.1583 0.1778 0.1889 0.2500 0.2250 
H27 0.1444 0.1278 0.1944 0.2611 0.2722 
H28 0.1444 0.1500 0.3000 0.2333 0.1722 
H29 0.1139 0.1472 0.2250 0.2722 0.2417 
H30 0.1333 0.1417 0.2611 0.1972 0.2667 
H31 0.1139 0.1528 0.2278 0.2139 0.2917 
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H32 0.1139 0.1528 0.2694 0.2833 0.1806 
H33 0.1389 0.1417 0.1917 0.2778 0.2500 
H34 0.1194 0.1778 0.2250 0.2611 0.2167 
H35 0.1278 0.1850 0.1956 0.2500 0.2417 
H36 0.1528 0.1889 0.2111 0.2194 0.2278 
H37 0.1250 0.1833 0.2333 0.2194 0.2389 
H38 0.1361 0.2222 0.2417 0.1694 0.2306 
H39 0.1306 0.1667 0.2167 0.2611 0.2250 
H40 0.0611 0.0806 0.2178 0.2456 0.3950 
H41 0.1056 0.1611 0.1861 0.2583 0.2889 
H42 0.0611 0.1750 0.1694 0.2306 0.3639 
H43 0.0722 0.1694 0.1806 0.2722 0.3056 
H44 0.1111 0.1667 0.1806 0.2167 0.3250 
H45 0.1667 0.1222 0.1444 0.1806 0.3861 
H46 0.0833 0.1389 0.2472 0.2500 0.2806 
H47 0.0556 0.1333 0.2556 0.2472 0.3083 
H48 0.0722 0.1333 0.2944 0.2361 0.2639 
H49 0.0556 0.1389 0.2222 0.2361 0.3472 
H50 0.0611 0.2500 0.2222 0.2194 0.2472 
H51 0.0639 0.1861 0.1972 0.2806 0.2722 
H52 0.0667 0.1472 0.1833 0.2778 0.3250 
H53 0.0556 0.1222 0.1833 0.2389 0.4000 
H54 0.0778 0.1806 0.2528 0.2139 0.2750 
H55 0.0833 0.1694 0.2417 0.2333 0.2722 
H56 0.0722 0.1889 0.2361 0.2278 0.2750 
H57 0.0778 0.1111 0.2111 0.2972 0.3028 
H58 0.1000 0.2167 0.3056 0.2056 0.1722 
H59 0.0611 0.1611 0.2306 0.2628 0.2844 
H60 0.0972 0.1972 0.2361 0.2556 0.2139 
H61 0.0528 0.1944 0.1972 0.3333 0.2222 
Appendix 3.36: Analysis of Shipping Route D hazards by Hugin software 
Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
H1 0.1806 0.2167 0.1806 0.2028 0.2194 
H2 0.1333 0.2028 0.1806 0.2683 0.2150 
H3 0.1667 0.1556 0.2250 0.1878 0.2650 
H4 0.1667 0.2278 0.2000 0.1778 0.2278 
H5 0.1194 0.1333 0.2278 0.2722 0.2472 
H6 0.1194 0.1306 0.2361 0.2750 0.2389 
H7 0.2000 0.1833 0.1750 0.2694 0.1722 
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H8 0.1583 0.1944 0.2806 0.2028 0.1639 
H9 0.0889 0.1639 0.3417 0.2667 0.1389 
H10 0.1639 0.1500 0.2000 0.2917 0.1944 
H11 0.1694 0.1333 0.2000 0.2139 0.2833 
H12 0.1333 0.1611 0.2722 0.2361 0.1972 
H13 0.0944 0.1333 0.2389 0.2583 0.2750 
H14 0.1167 0.1611 0.2778 0.2389 0.2056 
H15 0.1111 0.2000 0.2417 0.1944 0.2528 
H16 0.1056 0.1611 0.2611 0.2389 0.2333 
H17 0.1167 0.1472 0.1806 0.3167 0.2389 
H18 0.1194 0.1167 0.2583 0.2000 0.3056 
H19 0.1278 0.1056 0.2222 0.3056 0.2389 
H20 0.1583 0.1917 0.1861 0.2444 0.2194 
H21 0.1444 0.1278 0.1944 0.2611 0.2722 
H22 0.1444 0.1500 0.3000 0.2333 0.1722 
H23 0.1139 0.1472 0.2250 0.2722 0.2417 
H24 0.1333 0.1417 0.2611 0.1972 0.2667 
H25 0.1139 0.1528 0.2278 0.2139 0.2917 
H26 0.1222 0.1556 0.2722 0.2833 0.1667 
H27 0.1389 0.1444 0.1944 0.2778 0.2444 
H28 0.1194 0.1778 0.2250 0.2611 0.2167 
H29 0.0944 0.2111 0.2667 0.2444 0.1833 
H30 0.1111 0.1556 0.2167 0.2444 0.2722 
H31 0.1111 0.2056 0.2528 0.2056 0.2250 
H32 0.0889 0.1417 0.2583 0.3111 0.2000 
H33 0.1361 0.1611 0.1750 0.2194 0.3083 
H34 0.0944 0.2250 0.2917 0.2222 0.1667 
H35 0.1278 0.1850 0.1956 0.2500 0.2417 
H36 0.1528 0.1889 0.2111 0.2194 0.2278 
H37 0.1250 0.1833 0.2333 0.2194 0.2389 
H38 0.1361 0.2222 0.2417 0.1694 0.2306 
H39 0.1389 0.1583 0.2250 0.2583 0.2194 
H40 0.0611 0.0806 0.2178 0.2456 0.3950 
H41 0.1056 0.1611 0.1861 0.2583 0.2889 
H42 0.0611 0.1750 0.1694 0.2306 0.3639 
H43 0.0722 0.1694 0.1806 0.2722 0.3056 
H44 0.1111 0.1778 0.1861 0.2139 0.3111 
H45 0.1694 0.1222 0.1444 0.1806 0.3833 
H46 0.0833 0.1389 0.2472 0.2500 0.2806 
H47 0.0556 0.1333 0.2556 0.2472 0.3083 
H48 0.0722 0.1333 0.2944 0.2361 0.2639 
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H49 0.0556 0.1389 0.2222 0.2361 0.3472 
H50 0.0611 0.2500 0.2222 0.2194 0.2472 
H51 0.0639 0.1861 0.1972 0.2806 0.2722 
H52 0.0667 0.1472 0.1833 0.2778 0.3250 
H53 0.0556 0.1222 0.1833 0.2389 0.4000 
H54 0.0778 0.1806 0.2528 0.2139 0.2750 
H55 0.0833 0.1694 0.2417 0.2333 0.2722 
H56 0.0722 0.1889 0.2361 0.2278 0.2750 
H57 0.0778 0.1111 0.2111 0.2972 0.3028 
H58 0.1000 0.2167 0.3056 0.2056 0.1722 
H59 0.0611 0.1611 0.2306 0.2628 0.2844 
H60 0.0972 0.1972 0.2361 0.2556 0.2139 
H61 0.0528 0.1944 0.1972 0.3333 0.2222 
Appendix 3.37: Analysis of Shipping Route E hazards by Hugin software 
Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
H1 0.0944 0.2111 0.2667 0.2444 0.1833 
H2 0.1111 0.1556 0.2167 0.2444 0.2722 
H3 0.1111 0.2056 0.2528 0.2056 0.2250 
H4 0.0889 0.1417 0.2583 0.3111 0.2000 
H5 0.1361 0.1611 0.1750 0.2194 0.3083 
H6 0.0944 0.2250 0.2917 0.2222 0.1667 
H7 0.1806 0.2167 0.1806 0.2028 0.2194 
H8 0.1333 0.2028 0.1806 0.2683 0.2150 
H9 0.1667 0.1556 0.2250 0.1878 0.2650 
H10 0.1667 0.2278 0.2000 0.1778 0.2278 
H11 0.1194 0.1333 0.2278 0.2722 0.2472 
H12 0.1194 0.1306 0.2361 0.2750 0.2389 
H13 0.2000 0.1833 0.1750 0.2694 0.1722 
H14 0.1583 0.1944 0.2806 0.2028 0.1639 
H15 0.0889 0.1639 0.3417 0.2667 0.1389 
H16 0.1639 0.1500 0.2000 0.2917 0.1944 
H17 0.1694 0.1333 0.2000 0.2139 0.2833 
H18 0.1333 0.1611 0.2722 0.2361 0.1972 
H19 0.0944 0.1333 0.2389 0.2583 0.2750 
H20 0.1167 0.1611 0.2778 0.2389 0.2056 
H21 0.1111 0.2000 0.2417 0.1944 0.2528 
H22 0.1056 0.1611 0.2611 0.2389 0.2333 
H23 0.1167 0.1472 0.1806 0.3167 0.2389 
H24 0.1194 0.1167 0.2583 0.2000 0.3056 
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H25 0.1278 0.1056 0.2222 0.3056 0.2389 
H26 0.1583 0.1917 0.1861 0.2444 0.2194 
H27 0.1444 0.1278 0.1944 0.2611 0.2722 
H28 0.1444 0.1500 0.3000 0.2333 0.1722 
H29 0.1139 0.1472 0.2250 0.2722 0.2417 
H30 0.1333 0.1417 0.2611 0.1972 0.2667 
H31 0.1139 0.1528 0.2278 0.2139 0.2917 
H32 0.1222 0.1556 0.2722 0.2833 0.1667 
H33 0.1389 0.1444 0.1944 0.2778 0.2444 
H34 0.1194 0.1778 0.2250 0.2611 0.2167 
H35 0.1278 0.1850 0.1956 0.2500 0.2417 
H36 0.1528 0.1889 0.2111 0.2194 0.2278 
H37 0.1250 0.1833 0.2333 0.2194 0.2389 
H38 0.1361 0.2222 0.2417 0.1694 0.2306 
H39 0.1389 0.1583 0.2250 0.2583 0.2194 
H40 0.0611 0.0806 0.2178 0.2456 0.3950 
H41 0.1056 0.1611 0.1861 0.2583 0.2889 
H42 0.0611 0.1750 0.1694 0.2306 0.3639 
H43 0.0722 0.1694 0.1806 0.2722 0.3056 
H44 0.1111 0.1778 0.1861 0.2139 0.3111 
H45 0.1694 0.1222 0.1444 0.1806 0.3833 
H46 0.0833 0.1389 0.2472 0.2500 0.2806 
H47 0.0556 0.1333 0.2556 0.2472 0.3083 
H48 0.0722 0.1333 0.2944 0.2361 0.2639 
H49 0.0556 0.1389 0.2222 0.2361 0.3472 
H50 0.0611 0.2500 0.2222 0.2194 0.2472 
H51 0.0639 0.1861 0.1972 0.2806 0.2722 
H52 0.0667 0.1472 0.1833 0.2778 0.3250 
H53 0.0556 0.1222 0.1833 0.2389 0.4000 
H54 0.0778 0.1806 0.2528 0.2139 0.2750 
H55 0.0833 0.1694 0.2417 0.2333 0.2722 
H56 0.0722 0.1889 0.2361 0.2278 0.2750 
H57 0.0778 0.1111 0.2111 0.2972 0.3028 
H58 0.1000 0.2167 0.3056 0.2056 0.1722 
H59 0.0611 0.1611 0.2306 0.2628 0.2844 
H60 0.0972 0.1972 0.2361 0.2556 0.2139 
H61 0.0528 0.1944 0.1972 0.3333 0.2222 
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Appendix 3.38: Analysis of Pipelines hazards by Hugin software 
Hs 
Degree of Belief (VH, H, M, L, VL) 
VH H M L VL 
H1 0.1600 0.1067 0.1478 0.1833 0.4022 
H2 0.1000 0.1056 0.1722 0.2278 0.3944 
H3 0.1167 0.1167 0.1500 0.1889 0.4278 
H4 0.1656 0.0956 0.1089 0.1333 0.4967 
H5 0.1000 0.1222 0.1889 0.2333 0.3556 
H6 0.1056 0.1167 0.1722 0.1944 0.4111 
H7 0.0778 0.1167 0.2333 0.2556 0.3167 
H8 0.0889 0.0833 0.1667 0.2556 0.4056 
H9 0.1056 0.1222 0.1667 0.1889 0.4167 
H10 0.0944 0.1000 0.1889 0.2444 0.3722 
Appendix 3.39: Weight of Ship Transportation Main Criteria 
 Weight 
H1 0.1950 
H2 0.8050 
H3 0.6217 
H4 0.3783 
H5 0.6591 
H6 0.3409 
H7 0.6025 
H8 0.3975 
H9 0.2701 
H10 0.7299 
H11 0.5273 
H12 0.2277 
H13 0.2450 
H14 0.3727 
H15 0.6273 
H16 0.7017 
H17 0.2983 
Appendix 3.40: Weight of pipeline transportation Hazards Criteria 
 Weight 
H1 0.2124 
H2 0.1985 
H3 0.2221 
H4 0.2047 
H5 0.2047 
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Appendix 3.41: Weight of Hull failure Criteria 
 Weight 
H1 0.3977 
H2 0.3578 
H3 0.2446 
H4 0.3391 
H5 0.4033 
H6 0.2577 
H7 0.3211 
H8 0.6789 
Appendix 3.42: Weight of Collision Criteria  
 Weight 
H1 0.4320 
H2 0.2535 
H3 0.3145 
H4 0.2922 
H5 0.1688 
H6 0.1971 
H7 0.3418 
H8 0.3581 
H9 0.2478 
H10 0.1902 
H11 0.2038 
H12 0.2421 
H13 0.7579 
H14 0.4142 
H15 0.5858 
H16 0.4820 
H17 0.5180 
H18 0.7006 
H19 0.2994 
Appendix 3.43: Weight of Grounding Criteria 
 Weight 
H1 0.3593 
H2 0.2529 
H3 0.3878 
H4 0.2866 
H5 0.1306 
H6 0.1776 
H7 0.1933 
H8 0.2119 
H9 0.2902 
H10 0.2639 
H11 0.2181 
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H12 0.2278 
H13 0.2636 
H14 0.2888 
H15 0.4476 
H16 0.6101 
H17 0.3899 
H18 0.5253 
H19 0.4747 
H20 0.7882 
H21 0.2118 
Appendix 3.44: Weight of Fire/explosion Criteria 
 Weight 
H1 0.3170 
H2 0.4683 
H3 0.2146 
H4 0.2528 
H5 0.2244 
H6 0.2110 
H7 0.1582 
H8 0.1537 
H9 0.2515 
H10 0.3843 
H11 0.3643 
H12 0.2252 
H13 0.7748 
H14 0.8333 
H15 0.1667 
Appendix 3.45: Weight of Equipment failure Criteria  
 Weight 
H1 0.1066 
H2 0.1402 
H3 0.1496 
H4 0.1027 
H5 0.1507 
H6 0.1314 
H7 0.1094 
H8 0.1093 
H9 0.4430 
H10 0.5570 
H11 0.2695 
H12 0.7305 
H13 0.3333 
H14 0.1667 
H15 0.3333 
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H16 0.1667 
H17 0.3333 
H18 0.6667 
H19 0.3899 
H20 0.6101 
H21 0.4142 
H22 0.5858 
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Questionnaire used for the purpose of Chapter 6 
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Dear Sir, 
 
My name is Ayman Fahad Alghanmi and I am a PhD student from Liverpool John 
Moores University. For my research project I am mitigating the hazard (i.e. human 
procedural failure during ship/port interference) that influence on the port operation 
which lead to crude oil spill. The results of this study will be used to eliminating and/or 
mitigating the operational risk of human procedural failure during ship/port interference 
(i.e. loading/unloading operation). Because you are an expert, I am inviting you to 
participate in this research study by completing this survey.  
The following questionnaire will takes a maximum of 20 minutes of your time. There 
is no compensation for responding nor is there any risk. In order to ensure that all 
information will remain confidential, please do not include your name. If you choose 
to participate in this project, please answer all questions as honestly as possible. Your 
participation in this project is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw from the study 
at any time.  
 
 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Ayman Fahad Alghanmi 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Tel: 074 7720 0174  
E-mail: A.F.Alghanmi@2013.ljmu.ac.uk 
School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Byrom Street 
L3 3AF UK 
 
Phone : 0044 0151 231 2028 
Fax : 0044 0151 298 2624 
Email 
Date 
: A.F.Alghanmi@2013.ljmu.ac.uk 
:  
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SECTION 1: PERSONAL DETAILS 
- Please mark the appropriate answer for each question: 
1. Please mark your age range: 
A. Less than 30 years old 
B. Between 30 and 40 years old 
C. 40 years old or more 
2. Please mark your appropriate qualification: 
A. Diploma 
B. BSc 
C. MSc 
D. PhD 
3. Please mark your work experiences: 
A. Work experience 1-5 Years 
B. Work experience 6-10 Years  
C. Work experience 11-15 Years 
D. Work experience 16-20 Years 
E. Work experience over 20 Years 
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SECTION 2: INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the research is to develop a novel safety assessment methodology for 
estimating, controlling and monitoring the operational risks. To achieve the aim of this 
study the most important factors that influences on mitigating the hazard (i.e. human 
procedural failure during ship/port interference) should be identify. Therefore, the 
criteria, and solutions (alternatives) listed in Table 1 are the parameters that need to be 
evaluated. 
Level number Criteria/ Alternatives Explanation 
Level 1 (Criteria) Operating Safety 
 
Safety level that offered 
by applying any of 
the Alternatives 
Operating Costs Cost of applying any of 
the Alternatives (e.g. 
Labour cost, Training 
cost, Maintenance cost, 
Equipment cost) 
Operating Time Time takes for operation 
after applying any of 
the Alternatives 
Operating Quality Quality of operation from 
applying any of 
the Alternatives 
Level 2 (Alternatives) 
Hiring qualified labour 
Raising the minimum 
qualifications a new 
employee is required to 
have before being hired 
Hiring highly qualified 
labour  
Hiring only specialists 
who are competent and 
have over 7 years’ 
experience and multiple 
certifications  
Labour training 
programme  
Implementing training 
programmes that new and 
current workers are 
required to take to 
improve their knowledge, 
skills and experience 
Enhancing work force 
capacity  
Increasing the number of 
workers involved in the 
operation 
Requiring 
Loading/discharging 
terminal supervision 
officer  
Posting an operator (port 
representative) from the 
port side to represent the 
port on the ship during 
ship-board operations to 
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ensure the safety of the 
loading and unloading 
operation 
Intensive regulation for 
safety and security checks  
Requiring an intensive 
checklist before, during, 
and after the operating 
process to ensure the 
safety of the loading and 
unloading operation 
Apply new equipment  
Renewing the equipment 
(Loading Arm/SBM) 
involved in the 
loading/unloading process 
Regulate an intensive 
maintenance program  
Implementing an intensive 
maintenance plan to 
ensure the safety and 
quality operation of the 
equipment  
Requiring visual 
operating signs  
Implementing visual 
guides in to assist the 
workers during the 
operation process 
Table 1: The list of criteria and alternatives that influences on the mitigating the 
hazard 
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SECTION 3: QUESTIONNAIRE  
Part 1 Goal: Select the best alternative that eliminate and/or mitigate the hazard of 
human procedural during ship/port interference (i.e. loading/unloading operation). 
What would be the operating safety  in order to apply the following alternatives? 
 0 
Low 
1 2 3 4 
5 
Medium 
6 7 8 9 
10 
High 
Hiring highly 
qualified employee 
    
      
 
Hiring qualified 
employee 
    
      
 
Regulating training 
programmes for 
employee 
    
      
 
Increase the number 
of employees that 
participate during the 
operation process 
    
      
 
An operator from the 
port side represent the 
port on ship and 
involve during the 
operation on ship side 
for insuring the safety 
of the operation 
process. 
    
      
 
Regulating intensive 
safety and security 
checks before, while 
and after the operation 
    
      
 
Regulating intensive 
maintenance 
programme 
    
      
 
Renew the operating 
equipment (Loading 
Arm/SBM) 
    
      
 
Requiring visual 
operating signs 
    
      
 
 
 
